The (International) Political Economy of Falling Wage Shares: Situating Working-Class Agency

This paper relates the financial and monetary dimensions of the contemporary economic crisis to working-class agency via a central concern of classical political economy: the distribution of surplus between the chief factors of production. The fall in the wage share of value added is now accepted as a stylised fact in the empirical economic literature. This paper argues that the punctuated pattern of the development validates the regulation theoretical narrative of an epochal shift from Fordism to finance-led accumulation. Furthermore, synthesising econometric studies supports a class-centred explanation. In the last instance, the falling wage share is due to successful transnational class rule in the form of a neoliberal hegemonic paradigm. Crucially, such class rule restructured the environment of trade unions, rendering increasingly ineffective its relational power resources. The paper concludes by considering the contradictory implications for organised labour of the current financial crisis. On the one hand, the financial crisis offers an opportunity to link its particular interests to the general interest of macroeconomic management since low wage share inhibits growth rates. But how might trade unions assert a higher wage share in the face of the structural power of (financial) capital?     

The Location of Firms in Unionized Countries*

This paper develops a two‐country economic geography model with Cournot competition, where the labor markets are unionized so that trade unions bargain efficiently with each firm over wages and employment. Agglomeration forces are present due to wage premia obtained by the trade unions. It is shown that if the bargaining power of unions differs across countries then, as trade costs are reduced, the country with relatively weak unions gradually acquires all firms. However, for a range of trade costs, it is also a locally stable equilibrium for all firms to locate in the country with strong unions.     

Union Wage Effects and the Probability of Union Membership*

This paper uses Lee's (1978) model to determine the wage gains associated with trade union membership and the reasons individuals join trade unions in Australia The data are derived from the 1984 Australian National Social Science Survey. A major conclusion is that unions secure a 17.22 per cent wage gain for their members, other things the same. This expected wage premium is shown to have an important positive impact upon the union membership decision. The welfare loss associated with the union wage premium is argued to be relatively minor about one half of one per cent of gross domestic product     

Labour Demand, Wage Mark-ups and Product Market Integration

Globalization makes it easier to relocate production and thus employment across countries. Therefore, it is often asserted that labour demand becomes more elastic, causing wage mark-ups to fall and thus erode the effective market power of trade unions. We explore this issue in a general equilibrium model where the elasticity of labour demand is endogenized and related to the facility by which production can be relocated across countries. Wages and employment increase unambiguously as a result of product market integration, but it is ambiguous whether wage mark-ups decrease or increase. A numerical illustration suggests that the elasticity effect – even when the wage mark-up falls – is of second order relative to the gains from trade.      

Unions, progressive taxes, and education subsidies

Progressive income taxes moderate distortionary wage demands by trade unions and thereby reduce unemployment, and at the same time underlie disincentives to acquire skills and decrease labour productivity. Governments can respond by combining progressive taxes with subsidies to investment in human capital. A system of generous education subsidies and steep progressive tax rates is more likely to emerge, the greater the market power of trade unions and the better the ability of governments to influence private education decisions. Empirical analysis for several OECD countries provides results consistent with these propositions. A policy mix of high education subsidies and relatively progressive income taxes is found in countries where union membership is significant.     

Trade and Wages When the Trade Regime is Determined Endogenously

The paper shows that whether trade is one-way or two-way depends on wage strategies adopted by trade unions. The union's wage strategy choices themselves depend upon the conditions under which trade takes place, as well as upon the characteristics of both the labor and the product markets in the trading countries. Thus, trade and labor market outcomes are determined endogenously. Testable hypotheses are generated, and the implications of the theoretical model for the econometric analysis of trade and wages are discussed.     

Who is afraid of capital mobility? on taxation of labor income and the level of public services in an open economy

This paper deals with the effects of international capital mobility on the taxation of labor income and on the size of the public sector. It employs a model of the labor market where national trade unions set the wage level in their country and national governments set the tax rate of a proportional labor-income tax. The tax revenues are used to finance a public good and unemployment benefits. In this model, competition between the national trade unions caused by international capital mobility leads to full employment, and the governments supply the public good on the first best level. As no unemployment benefits have to be financed, the tax on labor income may decline with the introduction of capital mobility. These tax cuts may even overcompensate the unions for the wage decline.     

