Spousal Violence and Women's Employment in India

This study analyzes women's experiences of physical or sexual spousal violence as a correlate of their employment. Based on the 2005–6 National Family Health Survey III, a nationally representative dataset from India, the analysis illustrates that married women who experienced spousal violence are more likely to be employed and are also more likely to work for cash remuneration and be employed year-round. These results may appear to suggest that spousal violence is associated with higher likelihood of married women seeking financial self-reliance. However, investigation of who decides how to spend women's earnings reveals that Indian women who experienced spousal violence are less likely to have a say in that vital decision, which suggests that women who experience spousal violence may also be more susceptible to financial exploitation. The evidence further indicates a need for caution among analyses that uniformly embrace employment as a financial empowerment tool for women.     

Differences in the effects of informal family caregiving on health and life satisfaction between wives and husbands as caregivers

We analyze whether or not informal family caregiving worsens caregivers’ health and life satisfaction among Japanese married middle‐aged and elderly individuals from the Japanese Study of Aging and Retirement. Unlike previous studies, we distinguish between wives and husbands as caregivers and between one's own and one's spouse's parents as care recipients. We find women's depressive state is negatively associated with caregiving for spousal parents both in our instrumental variable estimations and fixed‐effect panel analysis, and also find women's life satisfaction is negatively associated with caregiving for spousal parents in our fixed‐effect panel analysis, though only marginally so. However, as our results are marginally significant, caregiving for either own or spousal parents does not seem to matter much for caregiver's health or life satisfaction. All that can be said for certain in our paper is that men's subjective health, depressive state, and life satisfaction are generally less sensitive to informal care, for both spousal and own parents, than that of women.     

Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: the core

Summary. This paper examines the ex ante core of a pure exchange economy with asymmetric information in which state-dependent allocations are required to satisfy incentive compatibility. This restriction on players' strategies in the cooperative game can be interpreted as incomplete contracts or partial commitment. An example is provided in which the incentive compatible core with nontransferable utility is empty; the game fails to be balanced because convex combinations of incentive compatible net trades can violate incentive compatibility. However, randomization of such strategies leads to ex post allocations which satisfy incentive compatibility and are feasible on average. Hence, convexity is preserved in such a model and the resulting cooperative games are balanced. In this framework, an incentive compatible core concept is defined for NTU games derived from economies with asymmetric information. The main result is nonemptiness of the incentive compatible core. Received: December 26, 2001; revised version: June 11, 2002 RID="*" ID"*" This work was financed, in part, by contract No 26 of the programme “P?le d'attraction interuniversitaire” of the Belgian government, and, in part, by research grant SBR93-09854 from the U.S. National Science Foundation. Much of my thinking about this topic was developed during a wonderful visit to CORE for the 1991–1992 academic year (on sabbatical from the University of Pennsylvania). This paper was originally circulated in December 1991 as CARESS Working Paper #91-38, Center for Analytic Research in Economics and the Social Sciences, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and in February 1992 as CORE Discussion Paper 9221, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics, Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. RID="*" ID="*" At the very start of my research, Jean-Fran?ois Mertens was almost a co-author. Fran?ois Forges provided detailed comments at a later stage, during my visit to THEMA, Université Cergy-Pontoise, in Spring 1997. They are entitled to the customary disclaimer.     

Expected widowhood duration varies with socio-economic status

This article examines the expected duration of widowhood and its variation by socio-economic status (SES). The relationship between widowhood duration (WD) and SES and how they relate to annuitization and longevity risk is relevant in the light of ongoing changes in many pension systems. Using data from Ireland, WD is estimated for older married individuals, as a function of spousal age gap and spousal longevity gap. Both of the gaps are negatively correlated with SES. Thus, WD is negatively correlated with SES. Wives in the bottom of the SES distribution have the highest degree of annuitization, protecting them against longevity risk brought about by a higher WD. The movement towards less automatic annuitization may impact future widows differently, depending on their SES.     

Body mass index in families: spousal correlation,endogeneity, and intergenerational transmission

Previous studies have documented spousal and intergenerational correlations in body mass index (BMI) but few have considered familial weight data augmented with socioeconomic and behavioral control variables. This article considers a U.S. dataset that contains such information on husbands, wives, and grown children. Although certain variables (like education, race, and smoking status) are helpful in explaining an individual’s BMI, the BMI of one’s spouse (or parents) remains the most significant predictor of BMI. To help distinguish between correlation and causality in the married-adult BMI regressions, we consider two alternative approaches for dealing with possible endogeneity (due to omitted variables): (1) including spousal variables to proxy for omitted variables and (2) modeling spousal BMI in a hierarchical framework to explicitly allow for a “couple” effect. The results suggest endogeneity of educational attainment, but not smoking status, and support prior research that finds different associations of BMI with income for husbands and wives. For grown children, parental BMI and smoking status are identified as significant predictors.     

