The Economics of Taxation in Casino Tourism with Cross‐border Market Power

This paper provides a theoretical proof that casino taxation may have great potential as a contributor to tourism efficiency under sufficient market power. We also examine empirical evidence for the economic efficiency of casino tourism in Macao even with a “high” tax owing to geographic market power. Both theory and evidence point to such power as a key factor that affects the ability of a tourism resort to pass along local taxes to gambling visitors. This ability makes all the difference between the good or bad effect of casino taxes on tourism development. The policy implication is that a gaming tax should be lowered to support casino businesses if it is inefficient, but can be raised to extract public revenues if it is efficient.     

Trade Policies for Exporting Industries under Free Entry

This paper computes optimal export taxes and domestic production subsidies for exporting industries under free entry. We show that domestic welfare is not at maximum, as is typically believed, when the export price is a monopoly price, and the domestic price is a competitive price, because a market structure effect has to be taken into account. Furthermore, we show that the optimal tax/subsidy formulas for an oligopoly coincide with those under perfect competition, if foreign and domestic demand functions are both linear. We also discuss optimal trade policies when only one instrument is available, and we run numerical simulations to determine and compare optimal trade taxes under endogenous and exogenous market structures.     

Strategic Environmental Policies when Waste Products are Tradable

The paper deals with international trade in hazardous waste products when there is an international oligopoly market for waste, and both waste‐importing and waste‐exporting countries act strategically to utilize national environmental policies to attach rents arising from trade in waste. The authors model a multiple‐stage game where waste is generated in an industrialized country as a byproduct of production, and potentially is exported to some less‐developed countries, if not abated locally, or imposed on local residents at a cost of an environmental tax. In the market for waste, an oligopolistic supply is assumed. The demand for waste is perfectly competitive, with waste‐processing firms guided by marginal disposal costs and environmental taxes levied by foreign countries. With each country playing Nash, the analysis finds domestic and foreign taxes to be distorted from the Pigouvian taxes in such a way that the domestic (waste‐exporter) tax rate is set below, and the foreign tax rate is set above, the Pigouvian taxes. However, a global welfare optimum requires tax distortions in the opposite direction, in the sense that foreign environmental taxes must be set below the Pigouvian tax rate.     

Unit versus Ad Valorem Taxes in Multiproduct Cournot Oligopoly

The welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes over unit taxes in a single‐market Cournot oligopoly is well known. This article extends the analysis to multimarket oligopoly. Provided all ad valorem taxes are equal and positive, unit costs are constant, firms are active in all considered markets, and a representative consumer has convex preferences, ad valorem taxes are shown to dominate in multiproduct equilibrium. Conditions exist, however, under which economic efficiency declines upon replacing specific taxes with ad valorem taxes that preserve output levels. We discuss the roles of unit cost covariances across multiproduct firms, and also of complementarity in demand, in determining the extent of cost efficiencies arising under ad valorem taxation. For goods that are complementary or independent in demand, conditions are found such that industry profits decline upon use of ad valorem taxes.     

Micro and macroeconomics of tax reform: Indonesia

Indonesia enacted reforms in taxation in 1983. The new laws replace outdated, complicated and unproductive taxes adopted several decades earlier. A complete overhaul of the tax system was required. Use of higher tax rates or other forms of tinkering with the old system were not options under the circumstances. Reform studies began in early 1981. They were strongly focused on base broadening and drastic simplification. While the original impetus for the reform was not fiscal crisis, the new system will be in place in time to supplant much of a projected decline in oil revenues. Other objectives of the reform were more effective income redistribution, simplification of taxation, a new tax information system and streamlining of tax administration. The Indonesian reform made eclectic use of the lessons from similar fiscal exercises in Asia, Africa and Latin America and of recent innovations in tax analysis elsewhere, but was tailored to national objectives and constraints. Prospects for fruitful implementation of the reform are as yet unknowable: one factor augering for some success is that the tax reform was introduced as one of a series of six major belt-tightening policy measures which gained a measure of public acceptance. None were imposed or required for external assistance. It is unclear which, if any, of the lessons derived from this tax reform are transferable elsewhere. However, among the lessons of possible relevance elsewhere is the importance of identifying at the outset those fiscal problems lying at the intersection of the sets of ‘complex’, ‘difficult’ and ‘politically sensitive’ issues. Of the dozens of issues faced in the process of reform in Indonesia, three such issues in this intersection accounted for more than half the intellectual and other resources expended on the reform.     

