民营化进程、企业目标函数选择与转轨效率

文章把转轨过程看作是政府可控的变量,从我国转轨中民营企业独特的目标函数出发,分析经济转轨过程中国有企业的成本函数选择对民营企业经营目标和经营行为的影响,以及在改革进程可控条件下,不同程度的改革进程是如何决定民营企业对目标函数和企业行为选择的,并对该选择与改革对社会福利水平的影响作了进一步分析。研究发现,政府与民营企业具有追求收入最大化内在合作的要求,该要求是竞争中双方博弈的均衡解;在非利润最大化目标函数的框架下,选择渐进转轨不会导致社会总产出的急剧下降,从而避免经济转型发生社会震荡。并且民营企业在改革进程中的目标函数选择与企业行为与实施的改革战略(改善社会福利)具有内在的一致性,因此,民营企业在改革不同阶段的选择行为对改革进程起到了一定的促进作用。     

The environmental Porter hypothesis: theory,evidence, and a model of timing of adoption

The Porter hypothesis postulates that the costs of compliance with environmental standards may be offset by adoption of innovations they trigger. We model this hypothesis using a game of timing of technology adoption. We will show that times of adoption will be earlier if the non-adoption tax is higher. The environmental tax will turn the preemption game with low profits into a game with credible precommitment generating higher profits (pro-Porter). If there is a precommitment game without environmental taxes, the introduction of a tax will lead to lower profits (anti-Porter). An evaluation of the empirical literature indicates that the Porter hypothesis will hold even for profit-maximizing firms under multiple market imperfections such as imperfect competition, X-inefficiency, and agency costs. These are more likely to be present in sectors with large firms. In many case studies that we have evaluated, though, we detected an element of explicit or implicit subsidies for environmentally friendly behaviour, which is in line with Pigovian policies.     

产品差异与技术差距影响研发溢出的理论探讨

在传统研发溢出效应假设基础上，通过技术差距将溢出效应与产品差异有机联系起来，并通过构建双寡头企业两阶段博弈模型对研发卡特尔、生产卡特尔、完全合作等不同形式合作联盟的均衡水平和福利变化进行分析比较。研究证实：当企业间技术差距较小时，完全合作或研发卡特尔能有效提高企业利润和社会福利；而当技术差距较大时，研发阶段的合作不仅无法激励企业进行研发投入，还会抑制企业创新的积极性。此外，与完全合作相比，局部合作具有更强的稳定性和可持续性，尤其是在产品差异程度较大的情况下，研发卡特尔最为稳定。     

Evolutionary stability of social norms in a socioeconomic equilibrium model

A hybrid of a model of economic equilibrium in two markets and a social game is formed. The link between the two is established through a social norm that conditions correct social behavior on economic variables and therefore distorts the economic equilibrium allocation. The initial endowment of an individual determines whether she gains from a social norm. The evolution of norms is examined in a dynamic model where norms are more likely to persist if they deliver higher utility to their believers. Also it is assumed that norms lose importance when they are disobeyed by their believers. Optimally coordinating norms are not necessarily evolutionarily stable, and a suboptimal norm can be the outcome of the evolutionary process.     

创业导师指导效果影响因素与对策研究

创业导师是指凭借自身丰富知识和经验向初创企业创业者提供激励与建议,以帮助他们避免出现致命错误的人。采用自我决定理论和社会认知理论考察创业导师外部服务动机、内部服务动机、创业指导自我效能感对新创企业成长、创业者成长及创业导师自身幸福感的影响,对176名创业导师数据进行回归分析。结果显示：①创业导师外部服务动机与新创企业销售额增长、创业者成长呈显著正向关系;②创业导师内部服务动机与新创企业市场份额增长、创业者成长及创业导师幸福感呈显著正向关系;③创业导师创业指导自我效能感与新创企业销售额及市场份额增长、创业者成长及创业导师幸福感呈显著正向关系。基于上述研究结果,从培育创业导师特色文化、强化创业导师激励机制、培养创业导师核心能力和搭建创业导师智库平台4个方面提出提升创业导师指导效果的对策建议。     

Oligopolistic Competition and New Technology Adoption under Uncertainty

The paper examines the adoption of a new technology in oligopoly, where there is ex ante uncertainty about variable costs of the new technology. Each firm can either adopt the new process by bearing some up-front investment or may continue to use the old one, after which firms play a Cournot market game. If in equilibrium both technologies are employed, more uncertainty about the new technology increases (decreases) the number of innovating firms and decreases (increases) the product price if the up-front investment is large (small). Our model applies readily to vertical integration if integrated firms neither buy nor sell the intermediate good on the market. However, if buying and selling is allowed, the number of integrated firms is independent of input price uncertainty.     

