A Real Options Approach to Abatement Investments and Green Goodwill

In this paper we adopt the green goodwill argument as to why firms voluntarily invest in abatement capital. We investigate the effects on the abatement investment decision of changes in uncertainty about future green goodwill, competitor abatement investments, regulations, etc., using a real options framework. Our results indicate that increased uncertainty about consumers' willingness to pay for green products in the future discourage voluntary abatement investments. The model also suggests that voluntary abatement investments are promoted by an increased threat of regulation and competitor abatement investments. Furthermore, the benefit-cost ratio of the abatement investment project, at the point where it is optimal to invest, is independent of what regulatory regime (stringent or lenient) the firm operates in. We also conclude that despite the fact that voluntary abatement investment exists, there may still be room for environmental policy.     

The effect of uncertainty on pollution abatement investments: Measuring hurdle rates for Swedish industry

We estimate hurdle rates for firms’ investments in pollution abatement technology, using ex post data. The method is based on a structural option value model where the future price of polluting fuel is the major source of uncertainty facing the firm. The empirical procedure is illustrated using a panel of firms from the Swedish pulp and paper industry, and the energy and heating sector, and their sulfur dioxide emissions over the period 2000–2003. The results indicate that hurdle rates of investment vary from 2.7 to 3.1 in the pulp and paper industry and from 3.4 to 3.6 in the energy and heating sector depending on econometric specification.     

Environmental regulation and profitability: An application to Swedish pulp and paper mills

In this paper we analyze the impact on firm profits of the environmental regulations in the Swedish pulp and paper industry. The approach taken is a non-parametric programming model of the technology. A feature of this industry is that environmental regulations are determined individually for each mill. A question, then, is if these individual regulations have a similar impact on firm profits. The approach in this paper allows us to calculate both the regulated and unregulated profits, which means that the severity of the regulations, in terms of foregone profits, can be calculated for each mill. The empirical result shows that the impact on the mills varies substantially, and that the burden from the regulations is less severe in 1990 than in 1989.     

Emissions Trading and Profitability: The Swedish Pulp and Paper Industry

The purpose of this paper is to develop models with and without potential emissions trading and to compare industry profits under the two regimes. The model in which emissions trading is permitted is a nonparametric industry frontier model in the spirit of Färe et al. (1992). It is relative to this model that industry profit is computed. This profit is compared to the profit without emissions trading to give an estimate of the potential gains that can be realised by allowing for emissions trading. The model, which is applied to data for the Swedish pulp and paper industry, suggests that this industry would have had up to 6% (1%) higher profits in 1989 (1990) if emissions trading had been used instead of individual permits to achieve the same total emissions target. Currently there is no permit trading in this industry so our results only model the potential gains that can be made.     

Command-and-control revisited: Environmental compliance and technological change in Swedish industry 1970–1990

This paper addresses the issue of environmental policy instrument choice for achieving deep emission reductions in the industrial sector. Specifically, it provides: (a) a theoretical and empirical review of the conditions under which performance standards can provide efficient incentives for deep emission reductions and technology adoption; and (b) an analysis of the design and the outcomes of the standards-based regulation of industrial pollutants in Sweden during the period 1970–1990. Our empirical findings suggest that the Swedish regulatory approach comprised many key elements of an efficient policy-induced transition towards radically lower emissions in the metal smelting and pulp and paper industries. The regulation relied solely on performance standards, thus granting flexibility to firms in terms of selecting the appropriate compliance measures. These standards were implemented in combination with extended compliance periods. R&D projects and the new knowledge that was advanced incrementally in interaction between the company, the environmental authorities and research institutions provided a direct catalyst to the regulatory process. In these ways the Swedish regulatory approach provided scope for creative solutions, environmental innovation, and permitted the affected companies to coordinate pollution abatement measures with productive investments.     

