Does Taxation Stifle Corporate Investment? Firm‐Level Evidence from ASEAN Countries

This article conducts a firm‐level analysis of the effect of taxation on corporate investment, using large‐scale panel data on non‐financial firms over the period 1990–2014, and controlling for macrostructural differences among ASEAN countries. We find a significant degree of persistence in fixed investment over time, which varies with firm characteristics, such as size, growth prospects, profitability and leverage. The non‐linear estimations indicate that taxation facilitates business investment (possibly by enabling public investment in infrastructure and human capital, and the proper functioning of government institutions), but this effect turns negative and stifles private investment growth as the tax burden increases.     

CEO的财务经历有利于缓解企业融资约束吗*

CEO的财务经历有利于其做出合理的融资决策和投资决策,从而有助于降低企业融资约束。以2000—2013年沪深A股上市公司作为研究对象,本文实证检验结果证明了笔者的这一假设。该结论在控制内生性以及采用其他指标衡量融资约束等稳健性检验之后仍然成立。进一步检验结果表明,在外部融资条件较差时,CEO财务经历对于缓解融资约束的作用更为显著;同时,CEO财务经历有助于企业提高投资绩效。这表明了具有财务经历的CEO通过提高企业外部融资能力和投资决策的合理性,从而缓解企业融资约束。本文在丰富高阶梯队理论和融资约束领域文献的同时,对于上市公司制定科学合理的CEO聘任决策以及缓解融资约束等方面有重要的启示。     

Analysis of loan guarantees among the Korean Chaebol affiliates

This paper analyses corporate loan guarantees among the Korean chaebol affiliates. Loan guarantees are found to be efficiency‐neutral under a set of ideal conditions characterized by perfect and symmetric information, no agency problem, and no governmental interference in private financial contracts. In reality though, corporate loan guarantees have negative as well as positive effects. The negative effects of loan guarantees arise from the agency problem between the controlling minority shareholders and outside investors. Government's implicit support to financial institutions worsens the problem. Without such distortions, a loan guarantee by the guarantor firm may signal the quality of the investment project of the borrowing firm, if the guarantor firm has more information than the lending bank with regards to the type of the borrowing firm's investment project.     

Does bank shareholding impact corporate innovation? Evidence from China

Corporate innovation is an engine of economic development, while bank shareholding is the phenomenon of having a bank as a shareholder. Their relationship, however, has been underexamined. We provide the first study on the direct impact of bank shareholding on corporate innovation. Using patents granted to Chinese firms from 1999 to 2013, our findings suggest that bank shareholding significantly contributes to corporate innovation. Additional analysis suggests that easing financial constraints can facilitate the positive impacts of bank shareholding on corporate innovation. We also find that bank shareholding works better when firms have effective external monitoring and when they are nonstate-owned firms with nonstate-owned banks as shareholders. We contribute to the literature by showing that (1) despite the restrictions some countries impose on bank shareholding, allowing it could be a good economic policy for promoting corporate innovation, and (2) successful corporate innovation requires proper monitoring and incentives.     

Lending technologies,banking relationships,and firms’ access to credit in Italy: the role of firm size

This paper analyses the role of lending technologies and banking relationships on firms’ credit access in Italy. Using EFIGE firm-level data, we show that the depth and strength of firm–bank relationships have heterogeneous effects on credit demand and rationing probabilities depending on the size of the borrower. Multiple banking relationships alleviate financial constraints for small firms, while borrowing from a large number of lenders hinders access to credit for large companies. Small and medium-sized enterprises with a higher share of debt with the main bank have a lower probability of being credit denied, as debt concentration contributes to overcome the opacity problems typical of the SMEs. Long-lasting relationships, by reducing information asymmetries, significantly improve access to credit for small and large firms. Conversely, we find that medium-sized enterprises are more exposed to financing constraints as relationship duration increases, due to possible lock-in effects. Finally, firms maintaining banking relationships based on transactional technologies are more likely to be credit denied, while the use of relationship lending technologies improves credit availability for both small and large enterprises.     

Does financial liberalization improve the allocation of investment?: Micro-evidence from developing countries

Using firm level panel data from 12 developing countries we explore whether financial liberalization improves the efficiency with which investment funds are allocated. A summary index of the efficiency of investment allocation that measures whether investment funds are going to firms with a higher marginal return to capital is developed. We examine the relationship between this and various measures of financial liberalization and find that liberalization increases the efficiency with which investment funds are allocated. This holds after various robustness checks and is consistent with firm level evidence of a stronger association between investment and fundamentals after financial liberalization.     

