Analysis of Earnings Management in Chinese Listed Companies

This paper collect earnings management activities for 698 listed companies on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and the purpose is to test whether Chinese companies use real activities such as asset sales, purchase, exchange and equity sales or purchase to manage earnings to meet or exceed CSRC regulatory thresholds. But we do not observe significant difference in the frequency of earnings management activities. However, with weak evidence, these firms report larger income-increasing contributions to current year earnings from earnings management activities to meet or exceed important thresholds.     

The frequency and magnitude of earnings management in China

Earnings management is an indicator of the corporate governance quality and investor protection standard. We study the frequencies and magnitudes of earnings management under two different thresholds, zero earnings and prior earnings, in the Chinese market from 1997 to 2004. We model earnings as a mixed-normal distribution and obtain parameter estimators that measure the frequency and magnitude of earnings management. We show that the practice of earnings management has gone up both in frequency and magnitude during the post-2000 period. We also find that the frequency and magnitude of earnings management are higher when firms try to avoid negative earnings than when firms try to report earnings increase. Our findings reflect the current economic environment in China and caution investors on the low-disclosure quality in the Chinese stock market.     

The asymmetric relationship between executive earnings management and compensation: a panel threshold regression approach

Prior research shows that chief executive officers (CEOs) are rewarded for their earnings management. We re-examine this issue using a panel threshold regression approach, which allows the effect of earnings management on the CEO compensation to change across the level of earnings management and CEO compensation. Our results show that the effect of CEOs’ discretionary accounting choices on their compensation is not homogeneous across various degrees of earnings management and compensation. In particular, for firms with moderate (inordinate) levels of earnings management and CEO compensation, earnings management is rewarded (penalized).     

Progressive taxation and corporate liquidation policies with mean-reverting earnings

This paper develops a real options model of an all-equity financed firm that receives mean-reverting earnings and is subject to progressive taxation. Tax progression arises from an exogenously given tax exemption threshold such that the firm pays no corporate income taxes should its earnings be less than this threshold. The firm possesses a perpetual option to liquidate its operation for a deterministic salvage value at any time. We show that the firm optimally exercises the liquidation option at the first instant when its earnings reach an endogenously determined threshold (the liquidation trigger) from above. Using numerical analysis, we show that the liquidation trigger is higher or lower than the exogenously given tax exemption threshold, depending on whether the tax exemption is below or above a unique critical level, respectively. We further show that the liquidation trigger is strictly decreasing for all tax exemption thresholds less than the critical level, and can be hump-shaped for all tax exemption thresholds greater than the critical level, especially when the salvage value is small. Corporate income taxes as such are not neutral when tax schedules are progressive.     

Public sector pay and corruption: Measuring bribery from micro data

This study provides the first systematic measure of bribery using micro-level data on reported earnings, household spending and asset holdings. We use the compensating differential framework and the estimated sectoral gap in reported earnings and expenditures to identify the size of unobserved (unofficial) compensation (i.e., bribes) of public sector employees. In the case of Ukraine, we find that public sector employees receive 24–32% less wages than their private sector counterparts. The gap is particularly large at the top of the wage distribution. At the same time, workers in both sectors have essentially identical level of consumer expenditures and asset holdings that unambiguously indicate the presence of non-reported compensation in the public sector. Using the conditions of labor market equilibrium, we develop an aggregate measure of bribery and find that the lower bound estimate of the extent of bribery in Ukraine is between 460 million and 580 million U.S. dollars (0.9–1.2% of Ukraine's GDP in 2003).     

公司资源的"隧道效应"-来自中国上市公司的证据

该文考察了中国上市公司在控制股东谋求自己利益的前提下,其盈余管理是否与公司资源的隧道效应有关.我们猜测在治理结构越差和超过监管阀值动力越大的公司,进行盈余管理的激励越强烈;当隧道行为变得困难时其也减弱.我们的实证分析表明应计利润总额和行业中值调整后的应计利润(INDUSTRY-MEDIAN-ADJUSTED ACCRUALS)与 H/B 股虚拟变量负相关,同时与下列因素表现出正相关关系:最大股东在公司的利益,高层管理人员在公司的利益以及董事会是否由 CEO 来控制.我们的结论显示了隧道问题在具有下列特点的公司里更为突出:一个强有力控股的股东,公司的 CEO 们对公司具有强烈的私人利益,董事会不是那么独立;然而当公司与境外投资者交易股票时这个问题减轻了.而且,中国资本市场发生的某些特殊事件也为我们的假设提供了支持.     

