The Demographics of Overconfidence

As is well-known, investors are subject to overconfidence. Using a survey of about 2,000 defined contribution pension plan members, we not only corroborate this, but also explore the demographics of this behavioral flaw. Noting that overconfidence can be partitioned into certainty and knowledge, we find that highly-educated males who are nearing retirement, who have received investment advice, and who have experience investing for themselves, tend to have a higher certainty level. For some groups knowledge matches certainty. Because highly-educated males do not have higher levels of knowledge we conclude that they are more subject to overconfidence.     

Retirements at risk: employees lack a comprehensive, realistic view of resources and needs

Employees who are following conventional retirement-planning advice will be in for a rude awakening as they approach retirement and discover that they can't afford to retire just yet or are likely to outlive their retirement funds. The article discusses how we have arrived at this point, what the implications are, and what both employers and employees can do to remedy the situation.     

Pension profile preferences: the influence of trust and expected expenses

This paper studies the influence of people’s expectations about expenses during retirement and trust in pension funds on preferences for different pension arrangements. Although most workers prefer a flat-rate annuity, many workers want to deviate from it. The most popular option is a high/low, annuity-based profile, followed by a partial lump sum payment. Workers who expect declining expenses during retirement are more likely to opt for a high/low annuity-based pension and/or a lump sum payment at retirement. Furthermore, workers and pensioners who do not trust their pension fund are more likely to prefer a lump sum over annuity-based arrangements.     

Potential Underdog Bias,Overconfidence and Risk Propensity in Investor Decision-Making Behavior

Abstract

In this study we investigate whether investors are prone to take risks, both in terms of how they rate their risk propensity and their behavior in choosing between options with different risk levels, and whether they display overconfidence and underdog bias. We also investigate the relationships among underdog bias, overconfidence and risk propensity. The results indicate overconfidence levels similar to that in other populations and do not reveal underdog bias or high levels of risk propensity. We found support for a negative predictive relationship between underdog bias and overconfidence.     

Rational expectations,difference of opinions and asset pricing

This article applies the concept of relative overconfidence (the measure of how heavily investors depend on others’ information) to combine the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) and difference of opinions (DO) models. And we discuss the effects of relative overconfidence on asset price efficiency and trading volume. We find that when investors hold assets to maturity, relative overconfidence has no effect on price efficiency and trading volume; however, when investors speculate, relative overconfidence reduces price informativeness and trading volume, because investors will reckon asset prices as more noisy and find it meaningless to speculate on capital gains based on their private information. Our results highlight the role of speculation in differentiating REE and DO models and influencing the effects of overconfidence.     

An experimental study of the impact of competition for Other People’s Money: the portfolio manager market

In this paper we experimentally investigate the impact that competing for funds has on the risk-taking behavior of laboratory portfolio managers compensated through an option-like scheme according to which the manager receives (most of) the compensation only for returns in excess of pre-specified strike price. We find that such a competitive environment and contractual arrangement lead, both in theory and in the lab, to inefficient risk taking behavior on the part of portfolio managers. We then study various policy interventions, obtained by manipulating various aspects of the competitive environment and the contractual arrangement, e.g., the Transparency of the contracts offered, the Risk Sharing component in the contract linking portfolio managers to investors, etc. While all these interventions would induce portfolio managers, at equilibrium, to efficiently invest funds in safe assets, we find that, in the lab, Transparency is most effective in incentivising managers to do so. Finally, we document a behavioral “Other People’s Money” effect in the lab, where portfolio managers tend to invest the funds of their investors in a more risky manner than their Own Money, even when it is not in either the investors’ or the managers’ interest to do so.     

Development of Scale to Measure Objectives-Oriented Investment Behavior

Abstract

While planning for personal finances, researchers recommend investors adapting systematically planned investment behaviors that align investments with their financial objectives; however, they fail to provide a scale for the measurement of such behaviors. Therefore, this study develops a scale, conducts exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, and provides evidence of the reliability of the scale measuring objectives-oriented investment behaviors. Examining a cross-sectional data of 448 investors collected through the new scale, the study finds that a majority of the investors’ do not follow objectives-oriented behavior. The results inform that the selection of investment avenues and allocation of funds were not aligned with investors’ financial objectives.     

