BANK COMPETITION AND FINANCIAL STABILITY: LIQUIDITY RISK PERSPECTIVE

We study whether competition affects banks' liquidity risk‐taking, which was at the heart of the 2008 financial crisis. We find that banks with greater market power take more liquidity risk, implying that decreased competition leads to financial fragility. During a financial crisis, however, the effect of market power on liquidity risk varies across bank size. Small banks with greater market power reduce liquidity risk while large banks with greater market power do not change their liquidity risk‐taking behavior. This suggests that enhanced charter values due to reduced competition lowers small banks' risk‐shifting incentives when their default risk significantly increases during a crisis. (JEL G21, G28)     

Bank liquidity risk and monetary policy. Empirical evidence on the impact of Basel III liquidity standards

We extend the literature on the bank lending channel in two aspects. First, rather than following the literature by analyzing the impact of banks’ liquidity (measured via their asset portfolio) on monetary policy transmission, we study the role of banks’ actual liquidity risk, as measured by the Basel III liquidity regulations. Second, we investigate the effect of complying with the Basel III liquidity standards on monetary policy transmission. We use highly detailed bank-level data from Luxembourg for the period 2003q1--2010q4. Our findings are that monetary policy transmission works its way through small banks that also have a large maturity mismatch, as measured by the Net Stable Funding Ratio. In contrast, large banks with a small maturity mismatch increase their lending following a monetary policy shock, which confirms existing results that Luxembourg’s banks are liquidity providers to the European market. Based upon in-sample predictions and upon simulated data from an optimization model that takes the banks’ business models into account, we conclude that the bank lending channel will no longer be effective once banks adhere to the new Basel III liquidity regulations.     

Do foreign-owned banks affect banking system liquidity risk?

Existing empirical research shows that foreign-owned banks play a stabilizing role in emerging economies’ banking systems. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this stabilizing role can be attributed to transnational banks’ access to more diversified sources of liquidity. There exists, however, no empirical evidence so far on transnational banks’ liquidity behavior and its effect on aggregate banking system liquidity. This paper aims at closing this gap. First, we look at the liquid assets holdings of transnational banks and show that in “normal” times they are significantly lower but in crises times higher than those of single-market banks. Second, we find evidence that transnational banks’ presence significantly reduces the risk of aggregate liquidity shortages in emerging economies.     

Basel III and perceived resilience of banks in the BRICS economies

This study investigates how the additional capital and liquidity requirements of Basel III would increase the resilience of banks. In particular, using panel data from 2007 to 2014, we examine the resilience of banks in the BRICS economies. Our results suggest that a 10% increase in capital adequacy ratio (CAR), Tier 1 capital ratio (TRA), and leverage ratio (LEV), the resilience (as measured by Z-Score of banks) increases by about 2.18, 0.89 and 1.31%, respectively. Similarly, for a 100% increase in liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), the resilience of banks increases by 0.51%, 1.10% and 1.19%, respectively, in the models associated with CAR, TRA, and LEV. Hence, our findings suggest that the CAR is robust to increase the resilience of banks. Our study also reveals that the LCR and LEV are the most effective to increase the resilience of banks if implemented simultaneously. We also find that the stage of economic development does not matter in formulating policies for the BRICS economies, and finally, we provide empirical evidence that economy-wide risk, such as a financial crisis, does not affect the resilience of banks and it influences the resilience of banks in the BRICS economies in the same way before and after the crisis.     

Real estate prices and systemic banking crises

The collapse of real estate prices has historically jeopardized banking stability and triggered systemic banking crises. This paper studies risk contagion in a banking system in real estate price shock by adopting complex network theory. Modelling the real estate-related asset as a common exposure of banks to the real estate market, we propose a model that incorporates two main risk contagion channels, i.e., the financial network and asset fire sales, and reveal how the real estate price shock is transmitted and propagated across banks. We demonstrate that banking stability is highly sensitive to the real estate price shock. Moreover, due to the particularly low liquidity of the real estate market, the asset fire-sales of real estate assets overwhelms the financial network, playing the dominant role in risk contagion. Our model can be adopted by regulators to conduct stress testing and to forge effective risk management strategies.     

