Tariff Rate as a Public Good

If domestic firms lobby for protection, the tariff rate is a public good to all domestic firms, whether they engage in lobbying or not. This paper analyzes how the endogenous tariff rate as a public good depends on the group size in two‐stage lobbying models. The result depends not only on whether domestic firms lobby cooperatively or not, but also on whether domestic firms incur indirect lobbying costs or not. This paper shows that if free riding is not very serious and if the number of domestic firms is small compared to the number of foreign firms, entry of a domestic firm is likely to increase the equilibrium tariff rate.     

Protectionist Lobbying and Strategic Investment

Why are some uncompetitive industry sectors so effective in lobbying for greater protection and support? This paper attempts to explain the lobbying success of these industries in terms of the strategic role of investment in technology as a credible commitment device. By eschewing potentially profitable investment opportunities firms credibly signal to the government that the cost of a tariff reduction will be substantial. This enables the firms to lobby more effectively for policy concessions. Political considerations may therefore provide a significant incentive for firms to reject investment in newer technologies, even when these lower production costs.     

THE NUMBER OF FIRMS AND THE POLITICS OF STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY

Incorporating home firms' lobbying in a country into a third market model of oligopoly, this paper studies how such lobbying affects the government's strategic export policy scheme. We pay special attention to the home firms' lobby formation and its effect on domestic welfare. The home firms can organize a lobby more easily when the number of their rival foreign firms is larger than that of them, and/or when the government is overly concerned with political contribution relative to domestic welfare. The strategic export policy under lobbying cannot improve the domestic welfare, which depends on the number of firms, the government's concern about political donation and the level of socially wasted lobbying costs.     

Regulating away competition: the effect of regulation on entrepreneurship and employment

Many scholars have worried that regulation deters entrepreneurship because it increases the cost of entry, reduces innovation in the regulated industry, and benefits large firms because they can overcome the costs of complying with regulations more easily than smaller firms. Using novel data on the extent of US federal regulations by industry and data on firm births and employment from the Statistics of US Businesses, we run fixed effects regressions to show that more-regulated industries experienced fewer new firm births and slower employment growth in the period 1998–2011. Large firms may even successfully lobby government officials to increase regulations to raise their smaller rivals’ costs. We also find that regulations inhibit employment growth in all firms and that large firms are less likely to exit a heavily regulated industry than small firms.     

Dissertation abstract: The experimental analysis of the political economics of fisheries governance

This dissertation focuses on the political economy of fisheries governance. The study develops a formal model of fisheries governance by combining the features of the common pool fishery and the political institution of lobbying; designs a laboratory fishery governance institution and conducts economic experiments to test the hypotheses derived from the formal model. Specifically, the study analyzes how fishing firms invest in efforts to influence fishery regulation and management through voluntary contribution lobbying. The study also analyses and compares contribution and effort behavior in the lobbying and the CPR using data from economic experiments. The results indicate that lobbying to change suboptimal fishery regulations was significantly below the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction and contributions to raise the cap were significantly different than contributions to lower the cap toward the social optimum. Study results show that subjects successfully lobbied to raise inefficiently low fishing quotas, but were unable to lobby to reduce inefficiently high fishing quotas. Detailed analysis of subjects’ contribution and effort behavior suggest that despite the interesting benefit-cost duality between pure public goods and CPRs, the pattern of cooperative behavior in these two social dilemma situations was different and the level of cooperation in the voluntary contribution lobbying experiment was lower than those reported in other public goods experiments. To provide external validity to these experimental findings, the study further analyzes and compares lobbying expenditures in the fishery sector with those in other natural resource industries using field data from the United States. A comparison of actual lobbying expenditures as percentage of valued added shows that lobbying effort in the U.S fishery sector is not significantly different than those in other natural resource industries such as mining and electric utility industries, but the pattern of lobbying is different. Whereas fishing firms lobby through associations or pressure groups, firms in other natural resource industries lobby unilaterally. This observation suggests that differences in industrial structure and incentives influence the pattern of lobbying and the lobbying behavior of firms across industries. The theoretical predictions derived from the formal model of fisheries governance are consistent with our experimental findings and with the field data on lobbying in the US fisheries sector. These findings suggest that heterogeneity drives rent-seeking activities in the US fisheries sector and that fishing firms attempt to circumvent political collective action problems by forming and lobbying through associations of stakeholders with relatively homogenous policy preferences. JEL Classification D22, D72, D78, H41 Advisor: Prof. Jon G. Sutinen     