Tax evasion and competition

Using a Cournot oligopoly model with an endogenous number of firms and evasion of indirect taxes, we show that more intense competition may have the negative side effect of increasing tax evasion, thereby, lowering public revenues and welfare. This will be the case if market entry costs decrease. A similar result will hold if marginal production costs fall and demand is either weakly concave, or convex and inelastic. The result of more competition, less evasion and higher public revenues will be obtained if (a) marginal production costs fall and demand is convex and elastic or (b) the demand elasticity increases. As a policy implication, we prove that tax enforcement should be intensified if there is a negative trade‐off between competition and evasion.     

Controling tax evasion under direct and indirect taxation: Some notes

The purpose of the paper is to use a simple model of the firm having monopoly power in the goods market as the framework to study the relative effectiveness of unit, ad valorem and profit taxes under two alternative criteria when the taxes are changeds so as to keep either the expected utility of the monopoly firm or the expected tax revenues for government constant. Under the former policy the profit tax turns out to be best and the unit tax worst in all respects; for instance, the profit tax will give rise to higher production, lower prices, lower tax evasion and higher tax revenues for government than other taxes. The dominance of the profit tax and the inferiority of the unit tax still holds under the policy of keeping the expected tax revenues constant in terms of production, prices and the expected utility of the monopoly firm. But strikingly, in terms of effectiveness of tax evasion control the ranking of taxes is now exactly the reverse from the one obtained under the expected utility criterium; now the unit tax is best and the profit tax worst.     

现行税制对劳动力供给影响的理论与实证分析

税收对劳动力供给的影响取决于征税后收入效应与替代效应的对比.然而,不同收入水平的国家以及不同税制结构下所产生的收入效应与替代效应存在一定差异.本文从理论与实证相结合的角度,运用OLS方法,分析了在以商品劳务税为主体的税制结构下,中国现行税制对劳动力供给的影响,认为对劳动所得征税会产生收入效应大于替代效应的结果,最后提出了缓解劳动供求结构性矛盾的税制改革取向.     

Dividend taxes,corporate investment,and ‘Q’

Taxes on corporate distributions have traditionally been regarded as a ‘double tax’ on corporate income. This view implies that while the total effective tax rate on corporate source income affects real economic decisions, the distribution of this tax burden between the shareholders and the corporation is irrelevant. Recent research has suggested an alternative to this traditional view. One explanation of why firms in the United States pay dividends in spite of the heavy tax liabilities associated with this form of distribution is that the stock market capitalizes the tax payments associated with corporate distributions. This capitalization leaves investors indifferent at the margin between a corporation's decision to pay out dividends or to retain earnings. This alternative view holds that while changes in the dividend tax rate will affect shareholder wealth, they will have no impact on corporate investment decisions.This paper develops econometric tests which distinguish between these two views of dividend taxation. By extending Tobin's ‘q’ theory of investment to incorporate taxes at both the corporate and personal levels, the implications of each view for corporate investment decisions can be derived. The competing views may be tested by comparing the performance of investment equations estimated under each theory's predictions. British time series data are particularly appropriate for testing hypotheses about dividend taxes because of the substantial postwar variation in effective tax rates on corporate distributions. The econometric results suggest that dividend taxes have important effects on investment decisions.     

Second best welfare economics in the mixed economy

The general problem of measuring welfare for large government projects is considered in a context where the government may interfere with the private market sector in a variety of ways. Measures are decomposed into a pure efficiency part and a pure equity part and it is shown that the efficiency part is measured by integrals under ‘uncompensated’ market demand functions. It is also shown that the efficiency part may be further decomposed into second best contributions due to commodity taxation, monopoly power and quantity constraints.     

