Evaluating borrower’s default risk in peer-to-peer lending: evidence from a lending platform in China

Recent years have witnessed the popularity of online peer-to-peer lending, which allows individuals to borrow from and lend to each other on an Internet-based platform. Using data from a large P2P platform in China, this article explores the factors that determine the default risk based on the demographic characteristics of borrowers. Moreover, we propose a credit risk evaluation model, which can quantify the default risk of each P2P loan. Empirical results reveal that gender, age, marital status, educational level, working years, company size, monthly payment, loan amount, debt to income ratio and delinquency history play a significant role in loan defaults. Finally, we analyse the relationship between default risk and these contributory variables, and the possible causes are also discussed in this study.     

Risk sharing and transition costs in the reform of pension systems in Europe

Unfunded pay-as-you-go state pension schemes are financially unsustainable in Europe as elsewhere. Proponents of reform argue that, by switching to a fully funded scheme that takes advantage of the high return on assets such as equities, the solvency of the state scheme could be restored at little or no financial burden to current taxpayers. We show that this is mistaken for two reasons.
First, making the transition is itself costly. Unless this cost is substantially financed by debt, it will fall on current generations, who are therefore likely to oppose the reform. Second, potentially higher returns are accompanied by significantly higher risk, which we quantify. We explain how an insurance scheme could be designed to mitigate both risk and moral hazard.     

区域森林保险发展的影响因素及优化策略——以湖南省为例

通过阐述区域森林保险发展的机理,建立模型对湖南省森林保险保费收入与参保比例、林农收入、上年度森林保险赔付率及GDP之间的关系进行分析,并据此提出应明确区域森林保险险种供给的主导方向,提高森林保险的保障水平,进行森林灾害风险区划,增加财政补贴森林保险保费的标准,依据不同的险种提供不同的补贴额等区域森林保险发展的对策建议。     

Health insurance subsidies and the expansion of an implicit marriage penalty: a regional comparison of various means-tested programmes

Any subsidy provision for healthcare premiums, including those embedded in Affordable Care Act (ACA), has the potential to result in some couples facing an implicit penalty when married relative to unmarried. To illustrate such consequences of means-tested subsidies of health insurance premiums, we construct hypothetical households earning different levels of income who are eligible for current subsidies in the USA. and compare the estimated implicit marriage penalty faced by these households to the one faced by low-income households who are eligible for various means-tested programmes (e.g. TANF, WIC, SNAP) for each of the 48 contiguous states. We find that, like very low-income households, marriage can potentially penalize couples who receive health insurance premium subsidies by decreasing their overall disposable income by as much as 14%. We find that the ACA increases the number of households subject to marriage penalties embedded in means-tested programmes for low-income couples. This distortion will exist for any future health insurance premium subsidies that are means tested at the household income level.     

Insurance,credit, and technology adoption: Field experimental evidencefrom Malawi

Does production risk suppress the demand for credit? We implemented a randomized field experiment to ask whether provision of insurance against a major source of production risk induces farmers to take out loans to adopt a new crop technology. The study sample was composed of roughly 800 maize and groundnut farmers in Malawi, where by far the dominant source of production risk is the level of rainfall. We randomly selected half of the farmers to be offered credit to purchase high-yielding hybrid maize and groundnut seeds for planting in the November 2006 crop season. The other half of farmers were offered a similar credit package, but were also required to purchase (at actuarially fair rates) a weather insurance policy that partially or fully forgave the loan in the event of poor rainfall. Surprisingly, take-up was lower by 13 percentage points among farmers offered insurance with the loan. Take-up was 33.0% for farmers who were offered the uninsured loan. There is suggestive evidence that reduced take-up of the insured loan was due to farmers already having implicit insurance from the limited liability clause in the loan contract: insured loan take-up was positively correlated with farmer education, income, and wealth, which may proxy for the individual's default costs. By contrast, take-up of the uninsured loan was uncorrelated with these farmer characteristics.     

Odious Debt in an Imperfect World

The odious debt problem refers to a government's ability to borrow for elite consumption while the general population repays. Although an intuitive response is to ban lending to such regimes, this paper shows that if a government faces endogenous replacement risk, then an international odious debt doctrine which (i) decreases the country's debt ceiling; (ii) decreases the likelihood that the citizens must repay the debt; or (iii) increases the government's cost of borrowing for a given default risk can all decrease citizens' welfare. These findings suggest that, even when a regime is clearly odious, allowing it to borrow up to a point may be preferable to a complete lending ban.     