IS THERE A (DOWNWARD SLOPING) DEMAND CURVE FOR VOLUNTEER LABOUR?

ABSTRACT * * I would like to thank the Indiana University Center on Philanthropy and the Irwin Foundation for financial support for my dissertation, which led to many of the ideas contained in this paper, as well as my dissertation advisors at Boston College. I would also like to thank my colleagues at John Carroll University and at the Mandel Center for Nonprofit Organizations at Case Western Reserve University, for their advice and comments on previous versions of this paper. All errors, however, remain my own responsibility.
: Are organizations that use volunteers content to accept all of the volunteer labour offered to them, or do they make some sort of demand-side decision as to how much volunteer labour to use? This paper looks for evidence of such a demand curve for volunteer labour in data collected by the Urban Institute in the early 1980s. Evidence is found that organizations are consistent over time in their use of volunteer labour.     

Australia's Immigration Selection System and Labour Market Outcomes in a Family Context: Evidence from Administrative Data

This paper examines the efficacy of the Australian points system in a family context among working-age permanent resident immigrants who arrived between 2000 and 2011 when there was a major focus on skills selection. Sixty-seven per cent of these immigrants were granted a skilled visa while 25 per cent hold a spousal visa (spouses of Australian citizens). More than half of the skilled visa recipients are the spouses of the primary applicants. Primary applicants among skilled visa holders are assessed for their skills in line with the Australian points system but secondary applicants, such as spouses, among skilled visa holders and spousal visa holders are not subject to any skills assessment before becoming permanent residents. We study differences in economic outcomes by permanent visa types and the role of points system factors in explaining these differences using the Personal Income Tax and Migrants Integrated Dataset and the Australian Census Longitudinal Dataset. We find that primary skilled visa holders earn at least 26–28 per cent more than spousal visa holders, and this is similar for both genders. However, spouses of primary skilled visa holders earn 13–18 per cent more than spousal visa holders. This difference is higher among females than males. Occupation differences can account for nearly half of the differences in income and can entirely capture the role of education and English proficiency. Primary skilled immigrants and their spouses have higher rates of labour force participation and employment than spousal visa holders, starting in the first year of arrival, and the gap is much higher for primary skilled visa holders, but these differences do not disappear quickly.     

Envy and the Islamic revival: Experimental evidence from Tunisia

I design and conduct a survey with an embedded lab-in-the-field experiment to test whether envy triggers popular support for the Islamic revival using a nationally representative sample of 600 Tunisians. Individuals exposed to high inequality may feel envious if they perceive that the success of others is granted rather than earned. Thus, envious individuals may be motivated to engage in religious and political activities to cope with their feelings. I trigger the sentiment of envy with a 2 ?×? 2 design by interacting a priming video and low stakes. I find that individuals in the envy treatment donate a larger proportion of their endowment to a politically involved religious charity, my measure of support for the Islamic revival. Overall, my experimental findings, consistent with survey data, confirm the idea that envy is an important determinant of popular support for the Islamic revival, even after controlling for religiosity.     

Socially Subjective Equilibrium in Strategic Form Games

This study provides a new framework and a new equilibrium concept, which are able to describe the situation where people have various images of the society and have various solution concepts for social outcomes, and where people accept the social outcomes. In socially subjective equilibrium, people have a coherence of their own norms in two senses. One is the consistency of the norm itself. Imagined outcomes should satisfy a certain (subjective) solution concept. The other is the consistency between the imagined outcomes and realized one. These are the main features of our equilibrium concept. This paper forms a part of my doctoral thesis, which is titled “On socially subjective equilibrium”. The first person I would like to thank is my direct supervisor Professor Ken Urai (Osaka University). I obtained a basic idea of the main concept of my doctoral thesis, that is, the solution concept scheme, from Professor Urai. I am grateful to Professor Hiroaki Nagatani (Osaka University) and Professor Ken-Ichi Shimomura (Kobe University), who monitored my works and took efforts in providing me with valuable comments on earlier versions of my thesis. I also obtained a fruitful advice from Professor Kenichi Amaya (Kobe University). Lastly, I specially thank to Kozo Shiraishi (Osaka University).     

