Price discrimination via information provision

We study price discrimination where different prices are offered as a bundle with different levels of information about a product. The seller’s price discrimination induces high valuation buyers to purchase a good without information and low valuation buyers to purchase with information. Our analysis highlights several interesting results about price discrimination: (i) the seller’s choice of information provision is the combination of full information and no information, (ii) products can be cheaper without information provision than with information provision, (iii) as a result of price discrimination, prices can be more dispersed as buyers’ valuations become largely similar, and (iv) the high valuation buyers purchase a damaged good and may earn negative surplus. Furthermore, we investigate under which circumstances price discrimination is more profitable than uniform pricing. We show that a decline in transportation costs which facilitate price discrimination can be welfare reducing.     

PRICE DISCRIMINATION AT THE LINKS

This paper reports on an econometric analysis of the pricing structures at 46 public access golf courses in the San Francisco area. Comparisons among several attempts to get a generic measure of price discrimination suggest that the standard deviation of the prices charged is the best measure. Using narrowly cast measures of price discrimination, the paper successfully distinguishes among several different types. Measures of price discrimination can be significant regressors, yet the overwhelming majority of existing work excludes such a variable, leading to biased estimates of the other parameters.     

Pricing behavior of the budget-constrained public enterprise

By assuming that a budget-constrained multiproduct public enterprise chooses prices with the goal of maximizing its budget, its revenue or its output, specific pricing rules can be derived. Rather than overstating demand elasticities and then pricing like a monopolist, as a budget-constrained welfare-maximizing firm would do, the enterprise pursuing one of these alternative goals is shown to understate marginal cost and then price like a monopolist. Non-optimal price discrimination and even cross subsidization may result. The outcome tends to be more perverse when statutory entry barriers protect some markets of the enterprise. In its pricing, the U.S. Postal Service has shown some of the signs of such other-than-welfare-maximizing pricing behavior.     

Price cap regulation of a dominant firm facing competition

Price cap regulation is typically applied to natural monopolies operating with subadditive costs. Price caps are known to provide superior incentives for the regulated monopoly to pursue cost reduction and, in a multiservice/product context, undertake welfare enhancing price discrimination. It is well known that capping a Laspeyres index of the firm’s prices induces the monopoly to charge socially optimal “Ramsey” prices in the long run. This paper examines the suitability of the Laspeyres form of regulation when the regulated firm faces competition in the market for one of its services (outputs). We present the appropriately modified Ramsey pricing rule for the regulated dominant firm and demonstrate that capping a Laspeyres index of the dominant firm’s prices leads to prices that satisfy this pricing rule in the long run.     

The Pricing of Economics Books

Using data as reported in the JEL in 2000 and 1985, the authors examine the pricing and other characteristics of books. There has been a substantial rise in book prices, even in real terms, between the two years, which the smaller rise in average page length appears insufficient to justify. A major factor behind the rise would appear to be the increasing importance of foreign presses that not only sell at a higher average price than U.S. presses but are increasingly likely to do so. University presses and other not-for-profit publishers sell at substantially lower prices than commercial publishing houses and are more likely to publish in paperback than commercial publishing houses. The discount on paperbacks appears to have been relatively stable in the two years.     

Pricing and patents of HIV/AIDS drugs in developing countries

This article provides empirical evidence on the impact of patents on drug prices across developing countries. It uses sales data on human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)/acquired immuno deficiency syndrome (AIDS) drugs in a sample of 34 low- and middle-income countries between 1995 and mid-2000. The main findings are that patents do shift drug prices up, drug prices are correlated to per capita income levels and drug firms follow a skimming strategy when pricing new HIV/AIDS drugs. That is, there is across country and intertemporal price discrimination in the global drug markets.     

Peak-load pricing with continuous and interdependent demand

Issues concerning time-of-use (TOU) pricing with continuous and interdependent demand are examined in a context where increasing marginal costs of production, as opposed to capacity constraints, provide the major incentive for flattening the load curve. The analysis develops the underlying consumer preferences sufficient to insure a continuously varying load curve and generalizes previous considerations of the peak load pricing problem by simultaneously considering continuous and interdependent demand in determining optimal prices and pricing period lengths. A profit incentive for TOU pricing as a form of price discrimination is revealed, which is tempered as substitution across pricing periods allows limited intertemporal arbitrage. The profit incentive leads a price-regulated firm, ceteris paribus, to choose a peak pricing period longer than the social optimum.     