Endogenous market regulation in a signaling model of lobby formation

This paper aims at explaining industry protection in a context in which the government cannot observe the state of market demand. We develop an asymmetric information model and use the tools of contract theory in order to understand (1) how the level of industry protection is endogenously determined, and (2) why some industries decide to engage in large lobbying costs to become politically active. Our model offers plausible explanations to phenomena such as the “loser’s paradox”, where weak industries receive the most protection although strong industries are the ones that spend more resources on lobbying activities. The model also allows for an analysis of the influence that lobbying costs have on the decision to organize actively as a lobby.     

INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOBILITY AND TRADE POLITICS: CAPITAL FLOWS, POLITICAL COALITIONS, AND LOBBYING

Conventional wisdom holds that increasing international capital mobility reduces incentives for firms to lobby for trade protection. This paper argues that the effects of increased international capital mobility on the lobbying incentives of firms depend critically upon levels of inter-industry mobility. General-equilibrium analysis reveals that if capital is highly industry-specific, greater international mobility among some types of specific capital may increase lobbying incentives for owners of other specific factors and thereby intensify industry-based rent-seeking in trade politics. Evidence on levels of inward and outward investment in US manufacturing industries between 1982 and 1996, and on industry lobbying activities, indicate that these effects may be quite strong.     

Collective vs. individual lobbying

This paper presents a menu-auction model in which firms lobby the government to make an environmental regulation less burdensome. In this lobbying game, industrial interests are opposed by an environmental interest group. We compare political outcomes under two institutional arrangements. In the first, firms must join an organization that represents the interests of the industry. In the second, firms would lobby the government individually. The two arrangements result in strikingly different equilibrium outcomes. Only a small fraction of firms join the lobby group under collective lobbying, but all firms participate in lobbying activities when there is no such group. Thus, an attempt by firms to solve the apparent collective action problem through coordination would effectively backfire. The reason is that coordination among firms would increase the leverage available to the government, to demand high political contributions. We also evaluate the desirability of the two lobbying regimes from the private perspective of individual firms, and from the perspective of society as a whole. This permits us to evaluate possible restrictions on lobbying activities.     

Influence in Decline: Lobbying in Contracting Industries

Recent empirical work suggests that declining industries lobby more successfully for policy concessions than do growing industries. This paper presents a novel and simple explanation for this phenomenon. It is shown that an industry in decline is constrained in its ability to raise revenue through production and therefore has a greater incentive to protect profits by lobbying for more favourable treatment. However, greater lobbying only translates into policy concessions if government policy is sufficiently responsive to lobby group contributions. The paper further explores the circumstances under which such government behaviour is likely to eventuate. We show that a self-interested government will always be more receptive to the demands of lobbyists in declining industries.     

Entry,market turbulence and industry employment growth

This paper investigates the relationship between industrial dynamics in terms of firm entry, market turbulence and employment growth. Do entry of firms, the composition of industry dynamics (net entry) and market turbulence (entry and exit) influence industrial employment growth? This paper provides an empirical investigation, using unique data for 42 disaggregated Swedish industrial sectors during the period 1997–2001. It is hypothesised that the importance of entering firms, net entry and market turbulence may differ significantly across industries. A quantile regression method is used in order to detect industrial differences in the response to industrial employment growth. The empirical evidence shows that, on the one hand, firm entry and market turbulence have a positive effect on employment for fast growing industries and that the effect is larger for high growth industries. On the other hand, the composition of industry dynamics in terms of net entry rates has a more dispersed effect across all industries, even though the effect of net entry is larger for high growth industries.     

