The Monetary Policies of the European Central Bank and the Euro's (Mal-)Performance: A stability-oriented assessment

The stability-oriented macroeconomic framework established in the Treaties on European Union, especially the unparalleled status of independence and peculiar mandate of the European Central Bank (ECB), were promised virtually to guarantee price stability and a strong euro. Shattering these hopes and promises in a rather drastic way, the euro's external value has declined markedly while consumer price inflation has quadrupled since the new currency's inception. This paper assesses the ECB's role in relation to the euro's (mal-)performance. It challenges the truly odd conventional wisdom that, despite these dismal monetary developments, neither the Maastricht regime nor the ECB might possibly be at fault. Reviewing the ECB's interest rate policies and scrutinising its rationale, a conspicuous anti-growth bias is diagnosed that has produced rather perverse consequences.This stability-oriented assessment concludes that the ECB has been key to the 'euro puzzle', propagating euro weakness and pushing up inflation. Euroland's democratically elected representatives are therefore urged to reform Europe's key structural problem, namely, the ECB, an independent monetary policymaker whose unbounded discretion allows it to pursue ill-guided and thoroughly idiosyncratic policies without being held to account for the consequences.     

Oil prices and economic downturns: the case of Spain

We address the macroeconomic effects of an oil price shock in Spain. We apply a vector autoregression model (VAR) analysis to quarterly data for the Spanish economy since 1986, to elucidate the effects of variations in the oil price on the economy, considering the three main causes of disruptions in the oil markets: oil supply shocks, oil demand shocks and oil-specific (precautionary) demand shocks. We conclude that the effects in Spain strongly depend on the type of shock: the consumer price index (CPI) has mainly been influenced by oil demand shocks; output has only reacted to oil supply shocks; and monetary policy has mainly reacted after precautionary shocks. Second-round effects caused by the behaviour of nominal wages have not been found. Additionally, we discuss two facts: the ability of firms to increase markups in a context of rising demand and the procyclical role of monetary policy when faced with oil demand shocks.     

What matters when? The impact of ECB communication on financial market expectations

This article analyses financial markets’ reaction to European Central Bank's (ECB) communication. We apply a novel indicator that quantifies the contents of the ECB's introductory statements and allows disentangling ECB statements on prices, the real and the monetary sector. We provide evidence that it matters what issue the ECB is speaking about: especially, the ECB's statements on price developments represent important news to financial markets. It also matters when the ECB affects markets: communication drives maturities above 4 months.     

Modelling Anti-inflationary Monetary Targeting in Romania

This paper characterises Romania's experience with anti-inflationary monetary targeting over the period 1999–2005 prior to the country's switch to inflation targeting. We uncover the National Bank of Romania's preferences, conditional on an estimated macro-model. We find that Romania's monetary targeting regime can be characterised by a concern for price stability and an additional role for smoothing of the central bank's instrument (base money growth). Exchange rate variability and output gap stability appear not to significantly enter the National Bank of Romania's objective function.     

The microfoundation of macroeconomic populism: The effects of economic inequality on public inflation aversion

Previous work on the politics of monetary policy has focused on the role of distributive motives stemming from individual characteristics such as income or factoral/sectoral interests in citizens' formation of monetary policy preferences. However, the existing literature has paid little attention to how a country's overall distributive context, namely, its level of economic inequality, affects citizens' preferences vis-à-vis price stability and employment. This article argues that as inequality pushes more citizens below a society's average income, there is more demand for redistribution through higher employment and increased fiscal spending, each of which can be better supported by expansionary monetary policy. This means that inequality makes citizens more tolerant of inflation. This study uses the International Social Survey Program, the Integrated Values Surveys, and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, which together include 293,100 respondents from 53 countries between the years 1976 and 2016 to demonstrate that overall, inequality significantly moderates citizens' inflation aversion.     

Re‐vitalizing money demand in the Euro area. Still valid at the zero‐lower bound

The analysis of monetary developments has always been a cornerstone of the ECB's monetary analysis and, thus, of its overall monetary policy strategy. In this respect, money demand models provide a framework for explaining monetary developments and assessing price stability over the medium term. It is a well‐documented fact in the literature that, when interest rates are at the zero‐lower bound, the analysis of money stocks become even more important for monetary policy. Therefore, this paper re‐investigates the stability properties of M3 demand in the euro area in the light of the recent economic crisis. A cointegration analysis is performed over the sample period 1983 Q1 and 2015 Q1 and leads to a well‐identified model comprising real money balances, income, the long‐term interest rate and the own rate of M3 holdings. The specification appears to be robust against the Lucas critique of a policy dependent parameter regime, in the sense that no signs of breaks can be found when interest rates reach the zero‐lower bound. Furthermore, deviations of M3 from its equilibrium level do not point to substantial inflation pressure at the end of the sample. Excess liquidity models turn out to outperform the autoregressive benchmark, as they deliver more accurate CPI inflation forecasts, especially at the longer horizons. The inclusion of unconventional monetary policy measures does not contradict these findings.     