History-based price discrimination and entry in markets with switching costs: A welfare analysis

We analyze history-based price discrimination in an asymmetric industry, where an incumbent, protected by switching costs, faces an entrant who does not have access to information about consumers’ purchase histories. We demonstrate that consumer surplus is higher with uniform pricing than with history-based price discrimination. We find that the entry decision is invariant to whether the incumbent implements history-based pricing or uniform pricing. This implies that the potential abuse of market dominance imposed by history-based price discrimination is exploitation, not exclusion. Finally, we establish that the profit gain to the incumbent from history-based pricing exceeds the associated loss to consumers.     

Product line pricing in a vertically differentiated oligopoly

Abstract This paper examines the joint pricing decision of products in a firm’s product line. When products are distinguished by a vertical characteristic, those with higher values of that characteristic will command higher prices. We investigate whether, holding the value of the characteristic constant, there is an additional price premium for products on the industry and/or the firm frontier, that is, for the products with the highest value of the characteristic in the market or in a firm’s product line. We also investigate the existence of price premia for lower‐ranked products and other product line pricing questions. Using personal computer price data, we show that prices decline with the distance from the industry and firm frontiers, even after holding absolute quality constant. We find evidence that consumer tastes for brands is stronger for the consumers of frontier products (and thus competition between firms weaker in the top end of the market). There is also evidence that a product’s price is higher if a firm offers products with the immediately faster and immediately slower computer chip (holding the total number of a firm’s offerings constant), possibly as an attempt to reduce cannibalization. Finally, a product’s price declines with the time it is offered by a firm, suggesting intertemporal price discrimination.     

Reference Pricing with Elastic Demand for Pharmaceuticals

In this paper, we re‐examine the properties of two commonly adopted government reimbursement schemes for pharmaceuticals: reference pricing and fixed percentage reimbursement. We depart from the previous literature by assuming that the individual demand is price‐sensitive and depends on the copayment rate (i.e., the part paid by each consumer). We obtain two novel results under reference pricing: first, as the copayment rate increases, so do pharmaceutical prices; second, this increase in pharmaceutical prices reduces social welfare. Whilst reference pricing does emerge as a preferable reimbursement scheme, demand elasticities and the copayment rate interact in complex ways. This leads (unexpectedly) to the possibility that a higher copayment rate (lower reimbursement rate) results in higher government expenditure.     

Art in Africa: Hedonic price analysis of the South African fine art auction market, 2009–2014

Real asset markets are characterized by illiquidity and heterogeneous assets, presenting challenges to price estimators. Use of a new dataset of 7,553 auction fine art lots brought to market in South Africa, for 2009–14, allows us to examine the full sales hedonic price estimator over a wide set of characteristics. Results validate full sale hedonic pricing: Identities of artists, medium and genre, dating characteristics, and physical characteristics of artwork are significant. External validity of hedonic pricing is supported by out-of-sample price prediction for 40 individual artists. Auction house catalogue presentation of art work also proves correlated with realized auction prices. Art as an asset finds support: art prices move countercyclically with GDP and domestic equity markets, pro-cyclically with off-shore equity markets, implying a risk diversification role. JEL Codes: D1, L8. Keywords: hedonic price equation, art market, South Africa Word Count: 9467 (including all Tables, Figures, References).     

A dynamic model of price discrimination and inventory management at the Fulton Fish Market

We estimate a dynamic profit-maximization model of a fish wholesaler who can observe consumer characteristics, set individual prices, and thus engage in third-degree price discrimination. Simulated prices and quantities from the model exhibit the key features observed in a set of high quality transaction-level data on fish sales collected at the Fulton Fish Market. The model's predictions are then compared to the case in which the wholesaler must post a single price to all retailers. We find the added revenue the wholesaler receives from price discriminating to be small.     

Cointegration relationships and hedonic pricing of differentiated commodities: an application to price dynamics in the US dairy sector

This study investigates the implications of hedonic pricing for price dynamics of differentiated commodities. A conceptual model of hedonic pricing is developed under a Leontief technology, showing how commodity prices reflect the underlying value of their components. Implications for the existence of cointegration relationships among commodity prices are derived. An application to the pricing and dynamics of selected US dairy commodities is presented. It provides evidence on the role of component valuation in the dynamics of dairy commodity prices in the short run as well as in the long run. Distinguishing between market regime and government regime (when the government price support is active), the analysis finds significant differences in dairy price dynamics between the two regimes.     

