Competition among banks and the pass-through of monetary policy

This paper introduces monopolistically competitive financial intermediaries into the New Keynesian DSGE setting. Modelling bank market power explicitly contributes to understanding two empirical facts: (i) The short-run transmission of changes in money market rates to bank retail rates is far from complete and heterogeneous. (ii) Stiffer competition among commercial banks implies that loan rates correlate more tightly with the policy rate. In my model, the degree of monopolistic competition in the banking sector has a sizeable impact on the pass-through of changes in the policy rate. In particular, a more competitive market for bank credit amplifies the efficiency of monetary policy.     

Measuring competition in microfinance markets: a new approach

This paper employs a relatively new method of competition measurement, the Boone indicator, for data on 521 microfinance institutions (MFIs) in ten vibrant microfinance markets: Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Indonesia, the Philippines, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Mexico and Peru. This approach is able to measure competition on a yearly basis in market segments without considering the entire market, as other well-known methods – for instance, the Panzar-Rosse model – require. Stochastic frontier (SF) models have been employed to estimate the translog cost function (TCF) and then marginal costs are computed. The potential endogeneity of performance and costs are overcome by utilising a two-step GMM estimator. Results show that competition levels vary from country to country, and over the period 2003–2010 India and Nicaragua had the most competitive microfinance loan markets. Competition among the microfinance institutions in Bangladesh and Bolivia declined significantly over time, which may be due to the partial reconstitution of market power by the giant MFIs in these countries. Competition in other countries remained mostly unchanged over the years, in line with the consolidation and revitalisation of respective microfinance markets.     

European policy and markets: Did policy initiatives stem the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area?

We investigate how European policy initiatives influenced market assessments of sovereign default risk and banking sector fragility during the sovereign debt crisis in four adversely affected countries — Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy. We focus on three broad groups of policies: (a) ECB policy actions (monetary and financial support), (b) EU programs (financial and fiscal rules as well as financial support in crisis countries), and (c) domestic austerity programs. We measure immediate market impact effects: what policies changed risk perceptions, using CDS spreads on sovereign bonds and banks in this assessment. We employ dynamic panel and event study methodologies in the empirical work. We find that a number of programs initially stabilized sovereign and bank bond markets (e.g. Outright Monetary Transactions program), although announcement and implementation impacts on markets differed in some cases (e.g. second Covered Market Bond Program). Actions designed to shore up sovereign markets often lowered risk assessments in bank bond markets and policies designed to ensure safety and soundness of the European banking system in some cases significantly impacted sovereign debt markets. Finally, a number of policies designed to stabilize markets had surprisingly little immediate impact on either sovereign or bank bond market risk assessments.     

商业银行竞争与公司盈余管理

本文以2007—2017年我国上市公司为研究样本,利用银保监会公布的商业银行在各城市开设分支机构的数据,构造地级市区域银行竞争指标,检验了商业银行竞争程度与公司盈余管理之间的关系。研究发现,银行业竞争性的市场结构能够有效降低企业盈余管理水平。对机制的考察表明,企业会计信息质量的提高得益于银行债权人治理作用不断加强。本文选择2009年银保监会放开银行设立分支机构限制的政策作为外生事件,并通过构造工具变量等方法进一步验证了研究结论。本文的结果从债权人的角度丰富了企业会计信息质量的文献,同时对银行竞争方面的研究做出了有益补充。     

Pricing-to-Market Behavior: Japanese Exports to the US, Asia, and the EU

The paper examines the pricing-to-market (PTM) behavior of Japanese exporters in the US, Asian, and EU markets. Empirical evidence shows that PTM elasticity is highest to the US market. This matches the in-tuitive reasoning that the US market is more competitive than the EU and Asian markets for Japanese exporters. Furthermore, PTM elasticities estimated in this paper using expected exchange rates are positive but their amounts are smaller than PTM elasticities estimated by previous studies with actual exchange rates. The difference may be due to the fact that the invoice currency for most Japanese exports is the US dollar.     

Twin Crises in Emerging Markets: The Role of Liability Dollarization and Imperfect Competition in Banking

Currency crises in emerging markets have been accompanied by banking crises, with concentration in the market for bank credit increasing after large devaluations. This paper examines how the presence of imperfect competition and liability dollarization in banking shapes the real effects of the just mentioned twin crises. An important gap in the theoretical literature is filled, by being the first paper to provide a model of twin crises in the presence of imperfect competition in banking, and the changes in market structure that occur in the aftermath of crises. Doing so, the analysis is able to reveal that currency devaluations generate more severe twin crises in economies with less competitive banking sectors. This result is consistent with the empirical evidence on the concentration‐fragility view, and it unveils the importance of prudential regulation that focuses on the market structure in banking.     