Unionization,international integration,and selection

Abstract We study how unionization affects competitive selection between heterogeneous firms when wage negotiations can occur at the firm or at the profit‐centre level. With productivity specific wages, an increase in union power has: (i) a selection‐softening; (ii) a counter‐competitive; (iii) a wage‐inequality; and (iv) a variety effect. In a two‐country asymmetric setting, stronger unions soften competition for domestic firms and toughen it for exporters. With profit‐centre bargaining, we show how trade liberalization can affect wage inequality among identical workers both across firms (via its effects on competitive selection) and within firms (via wage discrimination across destination markets).     

Minority positions in the German Council of Economic Experts: A political economic analysis

I study diversity in views expressed by economists regarding appropriate economic policies. The dataset is for voting by economists on the German Council of Economic Experts, over the period 1971–2011. The results show that the best predictor of minority voting is having been nominated by the trade unions, which results in being some 70 percentage points more likely to vote against the majority opinion. The voting pattern confirms that ideological identity through the channel of political appointment influences economists' voting behavior.     

Economic growth, skill-biased technical change and wage inequality: A model and estimations for the US and Europe

In recent literature skill-biased technical change has been viewed as a major cause for wage inequality. Some modelling and presentation of stylized facts have been undertaken for US time series data. A preliminary study of wage inequality in a model with knowledge as input in an aggregate production function has been presented by Riddell and Romer [General Purpose Technologies and Economic Growth, 1998, MIT Press]. Although some important forces determining wage inequality are widely accepted we know little about the quantitative impact of each source and differences across countries. We present a growth model of the Romer type with innovation-based technical change and two skill groups where the growth of knowledge, the relative supply of the two skill groups, externalities and substitution effects among the two groups are the driving forces for wage inequality. We undertake estimates for US time series data and contrast those estimates with results from some European countries. In particular, we compare parameter estimations for US and German time series data. The paper concludes that there is less wage inequality across skills in Europe in contrast to the US on the macroeconomic level. But, considering disaggregated data we observe some increases in inequality for Germany, too. Although our model reveals important variables for the explanation of wage inequality there may, however, also be other factors, such as trade unions, which have impacted the wage spread.     

Endogenous domestic market structure and the effects of a trade cost reduction in a unionised industry

In contrast to the existing partial equilibrium literature considering the effects of a trade cost reduction on unionised wage under a given market structure, we show the effects by determining the domestic market structure endogenously. A lower trade cost reduces the number of active domestic firms, but it increases unionised wage in the active domestic firms under decentralised unions. Although a lower trade cost increases wage in the active domestic firms, it reduces domestic employment and total union utility at the free entry equilibrium. So, a trade cost reduction benefits domestic employed workers by increasing the unionised wage, but its effect on the total domestic workers is not favourable. If there is a centralised union, a lower trade cost reduces the number of active domestic firms, unionised wage, domestic employment and union utility.     

Employment Protection Versus Flexicurity: On Technology Adoption in Unionised Firms*

We analyse how different labour‐market institutions – employment protection versus ‘flexicurity’– affect technology adoption in unionised firms. We consider trade unions’ incentives to oppose or endorse labour‐saving technology and firms’ incentives to invest in such technology. Increased flexicurity – interpreted as less employment protection and a higher reservation wage for workers – unambiguously increases firms’ incentives for technology adoption. If unions have some direct influence on technology, a higher reservation wage also makes unions more willing to accept technological change. Less employment protection has the opposite effect, as this increases the downside (job losses) of labour‐saving technology.     

Trade union power and jobs: theory and policy

This paper looks at the relationship between trade union power and jobs in a capitalist economy. It is argued that trade unions, as they threaten profitability, may hinder the functioning of capitalist economies. But, any adverse effects of trade unions on jobs arise because of the constraints imposed on trade union activity by the state and capitalists. In alternative forms of economic organization, trade unions are not likely to reduce the number of jobs. The implications of this argument for policy towards trade unions are also discussed.     

Hit by the Silk Road: how wage coordination in Europe mitigates the China shock*

Coordination in collective wage setting can constrain potential monopoly gains to unions in non-tradable industries. Countries with national wage coordination can thus stabilize overall employment against fluctuations and shocks in the world economy. We investigate this argument by exploring within-country variation in exposure to competition from China in 13 European countries. Our estimates demonstrate that in countries with uncoordinated wage setting, regions with higher import exposure experienced a marked fall in employment, while countries with wage coordination experienced no such employment effects. We show that our findings are robust to alternative measures of wage coordination, industry classifications, and trade exposure.     