Firms Responses to Effluent Regulations: Pulp and Paper in Ontario, 1985-1989

This paper explores the effects of effluent regulatory activity in the Ontarian pulp and paper industry. The model uses instrumental variables to distinguish between that correlation between emission limits and emissions coming from regulatory capture and that coming from true influence on the part of the regulator. Results suggest that total suspended solids (TSS) limits were more effective than biological oxygen demand (BOD) limits. Firm responses to TSS limits were in part through modulating output and these responses lowered emissions. In contrast, firms reported investing in abatement technology in response to BOD limits, but these investments had no discernible impact on emissions.     

A dynamic approach to voluntary environmental contributions in tourism

In an evolutionary game-theoretical model of tourism firms that use an endogenous natural Common Pool Resource (CPR) we show that stable equilibria with voluntary environmental initiatives may coexist with other equilibria where voluntary abatement is absent. The basins of attraction of the equilibria are identified and a bifurcation analysis is carried out producing two results with policy implications. First, there is a highly non-linear relationship between the cost of abatement required to be green and the share of green firms. Second, increases in the number of the CPR's users will ultimately dissipate the incentives to make abatement beyond regulation.     

Regulating a Polluting Oligopoly: Emission Tax or Voluntary Agreement?

This paper compares, in a polluting oligopoly, an emission tax and a form of environmental policy called voluntary agreement (VA). Here there are two ways of reducing pollution: output contraction and end‐of‐pipe abatement. Given the imperfect competition, firms’ reaction to the tax is sub‐optimal. They reduce output excessively in order to raise the price and do not abate enough. The VA is a take‐it‐or‐leave‐it contract on abatement effort, offered to the firms with the threat of a tax. It has a limited effect on output and always allows higher abatement than the tax. We find that this kind of VA may be more efficient than the tax in a concentrated industry, when pollution is not too harmful and when the abatement technology is rather efficient and cheap.     

Environmental Policy with Endogenous Technology from a Game Theoretic Perspective: The Case of the US Pulp and Paper Industry

The merits of different types of regulatory tools in eliminating pollution and at the same time inducing innovation have long been an interest of researchers in both environmental economics and industrial organization. Although there is a substantial theoretical literature investigating the potential for various environmental policies to attain these dual goals, this is a challenging empirical problem because every industry has its own inherent characteristics that play an important role in determining the performance of different regulatory tools. The majority of the work to date focuses on pollution abatement while leaving pollution prevention understudied. In most of the literature firms are also assumed to be symmetric. Asymmetries among firms add another degree and level of complexity to their strategic interactions, and affect the performance of different regulatory tools. This paper investigates the performance of two alternative regulatory tools, an emissions performance standard and an emissions tax, in reducing pollution and inducing pollution prevention and abatement R&D in the US pulp and paper industry. We construct a model representing the industry in an asymmetric Cournot duopoly framework, calibrate the model to disaggregated industry data, and run scenarios to replicate the behavior of the firms in an imperfectly competitive output market. Our results suggest that pollution prevention R&D can respond quite differently than abatement R&D to different policy instruments. The results indicate that R&D spillovers among firms play crucial role in technology development and strategies of the firms. Our results also suggest that strategic interactions between firms in an imperfectly competitive industry can have significant impacts of the levels of both types of R&D.      

How to design and use the clean development mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol? A developing country perspective

Under the Kyoto Protocol, industrialized countries committed to emission reductions may fullfil part of their obligations by implementing emission reduction projects in developing countries. In doing so, they make use of the so-called Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Two important issues surround the implementation of the CDM. First, if the cheapest abatement measures are implemented for CDM projects, developing countries may be left with only more expensive measures when they have to meet their own commitments in the future (the so-called low-hanging fruits (LHF) issue). Second, a choice must be made on the type of baseline against which emission reductions are measured: an absolute baseline or a relative (to output) one (the baseline issue). The purpose of this paper is to study the interactions between these two issues from the point of view of the developing country. Two major results are obtained. First, when possible future commitments for developing countries and irreversibility of abatement measures are taken into account, we show that the industry where CDM projects are implemented enjoys larger profits under an absolute baseline than under a relative one. Second, concerning the LHF problem, the financial compensation required by the developing country for implementing ‘too many’ CDM projects is larger under the relative baseline.     