What broad banks do, and markets don’t: Cross-subsidization

We show that interbank markets are a poor substitute for “broad” banks that operate across regions or sectors. In the presence of regional or sectoral asset and liquidity shocks, interbank markets can distribute liquidity efficiently, but fail to respond efficiently to asset shocks. Broad banks can condition on the joint distribution of both shocks and, hence, achieve an efficient internal allocation of capital. This allocation involves the cross-subsidization of loans across regions or sectors. Compared to regional banks that are linked through well-functioning interbank markets, broad banks lead to higher levels of aggregate investment, higher output, and less fluctuations within regions. However, broad banks generate endogenously aggregate uncertainty.     

Do Bank Capital and Liquidity Affect Real Economic Activity in the Long Run? A VECM Analysis for the US

This paper analyses the long‐term economic costs of the new regulatory standards (the so‐called Basel III reform) for the US. Using a Vector Error Correction Model that estimates long‐run relationships among a small set of macro‐variables over the period 1994–2008, it shows that tighter capital and liquidity requirements have negative (but rather limited) effects on the level of long‐run steady‐state output and more sizeable effects on banks’ return on equity. The economic costs are considerably below the estimated positive benefit that the reform should have by reducing the probability of banking crises and the associated banking losses ( BCBS, 2010b ).     

Banking crises in monetary economies

Abstract.  This paper analyzes the effect of inflation on banking crises in a model in which money and banks play essential roles. The model's equilibrium replicates some key features of actual banking crises, namely, the partial suspension of payments and the desire to hold cash even in the absence of pressing liquidity needs. When banks have access to a stable foreign currency, inflation has a threshold effect on banking crises: higher inflation reduces the likelihood of crises when inflation is below the threshold; the reverse happens when inflation exceeds the threshold. This result appears to be broadly consistent with available evidence.     

“Interest Rate Trap”, or Why Does the Central Bank Keep the Policy Rate Too Low for Too Long?

In this paper, we provide a framework for modeling one risk‐taking channel of monetary policy, the mechanism whereby financial intermediaries' incentives for liquidity transformation are affected by the central bank's reaction to a financial crisis. The anticipation of the central bank's reaction to liquidity stress gives banks incentives to invest in excessive liquidity transformation, triggering an “interest rate trap” – the economy will remain stuck in a long‐lasting period of suboptimal, low interest rate equilibrium. We demonstrate that interest rate policy as a financial stabilizer is dynamically inconsistent, and the constrained efficient outcome can be implemented by imposing ex ante liquidity requirements.     

Liquidity risk and bank portfolio management in a financial system without deposit insurance: Empirical evidence from prewar Japan

Using data from prewar Japan, this paper investigates the impact of a liquidity shock induced by depositors' behavior on bank portfolio management during financial crises in a system lacking deposit insurance. It is found that banks reacted to the liquidity shock sensitively through an increase in their cash holdings not by liquidating bank loans but by selling securities in the financial market. Moreover, banks exposed to local financial contagion adjusted the liquidity of their portfolio mainly by actively selling and buying their securities in the financial market. Finally, there is no evidence to conclude that the existence of the lender of last resort mitigated the liquidity constraints in bank portfolio adjustments.     

The bank lending channel of unconventional monetary policy: The impact of the VLTROs on credit supply in Spain

We assess the impact on the credit supply to non-financial corporations of the two very long term refinancing operations (VLTROs) conducted by the Eurosystem in December 2011 and February 2012 for the case of Spain. To do so we use bank–firm level information from a sample of more than one million lending relationships during two years. Our methodology tackles three main identification challenges: (i) how to disentangle credit supply from demand; (ii) the non-random assignment of firms to banks; (iii) the endogeneity of the VLTRO bids, as banks with more deteriorated funding conditions were more likely both to ask for a large amount of funds and to restrain credit supply. Our findings suggest that the VLTROs had a positive moderate-sized effect on the supply of bank credit to firms. We also find that the effect was greater for illiquid banks and that it was driven by credit to SMEs, as there was no impact on loans to large firms. By contrast, strong firm–bank relationships were less sensitive to the positive liquidity shock caused by the VLTROs, which is consistent with the studies that find that relationship lending is a more stable source of credit than transaction lending. Finally, the VLTROs had no impact on either the degree of loan collateralisation or the probability of making loans to new borrowers, while they decreased the probability of renewing old ones, which suggests that those funds were not used for loan “evergreening”.     

