Foreign investment and environmental regulations in LDCs

This paper examines the welfare and policy issues of pollution taxes and foreign-investment quotas for a small, developing economy. We consider each policy in isolation and joint optimum of them. We find that, for a country with capital inflows, an active environmental policy along with a liberal policy on foreign capital is optimal.     

Corporate governance,environmental regulations,and technological change

This paper investigates the relationship between environmental regulations and innovation by focusing on the automobile industry in a cross-country setting. We provide empirical evidence that the presence of agency problems mitigates the negative effects of environmental regulations on overall R&D activity, which leads to full compensation when the degree of agency problems is sufficiently high. Guiding our empirical analysis, we provide a general model consistent with the structure of existing ownership data. Specifically, we model ownership structure as a combination of two extreme corporate governance types. On the one extreme there are profit maximizers, and on the other extreme there are managers who are only concerned with their private benefits. The model leads to a simple country level ownership indicator and shows that if an economy is dominated by firms with higher agency problems, then pollution tax might even increase overall R&D, while reducing pollution. According to our estimations, such an outcome is possible only for out-of-sample values of the ownership indicator, where the degree of agency problems is extremely high.     

Concealment and verification over environmental regulations: a game-theoretic analysis

We consider a strategic situation in which a firm may conceal the illegal activity of violating environmental regulations and a regulator seeks to verify the illegality to punish the firm. We study two main factors, fines and social monitoring, that influence the firm’s decision in that situation. First, we find all the possible equilibria of our model and examine conditions of those two factors that lead to each equilibrium. Using the equilibrium conditions, we then study the optimal enforcement policies that induce the most socially desirable equilibrium and improve social welfare within each equilibrium. Our main findings are as follows. First, the two factors have a complementary relationship in getting the most desirable equilibrium: Certain high levels of fines and social monitoring are both needed. Second, if making the social monitoring above the certain critical level is impossible, setting the level of the fines as high as possible may be the optimal enforcement policy. Finally, if setting the fines above the certain critical level is not available, either, setting the level of the fines as low as possible might be optimal, and the higher level of the social monitoring does not necessarily bring higher social welfare.     

Can R&D-inducing green tariffs replace international environmental regulations?

This paper investigates the link between trade and environment by exploring the effects of green tariffs on innovation, location of production and the environment. It shows that tariffs levied on polluting goods could result in less world pollution than global harmonization of environmental standards by inducing more pollution-abatement R&D effort and generating lower unit emissions from production. Specifically, green tariffs reduce pollution by (1) shifting production to the region where environmental standards are respected, (2) inducing the firm in the clean country to engage in more abatement R&D by granting it a higher market power/share in its home market, (3) instigating green R&D investment by deterring delocation. When these outweigh the R&D-creating effect of environmental harmonization in the dirty country, green tariffs bring about a cleaner environment.     

Effectiveness of environmental regulations under imperfect enforcement and the firm's avoidance behavior

This paper explicitly defines enforcement quality and develops a model by incorporating enforcement quality and the firm's avoidance behavior. The results indicate that the effectiveness of environmental regulations is likely to depend upon the level of enforcement quality, as well as upon the nature of the firm's avoidance behavior. Policy instruments may become incompatible under certain circumstances. Enforcement quality should be properly targeted to enhance functional harmonization between instruments. The condition under which emission tax is more effective under imperfect enforcement than under complete enforcement is also identified.     

Effects of different environmental regulations and their heterogeneity on air pollution control in China

This study endeavors to explore the impact of different environmental regulations and their heterogeneity on air pollution control in China. By employing a slacks-based measure of directional distance function model, considering undesirable outputs, the efficiency of air pollution control of China’s 30 provinces during 2001–2014 is evaluated. The estimates indicate that the efficiency of air pollution control is fluctuating, and there is obvious regional differences. By using provincial-level panel data and panel threshold models, empirical results show that: (1) There is a nonlinear relationship between environmental regulation and air pollution control efficiency, and it can be positively correlated, but it is constrained by the stringency of regulation: there is a single threshold for formal (command-and-control (CAC) and market-based) regulation, while there is a double threshold for informal regulation. (2) Different environmental regulations have different governance effects. Compared with CAC regulation, market regulation can attract more attention of enterprises. (3) It may be ineffective to expect informal regulation to improve the air pollution control efficiency. Therefore, in order to achieve real sustainable development, the government should set up reasonable regulation stringency and optimize the combination of regulation tools.