EASY MONEY OR HARD TIMES? HEALTH AND 401(k) LOANS

Rising health care costs and declining personal savings rates are nearly synonymous with household medical debt. For some, defined contribution (DC) retirement savings plans provide a ready source of funds to meet these medical debts. We examine whether health status and health insurance coverage predict the likelihood of having a DC loan using data from the Federal Reserve's triennial Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) from 1989 to 2007. We find that poor health raises the likelihood that a household will borrow from their DC plans, even controlling for other forms of debt, access to credit, and whether households are covered by health insurance. Our estimates of the amount of the DC loan, taking selection effects into account, indicate that DC loan amounts are also influenced by health status; those with poor health borrow more from their DC plans. Apart from health status, once a household decides to borrow from their retirement funds, race and education also influence how much to borrow. We argue that public policy can improve the long‐term financial retirement security of households by offering more opportunities to save for medical emergencies, while cautiously maintaining the opportunity to borrow from DC plans. (JEL D12, D14, D91)     

Default and aggregate income

This paper studies how default varies with aggregate income. We analyze a model in which optimal contracts enable risk sharing of privately observed, idiosyncratic income by allowing for default. Default provisions allow agents with low idiosyncratic income realizations to repay less and thus provide insurance. Default penalties ensure that only these agents default. We show that default can occur under the optimal contract and that default provisions vary with aggregate income. We provide conditions such that both the amount of default and default penalties vary countercyclically with aggregate income and show that the default rate can be discontinuous.     

消费者对地理标志农产品支付意愿的实证分析——以盐池滩羊为例

以农产品主销区消费者调查问卷为依据,分析了影响因素对消费者地理标志农产品支付意愿的实际影响。结果表明:消费者对农产品地理标志了解和认知程度仍处初级阶段;受教育程度正向影响购买意愿,反向影响溢价支付意愿;对农产品注册为地理标志了解程度、对农产品口感味道评价正向影响购买意愿和支付意愿;非穆斯林、已婚、羊肉占肉类消费比重正向影响购买意愿,而家庭收入水平、无羊肉忌口、无超市购物去处等则正向影响溢价支付意愿;但性别、年龄、农产品品牌了解程度、地理标志了解程度等均未显著影响消费者支付意愿。     

A finite-life private-information theory of unsecured consumer debt

We present a theory of unsecured consumer debt that does not rely on utility costs of default or on enforcement mechanisms that arise in repeated-interaction settings. The theory is based on private information about a person's type and on a person's incentive to signal his type to entities other than creditors. Specifically, debtors signal their low-risk status to insurers by avoiding default in credit markets. The signal is credible because in equilibrium people who repay are more likely to be the low-risk type and so receive better insurance terms. We explore two different mechanisms through which repayment behavior in the credit market can be positively correlated with low-risk status in the insurance market. Our theory is motivated in part by some facts regarding the role of credit scores in consumer credit and auto insurance markets.     

Cost of Road Accident Fatalities to the Economy

Road accidents have a major impact on the economy as well as society. In other words, such an event also has an impact on the affected individuals’ contribution back to society and state. The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of traffic accidents on the economy. We evaluate the value or cost of a human life in traffic accidents. To estimate the cost, we need to know the income contribution of each individual via his or her employment or other earnings, i.e. his or her income-generating capacity for the remainder of his or her life, had the incident not occurred. Then we find the “present value” of such income, adjusted for the probability of such an event (fatality) happening. This is similar to the calculation of a pure insurance premium. Assessment of the economic impact caused by human life loss is dealt with using insurance-based methods. We calculate the burning cost of an insurance policy that provides coverage for the risk under investigation. It is of interest to the state and the family of the deceased to recover as much of this lost income as possible.     

Mispricing of Risk in Sovereign Bond Markets with Asymmetric Information

The likelihood that a government will repay its sovereign debt depends both on the amount of debt it issues and on the government's future ability to repay. Whilst the former is publicly observable, the government may have more information about the latter than investors. This paper shows that this asymmetric information problem impairs the market's ability to differentiate economies according to their fiscal sustainability, and can lead to a disconnect between bond prices and default risk. The model can help rationalise the behaviour of Eurozone bond prices prior to the recent European sovereign debt crisis.     

How a Bank Bailout may Increase Systemic Risk

In 2008–2009, the US government spent trillions of dollars to bailout its financial system and prevent insolvency due to a deterioration in domestic loan portfolios. The following dips in US bond prices suggest that global investors feared that the US was over-extending itself and might be unable to repay its debt with taxes rather than inflation. The paper illustrates that if uncertainty arises about a large government's ability to raise taxes to repay its debt, then a debt-financed bailout which initially restores bank health may inadvertently contribute to the financial system's ultimate demise if banks are important lenders to a foreign country that pegs its currency to the domestic money.     

