Privatization Policies and Public Enterprise: A Survey*

This paper surveys and analyzes the economic literature on ‘privatization’ policies, restricting coverage to policies designed to improve the operating efficiency of public sector enterprises through increased exposure to competitive market forces. These include asset sales, liberalization (or deregulation) and franchising. The objectives, incentives and constraints of public and private enterprises are examined, and evidence on their comparative performance is analyzed. Public sector revenue effects from asset sale are also explored. On the basis of these considerations, the paper concludes that liberalization is an important ingredient in any policy package designed to improve the operating efficiency of public sector enterprises. Asset sale may enhance the beneficial impact of deregulation but asset sale in the absence of deregulation is unlikely to improve efficiency, and may introduce additional market distortions. Franchising is seen as an appropriate mechanism for privatization when the market is inherently monopolistic and when the government desires to retain control over output and/or price.     

An international comparison of hospital efficiency: does institutional environment matter?

The consensus among many health economists is that no meaningful performance differences exist among for-profit and non-profit hospitals in the US, but this topic has continued to be a matter of academic, judicial, and public policy interest. A similar debate has ensued internationally, regarding the potential efficiency gains from privatization of public enterprises. In this paper, we examine empirical evidence from the public, highly regulated Norwegian hospital sector and the private, highly competitive and unregulated California hospital sector to ascertain whether institutional environment and level of market competition significantly affect the degree of productive efficiency in hospitals. We compare and discuss the productive efficiency of four similar sets of hospitals operating in different institutional and competitive environments. The four samples are carefully matched in the dimensions of sample size, hospital size, and average lengths of stay. Heterogeneity in output definition is used to control for other dimensions (casemix, age distribution of patients). We use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to estimate and compare average long-run as well as short-run efficiency measures across groups. We find that scale and scope regulation of Norwegian hospitals improves long-run efficiency, primarily due to better utilization of capital.     

论港口业务领域的分类规制政策

港口产业是国民经济的战略性基础产业和自然垄断产业改革的重要对象。对港口产业经济特性的传统认识使之长期以政府规制和公共经营为主导发展特征,但这却导致港口服务低效率和高成本。以往研究港口产业经济特性时,一般是从整体的角度来描述其自然垄断性,并认为有必要由政府施加经济规制。但实际上,对港口业务应该做进一步细分,以更准确地认识其经济特性。根据对港口不同业务领域规制需求的分析,在港口产业规制改革的具体过程中应该实行分类规制政策。为保障港口民营化改革的成功实施,基于对港口各业务环节不同经济特性的分类识别,提出了港口规制改革政策的基本模式,即在仍具有自然垄断特征的基础设施环节保持内生规制和引进接入定价规制,在竞争性环节放松或取消规制、实行竞争强化战略,在中间领域引入激励性规制。     

LIBERALIZATION WITHOUT DEREGULATION: U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY DURING THE 1980s

During the past 20 years, the U.S. telephone industry has undergone a remarkable evolution from a set of government-enforced monopolies to a much more competitive environment. Long-distance service, private-line service, data communications, and terminal equipment once were available only from the telephone monopolist. Now they are freely available from numerous competitive suppliers due to a series of regulatory and judicial decisions. But despite this veritable explosion in competition, the telephone industry still is regulated at both the federal and state levels. Only the provision of terminal equipment is totally deregulated.
Regulating telephone rates has created a highly inefficient rate structure replete with cross-subsidies. Legislators' and state regulators' reluctance to eliminate these cross-subsidies remains the most important hurdle to transforming the telephone industry to a fully competitive market. Nevertheless, liberalizing entry has generated some economic efficiencies through its effect on productive efficiency and on regulated rates. Productive efficiency gains may have reached $3 billion by 1988, and the welfare gains from the limited rationalization of rates caused by entry are nearly $1 billion per year.
Fully deregulating long-distance and local service requires that regulators abandon their policies of cross-subsidizing rural residences at the expense of businesses and of cross-subsidizing local service at the expense of long-distance service. Movement toward deregulation is progressing at the federal level and in some states, but full deregulation appears unlikely in the foreseeable future.     