     

On International compensations for environmental stocks

This paper sheds some light on the possible implications of compensations which are paid for the maintenance of an environmental stock. It shows that serious complications can arise if the resource-owner may influence the compensation price strategically. If the incentive to raise the compensation price dominates the preservation incentive, the steady-state stock falls short from that which is voluntarily held. Whether compensation policies can neglect this feature depends crucially on the institutional setting which determines the compensation price.This paper originated from a research project about the stability of international environmental agreements. I gratefully acknowledge financial support by the Volkswagen Foundation. A predecessor of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Ausschuß für Umwelt- und Ressourcenökonomie of the Verein für Socialpolitik in Ladenburg. I am indebted to the participants for many helpful comments which improved this paper significantly. Thanks are also due to Gernot Klepper, Peter Michaelis and two anonymous referees whose comments and suggestions were very helpful. The usual disclaimer applies.     

The impact of environmental regulations on international competitiveness of textile industry in China

A greater focus of environmental protection is directed toward environmental regulations in China. This paper focuses on environmental regulations and their impact on textile industry. The academic circle does not reach a consensus on the relationship between environmental regulations and international competitiveness. Some hold the view that environmental regulations lower international competitiveness while others think that environmental regulations improve both environment and economic performance. This paper aims to analyze the impact of the environmental regulations on the international competitiveness of textile industry in China. This study starts with theories relative to this subject; the second part, based on the impact mechanism of environmental regulations on competitiveness, analyzes the environmental impact on textile from the perspective of cost and market. The conceptual exploration comes to the conclusion that environmental regulations make a negative impact on the international competitiveness on the cost side and improve it by means of innovation and product differentiation on market side; the third part gives time series evidence to examine the impact. In this part the Pearson Correlation Analysis is conducted based on the data of China＇s textile industry of the period from 1991 to 2005. It turns out to prove that the negative environmental impact on cost side exceeds the positive environmental impact on market side, namely, environmental regulations deteriorate the international competitiveness in textile industry as a whole during the inspected period.     

International comparisons of macroeconomic performance

In this article we present the results of a contingent rating study carried out on a sample of tourisits visiting Scicli, a Sicilian town known for its baroque heritage. In particular, we focus on different attributes of tourism products – namely, season, accommodation and cultural heritage – to study how much each of these attributes weights in tourists’ preferences. We also study how the socio-demographic characteristics of people affect their evaluation of the different attributes of tourism products. The heritage endowment appears to be far from being the most important factor; this result is consistent across different socio-demographic subgroups of interviewed persons.     

Green certification,heterogeneous producers,and green consumers: a welfare analysis of environmental regulations

We develop a vertical differentiation model to analyze welfare implications of environmental policies in a competitive market with production and consumption heterogeneity. Consumers with heterogeneous preferences choose between non-green and certified green products, while producers with heterogeneous production costs decide whether to engage in green production. In order for green products to be recognized by consumers, producers must join a green club. Key findings are summarized as follows. (i) The number of green producers, environmental standard, and overall welfare under the market solution are all socially sub-optimal. (ii) The introduction of a subsidy policy for greener production and standards is shown to increase social welfare, but is not Pareto optimal. (iii) A dual policy, which combines abatement subsidizes for a greener production standard and a tax charge for green certification, is shown to be the Pareto-optimal outcome.     