AFTERMATH OF THE THRIFT CRISIS: BALANCING THE ECONOMY'S BOOKS

The thrift crisis has presented the federal government with a cleanup bill of unparalleled magnitude. Estimates of the present-value cost range from $90 billion to $140 billion. Most observers acknowledge that the economic cost of the crisis already has occurred in the form of lost investment opportunities and a lower capital stock. Fewer acknowledge, however, that full payment of the cost can be made only through a reduction in private sector claims to wealth so as to match the misuse of deposits and soured loans made by thrifts. Some of that reduction has occurred through equity write-downs in businesses and thrifts, but much of the necessary reduction has yet to occur. The necessary reduction constitutes an increased tax burden.
The thrift insolvencies, coupled with deposit insurance and bankruptcy of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), threw the economy's books out of balance: Claims on real assets in the form of insured deposits exceeded the value of assets owned by thrifts and insurance reserves of the FSUC. In the absence of deposit insurance, a write-down of claims would have occurred through the market mechanism and the bankruptcy courts. In the presence of deposit insurance, the write-down must be through taxation and the political mechanism. Recently enacted legislation will effect the writedown by spreading the taxation over time through debt finance, relying primarily on future taxes to service the debt. The desirability of debt finance hinges on whether the legislation also will prevent a recurrence of future crises. Critics maintain that prevention must entail reform of deposit insurance.     

A dynamic model of unsecured credit

We study the terms of credit in a competitive market in which sellers (lenders) are willing to repeatedly finance the purchases of buyers (borrowers) by engaging in a credit relationship. The key frictions are: (i) the lender cannot observe the borrower?s ability to repay a loan; (ii) the borrower cannot commit to any long-term contract; (iii) it is costly for the lender to contact a borrower and to walk away from a contract; and (iv) transactions within each credit relationship are not publicly observable. The lender?s optimal contract has two key properties: delayed settlement and debt forgiveness. Finally, we study the impact of changes in the initial cost of lending on the contract terms.     

中国养老金隐性债务规模估算

随着我国养老保险体制的转轨,现收现付制下形成的隐性债务开始显性化,形成了庞大的统筹资金缺口.而解决养老金隐性债务的基本前提是要准确测算债务规模.本文在分析隐性债务来源的基础上,将我国参保职工分为五类,采取个体成本法精算出2008年初的养老金隐性债务规模.     

中国寿险需求实证分析

本文对国内外的寿险需求分析研究进行了简单综述，在此基础上抽取全目30省市1998—2003年的数据．采取面板数据模型就收入、通货膨胀、社会保障、银行利率、死亡率等寿险需求影响因素与保费收入相关性作了Granger因果性检验分析。     

Income tax deductions for losses as insurance revisited

Kaplow (1992) shows that allowing income tax deductions for losses as partial insurance is undesirable in the presence of private insurance markets. This paper revisits the issue by considering a model that integrates Kaplow (1992) with Stiglitz (1982). We address the following question: Whether the income tax deduction for losses is part of an optimal income tax system. We show that introducing the income tax deduction for uninsured losses to complement an optimal nonlinear labor income tax will Pareto-improve welfare, provided that: (i) information is incomplete for the government as in the Stiglitz framework, and (ii) the premium for private insurance is unfair or moral hazard is present.     

IMF Conditionality as a Screening Device

A theoretical model is developed in which both buybacks and the adoption of an IMF programme can be used as screening devices which enable a creditor to discriminate between debtor countries which are willing to use debt relief in order to invest and repay and countries which are not. Asymmetric information is assumed. This problem can be solved if the country has sufficient resources to engage in a debt buyback and so gain the debt relief. When the country is credit constrained, an alternative screening mechanism is to undertake an IMF programme in return for debt reduction and possibly an IMF loan.     

Loan guarantees and the cost of debt: evidence from China

In this article, we examine the potential influence of loan guarantees and the nature of ownership on a company’s cost of debt. Using data on Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2014, we find that guaranteeing another entity’s debt significantly increases the guarantor’s cost of its own debt. Regarding the nature of ownership, our results indicate that the cost of debt for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is lower than that for non-SOEs. Among SOEs, firms controlled by the central government have lower cost of debt than firms controlled by local governments. We also find some evidence that local government ownership mitigates the effects of loan guarantees on the cost of a guarantor’s own debt.