Lobbying for Education in a Two‐Sector Model

Firms specialized in two different sectors lobby to induce the government to subsidize the type of education complementary to their production. Lobbying is endogenous. We show that, if lobbying is not costly, both sectors will lobby in equilibrium and the education policy will induce the same skill composition that would be chosen by the social planner. However, if lobbying is costly and there is sufficient asymmetry between the sectors, only one sector will exert pressure on the policy‐maker in the attempt to direct resources toward the type of education required by its production. Which sector will engage in lobbying depends on relative size, productivity, and price. We also provide some preliminary evidence that lobbying activity by firms may influence the production of skills needed by those firms.     

Foreign direct investment in R&D and domestic entrepreneurship in China’s manufacturing industries

This paper argues that internationalization of innovation and the related spillovers can also affect the likelihood of firm entry and exit into an industry. By making use of firm-level panel data from China over the period 2005 to 2007, this paper examines the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) in research and development (R&D) and the related linkages on entry and exit likelihoods of domestic firms in (i) transport equipment and (ii) electrical machinery and equipment manufacturing industries. In order to evaluate the region-of-origin effect, this paper also separately examines the impact of FDI in R&D originating from (i) all countries except Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan and (ii) Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. Furthermore, the impact of FDI in R&D on entry and exit of Chinese firms in the two industries is examined by splitting the data into large and small firms within the two industries. The results of the pooled probit regression reveal that FDI in R&D and the related spillovers can have a significant impact on the likelihood of entry and exit of domestic firms in transport equipment and electric machinery and equipment industries. The empirical analysis also suggests that the impact of changes in FDI in R&D and the related spillovers varies across firm size.     

The political economy of entry barriers

We study a political economy model of entry barriers. Each period the policymaker determines whether to impose a high barrier to entry, and the special interest groups try to influence the policymaker's decision. Entry is accompanied by creative destruction—when many new firms enter, old firms are more likely to be driven out of the market. Therefore the current incumbents (industry leaders) tend to lobby for a higher entry barrier and potential entrants (industry followers) are likely to lobby for a freer environment for entry. We analyze both static and dynamic versions of the model to examine what kind of environment supports a policy that blocks entry. In the dynamic model, the economy can exhibit various different dynamics. In particular, multiple steady states may arise in equilibrium.     

Campaign finance regulation with competing interest groups

Regulatory caps on contributions to political campaigns are the cornerstones of campaign finance legislation in many established democracies, and their introduction is considered by most emerging ones. Are these regulations desirable? This paper studies contribution caps in a menu auction lobbying model with limited budgets and costly entry. In the absence of entry, contribution caps improve welfare by “leveling the political playing field”. With entry, however, a competition effect and a bargaining effect may arise, resulting in inefficient entry and exit decisions. In particular, a cap may lead to worse policies than the status quo; and even if better policies are chosen, the resulting gain in welfare may be more than offset by the entry costs. Regulation can also lead to the simultaneous entry of competing groups, creating costly rent-seeking on issues previously unaffected by lobbying.     

Simple measures of endogenous free-riding in protectionist lobbies

Even though there is a well-known empirical and theoretical link between lobby and the free-rider problem, the existing literature only attributes its findings to the free-rider rather than the measurement of its extent. We develop broader theoretical micro-foundations for measuring free-riding and investigate the determinants of tariff rates from the perspective of corporate lobbying and free-riding. Our estimation result shows that the degree of free-riding not only varies across industries but is particularly high in larger industries indicating the underutilization of lobbying. The tariff rates under monopoly are about 8 times higher than under perfect competition in most industries suggesting that stakeholders should maintain higher industry protection levels through lobbying.     