International trade performance and concentration in British industry

This paper reports the results of a cross-sectional analysis for 97 industries at the Minimum List Heading level, of their international trading performance 1970–77 and the influence of industrial structure on this. It is shown that, on average, import penetration increased faster than the export ratio for the industries analysed. Investigation of the relationship between industrial concentration and international trade suggest that in the majority of the analyses, especially where the relation between prior concentration change and subsequent with a performance was concerned, higher or increasing levels of concentration were associated with a weaker international trade performance. On the basis of this it is argued that more attention needs to be paid to international trade as a performance rather than merely a structural phenomenon in industry, the reasons for the relatively disappointing performance need to be investigated in more detail, the risk of a decline in internaional trade performance needs to be taken into account in formulating competition policy, especially with respect to mergers and the investigation of dominant firms.     

Can consumers enforce environmental regulations? The role of the market in hazardous waste compliance

We examine the U.S. hazardous waste management industry to assess the role that consumers play in encouraging environmental compliance. We first examine whether environmental performance affects consumer demand and find that noncompliance does decrease demand, at least in the short term. Next we consider whether market characteristics affect compliance behavior. While we do not find evidence that market size affects behavior, local competition does appear to increase compliance. However, as competition becomes less localized, it has a smaller effect. Finally, regardless of the pressures exerted by consumers to comply, commercial managers are less likely to be in compliance than on-site managers. For example, President Bush’s 2006 budget request for EPA significantly cut funding to the states who are responsible for over 95% of environmental inspections (ECOS, 2005). At the federal level, the number of positions for compliance monitoring decreased by over 17% from FY 2001 to FY 2003 (U.S. GAO, 2002).     

The effect of environmental and social performance on the stock performance of european corporations

This paper examines the effect of sustainability performance of European corporations on their stock performance, measured as the average monthly stock return from 1996 to 2001. The econometric analysis is based on common empirical asset pricing models, particularly on the multifactor model according to Fama and French (1993, Journal of Financial Economics, 33:3–56). The consideration of sustainability performance is two-fold: The average sustainability performance of the industry in which a corporation operates and the relative sustainability performance of a corporation within a given industry. The main result is that the average environmental performance of the industry has a significantly positive influence on the stock performance. In contrast, the average social performance of the industry has a significantly negative influence. The variables of the relative environmental or social performance of a corporation within a given industry have no significant effect on the stock performance. As a by-product, the econometric analysis implies that some results of Fama and French (1993, 1996, The Journal of Finance, LI (1):55–84) regarding the risk factors of the multifactor model need not hold true for different observation periods, for different stock markets, and for the use of single stocks (instead of portfolios). An erratum to this article can be found at     

International trade agreements, environmental policy, and relocation of production

This paper studies the influence of free trade agreements on national environmental policies and location strategies of polluting firms. It is shown that banning export subsidies makes relocation of production more attractive for firms. When export subsidies are banned relocation is profitable because: (1) the rival firm reduces output due to more stringent emission regulation in the host country of the investment and (2) relocation leads to lower emission tax rate in the original home country of the investing firm. When export subsidies are used, the first effect is absent because the host government is able to use the export subsidy to compensate the negative effect of more stringent emission taxation on domestic shareholders.     

Measuring environmental performance with stochastic environmental DEA: The case of APEC economies

Data envelopment analysis (DEA) has been widely used for environmental performance measurement at different levels. Most of environmental DEA models take the deterministic form without considering random factors. This paper presents a stochastic environmental DEA model that can measure environmental performance under random conditions. The proposed model has been applied to evaluate the environmental performance of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) economies in 2010. The results indicate that the stochastic pure environmental performance of APEC economies is indeed affected by random factors. Especially, the fluctuation of Republic of Korea's stochastic pure environmental performance is most obvious among all the APEC economies.     

Public sector decentralization and school performance: International evidence

Using a panel of international student test scores 1980-2000 (PISA and TIMSS), panel fixed effects estimates suggest that government spending decentralization is conducive to student performance. The effect does not appear to be mediated through levels of educational spending.