Wage restraint and monetary union

Existing work on wage bargaining predicts more aggressive wage setting under monetary union. This is exemplified by Cukierman and Lippi (2001) who postulate that wages are set having area-wide prices in mind. The insight of aggressive wage behaviour has not been confirmed by the EMU experience, which has been characterised by wage moderation. The present paper investigates the possibility of wage restraint using a monetary union model which, realistically, assumes that trade unions set wages with national prices in mind. Drawing on plausible ranges for all parameter values (and macroeconomic shocks), our simulations show that a monetary union elicits real wages that are broadly comparable to those obtained under monetary autonomy. The confidence bounds around these results are rather wide, in particular including scenarios of wage restraint.     

Trade and unions: Does size matter?

Our empirical analysis builds upon the hypothesis that unions are detrimental to a firm's efficiency. Using a rich survey of German manufacturers, we investigate firm-level determinants on the probability of collective wage bargaining with particular focus on the impact of a firm's engagement in foreign markets. An interesting and very robust finding is that exporters are less likely to engage in union wage bargaining. This finding is in line with a pessimistic perception of unions. The negative effect of collective bargaining can be offset by efficiency gains for larger exporters, who can benefit from operation cost saving effects. Size does matter as larger firms export and may find bargaining with a single entity representing the workforce more convenient than bargaining with each worker individually. We are using firm level information on IT investment as instrument for the export dummy and successfully test for the validity of this instrument.     

Optimal contracts and the role of the government in wage bargaining

This paper introduces a contract between the government and trade unions in a model of strategic wage bargaining à la Lippi (2003). It shows that an optimal contract can be implemented through an appropriately defined inflation target.     

INFORMATION SHARING IN UNION–FIRM RELATIONSHIPS*

Large firms often negotiate wage rates with labor unions. When they do, an ex ante agreement to share information should make it more likely that they will reach an agreement and capture the gains from trade. However, if the firm refuses to share information, the union may shade down its wage demand to increase the probability of acceptance. This reduction in the wage can increase the joint surplus of the agents and increase social welfare. As a result, there are some circumstances in which bargaining with incomplete information can be better for the agents and society than bargaining with complete information.     

The impact of trade on employment,welfare, and income distribution in unionized general oligopolistic equilibrium

This paper sets up a multi-sector general oligopolistic equilibrium trade model in which all firms face wage claims of firm-level unions. By accounting for productivity differences across industries, the model features income inequality along multiple lines, including inequality between firm owners and workers as well as within these two groups of agents, and involuntary unemployment. We use this setting to study the impact of trade liberalization on key macroeconomic performance measures. In particular, we show that a movement from autarky to free trade with a fully symmetric partner country lowers union wage claims and therefore stimulates employment and raises welfare. Whether firms can extract a larger share of rents in the open economy depends on the competitive environment in the product market. Furthermore, the distribution of profit income across firm owners remains unaffected, while the distribution of wage income becomes more equal when a country opens up to trade with a fully symmetric trading partner. We also analyze how country size differences and technological dissimilarity of trading partners affect the results from our analysis.     

Economic Reforms in Socialist Economics: A Comment on Petr

Abstract:

The pre-WWII approaches to trade unions were mainly based on the theoretical and methodological viewpoints of early institutional economics. Trade unions were conceived of as politico-economic organizations whose members were motivated by relative comparisons, and also were concerned with issues of equity and justice. In the post-war period, there was a major theoretical and methodological shift toward the idea of unions as optimizing economic units with well-defined objective functions, which are optimized subject to purely economic constraints. This conceptual transformation took place mainly through the Dunlop -Ross debate, in which John Dunlop conceived of unions as analogous to business firms, as opposed to Arthur Ross’s institutional and political approach. However, after decades of analytical developments, the current state of trade union theory has not produced very impressive theoretical results. We trace the historical development of the economic analysis of trade unions from a methodological perspective. We also examine the methodological reasons for the dominance of Dunlop’s approach, and the current state of – and the contemporary criticism toward – the established theory. Furthermore, we discuss the contemporary efforts to build a more comprehensive approach to trade union theory and trade union objectives, also incorporating Ross’s institutional and political insights.