群体规则和社会规范影响国企经理改革的实证研究

人们渴望社会认可的动机常常被主流经济学所忽略.Alkerlof等的理论分析表明,这一动机具有重要的激励涵义.能否获得社会认可取决于是否遵从群体规则和社会规范,因此,规则操纵者可以通过两种规则管理方式来影响现存的群体规则和社会规范,从而增进社会福利.本文对国企改革过程中,群体规则和社会规范对国企经理的影响进行了实证研究,发现国企经理确实会受它们的影响,但旨在改变群体规则的物质激励的不同幅度和精神激励的不同形式,对国企经理的影响却大不相同.     

R&D COOPERATION BETWEEN IMPATIENT RIVALS

We analyse R&D cooperation between product‐market competitors within a repeated‐game framework with imperfect monitoring. When firms are patient enough, R&D cooperation is attainable without product‐market collusion. However, if firms are less patient, we show that collusion in the product market is necessary to sustain R&D cooperation. Moreover, consumers can be better off when collusion is allowed in this case.     

基于演化博弈的生态供应链采购管理研究

生态采购是生态供应链管理中重要的一环,关系到整个供应链能否实现可持续发展,同时达到经济效益、社会效益与环境效益的最大化。文章运用演化博弈论来描述和分析生态供应链采购管理过程中制造商和供应商之间的合作博弈模型,进而得出供应链上企业采取生态策略所需的条件。     

IPO underpricing: A social comparison perspective

This paper studies a social comparison perspective on IPO underpricing. The social comparison theory in behavioral psychology suggests that when people do not know how to make a decision or are exposed to new information, they refer to the behavioral norm of the public or the behavior of others to frame their decisions. I argue that when IPO firms and underwriters are uncertain about an IPO firm's intrinsic values, they refer to similar IPO issuing firms in the same industry that went public earlier to determine the IPO offer price. Using a sample of Taiwan IPOs, I find evidence that supports the social comparison explanation of IPO underpricing.     

On the interpretation of bribery in a laboratory corruption game: moral frames and social norms

Past studies on laboratory corruption games have not been able to find consistent evidence that subjects make “immoral” decisions. A possible reason, and also a critique of laboratory corruption games, is that the experiment may fail to trigger the intended immorality frame in the minds of the participants, leading many to question the very raison d’être of laboratory corruption games. To test this idea, we compare behavior in a harassment bribery game with a strategically identical but neutrally framed ultimatum game. The results show that fewer people, both as briber and bribee, engage in corruption in the bribery frame than in the alternative and the average bribe amount is lesser in the former than in the latter. These suggest that moral costs are indeed at work. A third treatment, which relabels the bribery game in neutral language, indicates that the observed treatment effect arises not from the neutral language of the ultimatum game but from a change in the sense of entitlement between the bribery and ultimatum game frames. To provide further support that the bribery game does measure moral costs, we elicit the shared perceptions of appropriateness of the actions or social norm, under the two frames. We show that the social norm governing the bribery game frame and ultimatum game frame are indeed different and that the perceived sense of social appropriateness plays a crucial role in determining the actual behavior in the two frames. Furthermore, merely relabelling the bribery game in neutral language makes no difference to the social appropriateness norm governing it. This indicates that, just as in the case of actual behavior, the observed difference in social appropriateness norm between bribery game and ultimatum game comes from the difference in entitlement too. Finally, we comment on the external validity of behavior in lab corruption games.     

Oligopolistic Trade and Competition in Wages Legislations

Wages legislation, or selective enforcement of such legislation, may be used to enhance the competitiveness of domestic firms. We show that, if domestic and foreign firms produce close substitutes and are Bertrand rivals, then wages legislation and enforcement display the characteristics of a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Other scenarios are also investigated.
JEL Classification: F13     

The Impact of Company Human Resource Policies on Social Skills: Implications for Training Sponsorship, Quit Rates and Efficiency Wages

The concept of a firm's human capital is reconsidered to include both the technical and the social skills of its workforce. Technical skills are defined by the ability to turn inputs into outputs, and measured by the productivity of unit labour effort. Social skills are defined by the propensity to behave in a manner conducive to the firm's objectives. In other words, social skills are constituted as the norm of effort contribution to which an individual assents, and are measured by observed motivation and behaviour. The existence for firms of a labour management function is proposed and supported, relating social skills to human resource policies. Implications for the labour market are that: (i) firms pay for general training and, at the same time, wages do not necessarily increase with training; (ii) human capital acquisition may not lead to an increase in quitting, even controlling for wages; (iii) human resource policies substitute for efficiency wages or for employee monitoring; and (iv) economies with high organisational commitment have low equilibrium unemployment rates.     