Why is Corruption Tolerated?

It is maintained that a closer analysis of the features of the underlying contract reveals that under many circumstances corruption is in fact a rational and understandable reaction to institutional failures, which are often far from accidental. Sometimes it can even be considered legitimate, when instrumental in achieving goals shared by the vast majority of the electorate.To this purpose, three different stylized institutional frameworks are analyzed: developed, totalitarian and transition countries. The origin, scope and consequences of corruption vary significantly across the different frameworks. The normative conclusions should therefore be adjusted accordingly.     

Švejkian Geopolitics: Subversive Obedience in Central Europe

This article uses the character of Josef ?vejk from the popular Czech novel The Good Soldier ?vejk and his Fortunes in the World War to illuminate the subversive effects of irony and self-deprecating humour on dominant geopolitical narratives. Empirically, my examples focus on the coverage of NATO invitation in major Estonian newspapers in 2002. Theoretically, these examples highlight the subtlety of resistance and the central role of irony in it. By foregrounding ?vejkian absurd obedience, which is nonetheless highly subversive, the article contributes to a better understanding of popular geopolitics, resistance geopolitics, and more broadly, the role of human agency in geopolitical discourses.     

How does the marriage market clear? An empirical framework

Abstract. The paper surveys the Choo and Siow (2006a; CS) marriage matching model and its extensions. CS derives a behavioural marriage‐matching function. The collective model of intra‐household allocations can be integrated into this framework. Spousal labour supplies respond to changing marriage market conditions. Marriage market tightness, the ratio of unmarried type i men to unmarried type j women is a sufficient statistic for marriage market conditions for those types of individuals. The hypothesis that spousal labour supplies vary to equilibrate the marriage market has overidentifying restrictions. The framework extends to a dynamic marriage‐matching environment. Empirically, this paper shows how the famine caused by the great leap forward in Sichuan affected the marital behaviour of famine‐born cohorts. Marriage market tightness is shown to be a useful statistic for summarizing marriage market conditions in the United States. Marriage market conditions in the contemporary United States primarily affect spousal labour force participation rather than hours of work.     

Currency unions and trade: the effect is large

The impact of a common currency on trade can be grossly mismeasured if countries that belong to currency unions are systematically different from those that do not, and if the relationship between trade and its observable determinants is complex. I argue that such complications are plausible and likely to distort the empirical results of a recent Economic Policy paper by Andrew Rose (Issue 30, 2000: pp. 7–45). Using techniques designed to be robust in this situation, I find that the effects of common currency on international trade are considerably less dramatic and much less precisely estimated.
I have always maintained that the measured effect of a single currency on trade appears implausibly large, but I am not convinced by Torsten Persson's diagnosis and proposed solution. I apply a variety of estimation techniques to a new larger data set, where many more instances of currency union creation and abandonment make it possible to rely on time–series as well as cross–sectional evidence. The results are similar to my earlier ones: the effect of a single currency on trade is large.     

Endogenous gender power,household labor supply and the demographic transition

We present a microeconomic model of the household in which there exists no difference in spousal preferences but childrearing is more time costly for women. Bargaining between the wife and the husband forms the basis of household decisions. Marital bargaining power is determined according to the incomes of the spouses, which in turn help to determine their reservation utility levels outside the marriage. The endogeneity of bargaining power introduces a non-cooperative element to the couples' decision-making problem because both the husbands and the wives take into account how their pre-marital education decisions affect their marital power and the share they extract from household resources in the future. The model predicts that wives invest more than is Pareto efficient in their education in order to increase their bargaining power in marriage. As a consequence, couples have fewer children and consume more when exogenous structural changes lead women to invest more in education. A corollary of the model is that empowering women directly through social reforms such as a lower gender wage gap leads to lower fertility and higher spousal consumption and leisure.     

Changing One's Mind when the Facts Change: Incentives of Experts and the Design of Reporting Protocols

Experts often collect and report information over time. What reporting protocol elicits the most information? Here, a principal receives reports sequentially from an agent with privately known ability, who observes two signals about the state of the world. The signals differ in initial quality and, unlike previous work, differ in quality improvement . The paper finds that "mind changes" (inconsistent reports) can signal talent if a smart agent improves faster. Also, sequential reports dominate when the principal's decision is very sensitive to information; a single report dominates if the mediocre agent's signals improve faster or the agent is likely mediocre.
When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir? — John M. Keynes ¹     

Eriksson on Critical Realism: a rejoinder

Abstract

In this response to Andrew Mearman I argue that his critique suffers from a series of misrepresentations of my paper. For example, Mearman generalizes my arguments about Keynes to be about Critical Realism (CR), and he challenges my criticism of Tony Lawson's arguments by claiming that I have misrepresented CR. In fact the text of my 1998 paper does not support Mearman's claims. Furthermore, since (i) the principal aim of my paper was to question the interpretation of Keynes as a realist, and (ii) Mearman does not present any arguments suggesting how CR in its current form would refute my conclusions, his criticism must be judged doubly misdirected.     