A contest model of liberalizing government procurements

This paper models liberalization of government procurements as admitting entry of foreign firms in a contest among potential rent seekers. It contributes to the literature on how institutions influence socially desirable outcomes. Liberalizing procurements reduces wasteful domestic lobbying but also increases the likelihood that a foreign firm will capture the rent. A main result is that the domestic welfare change is not monotonic in the foreign firms' abilities. Furthermore, we show that domestic liberalization policies can be inefficient from the global point of view because foreign lobbying costs can outweight productive efficiency.     

经济政策不确定性与企业退出决策:理论与实证研究

经济政策影响微观企业经营是现有研究的共识.在已有文献基础上,文章考察了经济政策不确定性对企业退出决策的影响.文章基于一个代表性企业最优退出决策的框架,构建了经济政策不确定性影响企业退出决策作用机制的理论模型,并利用1998?2011年中国工业企业微观数据对理论模型进行了实证检验.研究结果显示,经济政策不确定性通过增加市场预期收益的机制降低了企业的退出概率,即面对高水平的经济政策不确定性时,企业对未来市场形成了良好的预期,倾向于采取理性的"延迟退出"决策.进一步分析发现,企业退出决策的"延迟现象"在不同企业、行业和区域间呈现出异质性,经济政策不确定性更多地延迟了具有优越发展前景的企业、行业及区域的市场退出.从企业方面来看,这一现象在规模小、跨产业经营、出口、政府补贴的企业及创新企业中更加显著;从行业方面来看,这一现象在资金技术密集型的行业及生产率高的行业中更加显著;从区域来看,这一现象在市场化程度高的区域及经济增长快的区域更加显著.可见,政府的经济政策变动,不仅引导了企业制定理性的战略决策,而且激励了优势资源和市场的持续发展.     

Entry and Exit in International Markets: Evidence from Chilean Data*

Several studies examine the patterns and determinants of entry and exit in manufacturing industries. Not much work exists on entry and exit in international markets. This paper uses Chilean data to analyze the industry‐level determinants of entry and exit in export markets. First, we show as stylized facts that entry and exit rates differ across industries, vary over time, and are positively correlated. Then, we study the main determinants of these patterns. Our econometric analysis shows that within‐industry heterogeneity, measured by differences in productivity or other firm characteristics, has a significant effect on plant turnover in international markets. Our findings reveal that trade costs, factor intensities, and fluctuations in the real exchange rate play a minor role explaining entry and exit. This last result is consistent with hysteresis in international markets.     

Opportunity Costs,Competition, and Firm Selection

Abstract

The paper questions the standard economic assumptions that competing economic agents have identical reservation utility levels, and that when differences in opportunity costs exist, they can be conveniently represented by fixed costs. Asymmetries in opportunity costs are considered in relation to current efficiency. The effect of this interchangeability of skills is studied in the context of the effect of entry on firm selection in a Cournot setting. It is found that inefficient firms are more likely to crowd out efficient ones when the relationship between current efficiency and opportunity costs is strong, and when the fixed costs of changing markets are high. Moreover, in the long-run, firms with intermediate cost levels are likely to induce the exit of low and high cost firms. The model sheds light on the benefits of diversification by multiproduct and multinational firms, and their relationship to skill transferability.     

Imports, entry and competition law as market disciplines

Numerous countries have adopted or strengthened competition laws in the past two decades. At the same time, domestic industries in most countries are facing ever more intense pressure from imports. In this paper we study the impact of competition law on domestic competition for a large number of countries over time, controlling for the presence of imports and the number of domestic firms. We find that while industries that have higher import exposure or larger numbers of domestic firms tend to be more competitive, the direct effect of competition law on competition is insignificant. However, we also find that industries that operate under a competition law tend to have a larger number of domestic firms. This suggests that competition laws may have an indirect effect on domestic competition by promoting entry.