Organisational change and the productivity effects of green technology adoption

This study investigates induced productivity effects of firms introducing new environmental technologies. The literature on within-firm organisational change and productivity suggests that firms can achieve higher productivity gains from adopting new technologies if they adapt their organisational structures. Such complementarity effects may be of particular importance for the adoption of greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement technologies. The adoption of these technologies is often induced by public authorities to limit the social costs of climate change, whereas the private returns are much less obvious. This study finds empirical support for complementarity between green technology adoption (either CO₂-reducing or resources and energy efficiency-enhancing technologies) and organisational change. While the sole adoption of green technologies is associated with lower productivity, the simultaneous implementation of green technologies and organisational innovations is not.     

Cooperative R&D and Strategic Trade Policy with Bertrand Competition

This paper uses a strategic trade policy model to analyze the welfare effects from allowing cooperation in R&D when firms compete in a price‐setting game in the product market. A policy game between two governments is analyzed, where each government chooses a particular cooperative R&D policy in order to maximize national welfare. At the Nash equilibrium to this game only one government allows cooperation in R&D. This equilibrium is both individually and jointly optimal. International cooperation in R&D is superior to no cooperation in R&D but is inferior to the Nash equilibrium of the government policy game.     

Credible communication and cooperation: Experimental evidence from multi-stage Games

It is well known that communication often serves as a facilitator for cooperation in static games. Yet, communication can serve entirely different purposes in dynamic settings as communication during the game may work as a means for renegotiation, potentially undermining the credibility of cooperative strategies. To explore this issue, this paper experimentally investigates cooperation and non-binding communication in a two-stage game. More specifically, two treatments are considered: one with only pre-play communication and one where subjects can also communicate intra-play between the stages of the game. The results highlight a nontrivial difference concerning the effects of pre-play communication between the two treatments. Sending or receiving pre-play messages has a positive and significant effect on cooperation if there is no possibility of intra-play communication. However, this effect is significantly reduced when when intra-play communication is allowed. The results suggest that the credibility of pre-play messages may depend crucially on future communication opportunities.     

Corporate social responsibility and market entry

Is the decision of firms to pursue social interest and promote social progress philanthropic or motivated by strategic reasons? Using a simple Spence–Dixit entry model game with homogeneous goods, this paper studies the possible anticompetitive effect of the adoption of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the form of “consumer friendliness” (i.e., firms’ attention to the welfare of consumers). It is shown that, when the market becomes contestable, the incumbent can select to adopt CSR to hamper to a greater extent the potential entrant, regardless of its choice to engage in CSR activities. In other words, CSR can become a strategic barrier to entry.     

Standardization in electronic money

Abstract

Electronic money services are provided by the combination of Integrated Circuit (IC) cards and terminals. The compatibility of different brands of electronic money can be enabled by firms' joint adoption of standard terminals. In this paper, we analyse the effect of achieving compatibility among different brands of electronic money. We show that, if the unit production cost of a standard terminal is not so much different from that of a non-standard one, firms' joint adoption of standard terminals will increase the total sales of IC cards and the network size of terminals, thus raising consumers' surplus and firms' profits. On the other hand, if the unit cost of a standard terminal is so high that firms are discouraged from voluntarily adopting standard ones, the government may employ subsides to enhance efficiency. However, if the duty of implementing standardization is placed solely on the firms without subsidies, all the agents, including consumers and retailers, will be left worse off.     

Motivation crowding‐out and green‐paradox‐like outcomes

We analyze the effectiveness of environmental policy in a framework in which households’ utility is determined by both private and social components, representing their extrinsic and intrinsic motivations to undertake green actions, respectively. Environmental policy, in the form of a subsidy aiming to incentivize the adoption of a green technology, on the one hand, directly increases households’ extrinsic motivation, while, on the other hand, indirectly decreases their intrinsic motivation. We show that, provided that the indirect effect dominates, the policy leads to crowding‐out of intrinsic motivation which ultimately undermines the effectiveness of the policy itself. Specifically, despite its positive effect on environmental outcomes in the short run, the policy will lead to a deterioration in long‐run environmental outcomes, giving rise to a reverse green‐paradox‐like outcome. Moreover, even in the case in which the direct effect dominates, provided that the indirect effect is large enough, the policy will generate a deterioration in short‐run environmental outcomes. These results clearly suggest that the optimal design of environmental policy is particularly complicated since it requires to take into account also its effects on intrinsic motivation.