Tacit Collusion and Non–uniform Prices

This article examines the possibility of building a tacit agreement between price–setters that yields non–uniform pricing. It is shown that firms with market power may restrict competition not only by alternating between periods of high prices and low prices (Green and Porter (1984), Rotemberg and Saloner (1986)), but also by always charging different prices and taking turns in being the monopolist. In contrast with the existing literature, price variability is not due to imperfect monitoring, stochastic demand or short–run pricing rigidity but it is a pure supply side effect. The author provides the necessary conditions to have collusion with non–uniform pricing, and shows that the latter dominates a fixed price solution. In terms of competition policy this result confirms that no price parallelism is not, per se , a signal of no collusion.     

A mark-up pricing model for price simulations

This paper develops an input/output model of pricing using a mark-up pricing formula. The connection between mark-up pricing and competitive pricing is analyzed through the determination of sectoral equilibrium profit mark-up rates as a function of the profit rate and the capital intensity of each sector. The model is used to analyze the effects on relative prices and the aggregate price level of exogenous changes in the nominal wage rate, tax rates, the exchange rate and world prices. Exogenous changes in the prices of domestically produced commodities are modelled via the imposition of ad valorem tax rates, which yield a measure of the net effect of the exogenous changes. Simulations are carried out under passive price adjustment as well as adjustment with price ceilings. In this last instance the model calculates the endogenously determined reduction in profit mark-ups. Lastly, empirical results of various simulations are presented using data from the Mexican economy.     

基于我国成品油定价机制的石油双寡头行为分析

我国成品油定价实行最高零售限价已三年有余,价格管制在平抑国际油价冲击的同时也产生许多问题,管制效果备受争议,政府的补贴政策也饱受诟病.基于成品油最高零售限价,石油双寡头、寡头与政府之间的博弈行为表明:最高零售限价不能解决高油价问题,对形成成品油市场的竞争格局作用不大,而且政府在与石油寡头的博弈中处于弱势地位,针对国有石油企业的补贴政策将造成财政资金的浪费.我国成品油定价改革方向为市场定价,根本问题是尚未形成垄断竞争的市场格局.成品油定价改革应在培育垄断竞争格局的基础上,改革燃油税为从价计征、完善石油储备体系,为市场化定价改革铺平道路.     

Monopoly Price Dispersion Under Demand Uncertainty

When a monopolist sets its price before its demand is known, then it may set more than one price and limit the availability of its output at lower prices. This article adds demand uncertainty and price rigidities to the standard model of monopoly pricing. When there are two states of demand and the ex post monopoly price is greater when demand is high then the monopolist's optimal ex ante pricing strategy is to set two prices and limit purchases at the lower price.     

Peak-load pricing in duopoly

In this paper, we consider peak-load pricing by duopolists that maximize profit (not social welfare). We compare price levels and profits across peak-load versus uniform pricing regimes. Our main result is that the introduction of peak-load pricing can plausibly reduce prices by making price competition more severe and thereby reducing profits. This result suggests that competing firms may engage in collusion by not committing to peak-load pricing. Therefore, from the regulator's perspective, it will be desirable to encourage firms to engage in peak-load pricing to intensify competition.     

The pricing of protected areas in nature-based tourism: A local perspective

This paper extends the literature on optimal pricing of recreation in protected areas by introducing price discrimination between groups of visitors and, given that the agency charges different prices to subsets of visitors, by including a distributional dimension that is particularly relevant for a national park agency receiving visitors from different origins. Other issues related to optimal entrance fees, including negative ecological impacts and positive spillover effects on local communities resulting from changes in visitation, are also discussed. Based on this model, the paper provides an estimation of optimal entrance fees and revenues for the Costa Rican system of protected areas.     

Nonlinear pricing with self-control preferences

A basic assumption of economics is that consumers choose what they want. However, many consumers find it difficult to stop overeating, overspending, smoking, procrastinating, etc, even though they want to. In reality, consumers have temptation and it is psychologically costly to exercise self-control. To clarify the implications of the existence of temptation and self-control costs, this paper studies a firm's optimal selling strategy exploiting the behavioral features of consumers. We characterize optimal nonlinear pricing schemes for a monopoly when self-control is costly for consumers. Since consumers have a preference for commitment, the firm faces a trade-off between offering a small menu that makes the consumers’ self-control easier and offering a large menu that achieves better price discrimination. We show that the optimal menu resembles the one in the standard nonlinear pricing problem with a price ceiling, where the upper bound on prices is determined endogenously by a participation constraint. The ceiling motivates the firm to offer a relatively flat and compact price schedule, serving more consumers with low demand. The characterization also shows that the firm may earn less if consumers have temptation.