Bank Deregulation, Supervision, and Agency Problems

This article argues that the financial instability of the 1980s following financial deregulation in Australia can be partly traced to a lack of attention to agency problems in banking. Because the market for corporate control and corporate governance structures in banking were unsatisfactory, the benefits of increased competition in financial product markets were offset by inadequate monitoring and controls on bank management. It is also argued that the current emphasis of prudential supervision on capital adequacy requirements can provide only a partial solution to achieving efficiency and stability in the financial sector—because it focuses only upon the agency relationships between owners and government/depositors. Complementary developments in corporate governance and control are required to address agency relationships involving bank management. Some recent developments in this area and in supervision of non-bank financial markets are assessed from the perspective developed in this article.     

Firm investment and financial conditions in the euro area: evidence from firm-level data

We explore whether the sensitivity of firm-level investment to cash flow, typically associated with an external financing premium, is time-varying and in particular whether it varies with overall financial conditions. We find that financial conditions have indeed played a significant role in corporate investment decisions over recent years, rendering financing constraints even more binding. This finding appears to be robust to a number of control variables and robustness tests. Moreover, the impact of credit conditions is not uniform across firms, but rather it varies depending on firm size and leverage, with constrained firms being substantially more likely to condition their investment decisions on overall credit conditions. Our results cast new light on the interplay between financial and real cycle downturns and underline the need for monetary, fiscal and macroprudential policy to be countercyclical with respect to financial conditions.     

Location decisions of non‐bank financial foreign direct investment: Firm‐level evidence from Europe

The non‐bank financial sector in Europe has more than doubled in size between 2005 and 2015 reflecting the substantial growth in shadow banking activities. However, a large proportion of the non‐bank financial sector that remains unmapped as granular balance sheet information is not available for over half of the sector. Motivated by these data gaps and employing firm‐level data, this paper examines the location decisions of newly incorporated foreign affiliates in the non‐bank financial sector across 27 European countries over the period 2004 to 2012. The probability of a country being chosen as the location for a new foreign affiliate is found to be negatively associated with higher corporate tax rates and geographic distance but increases with the size and financial development of the host country. The financial regulatory regime in the host country and gravity related controls such as the home and host country sharing a common legal system, language, border, and currency are also found to impact the likelihood of non‐bank financial FDI.     

Effects of main bank switching on new business bankruptcy

This paper examines the effects of main bank switching on the probability of bankruptcy of new small businesses using a propensity score matching estimation approach. We use a unique firm-level dataset of approximately 1,000 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) incorporated in Japan; these SMEs are young and unlisted just after incorporation. We find that switching main bank relationships increases the probability of firm bankruptcy. In addition, the result holds only when the relationship between the firm and its main bank is terminated. Specifically, the probability of bankruptcy increases when firms switch their main banks to financial institutions with which they have not previously transacted, and when the ex-post main banks are not affiliated financial institutions of their ex-ante main banks. These results may be because such switching worsens the financial condition of client firms, and thus, it leads to bankruptcy.     

Taxes,risk taking,and financial stability

After the global financial crisis, the use of taxes to enhance financial stability received new attention. This paper analyzes the corrective role of taxes in banking and compares two instruments, namely, an allowance for corporate equity (ACE), which mitigates the debt bias in corporate taxation, and a Pigovian tax on bank debt (bank levy). We emphasize financial stability gains driven by lower bank asset risk and develop a principal-agent model, in which risk taking depends on the bank's capital structure and, by extension, on the tax treatment of debt and equity. We find that (i) the ACE unambiguously reduces risk taking, (ii) bank levies reduce risk taking if they are independent of bank performance but may be counterproductive otherwise, and (iii) taxes are especially effective if regulatory capital requirements are constrained to low levels.     

Does Financial Development Promote Innovation in Developing Economies? An Empirical Analysis

Using firm‐level data from 2006 to 2013 for a set of developing countries, we examine the effects of financial development on innovation. Financial development boosts innovation by improving resource allocation and investment in strategic sectors as well as facilitating technology to promote growth. Using binary response models and instrumental variable techniques to correct for endogeneity, we find robust but puzzling results. Contrary to most of the existing literature, financial development has a negative effect on the probability of a firm to innovate in developing countries. This effect is conditional on firm size, and only larger firms benefit from financial development. These results are robust to different measures of financial development and econometric specifications. We argue that this is a result of the design of the financial system in regard to the lack of capital and institutional system. Consequently, developing countries should first generate appropriate institutional conditions if they want financial development to spur growth through innovation.     

银行竞争、专用性人力资本投资激励与国有商业银行的公司治理

本文结合中国银行业竞争日趋激烈的现实背景,从商业银行专用性人力资本投资激励的独特视角入手,分别讨论了银行高层管理者和普通员工的专用性人力资本投资激励与他们参与银行公司治理机制的有关问题.研究发现,在国有商业银行公司治理结构改善过程中,更需要增加专用性人力资本投资的有效激励,并通过积极引入境外战略投资者和加强职工代表在银行监事会中影响力的办法,进一步激励银行员工进行能够提高银行经营绩效的专用性人力资本投资.     