Games of monetary and fiscal interactions in the EMU

This paper constructs various models of the EMU and ECB when member countries have different objectives. Voting in pursuit of national interest can yield moderate and stable inflation. The metaphor of Walsh-type contracts implements a monetary policy rule that averages the member countries’ most preferred rules. In a repeated relationship where a country suffering a large adverse shock can use political bargaining to subvert the ECB's commitment, the optimal rule should incorporate some flexibility to forestall that. Finally, freedom of national fiscal policies undermines the ECB's monetary commitment; this may justify fiscal constraints like the Stability and Growth Pact.     

Regime switches under policy uncertainty in monetary unions

This paper analyzes the effects of policy uncertainty on the stability of a monetary union. Focusing on peripheral countries, we study how uncertainty over the consequences of a possible exit affects regime switches. Applying game theory and a cost-benefit analysis, we model a regime switch as the endogenous result of a two-stage policy game. We find that the effects of uncertainty are not trivial. Unilateral exits are less probable, but contagion is more likely to be observed. Our results are driven by two opposite forces: a traditional conservative effect induced by policy uncertainty in a single policymaker framework, which calls for more stability, and a strategic effect, arising from the strategic interaction, which may undermine the monetary union's foundation and strengthen incentives for contagion.     

What's in a second opinion? Shadowing the ECB and the Bank of England

One way of evaluating how well monetary authorities perform is to provide the public with a regular and independent second opinion. The European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England (BoE) are shadowed by professional and academic economists who provide a separate policy rate recommendation in advance of the central bank announcement. In this paper, we systematically evaluate this second opinion and find that, first, the shadow committee of the ECB tends to be relatively less inflation averse than the ECB. In contrast, the shadow committee of the BoE proposes a more hawkish monetary policy stance than the BoE. Second, consensus within a shadow committee is far easier to reach when there is no pressure to change the policy rate. Third, the ECB's shadow committee is more activist than the ECB's Governing Council and a larger degree of consensus within the former brings about a greater likelihood that the two committees will agree.     

Writing Clearly: The ECB's Monetary Policy Communication

The article presents a novel methodology for measuring the clarity of central bank communication using content analysis, illustrating the methodology with the case of the European Central Bank (ECB). The analysis identifies the ECB's written communication as clear in about 85–95% of instances, which is comparable with, or better than, similar results available for other central banks. We also find that the additional information on risk to inflation and especially projection risk assessment contained in the ECB's Monthly Bulletins helps to improve communication clarity compared to ECB's press releases. In contrast, the bulletin's communication on monetary developments has a negative, albeit small, impact on clarity.     

Money demand instability and real exchange rate persistence in the monetary model of USD–JPY exchange rate

This paper proposes a hybrid monetary model of the dollar–yen exchange rate that takes into account factors affecting the conventional monetary model's building blocks. In particular, the hybrid monetary model is based on the incorporation of real stock prices to enhance money demand stability and also, productivity differential, relative government spending, and real oil price to explain real exchange rate persistence. By using quarterly data over a period of high international capital mobility and volatility (1980:01–2009:04), the results show that the proposed hybrid model provides a coherent long-run relation to explain the dollar–yen exchange rate as opposed to the conventional monetary model.     

Are monetary policy shocks causal to bank health? Evidence from the euro area

Despite considerable efforts of the European Central Bank (ECB) to support bank intermediation after the 2008 financial crisis, the recovery of euro area banks remained incomplete. Although many studies indicate that central banks can influence the stock prices of firms through their policy actions and communication, a knowledge gap exists as to whether the ECB's monetary policy can influence bank health. Through a high-frequency identification approach, this study reveals that the causal effect of conventional monetary policy action and communication by the ECB on bank stock prices differed over time, whereas its influence on bank financing costs was robust. This study provides new evidence showing that information effects related to policy easing surprises in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis hampered the ECB efforts to improve bank health and that its Odyssean communication signals (related to forward-looking announcements of policy easing) supported bank health during this phase. Local projections suggest that the response of banks to monetary policy shocks displayed some persistence, where ECB policy surprises and communications that shifted up (down) the yield curve were normally positive (negative) for bank health. The findings solicit a new perspective when assessing the influence of the ECB's monetary policy measures on euro area banks.     

The political economy of the impossible trinity

This paper reconsiders the policy trilemma in an open economy by incorporating political economy concerns. We argue that the impact of government ideology on monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and capital flow restrictions should be analyzed in the broader context of restrictions imposed by the impossible trinity instead of the usual single-dimensional constraints. Employing a de facto measurement of these restrictions for a sample of 111 countries from 1980 to 2010, we show that the impact of government ideology on a country's position in this trilemma is highly context dependent: we find that its impact on exchange rate stability and monetary independence varies between developed and developing countries. We also show that the impact of government ideology on these two trilemma components is contingent on the stance of the respective economy's business cycle. Left-leaning governments seem to favor exchange rate stability over monetary independence in case of a negative output gap; suggesting a reversal of their commonly assumed partisan preferences in economically tight times.     