IT adoption costs and productivity:: A reply to Diego Comin

Diego Comin (2002, Review of Economic Dynamics 5 (2)), critiques my paper “Technology adoption costs and productivity growth: The transition to information technology” (2002, Review of Economic Dynamics 5 (2)), concluding that all of my major results are unfounded. I contend, to the contrary, that my results hold up against his criticism. My paper analyzes the effect of investment adjustment costs on subsequent productivity growth for manufacturing industries. I find that adjustment costs increased substantially during the late 70's and early 80's and that this increase is associated with increased investment in information technology. I also estimate the effect of these adjustment costs on BLS productivity growth estimates. This analysis uses two datasets, the NBER–CES Manufacturing Industry Database (Bartelsman and Gray, 1996. NBER Working Paper 205) and the BLS Manufacturing Productivity release of April 2001. For the former I calculate productivity growth using a standard Solow residual; for the latter, I use BLS productivity growth estimates. Comin's critique, however, uses a different measure entirely. He introduces a “corrected TFP” measure that I believe is flawed. Most of his critique uses this measure, rather than the standard productivity growth measures I use. As a consequence, most of his criticism is not actually about my paper, but is, instead, about a paper Comin might have written using his measure. And because this measure is flawed, so is this alternative. In addition, he raises criticism of my evidence of a link between information technology (IT) and adjustment costs and of my corrections to BLS productivity estimates. I present additional evidence to address these concerns and to examine the robustness of my results.     

Currency unions and trade: how large is the treatment effect?

The impact of a common currency on trade can be grossly mismeasured if countries that belong to currency unions are systematically different from those that do not, and if the relationship between trade and its observable determinants is complex. I argue that such complications are plausible and likely to distort the empirical results of a recent Economic Policy paper by Andrew Rose (Issue 30, 2000: pp. 7–45). Using techniques designed to be robust in this situation, I find that the effects of common currency on international trade are considerably less dramatic and much less precisely estimated.
I have always maintained that the measured effect of a single currency on trade appears implausibly large, but I am not convinced by Torsten Persson's diagnosis and proposed solution. I apply a variety of estimation techniques to a new larger data set, where many more instances of currency union creation and abandonment make it possible to rely on time–series as well as cross–sectional evidence. The results are similar to my earlier ones: the effect of a single currency on trade is large.     

Agreeing on generalized Darwinism: a response to Geoffrey Hodgson and Thorbj?rn Knudsen

I thank Geoffrey Hodgson and Thorbj?rn Knudsen for their thought-provoking response to my latest generalization of Darwinism, and welcome their proposal to cooperate, after many years of our independent searches. I agree with them that our searches contain more similarities than both they and I had previously seen, but consider our remaining differences—especially in the terms employed and in the definitions of the terms we both employ, including “information,” “instructions,” “programs,” and “Lamarckism”—more important than they do. Their response also exaggerates or distorts some of my arguments. All this needs to be clarified before our cooperation can start.     

Building the Family Nest: Premarital Investments, Marriage Markets, and Spousal Allocations

We develop a transferable utility model of the household in which the marriage market is characterized by (negative or positive) assortative matching, and spousal allocations are determined by premarital investments. We demonstrate that all sharing rules along the assortative order support efficient outcomes both in terms of premarital investments and intra-household allocations. The efficiency of premarital choices and household allocations then enables us to show that, for each couple, the marriage market generates a unique and maritally sustainable sharing rule that is a function of the distribution of premarital endowments and the sex ratios in the market. According to our results, transfers among spouses occur on two margins: premarital investments and intra-marital spousal allocations. Asymmetries in the sex ratios in the marriage markets produce gender differences in premarital investments and consumption that are larger for individuals with small premarital endowments than those with larger endowments. A corollary of these findings is that, when men are in short supply in the marriage markets, women can invest more than men even when the returns to investment are lower or the costs are higher for women.