Market deregulation,trade liberalization and productive efficiency in Bangladesh agriculture: an empirical analysis

The impact of trade liberalization and of market deregulation in general, on the performance of agriculture remains contentious and empirical issue in the literature. Following the random coefficient frontier modelling framework, this paper attempts to contribute to this debate by computing the farm-specific productive efficiency indices in Bangladesh agriculture before and after reform. It also examines the impact of some farm-specific and policy variables on productive efficiency. The empirical results show that there are wide variations in productive efficiency across farms and regions and the average efficiency of all regions increased modestly by 8 percentage points from the pre-reform to post-reform period. The efficiency differentials are largely explained by farm size, infrastructure, households' off-farm income and the reduction of government anti-agricultural bias in relation to trade and domestic policies. The implication of these results suggests the need for further policy reform to augment productive efficiency.     

Deregulation, competition and consumer welfare in a banking market: evidence from Hong Kong

This paper examines competition among commercial banks following deregulation in a small open economy. I jointly estimate a system of differentiated product demand and pricing equations, and use conduct parameters to identify market structure. Overall, I find positive outcomes for the banking deregulation, which suggest that the benefits of deregulation understood in large industrialized economies indeed apply to a small open economy. Encouragingly, the industry becomes more competitive and the consumers are better-off after the deregulation. Empirical results also indicate that the banking sector is characterized by non-cooperative competitive behavior. Bank size is an important determinant of consumer’s bank choice.     

COMPETITION OR COOPERATION IN URBAN SERVICE DELIVERY?

ABSTRACT: Inter‐municipal cooperation is now as common among US local governments as for profit privatization. This article uses data from a national survey in 2007 to explore the benefits of cooperation – economies of scale, service coordination across the metropolitan region and greater community control. While privatization reforms have focused on harnessing the benefits of a competitive market, cooperation may be the new frontier where economies of scale and efficiency gains can be achieved with governments working together in a new form of collaborative service delivery.     

Optimal privatization of vertical public utilities

Abstract We examine restructuring, divestiture, and deregulation of a vertically integrated public utility, (e.g., electricity), from a public finance perspective. How an optimal restructuring plan for the utility depends on the cost of public funds and on the X‐efficiency gains from privatization, how the optimal degree of competition in the upstream and downstream segments are connected, and implications of privatization for consumer prices are examined. The higher the cost of public funds, the more likely the post‐privatization price will exceed the regulated public utility price. The greater the X‐efficiency gains from privatization, the more likely the post‐privatization price will fall.     

Industrial Policy and Islamic Finance

Debates on industrial policy have typically focused on interventions in the ‘real’ sector to facilitate the transformation of a resources-based economy to one that is based on manufacturing. Although the financial sector has always figured strongly in these discussions, its development, or rather repression, is almost always considered in the context of serving the ‘real’ sector. In contrast, this paper contributes to the emerging literature on government policies to develop financial sectors into independent and internationally competitive sources of economic growth on their own right through an analysis of the development of Islamic finance in Malaysia. The paper argues that the emergence of Islamic finance in Malaysia, and the country's evolution into a key player of the sector in the global market, can be attributed to developmental efforts or industrial policies adopted by the government. The case of Islamic finance in Malaysia suggests the continuing relevance of industrial policy for developmental purposes. More importantly, it demonstrates that developing countries can chart a path towards services-led growth, the next frontier in economic development.     