收入水平、金融结构与国家技术创新研究

利用85个国家1989—2011年的跨国数据,实证检验不同收入水平下,金融结构对国家技术创新的影响差异。结果显示,高收入水平国家偏向于金融市场的金融结构更加有利于技术创新。基于新结构经济学理论思想,对该结果进行了解释：不同收入水平国家的创新结构不同,即自主研发和模仿创新的比例不同。从事自主研发和模仿创新的企业在风险特征、企业规模方面具有差异,这要求不同比例的金融市场和银行信贷与之匹配。由此,创新结构决定技术创新视角下的最优金融结构。因此,在特定发展阶段,存在与之相匹配的最能有效促进技术创新的金融结构。该结论强调了考虑发展阶段因素的必要性,为新结构经济学相关理论提供了新的实证证据,也具有明确的政策含义。     

产权性质、债券融资与过度投资——基于中国A股上市公司的经验证据

以我国沪深两市2008-2011年发行公司债券的A股上市公司为样本,考察不同产权性质下公司债的发行对公司过度投资的影响,实证检验结果表明:公司债可以有效地制约过度投资;相对于国有控股的上市公司,公司债券对民营上市公司的过度投资可以发挥更为有效的制约作用,银行贷款负债的治理作用弱化不及公司债券对投资的约束作用。     

Does Over-credit Stimulate Corporate Investment? Evidence from Listed Companies in China

We define and quantify for the first time over-credit at the firm level, which refers to the case in which the amount of bank credit that a firm obtains exceeds its expenditure on corporate investment for the year. Then, we explore how over-credit affects corporate investment to determine whether credit expansion in China is consistent with the principle of finance serving the real economy. The results show that over-credit promotes firm investment, and this effect was enhanced by the housing boom. However, the effect of the property market reversed after 2012, owing to China’s economic transition from a quantitative to a structural mismatch between supply and demand. Finally, we explore how over-credit affects the capacity utilization ratio and whether it has aggravated the overcapacity problem in China. The results show that over-credit reduces firms’ capacity utilization ratio. This finding indicates that excessive credit expansion has exacerbated the overcapacity problem in China.     

Managerial flexibility, uncertainty, and corporate investment: The real options effect

This paper examines how changes in uncertainty affect corporate investment and how managerial flexibility influences this effect. Consistent with existing evidence, this study shows that increased uncertainty reduces a firm's capital expenditures even after controlling for investment opportunities and fund availability. It further shows that the negative effect of increased uncertainty on corporate investment is more pronounced for firms with fewer financial constraints and larger size. Overall, the results suggest that managerial flexibility proxied by certain firm characteristics affects the negative relation between uncertainty and investment.     

Is business saving really none of our business?

This paper revisits the role of business saving in the economy by critically scrutinizing the existing macroeoconomic and corporate finance literatures. We assemble and exploit a broad international, unbalanced panel of 47 countries over 1995–2013 on saving and investment by institutional sector to shed new light on the relevance of business saving for private saving and investment around the world. We show that businesses contribute on average more than 50% of national saving around the world. Using this unique dataset, we find evidence of partial piercing of the corporate veil: a $1 increase in business saving gives rise to a decrease of approximately $0.40 in household saving–thereby raising private saving by as much as $0.60. We also find that a $1 increase in business saving increases private investment by as much as $0.20 in countries where limited financing is a binding constraint on firms’ investment. The evidence suggests that business saving and external financing are complementary sources of financing for investment.     

Creditor passivity: The effects of bank competition and institutions on the strategic use of bankruptcy filings

In transition countries, banks often fail to take action against loan defaulters. Using a model of the bank–firm relationship, we study the trade-off a bank faces when having defaulting firms declared bankrupt. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it provides information about a firm’s type to its competitors. Therefore, asymmetric information between banks is reduced, and bank competition intensifies. We find that the better the institutions and the more competitive the banking sector, the greater the bank’s incentive to bankrupt defaulting firms. This makes information between banks less asymmetric and thus leads to lower interest rates and increases the probability that all banks offer loans.     

The Price Impact of Lending Relationships

This study analyzes the impact of bank relationships on a firm's borrowing costs. We find that a firm's borrowing costs decrease with relationship strength, proxied by the share of bank debt provided by the lender. Borrowing costs, however, rise with relationship length. While the increase over time is weak on average, bank‐dependent borrowers face a substantial premium after several relationship years. Switching the lender initially leads to only a small price discount on average. However, the discount is considerable for borrowers that switch and had a strong relationship with their previous lender. Our results suggest that close lending relationships lead to benefits for the firm, but may also imply hold‐up costs in the long term.