盈余管理程度的估计模型与经验证据:一个综述

盈余管理是一个与投资者保护和会计准则制定紧密相关的重要问题,它已经成为会计乃至金融、经济领域的重要研究课题。要研究在经济上具有意义的盈余管理,其前提是估计盈余管理的程度。本文对盈余管理程度的估计方法及其相应的经验证据进行评述,文献评述结果表明,非预期应计利润模型能够估计出单个公司的盈余管理程度,但它无法估计经济上具有意义的盈余管理程度;盈余分布法是目前估计盈余管理程度的核心方法,它能够估计出整体上的盈余管理程度,但它假设真实盈余分布是光滑的。盈余管理程度估计的未来研究,需要剔除盈余指标选择以及标准化方法选择等因素的影响,解决在同时存在多个阈值情况下不同阈值之间相互关联的影响问题,并放宽模型的假设或者给假设提供直接的证据。     

Short Selling Pressure,Reporting Transparency,and the Use of Real and Accruals Earnings Management to Meet Benchmarks

Abstract

Prior literature finds that short selling is beneficial to the market because it increases liquidity and helps to discipline optimistic market prices. The authors use 2 controlled experiments to examine the potential for an unintended consequence of allowing short selling or easing short selling restrictions. Because prior research identifies short sellers as sophisticated market participants who have the ability to see through accrual earnings management choices, we predict and find that, when reporting is transparent, managers are more likely to use real earnings management relative to accrual earnings management when short selling restrictions are relaxed. This is consistent with the idea that real earnings management activities are more defensible as the result of legitimate operating decisions and are therefore more likely to hold up to scrutiny from short sellers. Overall, the results suggest that regulations that are unrelated to financial reporting can affect how managers respond to the transparency that arises from financial reporting regulations.     

Directors network centrality and earnings quality

This study examines whether firms with network central boards of directors behave differently from other firms in terms of financial reporting quality. We find that earnings quality among firms is low when board networks are channels of incorrect information transmission (including earnings management information) and for firms whose directors are awarded equity-based compensation have connections through boardroom networks, but earnings quality is better for firms with good performance in spite of their networks. These results are robust to controlling for firm information environment, growth, size, age, leverage, performance, volatility in firm operations, and corporate governance.     

Main banks’ influence on financial reporting quality in Japan

This study investigated main banks’ influence on the quality of accounting firms’ audits and corporate firms’ earnings, focusing on companies on Japan’s Nikkei 500 index. We posed three questions in this research study about main banks’ influence on corporate clients’ earnings management. First, does a weakened main bank relationship influence corporate clients’ financial reporting quality? Second, does Japan’s firewall deregulation influence firms’ earnings quality? Finally, does the relationship between accounting firms and main banks affect client firms’ earnings quality? Our main findings were that main banks are not related to client firms’ earnings management; however, main banks mitigate client firms’ earnings management after firewall deregulation. On the other hand, firewall deregulation does motivate firms to manipulate their earnings management. Finally, using Pong and Kita’s (2006) study as a framework, we found that main banks and client firms using the same accounting firms had no influence on earnings management. Based on these evidences presented, our findings suggest that the quality of corporate clients’ financial reporting changes before and after firewall deregulation.     

SINGLE MOMS AND DEADBEAT DADS: THE ROLE OF EARNINGS,MARRIAGE MARKET CONDITIONS,AND PREFERENCE HETEROGENEITY

Why do some men father children outside of marriage without providing support? Why do some women have children outside of marriage when they receive little support from fathers? Why is this behavior more common among Blacks than Whites? We estimate a dynamic equilibrium model of marriage, employment, fertility, and child support decisions. We consider the extent to which low earnings, marriage market conditions, and preference heterogeneity explain nonmarital childbearing, deadbeat fatherhood, and racial differences in these outcomes. We find the Black–White earnings gap and preference heterogeneity explain a substantial portion of racial differences, whereas marriage market conditions are less important.     

The frequency and magnitude of earnings management: Time-series and multi-threshold comparisons

We measure the frequency and magnitude of earnings management assuming earnings follow a mixed-normal distribution. We show that the frequency of earnings management is the highest when firms try to meet analysts' forecasted earnings and furthermore the trend is magnified in recent years. Additionally, more firms manage earnings to avoid earnings decreases rather than to avoid negative earnings. Furthermore, the magnitude of earnings management is the greatest when firms try to avoid earnings decreases. Earnings managements to avoid negative and decreased earnings are lower in recent years, and the magnitude of earnings management to meet forecasted earnings became dominant after 2001.     

Employee Profit-sharing and Labor Extraction in a Classical Model of Distribution and Growth

This article sets out a classical model of economic growth in which the distribution of income features the possibility of profit-sharing with workers, as firms choose periodically between two labor-extraction compensation strategies. Workers are homogeneous with regard to labor power, and firms choose to compensate them with either only a conventional wage or a share of profits on top of this conventional wage. Empirical evidence shows that labor productivity (i.e. labor extraction) in profit-sharing firms is higher than labor productivity in non-sharing firms. The frequency distribution of labor-extraction employee compensation strategies and labor productivity across firms is time-variant, being driven by satisficing imitation dynamics from which we derive two significant results. First, heterogeneity in labor-extraction compensation strategies across firms, and hence earnings inequality across workers can be a stable long-run equilibrium outcome. Second, although convergence to a long-run equilibrium may occur with either a falling or increasing proportion of profit-sharing firms, the share of net profits in income and the rates of net profit, capital accumulation and economic growth nevertheless all converge to the highest possible long-run equilibrium values.     