Some aspects of the taxation of capital gains

The analysis of the effects of capital gains taxation requires a careful modelling both of the details of the tax code and the imperfections in the capital market. Under the standard assumptions concerning perfect capital markets and under the standard idealizations of the tax code, there are several strategies by which rational investors can avoid note only all taxes on their capital income, but also all taxes on their wage income; these strategies leave individuals' consumption and bequests in each state of nature and at each date unchanged from what they would have been in the absence of taxes. Although certain detailed provisions of the tax code may limit the extent to which rational investors can avail themselves of these tax avoidance activities, there are ways, in a perfect capital market, by which the effects of these restrictions can be ameliorated. Accordingly, any analysis of the effects of capital taxation must focus on imperfect capital markets.If individuals face limitations on the amounts which they can borrow and/or if there are limitations on short sales, then under some circumstances there is a locked-in effect (individuals do not sell securities which they would have sold in the absence of taxation); but under other circumstances individuals are induced to sell securities that they otherwise would have held, in order to take advantage of the asymmetric treatment of short-term losses and long-term gains. A policy of realizing gains as soon as they become eligible for long term treatment dominates the policy of postponing the realization of capital gains, provided the gains are not too large.A simple general equilibrium model is constructed within which it is shown that the taxation of capital gains may increase the volatility of asset prices, and lead individuals not to trade when they otherwise would. While the analysis casts doubt on the significance of the welfare losses resulting from these exchange inefficiencies, there are circumstances in which the tax leads to production inefficiencies, e.g. terminating projects at other than the socially optimal date.Finally, we argue that the focus of some recent policy debates on the short-run revenue impact of a decrease in the tax rate on capital gains is misplaced: even when the short-run revenue impact is positive, consumption may increase (thus exacerbating inflationary pressures) and private savings may decrease (thus leading to a lower level of investment in the private sector). Moreover, there is some presumption that the long-run revenue impact is negative.Our analysis has some important implications for empirical research. In particular, it suggests that the impact of the tax is not adequately summarized by a single number, such as the ‘effective tax rate’ representing the average ratio of tax payments to capital gains. Moreover, the impact of the tax cannot be assessed by looking only at reported capital gains and losses.     

Energy taxation: Reasons for discriminating in favor of the production sector

If a small open economy wishes to restrict it's greenhouse gas emissions, it has to decide whether to impose uniform taxes on all polluters or to resort to a discriminatory policy. In practice, countries tend to impose higher taxes on households and to tax the industrial sector more leniently. This paper identifies conditions under which this is efficient. It is shown that an efficiency maximizing tax planner discriminates in favor of the production sector if (i) there are restrictions on the taxation of lump-sum income or if (ii) labor supply exerts market power.     

Optimal Tax Policy, Market Imperfections, and Environmental Externalities in a Dynamic Optimizing Macro Model

This paper develops a dynamic real business cycle model that highlights pollution externalities (on welfare and production) and market imperfections and uses it to determine the socially optimal tax policy that encompasses labor income, capital income, and emission taxes. We show that the optimal tax on capital and labor income only addresses the production inefficiency (and is time-invariant), while the tax on the environmental externalities affects both the production inefficiency and the environmental spillovers (and is time-varying). More interestingly, the socially optimal emission tax will be characterized by a Keynesian-like stabilizer that is designed to mitigate business cycle fluctuations, i.e., that will stimulate the economy with a lower emission tax during recessions. In a positive analysis, we show that the beneficial effects arising from pollution taxation will become larger the greater is the degree of the firms' monopoly power. In addition, a triple dividend in terms of improving environmental quality and increasing employment and firms' profit can be simultaneously realized if the environmental production externality is more significant and if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is relatively small.     

Export taxes versus buffer stocks as optimal export policies under uncertainty

Optimal state-dependent export taxes and costly-to-store buffer stocks are compared in their welfare implications for an exporter possessing monopoly power in the international trade of a volatile commodity. Optimal stochastic control is used to derive the optimal buffer stock rules. It is shown that, if the internal and external fluctuations facing the exporter are large, if the storage costs are low, and if the price elasticity of export supply is small relative to that of export demand, the exporter would gain more from a buffer stock than from a optimal export tax. World welfare is always increased by buffer stocks, as opposed to tariffs; and, under some conditions, the foreign country might also benefit and, hence, not retaliate.     

