Bidding in private-value auctions with uncertain values

Auctions are often used to sell idiosyncratic goods difficult for potential bidders to value ex ante. Laboratory auctions with uncertainty over final values in this experiment resulted in 18% and 27% of bids above the expected value of the item in private-value first-price and English auctions, respectively. Risk-seeking preferences as measured on an individual decision task cannot explain overbidding and the first-price auction results suggest that risk aversion may not be a good explanation for bidding behavior observed with certain values. Several candidate explanations fail to explain overbidding, rather it appears to stem from some bidders who are prone to overbidding. Relative to first-price auctions, the size and frequency of overbids are significantly larger in English auctions, while more English auctions are won by overbidders. Differences between the formats appear to be driven by the dynamic nature of English auctions which is consistent with popular notions of “auction fever.”     

Location decisions of a polluting firm and the time consistency of environmental policy

This paper considers location decisions of a monopolist, who faces a tax on its emissions in the home country, under ex post that is, time consistent, and ex ante, that is precommitment, environmental policies. We show that the monopolist will relocate more often under ex post optimal emission taxes. A government which cannot commit to an ex ante emission tax and sets its tax ex post after abatement effort has been chosen, is unable to affect the monopolist’s location decision, because it cannot commit to strategically reduce its tax level in the first stage. Domestic welfare is often higher under ex post emission taxes whenever the monopolist relocates under both policy regimes. Otherwise, welfare is higher under government commitment to an ex ante emission tax level. Thus, government commitment to a policy is not always welfare improving.     

Tullock's Puzzle in Pay‐and‐Play Lobbying

We explain Tullock's puzzle of small payments from special interests to policy‐makers by the hold‐up problem between the two parties. We construct a simple lobbying environment where an uninformed policy‐maker is a price‐setter who sells access to two opposed and privately informed lobbyists. The key equilibrium property is “the curse of the ex ante favored lobbyist”; the lobbyist proposing a project with the higher expected public value ends up worse off than the lobbyist proposing a project with the lower expected public value. In the absence of contribution caps, the ex ante favored lobbyist strategically devalues her project, and the resulting competitive devaluations destroy private values, revenues, as well as correlated public values. Ex ante, the policy‐maker benefits from a binding contribution cap protects the ex ante favored lobbyist, eliminates competitive devaluations, and thus remedies the hold‐up problem.     

Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies

Summary. If the allocations of a differential information economy are defined as incentive compatible state-contingent lotteries over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any competitive equilibrium allocation can be viewed as an element of the core of the n-fold replicated economy, for every n. The converse holds under the further assumption of independent private values but not in general, as shown by a counter-example. Received: August 9, 1999; revised version: September 12, 1999     

English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem

We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, one for economies with n goods and n factors, and one for non-square economies. Similar assumptions and methods underlie these seemingly unrelated results.     

WORLD CUP 2010: SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY CHALLENGES INFORMED BY THE EXPERIENCE OF GERMANY 2006

The paper provides an ex post analysis of the financial burden and economic benefits of the World Cup (WC) in Germany 2006. Based on the usual cost-benefit measures, the experience of WC 2006 appears to be in line with existing empirical research on large sporting events and sports stadiums, which have rarely identified significant net economic benefits. The lessons from Germany 2006 provide a context for analyzing the potential risks and benefits for South Africa (SA), the WC hosts in 2010. For SA, a careful analysis might be even more urgent to assure the sustainability of investment in stadiums. The paper also argues that the "feel-good" and public image effects of sports events should no longer be neglected in cost-benefit studies of large sporting events, even though these effects have the character of experience goods, and their value are thus likely to be underestimated ex ante. ( JEL L83, R53, R58)     

Uncertainty, Commitment, and Optimal Taxation

This paper examines the optimal tax design problem in the presence of wage uncertainty. The wage has a continuous distribution, individuals are ex ante identical, preferences are separable in labor supply and goods, public policy aims at providing the population with social insurance, and the only restriction on the tax instruments is that emanating from lack of public observability of realized wages and labor supplies. We show that optimal tax structures depend crucially on whether it is labor supply or goods that consumers have to commit to before the resolution of uncertainty. Specifically, we prove that, in the absence of commitment, the social insurance problem collapses to the traditional optimal tax problem. Second, if labor supply is precommitted, it would be possible to effect a first-best outcome. Third, commitment to goods would make indirect taxation a useful instrument of tax policy even in the presence of a general income tax; it requires differential tax treatment of committed and noncommitted goods. Finally, if preferences are separable between the two types of goods, precommitted goods must be taxed at a uniform rate lower than that on the noncommitted goods.     