Do the ECB's introductory statements help predict monetary policy? Evidence from a tone analysis

In this paper, we examine whether a tone shock derived from European Central Bank communication helps predict ECB monetary policy decisions. To this purpose, we first use a bag-of-words approach and several dictionaries on the ECB's Introductory Statements to derive a measure of tone. Next, we orthogonalise the tone measure on the latest data available to market participants to compute the tone shock. Finally, we relate the tone shock to future ECB monetary policy decisions. We find that the tone shock is significantly and positively related to future ECB monetary policy decisions, even when controlling for market expectations of monetary policy and the Governing Council's inter-meeting communication. Further extensions show that the predictive ability of the tone shock is robust to (i) the normalization of the tone measure, (ii) alternative market expectations of monetary policy, and (iii) the horizon of macroeconomic variables used in the Taylor-type monetary policy rule. These findings highlight an additional channel through which ECB communication improves monetary policy predictability, suggesting that the ECB may have private information that it communicates through its Introductory Statements.     

Unconventional monetary policy in the Euro Area: Shadow rate and light effets

We assess transmission mechanisms and the macroeconomic impact of unconventional monetary policy (UMP) in the Euro Area. We estimate a FAVAR model and use a shadow rate to measure the stance of the monetary policy. The ECB's UMP measures adopted at the zero lower bound (ZLB) have sustained the real economy. For instance, in 2016, without UMP, investment would have been lower by 9%, consumption lower by 2% and the unemployment rate higher by 0.9%. However, the impact of unconventional monetary shocks is weaker and less persistent than those emanating from conventional monetary policy. Furthermore, the difference in the transmission of monetary policies between countries of the Euro Area was more pronounced during the period 2009-2016. This suggests that the ZLB has decreased the efficiency of monetary policy and accentuated the heterogeneity of the Euro Area.     

HETEROGENEITY IN A CURRENCY UNION WITH SOCIAL MARKET OBJECTIVES

In this paper, we explore whether heterogeneity among union members could threaten the stability of the European Monetary Union. The types of heterogeneity we consider are (1) asymmetries in the transmission of monetary and fiscal policies, and (2) differences in national preferences for price stability, output growth, and income redistribution. Our results show that the costs of membership can be significant for countries whose transmissions, structure, or preferences deviate from those underlying the common monetary policy. In part, these costs arise because monetary policy imposed by an independent central bank automatically constrains the use of fiscal policy by national governments.     

Non-linearities in euro area inflation persistence

This paper investigates the nature of inflation dynamics with a special focus on inflation persistence. Using data from euro area member-states we estimate dynamic non-linear panel models addressing in detail econometric issues concerning unobserved heterogeneity, genuine state dependence, and the initial conditions problem. After controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity, our results suggest that the degree of inflation persistence is genuine and varies depending on whether the inflation rate is too high, within the range of ECB's target of price stability, too low or negative. This implies that policies to stabilize inflation in the short run will have longer-run effects.     

Time-varying money demand and real balance effects

This paper presents an analysis of the stimulants and consequences of money demand dynamics. By assuming that household's money holdings and consumption preferences are not separable, we demonstrate that the interest-elasticity of demand for money is a function of the household's preference to hold real balances, the extent to which these preferences are not separable in consumption and real balances, and trend inflation. An empirical study of U.S. data revealed that there was a gradual fall in the interest elasticity of money demand of approximately one-third during the 1970s due to high trend inflation. A further decline in the interest-elasticity of the demand for money was observed in the 1980s due to the changing household preferences that emerged in response to financial innovation. These developments led to a reduction in the welfare cost of inflation that subsequently explains the rise in monetary neutrality observed in the data.     

Making EMU Work: Some lessons from the 1990s

This paper investigates what lessons may be learned from Europe's convergence process of the 1990s. The paper challenges the conventional focus on labour market institutions and 'structural rigidities' as the root cause behind Europe's poor employment record. Instead, it is argued that macro demand management played the key role, particularly monetary policy. Concentrating on Germany, the analysis shows that fiscal consolidation was accompanied by monetary tightness of an extraordinary degree and duration. This finding is of interest regarding the past as well as the future. For the Maastricht regime much resembles the one that produced the unsound policy mix of the 1990s: a constrained fiscal authority paired with an independent monetary authority free to impose its will on the overall outcome. The analysis thus highlights a key asymmetry in the Maastricht regime that is likely to continue to inflict a deflationary bias on the system. It is argued that this policy bias may be overcome only if the ECB deliberately assumed its real role of generating domestic demand-led growth, thereby resolving Euroland's key structural problem: asymmetric monetary policy. As regards the conventional structuralist theme, the analysis debunks the 'Dutch myth' of supply-led growth through structural reform. Depicting a popular fallacy of composition, we stress that the peculiar Dutch strategy of demand-led growth does not present itself as an option for Euroland.