自我归因偏差、学习与股民的过度自信

本文利用中国股民交易记录数据考察了自我归因偏差带来的反馈效应和投资经验带来的学习效应对股民的过度自信的影响。研究发现，股民的历史投资收益对其过度交易存在正向影响，即股民历史投资收益越高，则过度交易程度就越大。这表明良好的历史投资收益会通过自我归因偏差心理加剧投资者过度自信程度。而在控制了历史投资表现之后，笔者发现股民的投资经验对其过度交易的影响并不显著。过度交易或者过度自信并没有随着股民投资经验的积累而得到减弱。     

Changes in subjective well-being with retirement: assessing savings adequacy

Does retirement represent a state of relative prosperity or unanticipated hardship? To assess whether individuals are successful in smoothing their well-being across the transition to retirement we analyse measures of subjective well-being (SWB) in the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey. Specifically, this research examines retirees’ current standard of living, financial security and overall happiness relative to their pre-retirement levels. It is found SWB either improves or remains constant for the large majority of individuals as they retire from the labour force. However, there are significant disparities in changes in well-being with retirement among the group of retirees. In particular, the subset of individuals who are forced to retire early due to job loss or their own health, and who find their income in retirement to be much less than expected, report marked declines in their SWB with retirement.     

The Effect of Word-of-Mouth Communication on Stock Holdings and Trades: Empirical Evidence From an Emerging Market

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between investors’ satisfaction and intention and word-of-mouth communication. This study contributes to the ongoing debate on the relationship between investor behavior and word-of-mouth communication. Many studies are related to investors’ participation and individual investors’ asset allocation decisions that are instigated by their social community via word-of-mouth communication whereas this study directly investigates the relationship between investment satisfaction and intention and word-of-mouth communication. We emphasize how many factors are considered when making satisfactory investment decisions. Our results confirm the strong relationship between the satisfaction and intention of investors and word-of-mouth communication. This finding may be useful to regulators, investors and managers who seek to establish effective rules for stock holdings and trade.     

Are lifecycle funds appropriate as default options in participant-directed retirement plans?

Since the enactment of Pension Protection Act of 2006, lifecycle funds that reduce exposure to stocks with age have rapidly replaced money market funds as the most commonly nominated default investment options for participant-directed retirement plans. We examine their appropriateness in meeting a threshold level of retirement wealth required by plan participants. Using a utility function motivated by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), we show that whilst lifecycle funds are vastly superior to money market funds (except for very low thresholds), they rank below balanced funds that maintain constant exposure to equities over time. As thresholds increase, lifecycle funds are also dominated by funds that switch assets conditional to prior investment performance. Even in the absence of a minimum threshold wealth level, lifecycle funds do not emerge as the most preferred choice among the investment options considered by our paper.     

Do mutual fund flows affect the French corporate bond market?

We study whether investors’ withdrawals from mutual funds affect corporate bond prices. As mutual funds have become major players in the financial markets, they are likely to exert downward pressures on asset prices when facing investors’ redemptions, particularly in the less liquid markets such as corporate bonds. We use a novel dataset on the French bond funds and show that both flows in and out of mutual funds lead to a significant effect on the corporate bond yields. This effect is asymmetric as redemptions provoke a change in yields of greater magnitude than inflows. Moreover, all corporate bonds are not equally affected by investors’ withdrawals from funds: The more a bond is detained by funds, the higher the impact of redemptions on its yield. These three results are robust to various changes in econometric specifications.     

过度自信、有限参与和资产价格泡沫

当存在模型不确定性且有限市场参与内生时,过度自信的投资者和理性投资者参与股票市场的程度有着不同的行为模式。本文给出的模型分析了两种投资者在不同情况下对股票市场的参与情况,借此解释有限市场参与、超额进入和资产定价之间的关系。模型在流动性溢价、投资者结构和风险溢价的关系等方面具有明显的实证含义。模型表明,理性投资者有更大的投资区域,但是非理性投资者在其投资区域内更为激进。进而,在不同情形下,模型给出了资产均衡价格与投资者结构之间对应关系。     

Under- versus overconfidence: an experiment on how others perceive a biased self-assessment

This paper reports findings of a laboratory experiment, which explores how reported self-assessment regarding the own relative performance is perceived by others. In particular, I investigate whether overconfident or underconfident subjects are considered as more likeable, and who of the two is expected to win in a tournament, thereby controlling for performance. Underconfidence beats overconfidence in both respects. Underconfident subjects are rewarded significantly more often than overconfident subjects, and are significantly more often expected to win. Subjects being less convinced of their performance are taken as more congenial and are expected to be more ambitious to improve, whereas overconfident subjects are rather expected to rest on their high beliefs. While subjects do not anticipate the stronger performance signal of underconfidence, they anticipate its higher sympathy value. The comparison to a non-strategic setting shows that men strategically deflate their self-assessment to be rewarded by others. Women, in contrast, either do not deflate their self-assessment or do so even in non-strategic situations, a behavior that might be driven by non-monetary image concerns of women.     