Environmental Research Joint Ventures under Emission Taxes

The effect of environmentalpolicy depends crucially on the strategicbehavior of firms. Firms can undertakepollution abatement innovation cooperativelythrough environmental R&D joint ventures(RJVs). Environmental RJVs have not onlyenvironmental but also economic impacts. Threetypes of environmental RJV are discussed inthis paper: R&D cartelization in which firmschoose R&D efforts to maximize the jointprofit, RJV competition in which firms sharethe R&D fruits to maximize their own profits,and RJV cartelization in which firms share R&Dfruits and maximize the joint profit. An R&Dcartelization minimizes output quantities,maximizes the total emission, and minimizes thesocial surplus. An RJV cartelization with asufficiently high spillover coefficientmaximizes R&D efforts, minimizes the totalemission, and maximizes the social surplus.     

CORPORATE GOODWILL:

ABSTRACT ** : Corporate contributions to charity, like advertising expenditures, may have a long-term effect on a firm's image and profits. Recent examples of corporate giving show that many gifts are made in the 'enlightened self-interest' of the donor. One way to view corporate giving is as a managerial tool that affects the firm's profits. This paper examines charitable spending, where firms treat goodwill expenditures in both the product and factor markets as strategic variables. Contributions may be enhanced or impaired by contributions made by other firms. The model allows firms to make decisions about corporate giving that are cooperative or noncooperative, where efficiency is gained through cooperation. Market conditions determine whether cooperation is sustainable. As the time horizon lengthens, the discount factor of future earnings rises, or the level of industry cooperation rises, and firms are more likely to cooperate in charitable giving.     

When do firms support environmental agreements?

Several firms have recently supported their countries’ participation in international environmental agreements where countries commit to stricter environmental regulation. This paper analyzes the rationale of this conduct by examining equilibrium emission standards with and without environmental treaties. We identify that more stringent environmental regulation produces two effects on firm profits: a negative effect due to larger abatement costs, and a positive effect that arises from the amelioration of duopoly overproduction. We describe under which conditions the positive effect dominates the negative effect, increasing firm profits, and inducing them to support their countries’ participation in environmental treaties.     

Abuse of EU Emissions Trading for Tacit Collusion

In this paper, we show that loopholes in EU emissions trading law foster tacit collusion that impacts oligopolistic product markets. The abuses originate from the covert misuse of EU emissions trading institutions, such as pooling or project-based mechanisms. We analyse two types of these loopholes by means of game theoretical methods to show how oligopolistic firms establish output restrictions, even if those firms are price takers on the~permit market (which might actually be the case for the majority of obligated firms in the EU). The identified misuse of emissions trading law increases firms’ profits, decreases the consumers’ surplus and has negative effects on social welfare for specified parameter ranges. Consequently, public authorities should not allow emissions trading’s overall good reputation—based upon its efficient abatement of pollution—to blind them to options in European emissions trading legislation that would eventually restrict competition.      

Can ecolabels survive in the long run?: The role of initial conditions

This paper analyzes the interaction between three environmental strategies within a population of firms: brown, green, and certified green strategies. We first present a restricted version of an evolutionary game where only brown and green strategies are possible. Next, the model is extended to allow green firms to certify their environmental strategies by joining an ecolabel. Our analysis shows that when it survives, the ecolabel tends to fully replace other uncertified environmental initiatives and to increase the proportion of firms implementing voluntary abatement. Nevertheless, the long-run survival of the ecolabel is not a necessary outcome of the model, although it can be facilitated via policies that reduce abatement or certification costs, increase consumer's environmental concerns or improve the credibility of the certifier, whereas it may be reduced by green-wash news about the sector. An ecolabel's survival may also depend on how and when it is launched. In those common situations where the model has two stable equilibria, initial conditions play a key role in determining the ecolabel's survival. Specifically important determinants are the degree of adoption of voluntary abatement when the ecolabel is launched and the amount and composition of firms that participate in the creation of the ecolabel.     