中国医药上市企业股权结构对盈余管理影响的实证研究

选择了2007—2009年中国A股医药上市企业为研究样本,对中国医药上市企业股权结构对盈余管理的影响进行了实证研究,试图为优化中国医药企业股权结构,遏制过度盈余管理提供现实依据。研究结果表明,中国医药上市企业股权性质与盈余管理不相关;第一大股东持股比例与盈余管理呈正相关关系;股权制衡度与盈余管理负相关。     

我国微利上市公司盈余管理方式研究

基于我国资本市场“微利现象”,以1998-2009年沪深两市A股非金融类上市公司为样本,采用独立样本T检验和多元回归分析方法,研究微利上市公司的盈余管理方式。研究表明：微利上市公司同时存在应计盈余管理和真实活动盈余管理两种方式,并且真实活动盈余管理是微利公司调增利润的主要手段,微利公司的总体真实活动盈余管理程度比非微利公司平均高3％或4．6％,而应计盈余管理程度平均只高1．5％,为我国资本市场真实活动盈余管理的存在性提供了新的经验证据。     

资本市场开放与企业真实盈余管理——基于“陆港通”的经验证据

资本市场开放不仅是扩大国际融资、更好地利用国际金融市场的需要,而且对我国资本市场发育和上市公司行为具有多重外部治理效应。本文借助我国内地与香港资本市场互联互通机制这一准自然实验,研究资本市场开放对企业真实盈余管理的影响。研究发现:(1)总体上,“陆港通”机制的实施显著降低了标的公司真实盈余管理程度。(2)委托代理问题是企业进行盈余管理的重要原因,而“陆港通”机制开通后,能够缓解标的公司代理矛盾,进而约束管理层的真实盈余管理行为。(3)当资本市场信息环境改善、管理层面临较大股票抛售压力以及大股东监督力度较强时,“陆港通”抑制企业真实盈余管理行为的治理效果更强。本文结果表明,资本市场开放有助于提高我国上市公司财务信息披露质量及公司治理水平。     

资本市场开放与企业真实盈余管理——基于“陆港通”的经验证据

资本市场开放不仅是扩大国际融资、更好地利用国际金融市场的需要,而且对我国资本市场发育和上市公司行为具有多重外部治理效应。本文借助我国内地与香港资本市场互联互通机制这一准自然实验,研究资本市场开放对企业真实盈余管理的影响。研究发现:(1)总体上,“陆港通”机制的实施显著降低了标的公司真实盈余管理程度。(2)委托代理问题是企业进行盈余管理的重要原因,而“陆港通”机制开通后,能够缓解标的公司代理矛盾,进而约束管理层的真实盈余管理行为。(3)当资本市场信息环境改善、管理层面临较大股票抛售压力以及大股东监督力度较强时,“陆港通”抑制企业真实盈余管理行为的治理效果更强。本文结果表明,资本市场开放有助于提高我国上市公司财务信息披露质量及公司治理水平。     

Earnings distribution,corporate governance and CEO pay

We investigate the relationship between earnings differentials and the pay of CEOs of 190 British companies between 1970 and 1990. We find that (i) changes in the differential between the 90th and 50th weekly earnings percentiles for non‐manual adult male workers [90:50] explain changes in the level of real CEO salary and bonus in our sample of companies; (ii) changes in this differential also account for changes in the elasticity of CEO pay to firm size; (iii) a broader measure of earnings inequality does far worse than 90:50 at explaining changes in both the level and the firm size elasticity of CEO pay; (iv) fitting the model on data for 1970–1983 and predicting pay levels for the period starting with the widespread adoption of executive share option schemes in 1984, we find a structural break in the relationship between lower management pay differentials and the pay of the CEO. We conclude first that top executive pay prior to 1984 was a stable function of both firm size and earnings differentials lower on the administrative ladder, consistent with a hypothesis advanced by Herbert Simon in 1957; and second that the use of share options from 1984 onward represents not simply a change in the mode of top executive compensation, but a de‐linking of the pay of top executives and that of their subordinates.     

真实盈余管理动机下R&D削减行为与创新产出——数量、质量与效率

以2007—2017年沪深A股上市公司为样本，基于零盈余、上期盈余和分析师预测盈余对真实盈余管理动机进行刻画识别，检验公司在真实盈余管理动机下削减R&D支出对创新产出的影响。研究发现，与其它动机相比，真实盈余管理动机下的R&D削减会导致未来三期更低的创新产出、创新质量及创新效率。进一步，扩大盈余管理识别范围、使用全样本进行双重差分、替换被解释变量分别检验后，结果依然稳健。     

长期资产减值与盈余管理方式选择

以2007年长期资产减值的政策变化为背景,研究上市公司盈余管理方式的选择偏好变化。通过研究发现,应计项目和真实活动盈余管理是公司可选择的盈余管理方式,公司会基于两种盈余管理方式的成本来选择具体的盈余管理方式;禁止长期减值损失的转回会对应计项目盈余管理有遏制作用,同时极有可能存在企业管理者偏向使用真实活动盈余管理的趋势。