Global banking,global crises? The role of the bank balance-sheet channel for the transmission of financial crises

We examine whether shocks to leveraged creditors with cross border holdings have an incidence on debtor countries׳ risk of suffering financial turmoil. We construct a new proxy of shocks to international banks׳ balance-sheets using credit ratings and the structure of their international assets. This allows us investigating the effect of (foreign) bank balance-sheet shocks on domestic financial turmoil in a large sample of 146 developed and emerging economies from 1984 to 2011. Our proxies of shocks towards bank balance-sheets are strong predictors of systemic banking crises in their debtor countries. Confirming these results, bilateral bank flows significantly decrease when creditor banks׳ assets are hit by negative shocks, as measured by credit rating downgrades from third-party countries. Short-term liabilities towards global banks appear to increase roll-over and funding risks, thereby amplifying the impact of shocks to foreign lenders’ balance-sheets. Domestic banking sectors vulnerabilities, such as illiquid assets and a low deposit-asset ratio, are found to increase crisis contagion risk. In contrast, a high level of global liquidity attenuates the transmission of shocks to international banks׳ assets to debtor countries.     

TO JOIN OR NOT TO JOIN? DO BANKS THAT ARE PART OF A FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANY PERFORM BETTER THAN BANKS THAT ARE NOT?

This study compares the performance of banks that are part of a financial holding company (FHC banks) with that of banks that are not (independent banks) using Taiwan data from 2002:Q1 to 2006:Q2. The comparisons are based on 14 performance ratios resulting from the concept of CAMEL (which is an acronym for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management efficiency, Earnings ability, and Liquidity sufficiency). To ensure that becoming part of an FHC is a random process, we used four matching methods to select the controlled banks so that the characteristic variables of banks in the two groups are statistically indifferent. By using the data before matching, it was found that FHC banks significantly defeat independent banks, regardless of their performance ratios. Conversely, when the sample was used after the matching, the results changed dramatically. Although FHC banks still beat the independent banks in terms of capital adequacy, asset quality, and liquidity sufficiency, FHC banks and independent banks are found to have equal profitability and management efficiency. Earlier studies that do not consider the endogeneity problem tend to overestimate the joining effect.(JEL C21, G21)     

CROSS‐MARKET TRADING IN CHINA'S LARGE STATE‐OWNED COMMERCIAL BANKS, 2006–2011

This paper examines the differential between the share prices of China's large state‐owned commercial banks traded in Shanghai versus prices observed in Hong Kong. We find a significant role for investor sentiment, as reflected in relative price‐earnings ratios, in explaining these price differentials for all four banks. The share price in Shanghai tends to move ahead of the share price in Hong Kong when more positive sentiment in Shanghai makes local investors willing to pay more for the same predicted earnings. We also identify common trends in relative bank price‐earnings ratios and price differentials across the two markets. (JEL G14, G15)     

The Theory of the Second Best and the Competitive Equilibrium Model

We study the international transmission of bank liquidity shocks from multinational, Islamic, bank-holding companies to their subsidiaries. Based on a total sample of 120 Islamic and conventional bank subsidiaries, we test whether foreign bank lending for Islamic and conventional banks is determined by different factors. We estimate a model that includes subsidiary and parent bank characteristics as well as host and home country variables. Our empirical findings show that lending is negatively affected by the fragility of conventional parent banks' subsidiaries. Nevertheless, we show that parent Islamic banks do not significantly affect lending by subsidiaries. Finally, we examine the market discipline regarding the transmission of liquidity shocks. We also find that reduction in foreign Islamic bank lending is stronger for those that are dependent on the interbank market. We establish that the depositors react to a deterioration of bank performance and punish their institutions by withdrawing their money. We show that market discipline has a more important role for Islamic banks, whereas liquidity needs determine the change in conventional banks.     