Does Technological Innovation Really Reduce Marginal Abatement Costs? Some Theory,Algebraic Evidence,and Policy Implications

The existing literature models innovation in pollution control as a reduction in marginal abatement costs. We show that this assumption is inappropriate for production process innovations such as fuel switching. Algebraically, we examine the effects of different innovation types on marginal abatement cost curves, showing that some desirable innovations increase marginal abatement costs. Empirically, we estimate marginal abatement costs for sulfur dioxide by measuring the output distance function for electric power in Korea. Regression results confirm that production process innovations did raise marginal abatement costs in this case. One policy implication: economic instruments do not always provide stronger innovation incentives than command-and-control policies.      

Technical Synergies and Trade-Offs Between Abatement of Global and Local Air Pollution

In this paper, we explore the synergies and tradeoffs between abatement of global and local pollution. We build a unique dataset of Swedish combined heat and power plants with detailed boiler-level data 2001–2009 on not only production and inputs but also on emissions of \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) and \(\hbox {NO}_{\mathrm{x}}\). Both pollutants are regulated by strict policies in Sweden. \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) is subject to the European Union Emission Trading Scheme and Swedish carbon taxes; \(\hbox {NO}_{\mathrm{x}}\)—as a precursor of acid rain and eutrophication—is regulated by a heavy fee. Using a quadratic directional output distance function, we characterize changes in technical efficiency as well as patterns of substitutability in response to the policies mentioned. The fact that generating units face a trade-off between the pollutants indicates the need for policy coordination.     

节能减排约束下广东地区工业经济的可持续发展：2011—2020

本文基于方向性距离函数（DDF）模型,采用序列DEA方法测度和比较了广东省21市的工业在2011—2020年间不同节能减排情景的潜在产出变化,探索出广东工业未来可持续发展的最优节能减排情景。结果显示：对大部分地区工业而言,节能减排初始阶段会造成较大的潜在产出净损失,但最终会逐步实现潜在产出净增长;特别地,节能减排行为对经济发展水平较高的珠三角地区比经济发展水平较低的其它地区造成的损失更小。节能减排的技术进步是各地区工业环境全要素生产率增长的核心动力,当然技术效率在后期也发挥出作用,这些结果反映出各地区须进一步提高节能减排技术,最终实现工业经济的可持续发展。     

银行商誉资本与货币竞争性发行——来自中国白银风潮前夕银行微观数据的经验证据

1976年哈耶克提出了货币非国家化理论 ,主张赋予私人银行独立的货币发行权以约束政府滥发货币的行为 ,但反对者认为追求私利的发钞行必将无限增发货币引致通胀.文章将银行的发行和信贷统一起来分析银行声誉如何影响其发行行为,研究表明:在竞争性发行条件下 ,声誉机制能够有效地约束发钞行的行为,银行因追求长远收益而稳健发行.进而,文章以银行的生存历史和是否为上海银行公会会员度量声誉 ,利用白银风潮前夕中国34家发钞行和150家银行的微观数据检验声誉机制的作用 ,研究发现:声誉越好的银行,兑换券发行越稳健;声誉为银行带来了诸多经营优势,如更多的实收资本、盈余积累和存款 ,以致声誉好的银行贷款规模更大 ,利润水平更高 ;发钞行确实是因追求长远收益而稳健发行.根据民国时期银行竞争性发行的历史经验 ,文章首次为货币非国家化理论提供了微观证据 ,也为当前的货币政策制定和人民币国际化提供了启示.     

On the theory of the competitive firm with a utility function defined on profits and regret

In this paper we analyze the optimal output determined by a competitive firm facing uncertain demand. We analyze the effect of introducing uncertainty and the effect of increasing uncertainty on the optimal output, under the assumption that the utility function of the firm depends both on profits and on regret. We show that if the firm is more risk averse to profits than to regret (in a sense described below), both effects tend to decrease the optimal output. Similar effects of introducing uncertainty and of increased uncertainty were previously shown by Sandmo (1971) to exist in the case where utility is defined on profits only. Thus, this paper provides conditions under which the above results hold true, even when utility is defined on regret and on profits.