Bidding for money

We analyze monetary exchange in a model that allows for directed search and multilateral matches. We consider environments with divisible goods and indivisible money, and compare the results with those in models that use random matching and bilateral bargaining. Two different pricing mechanisms are used: ex ante price posting, and ex post bidding (auctions). Also, we consider settings both with and without lotteries. We find that the model generates very simple and intuitive equilibrium allocations that are similar to those with random matching and bargaining, but with different comparative static and welfare properties.     

Reconsidering Heterogeneity and Aggregation Issues in Environmental Valuation: A Multi-attribute Approach

The economic valuation of complex environmental goods (composed of multiple attributes) is an expanding field of research in ecological and environmental economics. However, several issues are still subjects of debate. This paper focuses on three of them: the linearity of the valuation function in the attributes; aggregation criteria for obtaining social values; and the heterogeneity of individuals’ utility functions. A methodological approach based on Multi-attribute Utility Theory, which enables us to contrast the impact of these concerns on the valuation of environmental goods, is proposed. We employ the methodology to value a protected natural area and, from the results obtained, we can conclude that the non-linearity and the heterogeneity of the individual utility function are relevant aspects of environmental valuation that need to be taken into account when valuing environmental goods.     

Unequal uncertainties and uncertain inequalities: an axiomatic approach

In this paper, we provide an axiomatic characterization of social welfare functions for uncertain incomes. Our most general result is that a small number of reasonable assumptions regarding welfare orderings under uncertainty rule out pure ex ante as well as pure ex post evaluations. Any social welfare function that satisfies these axioms should lie strictly between the ex ante and the ex post evaluations of income distributions. We also provide an axiomatic characterization of the weighted average of the minimum and the maximum of ex post and ex ante evaluations.     

Quality Uncertainty as Resolution of the Bertrand Paradox

It is well‐known that product differentiation eliminates the Bertrand paradox (i.e. marginal cost pricing under duopoly). While differentiation is often justified with reference to the consumer's ‘preference for variety’, the conditions under which such a preference is likely to arise are rarely considered. We investigate this question in a setting in which uncertainty about product quality can endogenously generate either convex or non‐convex preferences. We show that even when two goods are ex ante homogeneous, quality uncertainty can eliminate the Bertrand paradox.     

Frontrunners and Laggards: The Strategy of Environmental Regulation under Uncertainty

The extant literature on the political economy of environmental regulation does not provide a unified theoretical explanation for three salient stylized facts. First, companies voluntarily invest to reduce the environmental burden that they cause under threat of regulation. Second, ex ante estimates of the compliance cost tend to be systematically higher than ex post estimates. Finally, regulators use limited information provided by the industry. I construct a game-theoretic model of environmental regulation under uncertainty with a benevolent regulator. In equilibrium, companies undertake voluntary action to induce regulation that raises barriers to entry. This profit-driven behavior is not always socially detrimental, however, as the regulator obtains a credible commitment to production and a more accurate estimate of the compliance cost. Additionally, the results provide a selection explanation for the mismatch between ex ante and ex post cost estimates: if companies condition compliance on the installation cost, only low-cost companies install in equilibrium. The analysis combines “regulatory capture” with social welfare maximization to explain the curious combination of voluntary action and low ex post compliance cost without serious information collection by the regulator.     

On competitive balance in the group stage of the UEFA Champions League*

This article examines competitive balance in the group stage of the UEFA Champions League over the last two decades (1999/2000–2017/2018). Competitive balance is considered both before and after a competition. Have the groups been designed in such a way as to ensure similar levels of competitive balance ex ante? Have the demonstrated strengths (ex post competitive balance) of the different groups been similar over each season? What is the relationship between the competitive balance in the designed groups and that achieved in the same groups after the competition? Are the performance achieved in terms of ex post competitive balance similar to ex ante competitive balance levels? We found that, despite expectations, the groups' ex ante competitive balance was not homogeneous. Although ex ante competitive balance serves as a good predictor, on average, of ex post competitive balance, we observed significant differences at the levels of group and seasons. Therefore, it is possible to improve the design mechanism of the groups that make up the group stage of the champions so that they are composed homogeneously in terms of ex ante competitive balance.     

Estimating the Supply of Environmental Benefits by Agriculture: A French Case Study

There has been an increasing public interest in promoting the supply of environmental benefits by agriculture. The Environmentally Sensitive Area scheme addresses this challenge by offering farmers voluntary agreements: entrants are compensated for complying with a package of prescribed farming practices designed to secure conservation goals. This paper emphasizes the uptake of agreements from two perspectives: (i) ex post, it considers why some eligible farmers join a proposed scheme and why some do not, (ii) ex ante, it discusses how non-eligible farmers would behave if they were proposed a well-defined scheme. Ex post perspective refers to farmers' actual behaviour which is observed by the environmental agency, whereas the ex ante perspective is related to their contingent one. A single economic model is derived to deal with both cases. Econometric results from a French case study with respect to wetland preservation are given. There is some consistency between the empirical results obtained in both cases, and to some extent it may be argued that contingent behaviour predicts the actual one.     