Rating Agencies – An Experimental Analysis of Their Remuneration Model

Does it matter who pays for ratings? Yes, but not for the rating agencies’ behavior. These are the findings of our experiment where we analyze the effect of the remuneration model of rating agencies on their assessments as well as on investors’ and issuers’ behavior. First, we find that rating agencies’ assessments are comparable whether the agency is (partially) paid by issuers, investors or solely by the experimenter. Issuers, on the other hand, more often do not return investor's trust when they or investors pay for ratings. Further, investors more often act according to the agencies’ recommendations when they have to pay for this information.     

Hedge fund activism and corporate innovation

This paper investigates the impact of hedge fund activism on corporate innovating activities. It finds that innovative firms are as likely to be targeted by activist hedge funds as non-innovative firms. Activist hedge funds tend to target innovative firms with low innovation efficiency. Hedge fund interventions are associated with significant improvements in innovation output in both highly competitive and less competitive industries. The improvement is more pronounced in active intervention events. Our results suggest that activist hedge funds are not myopic investors and their interventions enhance innovative activities that benefit innovative firms’ long-term performance.     

COGNITIVE SKILLS AND CONFIDENCE: INTERRELATIONS WITH OVERESTIMATION,OVERPLACEMENT AND OVERPRECISION

This experimental study measures the three major types of judgmental overconfidence in a within‐subjects design. Performance‐based overestimation and overplacement are elicited in a Raven Progressive Matrices test for general intelligence. Calibration‐based overprecision is evaluated in a forecasting by confidence intervals task. This study takes a closer look at the interrelations of these different types. Moreover, as the main focus, it considers the effect of cognitive abilities on overconfidence. These are quantified in a cognitive reflection test. I find that cognitive skills are substantially interrelated with subjects’ confidence levels. Although overconfidence in absolute terms (overestimation) is not affected by cognitive abilities, the effect on overconfidence in relative terms (overplacement) is positive and significant. Overprecision, the calibration‐based type of overconfidence, is found to be significantly affected by cognitive capacity as well. Interval forecasts of cognitively more able subjects were much better calibrated than those of their peers who displayed substantial overconfidence in the precision of their forecasts.     

WHY HAVE U.S. HOUSEHOLDS INCREASINGLY RELIED ON MUTUAL FUNDS TO OWN EQUITY?

U.S. households have increasingly used mutual funds to own equity outside of retirement accounts owing to two developments. The first is a decline in equity mutual fund loads, which are negatively correlated with stock ownership rates, which have doubled owing to greater ownership through mutual funds. The second is improved confidence in future family finances. Both effects are consistent with recent models of equity participation, in which lower asset transfer costs and lower income risk induce equity investing by middle‐income households, who—in practice and owing to diversification considerations—are more likely to indirectly hold stocks through mutual funds.     

Contingent convertible bonds: Who invests in European CoCos?

Using a comprehensive data set on issuances and holdings of contingent convertible debt instruments (CoCos) issued by European banks, we investigate who invests in European CoCos. The results indicate that most European CoCos are not directly held by euro area investors. Foreign investors outside the euro area and investment funds located in Ireland and Luxembourg hold the large majority. Euro area banks, insurers and pension funds only have very limited direct exposures. Households in the euro area hold almost no direct positions in European CoCos, although there could be indirect holdings through non-euro area entities and euro area investment funds. Concerns for contagion through cross-holdings of CoCos by banks seem to be unwarranted.     

Herding in delegated portfolio management: When is comparative performance information desirable?

We address the issue of investors’ asset allocation decisions when portfolio management is delegated to an agent. Contrary to predictions from traditional financial theory, it is shown that investors may not induce their manager to allocate funds to the asset with the highest return. Instead they may herd in their asset allocation decision and induce trade in a particular asset, because another manager is trading in it and despite the presence of a more profitable alternative. Doing so allows investors to write an efficiency-improving relative-performance contract. On the other hand, herding leads investors to design wage contracts strategically, resulting in more aggressive and thus less profitable trade in equilibrium. We show that herding occurs, when the cost of information is high, information precision is low and when managers are sufficiently risk averse. Moreover, when investors can decide whether or not to disclose information about their manager's performance, they will not do so.