The Macroeconomics of Financial Crises: How Risk Premiums and Liquidity Traps Affect Policy Options

The paper offers an overview of what structural models of the IS-LM and Mundell-Fleming variety can tell about the macroeconomics of economic crises. In addition to demonstrating how the emergence of risk premiums in money and capital markets can generate liquidity traps at positive interest rates and may drive economies into recessions, it shows the following: (1) Fiscal policy works even in a small, open economy under flexible exchange rates when the country is stuck in a liquidity trap; (2) Near the fringe of liquidity traps, there may be perfect traps, in which neither monetary nor fiscal policy works when used in isolation but policy coordination is called for; and (3) Massive financial crises in the domestic money market may even destabilize the economy.     

Commercial bank ownership and performance in China

This study examines the determinants of bank performance based on proxy variables that assess the quality of assets, profitability, liquidity and overall performance. Using a sample of 111 Chinese commercial banks over the period of 2000–2012, we find that foreign banks appear to have better asset quality and overall performance although lower profitability compared to domestic banks. In contrast, the state-owned banks tend to be more profitable and have better liquidity position compared with other domestic banks and foreign banks. At bank level, equity/liability ratio exerts significant influence on overall bank performance, while at the macroeconomic level, per capital GDP, GDP growth, inflation and unemployment rates appear to have a bearing on bank performance.     

Desperately seeking cash: Evidence from bank output measurement

We examine the impact of a “near-zero” interest rate policy on bank output. Specifically, we document the existence of negative banking output on deposits for French banks from 2009. We show a structural break in banks' long run interest rate pass-through that explains this change in their business model during the 2003–2012 period. Since the crisis, banks are desperately seeking cash, and deposits have become a cost center. This is due to the new monetary policy and reveals banks' adaptation to the new banking regulation on liquidity. This new environment raises questions about banks' increasing exposure to interest rate risk and shows the necessity of coordinating monetary and regulatory policies.     

银行盈利的宏微观因素——对中国银行业的实证研究

This paper seeks to examine the determinants of the profitability of the Chinese banking sector during the post-reform period of 2000–2005. The empirical findings from this study suggest that all the determinants variables have statistically significant impact on China banks profitability. However, the impacts are not uniform across bank types. We find that liquidity, credit risk, and capitalization have positive impacts on the state owned commercial banks (SOCBs) profitability, while the impact of cost is negative. Similar to their SOCB counterparts, we find that joint stock commercial banks (JSCB) with higher credit risk tend to be more profitable, while higher cost results in a lower JSCB profitability levels. During the period under study, the empirical findings suggest that size and cost results in a lower city commercial banks (CITY) profitability, while the more diversified and relatively better capitalized CITY tend to exhibit higher profitability levels. The impact of economic growth is positive, while growth in money supply is negatively related to the SOCB and CITY profitability levels.      

Credit in Times of Stress: Lessons from Latin America during the Global Financial Crisis

The 2008–2009 global financial crisis disrupted the provision of credit in Latin America less than in previous crises. This paper tests whether specific characteristics at both the bank and country levels at the onset of the global crisis contributed to the behavior of real credit growth in this region during the crisis. As shown, financial soundness characteristics of Latin American banks, such as capitalization, liquidity, and bank efficiency in the pre‐crisis period, played a role in explaining the dynamics of real credit during the crisis. We also found that foreign banks and banks that had expanded credit growth more before the crisis were also those that cut credit the most. Among country‐specific characteristics, we found evidence that balance sheet measures such as the economy's overall currency mismatches and external debt ratios (measuring either total debt or short‐term debt) were key variables in explaining credit growth resilience.