SPECIALIZATION AND TRADE: A GAME THEORETICAL APPROACH

Abstract.  In this paper we consider the problem of specialization and trade for large economies with a continuum of ex ante identical individuals and with a finite number of goods. Different from the classical treatment, we adopt a game theoretical approach. Therefore in our models the prices of traded goods are endogenously formulated according to the bidding strategies of the producer-consumers. Furthermore, we assume that in the beginning individuals randomly choose their professions. As a result, with a short-run Nash equilibrium different types of professionals may have different utility levels; while through a dynamic process, a long-run Nash equilibrium with utility equalization is reached. Besides, we also attempt to provide a new algorithm for the computation of general equilibrium models in the Yang-Ng framework.     

Indivisibilities in the Ricardian model of trade

The idea that goods or factors of production may not be perfectly divisible has important implications for many areas of economics. This paper introduces both types of indivisibilities into the standard Ricardian model of international trade. Indivisibilities give rise to new results compared to the standard model with perfectly divisible goods and factors of production. Both types of indivisibility may result in complete specialisation even in autarky, while goods indivisibility may result in (ex ante) identical consumers consuming different bundles of goods, and hence enjoying different levels of welfare. Both types of indivisibilities lead to efficiency losses relative to the perfectly divisible case. International trade may eliminate efficiency losses resulting from indivisibility in the factors of production, but not those resulting from goods indivisibility. This suggests that the presence of indivisibilities leads to a second-best world, with the consequent implications for policy. The results of the paper are consistent with existing empirical evidence.     

EX POST VERSUS EX ANTE MEASURES OF THE USER COST OF CAPITAL

Should we use ex post or ex ante measures of user costs to calculate the contribution of capital in a growth accounting exercise? The answer, based on a simple model of temporary equilibrium, is that ex post is better in theory. In practice researchers usually calculate ex post user costs by assuming that the rate of return is equalized across assets. But this is only true if expectations are correct. In general, the ex post rate of return differs between assets, even though ex ante it is the same. I propose a hybrid method. The index of capital services is estimated using ex ante weights; the contribution of capital is the growth of this index multiplied by the ex post income share of capital. I show that this method is theoretically correct if the production function is CES. I compare the ex post, ex ante and hybrid methods using data for 31 U.K. industries from 1970 to 2000.     

Environment versus growth — A criticism of “degrowth” and a plea for “a-growth”

In recent debates on environmental problems and policies, the strategy of “degrowth” has appeared as an alternative to the paradigm of economic growth. This new notion is critically evaluated by considering five common interpretations of it. One conclusion is that these multiple interpretations make it an ambiguous and rather confusing concept. Another is that degrowth may not be an effective, let alone an efficient strategy to reduce environmental pressure. It is subsequently argued that “a-growth,” i.e. being indifferent about growth, is a more logical social aim to substitute for the current goal of economic growth, given that GDP (per capita) is a very imperfect indicator of social welfare. In addition, focusing ex ante on public policy is considered to be a strategy which ultimately is more likely to obtain the necessary democratic-political support than an ex ante, explicit degrowth strategy. In line with this, a policy package is proposed which consists of six elements, some of which relate to concerns raised by degrowth supporters.     

Macroeconomic adjustment processes

Simulations of the Canadian quarterly model RDX2 are used to illustrate the main macroeconomic adjustment processes called into play by an exogenous expenditure shock. Primary emphasis is placed on supply responses, including international flows of goods, services, capital and population, and on the key role played by inventory changes in buffering discrepancies between ex ante supply and demand. The constraining roles of prices, wages, and monetary policy are also dissected in some detail.     

On the efficiency of ex ante and ex post pricing institutions

Summary This paper compares the performance of three pricing institutions in a decentralized matching model in which random matching occurs. In the first, sellers make public ex ante commitments to trade at pre-specified prices before matching occurs. In the second, the buyer and seller engage in an alternating offer bargaining game once a match has occurred. In the final pricing institution, one party is chosen at random to make a take it or leave it price offer. The steady state equilibrium with ex ante pricing pareto dominates the steady state equilibrium with ex post take it or leave it offers, which in turn pareto dominates the steady state equilibrium with alternating offers. As the discount factor goes to one, the equilibrium with ex ante pricing generates participation rates that tend toward the pareto efficient level. The ex post pricing institutions generate participation rates that are bounded away from efficient levels. The surplus loss associated with switching from ex ante pricing to take it or leave it offers is small when the discount factor is close to one. Contrary to many models of decentralized trade, ex post pricing institutions encourage too much search by buyers.The financial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada is gratefully acknowledged. The research for this paper was completed while the author was visiting the University of California at San Diego. The author thanks Douglas Gale for comments.