Monetary policy transmission under different banking structures: The role of capital and heterogeneity

This work deals with the transmission of monetary policy through the bank loan market, in the presence of a capital requirement regulation. Unlike standard models, based on the “representative bank” shortcut, we adopt the heterogeneous agents approach: this allows us to explicitly model the strategic interaction between well-capitalized and under-capitalized banks. The main results are the following. (I) The propagation of a monetary policy impulse through the loan market differs considerably, depending on the market structure: under monopolistic competition, strategic complementarity among well-capitalized banks leads to a “multiplier effect”; in the Cournot oligopoly framework, an effect of the opposite sign is at work, due to strategic substitutability. (II) Well-capitalized banks are more important, in shaping the adjustment following a monetary policy shock, than what is implied by their relative number over total; this fact strengthens the monetary policy effectiveness. This result holds under both monopolistic competition and oligopoly, although the interaction among banks, leading to such a result, differs across the two banking structures.     

Measuring bank competition under binding interest rate regulation: the case of China

Many empirical studies suggest that financial reform promoted bank competition in most mature and emerging economies. However, some earlier studies that adopted conventional approaches to measure competition have concluded that bank competition in China declined during the past decade, despite progressive reforms implemented since the 1980s. We show that this apparent contradiction is the result of flawed measurement. Conventional indicators such as the Lerner index and Panzar–Rosse H-statistic fail to measure competition in Chinese loan markets properly due to the system of interest rate regulation. By contrast, the profit elasticity (PE) approach does not suffer from these shortcomings. Using balance sheet information for a large sample of banks operating in China during 1996–2008, we show that competition actually increased in the past decade when the PE indicator is used.     

Government bailouts and default risks of a duopoly: strong bank versus weak bank

A duopolistic loan market includes a strong bank without the problem of early closure that opts out of government bailouts and a weak bank with this problem that participates in the bailout programmes of distressed loan purchases and direct equity injections. A direct implication of our framework is that the strong bank’s equity will be priced as a standard call option, while the weak bank’s equity will be priced as a down-and-out call option. We find that an increase in either bailout (i.e. distressed loan purchases and direct equity injections) directly decreases the weak bank’s default risk but indirectly increases the strong bank’s default risk. Accordingly, either bailout contributes to banking stability since the indirect positive effect insufficiently offsets the direct negative effect, giving an overall negative response of default risks to an increase in either bailout. Higher competition by shifting to quasi-competition from collusion increases banking stability under either bailout. Our analysis suggests that competition is aligned with the regulatory objective of improving stability.     

SHOULD A MANDATORY SUBORDINATED DEBT POLICY BE INTRODUCED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM? EVIDENCE FROM THE ISSUANCE ACTIVITY OF BANKS AND BUILDING SOCIETIES

Current research is beginning to question the role and effectiveness of traditional rules‐based bank regulatory oversight in favor of incentive‐compatible regulatory design and market discipline and, in particular, mandatory subordinated debt market discipline. However, research on the suitability of a mandatory subordinated debt policy (MSNDP) has focused primarily on the United States. The primary aims of this article, therefore, are to examine the market for subordinated debt (SND) issued by UK credit institutions and to assess the suitability of introducing an MSNDP into UK banking regulation. A further contribution of this article is that it explores SND issuance and its characteristics at a bank level and, uniquely, considers them in relation to regulatory, structural, and economic events that either are specific to the UK or otherwise affect international banks. The article compares the UK findings with research on SND markets in the United States and Europe and, in so doing, raises concerns over whether an MSNDP for the largest global credit institutions would be feasible. Although the focus of this study is the UK banking industry, the country‐focused bank‐level approach provides conclusions that might be relevant to other countries considering the implementation of an MSNDP.(JEL G18, G28)     

Optimal monetary policy with the cost channel and monopolistically-competitive banks

This paper studies the optimal nominal policy interest rate in a model with the cost channel and imperfect competition in the banking sector. Due to this market power, the interest rate on deposits is relatively low; in particular it is lower than the policy interest rate. This, in turn, leads to a suboptimal level of deposits and, as a result, to a low level of intermediation. Deviations from the Friedman Rule are optimal in this setup regardless of the assumption about price rigidity; since households can hold their assets in the form of cash or deposits, taxing money, which is an imperfect substitute for deposits, is optimal in order to increase the level of deposits and encourage intermediation. The main results of the paper are robust to the introduction of market power in the loan market as well as stickiness in both the deposit and the loan markets.     

Implications of Shifting Retail Market Shares for Loan Monitoring in a Dominant‐Bank Model

This study utilizes a dominant‐bank model to investigate whether an increase in retail loan and deposit‐market concentration increases the incentives for both dominant and fringe banks to monitor their loans and thereby improve the quality of their loan portfolios. It shows that the effects on banks' incentives to engage in monitoring aimed at eliminating loan default losses in response to increased concentration of retail market shares of loans and deposits depend critically on whether the banks' asset and liability choices are interdependent. When the asset and liability decisions of both dominant and fringe banks are independent, a shift in market shares in favor of the dominant bank generates a straightforward increase in the incentives of all banks to monitor their loans. Under portfolio interdependence, the effects on monitoring outcomes at dominant banks and at banks within the competitive fringe depend on more complicated configurations of parameters. This fact helps explain mixed empirical evidence on the relationships between bank competition and measures of bank risk and soundness.     