Equivalence scales,horizontal equity and optimal taxation under utilitarianism

This paper analyzes the question of how differences in family size should be treated by the income tax system in order to achieve horizontal equity. Family size is incorporated into the demand system by the procedure of demographic scaling. Horizontal equity is defined as ‘equal treatment of equals’. It is shown that when lump-sum taxes are not available and the government has to rely on income taxation, then the only way to entail equal utilities for household of different size is to equate the labor supplies and the per-standard-adult consumptions of these households.     

Commodity taxes and welfare under endogenous market conduct

We consider consumption taxes in a model of endogenous Cournot versus Bertrand competition. It is argued that when the choice of unit versus ad valorem taxes affects longer-term decisions beyond the customary price or quantity decisions, the mix of the two taxes co-determines market conduct. This gives ad valorem taxes an anti-competitive effect that harms ad valorem taxes’ efficiency in comparison with unit taxes. We show that a mix of the taxes—or a unit tax alone if we compare one or the other of the taxes—is sometimes welfare superior on account of consumer-price and tax revenue effects. A practical implication of our findings is that pass-through rates are only sometimes useful guides for policy. In fact, we show when the proper response to demand for higher revenue is a higher unit tax rate and a lower ad valorem tax rate.     

On the Neutrality of Profit Taxation in a Mixed Oligopoly

This paper investigates the neutrality of profit taxation in a mixed oligopoly where one (partially) public firm competes with private firms. We find that the neutrality of a profit tax is robust under a general cost and a general demand function as long as the degree of privatization is endogenously determined. This result is also true when product heterogeneity is considered under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. By contrast, if the degree of privatization is exogenously given, the profit tax neutrality holds only in the cases where the public firm is fully privatized or fully state-owned; otherwise, the neutrality breaks down.     

Improving Mineral Taxation Policy in Australia*

Australian State governments have begun to increase royalty rates and other mineral taxes. The most instructive approach to taxation policy for the minerals sector is to set up a general model of mines which year the optimal structure of taxes. A model of mine production under uncertainty is presented. The optimal tax is a single tax with two parts. a bonus bid and conditional tax payments based on the ex-post rent of the mine. The actual structure of taxes levied by State and Commonwealth governments is seen to be distinctly sub-optimal in several respects. Proposals to move the actual to word the optimal structure are made, recognizing some of the constraints on information and the maximum acceptable rate of tax reform .     

Unit Versus Ad Valorem Taxes: The Private Ownership of Monopoly in General Equilibrium

Employing a general equilibrium framework, Blackorby and Murty prove that, with a monopoly and under 100% profit taxation and uniform lump‐sum transfers, the utility possibility sets of economies with unit and ad valorem taxes are identical. This welfare equivalence is in contrast to most previous studies, which demonstrate the superiority of the ad valorem tax in a partial equilibrium framework. In this paper, we relax the assumption of 100% profit taxation and allow the consumers to receive profit incomes from ownership of shares in the monopoly firm. We find that, under certain regularity conditions, for any fixed vector of profit shares, the utility possibility sets of economies with unit and ad valorem taxes are not generally identical. But it does not imply that one completely dominates the other. Rather, the two utility possibility frontiers cross each other. Additionally, employing a standard partial equilibrium welfare analysis, we show that the Marshallian social surpluses resulting from the two tax structures are identical when the government can implement unrestricted transfers.     

Taxation under oligopoly in a general equilibrium setting

Taxation under oligopoly is analyzed in a general equilibrium setting where the firms are large relative to the size of the economy and maximize the utility of their shareholders. Assuming that preferences are either identical and homothetic or identical and quasi‐linear, then the oligopoly model is an aggregative game, which greatly simplifies the comparative statics for the effects of taxation. This novel analysis of taxation leads to a number of counterintuitive results that challenge conventional wisdom in microeconomics. A lump‐sum tax may increase the price of the oligopolistic good and decrease welfare whereas a profits tax may decrease the price of the oligopolistic good and increase welfare. A profits tax is shown to be superior to a lump‐sum tax. Furthermore, in line with conventional wisdom, total tax revenue is always higher with an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax that leads to the same price for the oligopolistic good.