The impact of product market regulation on productivity through firm churning: Evidence from European countries

Productivity performance in European countries has been a policy concern for several decades. This paper shows that productivity can be enhanced by product market policies which, by increasing competition and efficiency, facilitate higher rates of firms’ entry and exit (i.e. firm churning). Drawing on annual country-sector data for the period 2000–2014 across the EU countries, we find that: (i) competition-enhancing regulation is associated with a higher rate of firm churning; (ii) firm churning, in turn, appears to be positively related to higher total factor productivity at the sector level by facilitating the entry of new competitive firms and the exit of less productive ones. Overall, we conclude that stringent product market regulation can be indirectly associated, via its impact on business dynamism, with the somewhat weak productivity performance in a number of EU countries. Thus, our results point towards substantial productivity gains that could follow from the introduction of further competition-enhancing measures in product markets.     

Government efficiency,institutions, and the effects of fiscal consolidation on public debt

We study the evolution of the ratio of public debt to GDP during 132 fiscal episodes in 21 OECD countries in 1981–2008. Our main focus is on debt dynamics during 40 consolidation periods. To define these periods we use data on the evolution of the underlying cyclically adjusted primary balance, and as such avoid biases that may be induced by one-off budgetary measures. The paper brings new evidence on the role of public sector efficiency for the success of fiscal consolidation. First, we confirm that consolidation programs imply a stronger reduction of the public debt ratio when they rely mainly on spending cuts, except public investment. Government wage bill cuts, however, only contribute to lower public debt ratios when public sector efficiency is low. Second, we find that a given consolidation program will be more effective in bringing down debt when it is adopted by a more efficient government apparatus. Third, more efficient governments adopt consolidation programs of better composition. As to other institutions, consolidation policies are more successful when they are accompanied by product market deregulation, and when they are adopted by left-wing governments. By contrast, simultaneous labor market deregulation may be counterproductive during consolidation periods.     

Economic transition and the distributions of income and wealth

This paper relies on a model of wealth distribution dynamics and occupational choice to investigate the distributional consequences of policies and developments associated with transition from central planning to a market system. The model suggests that even an efficient privatization designed to be egalitarian may lead to increases in inequality (and possibly poverty), both during transition and in the new steady-state. Creation of new markets in services also supplied by the public sector may also contribute to an increase in inequality, as can labour market reforms that lead to a decompression of the earnings structure and to greater flexibility in employment. The results underline the importance of retaining government provision of basic public goods and services; of removing barriers that prevent the participation of the poor in the new private sector; and of ensuring that suitable safety nets are in place.     

A duration analysis of privatization in the telecom sector

The paper attempts to identify the telecom-sector performance indicators, relevant economic variables, and institutional characteristics of a country that effect the process of privatization of state-owned telecom enterprises. Using standard duration analysis of a panel data, we demonstrate that the privatization incentives are not only shaped by the mobility of financial capital in a country but are also influenced by the degree of competitiveness of private sector participation in policy-making process. The empirical results also reveal the significant impact of productive efficiency in telecom service provision on its course to privatization. We thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. We are solely responsible for all mistakes.     

Differential Effects of Rail Deregulation on US Grain Producers

The efficiency benefits of US rail industry deregulation have been widely documented. This research provides new insight regarding the accrual of benefits within the US grain industry. A study of rail grain rates from 1980 to 2000 finds railroads decreased rates for all grain shippers. The greatest gain in benefits was to producers in the most competitive market environments. Regions and products with less competitive transportation markets will become increasingly disadvantaged if the trend continues. Rail rates are a key determinant in grain market viability and producer profitability in these rail dominated markets.     