Banking Sector Performance in Latin America: Market Power versus Efficiency

Since the mid‐1990s the banking sector in the Latin American emerging markets has experienced profound changes due to financial liberalization, a significant increase in foreign investments, and greater merger activities often occurring following financial crises. The wave of consolidation and the rapid increase in market concentration that took place in most countries has generated concerns about the rise in banks' market power and its potential effects on consumers. This paper advances the existing literature by testing the market power (Structure–Conduct–Performance and Relative Market Power) and efficient structure (X‐ and scale efficiency) hypotheses for a sample of over 2500 bank observations in nine Latin American countries over 1997–2005. We use the Data Envelopment Analysis technique to obtain reliable efficiency measures. We produce evidence supporting the efficient structure hypotheses. The findings are particularly robust for the largest banking markets in the region, namely Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. Finally, capital ratios and bank size seem to be among the most important factors in explaining higher than normal profits for Latin American banks.     

The Italian Banking Structure in the 1990s: Testing the Multimarket Contact Hypothesis

The multimarket contact hypothesis holds that more contacts between firms competing in the same markets may induce more collusion. This paper tests the hypothesis for the Italian banking market, analysing the behaviour of the largest Italian banks from 1990 to 1996. Market rivalry is gauged by changes in loan market shares and interest rates in each Italian province. We estimate the effects of increasing multimarket contacts, concentration indicators, banks' costs and loan demand on variations in market shares and interest rates. No support is found for the multimarket contact hypothesis. Geographical overlap in banking is positively correlated with changes in market shares, confirming the thesis of an overall increase in competition within the Italian banking system. Greater multimarket links also seem to correspond to lower lending rates.
(J.E.L.:G21, C33, L40.)     

Opening up for foreign banks: How Central and Eastern Europe can benefit1

This paper analyses the role of foreign banks in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Poland. With respect to their planned EU membership, these countries have to consider the full implementation of free trade in financial services. Generally, liberalizing the market access of foreign banks allows the production of financial services according to comparative advantage, it fosters competition, it promotes bank privatization, and it facilitates a transfer of know-how into the emerging financial systems. The most important sequencing issue that arises is that the incumbent banks should have been recapitalized for their truly inherited bad loans before markets are opened up. In view of the reform progress that has already been made in the countries under review, abolishing remaining entry barriers is unlikely to put the stability of banking systems at risk while allowing the benefits of open markets to be exploited.     

Structural breaks in the lending interest rate pass-through and the euro

This paper investigates whether size and speed of the pass-through of market rates into short term business lending rates have increased in the wake of the introduction of the euro. Allowing for multiple unknown structural breaks we find two in four EMU countries, and in the UK as well, and a single one in five other countries. The pattern of dates fits national banking systems adjusting slowly to the new monetary regime and suggests caution in associating structural changes to the introduction of the euro. The estimated equilibrium pass-through in the last break-free period is on average more incomplete, hinting at a reduced effectiveness of the single monetary policy. These results run against the economic intuition that a reduced volatility in money market rates is bound to mitigate uncertainty and to ease therefore the transfer of policy rate changes to retail rates; the run-up to Basel 2 and a deterioration of competition in loan markets could be the motivations. Caution in extrapolating these findings to recent periods is suggested by the differences between the unharmonized and the new harmonized retail rates.     

MARKET COMPETITION BEFORE AND AFTER BANK MERGER WAVE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF KOREA AND JAPAN

Abstract. Reflecting recent merger trends in the banking industry of Korea and Japan, this paper examines the degree of competition before and after the bank merger wave. Two major implications are derived from empirical analyses. First, high levels of banking market competitiveness are detected after mergers in both the Korean and Japanese metropolitan areas. Second, although the level of market competition remains low throughout Japanese local cities, it is competitive compared with the metropolitan area of Korea. This paper concludes that market concentration brought about by bank mergers does not always result in low competitiveness.     

Real estate markets and the macroeconomy: A dynamic coherence framework

This paper analyzes the dynamic interactions between real estate markets, in the US and the UK and their macroeconomic environments. We apply a new approach based on a dynamic coherence function (DCF) to study these interactions bringing together different real estate markets (the securitized market, the commercial market and the residential market). The results suggest that there is a common trend that drives the different real estate markets in the UK and the US, particularly in the long run, since they have a similar shape of the DCF. We also find that, in the US, wealth and housing expenditure channels are very conductive during real estate crises. However, in the UK, only the wealth effect is significant as a transmission channel during real estate market downturns. In addition, real estate markets in the UK and the US react differently to institutional shocks. This brings some insights on the conduct of monetary policy in order to avoid disturbances in real estate markets.     

银行业市场结构与货币政策冲击——基于异质性银行的模型分析

通过构造货币政策冲击下的贷款市场总体均衡模型,研究在受到资本充足率和存贷比约束的条件下,银行最优信贷决策行为。分析发现,在垄断竞争的银行业市场结构背景下,银行间在价格竞争方面表现出战略互补特征和由此带来的模仿效应。因而,当银行满足资本充足率和存贷比要求时,银行业传导的货币政策信贷渠道是有效的,而当贷款市场中的银行不能满足资本充足率或存贷比要求时,信贷渠道则表现出无效性。