澳大利亚教育“去管制化”与“教育公共化”运动

本篇主旨为探讨澳大利亚的教育变革是在去管制化趋势下,朝向偏重资源运用的效率、市场竞争导向和消费者利益为考虑的变革,对教育本身产生价值冲击。去管制化政策保障新市场的运行,扩大既成市场利润,导致教育资源的垄断和财团化。这也意味着财团的权力扩大,社会冲突增加,公民权力受到限缩与压制。其结果）中击到澳大利亚人民一百多年来所建立的平等主义、进步主义和多元文化等人文社会价值,以及这些价值所体现的不分阶级、性别、种族和国籍的社会内容与教育哲学。随着新自由主义的管理主义导向,这些传统价值逐渐流失。于是,澳大利亚教育工会和公共大学协会等公民组织开始反思新自由主义所带来的危害,他们经由倡议、论辩与活动,提出不同的观点与行动策略。本文旨在探讨澳大利亚公民社会自20世纪90年代以来如何对新自由主义去管制化政策进行批判,如何重新组织教育,如何经由论辫提出建设性的方案。     

产业界、科研机构与金融业的合作环境——英国促进科技成果转化的最新政策

在科技成果转化过程中,各参与主体不是孤立存在的。产业界、科研机构与金融业等各参与方的合作环境建设可成为政府相关宏观政策的着力点。英国在相关方面进行了长期探索,其政策领域处于世界前列。经过全面研究,按不同政策对象主体,英国政府科技成果转化的相关政策大致分为学术界、产业界、金融业和非正式风险资本市场四大类,形成了科技成果转化的政策体系,基本覆盖了科技成果转化过程的各个方面。特别是英国政府在金融业和非正式风险投资领域的政策方面,其经验具有较好的参考价值。     

Public Monopoly,Mixed Oligopoly and Productive Efficiency

In general, the introduction of competition into the public sector seems to lead to higher cost‐efficiency in service production. However, there are examples of substantial cost increases in some areas. In this paper, using a mixed oligopoly model, we investigate the effects of deregulation on the cost‐reducing incentives of a public firm. Our results show that a firm that is a public monopoly has greater incentive to conduct cost‐reducing investment than a public firm within mixed oligopoly market.     

Disentangling liberalization and privatization policies: Is there a political trade-off?

We empirically investigate the political determinants of liberalization and privatization policies in six network industries of 30 OECD countries (1975–2007). We unbundle liberalization and privatization reforms and study their simultaneous determination in a two-equation model. Unlike previous studies, we account for cross-effects between the two pro-market measures. Our findings unveil that both right-wing and left-wing governments implement liberalizations and privatizations, showing a common trend under the so-called neo-liberalism wave. However, although the privatization rate is higher than liberalization in right-wing environments, the opposite occurs under left-wing governments. We argue that ideological cleavages still affect pro-market reforms, particularly the combination of privatization and liberalization policies. We conclude that different deregulation patterns should be expected under governments characterized by different political ideologies. Our results shed new light on the literature investigating the political-economic rationale underpinning pro-market choices.     

Partisan politics: The empirical evidence from OECD panel studies

This paper describes the empirical evidence on partisan politics in OECD panel studies. I elaborate on the research designs, the measurement of government ideology and why the empirical studies did not derive causal effects. Discussing about 100 panel data studies, the results indicate that leftwing and rightwing governments pursued different economic policies until the 1990s: the size and scope of government was larger when leftwing governments were in power. Partisan politics have not disappeared since the 1990s, but have certainly become less pronounced. In particular, government ideology still seems to influence policies such as privatization and market deregulation. I discuss the consequences of declining electoral cohesion and what future research needs to explore.     

Inefficient arbitrage in inter-regional electricity transmission

This paper analyzes the efficiency of an explicit ex ante auction for network access to facilitating trade between two separate, but linked, electricity wholesale markets. It is generally assumed that greater regional interconnection will mitigate the exercise of local market power by dominant generators, but we show analytically that when a dominant player has access to a more competitive neighboring market, and is also the lowest cost producer, the exercise of market power becomes attractive and can have negative consumer welfare implications. For an empirical analysis, we use a unique data set of daily company-level flow nominations on the Anglo-French Interconnector (IFA). This provides a clear case study, “free of loop flows” (with the IFA being the only link between the UK and France). We are able to identify evident inefficiencies in the market behavior, for which several explanations, including market power, may contribute.