Can central bank communication help to stabilise inflation expectations?

This paper examines whether central bank communication stabilises euro area inflation expectations through the information and news channel. A novelty of the study is its use of data from Google Analytics on ECB website traffic as proxy for visitors’ attention to its communication. We conduct several econometric tests with daily data to measure the impact of ECB communication on the information demand of the public and ultimately on inflation expectations. Overall, this study shows that website attention, as captured by search volumes of visitors, influences euro area inflation expectations. We find that increased website attention contributes to narrowing the gap between market-based forecasts and (the mean of) longer-term professional inflation expectations. Our findings add to the theoretical evidence on the existence of an information and news channel.     

What determines households inflation expectations? Theory and evidence from a household survey

The purpose of the present paper is to study how households form inflation expectations using a novel survey dataset of Italian households. We extend the existing ‘inattentiveness’ literature by incorporating explicitly inflation targets and distinguishing between aggregate and disaggregate dynamics based on demographic groups. We also consider both the short- and long-run dynamics as households update their inflation expectations. While we find clear distinctions between the various demographic groups behavior, households tend to absorb professionals forecast. The short-run dynamics also indicate they not only overreact when updating their expectations but also adjust asymmetrically to any perceived momentum change of future inflation.     

Inflation literacy and inflation expectations: Evidence from Austrian household survey data

Inflation expectations are known to be quite heterogeneous across agents. We investigate whether this heterogeneity is primarily due to differences in people’s understanding of the inflation process and of the goals and intentions of the central bank. Using micro data from a survey conducted among 2000 Austrian households, we construct an indicator of “inflation literacy” from several questions on people’s knowledge about different aspects of inflation. We find that this indicator helps explain both the level and the uncertainty of inflation expectations: Households with relatively higher levels of inflation literacy tend to have lower and more accurate short-term and long-term inflation expectations. Interestingly, however, they are less certain about their inflation expectations than people with lower levels of inflation literacy. We also find that people’s trust in the central bank and in its ability to maintain price stability significantly dampens their inflation expectations.     

The reaction of disagreements in inflation expectations to fiscal sentiment obtained from information in official communiqués

Using official communiqués about fiscal policy, we develop a fiscal sentiment indicator, and we verify the reaction of disagreements in inflation expectations to fiscal sentiment. This analysis is relevant to inflation targeting (IT) countries because transparency and communication can influence expectations. The results suggest that a more optimistic fiscal sentiment reduces disagreements in inflation expectations. Estimates show that, for higher disagreements in inflation expectations at 12-month maturity, an optimistic fiscal sentiment can reduce the disagreement more sharply. In turn, the fiscal sentiment effect on the disagreement for the 48-month maturity is stronger the smaller the disagreement is. The results allow us to outline the following policy recommendations. First, an optimistic fiscal environment is important in the task of guiding inflation expectations and reducing inflation uncertainty. Second, fiscal communication is an important tool for the expectations formation process, and therefore it must be carefully managed to help in the task of forward guidance of inflation expectations, being important for the IT regime. Third, both fiscal credibility and monetary policy credibility are important for the expectations formation process, particularly for the reduction of inflation uncertainty, representing aspects that must be preserved in countries that adopt the IT regime.     

Quantification and characteristics of household inflation expectations in Switzerland

Inflation expectations are a key variable in conducting monetary policy. However, these expectations are generally unobservable and only certain proxy variables exist, such as surveys on inflation expectations. This article offers guidance on the appropriate quantification of household inflation expectations in the Swiss Consumer Survey, where answers are qualitative in nature. We apply and evaluate different variants of the probability approach and the regression approach; we demonstrate that models that include answers on perceived inflation and allow for time-varying response thresholds yield the best results; and we show why the originally proposed approach of Fluri and Spörndli (1987) has resulted in heavily biased inflation expectations since the mid-1990s. Furthermore, we discuss some of the key features of Swiss household inflation expectations, i.e. the fact that there has been a shift in expectation formation since 2000 (expectations are better anchored and less adaptive, and there is lower disagreement of expectations). We suggest that this may be linked to the Swiss National Bank’s adjustment of its monetary policy framework around this time. In addition, we outline how expectation formation in Switzerland is in line with the sticky information model, where information disseminates slowly from professional forecasters to households.     

Decomposing household,professional and market forecasts on inflation: a dynamic factor model analysis

A dynamic factor model with stochastic volatility is used to investigate the relationships between three alternative measures of inflation expectations. The results show evidence of both a common time-varying trend and a common transitory component between inflation and short-term inflation expectations from households, professionals and markets. While the common time-varying trend has declined in both level and volatility since the early 1980s, it was found that consumer expectations are disproportionately influenced by the visibility of prices of select few goods. Roughly speaking, a 1% point increase in food and energy prices leads to about 1/3% point increase in consumer forecasts of inflation. In terms of policymaking, this finding suggests that stability in highly visible prices can moderate inflation in a meaningful way.     

缓解通货膨胀预期的策略思考

通货膨胀的发生会对国民经济发展产生各种不良影响,导致产业和经济结构的畸形变化.通货膨胀预期作为通货膨胀的心理延续对通货膨胀的再现起着举足轻重的作用,所以采取何种措施缓解通货膨胀预期成为中国政策运行的重点.当前通货膨胀预期是需求拉动型、成本推进型和预期型三种类型交叉,金融预期和金融作用紧密结合、投资过热、原材料成本价格上升及市场预期的影响成为通货膨胀预期动因.准确分解通货膨胀预期的成因,采取有针对性的调控政策,落实科学发展观,进行增长模式的改革以及明确宏观经济政策目标,通过合理预期应对通货膨胀预期等措施,成为缓解通货膨胀预期的必经之路.     

通胀预期对未来住房价格的影响——基于消费者信心指数的分析

以消费者信心指数作为通货膨胀预期指标,以中国1999—2010年住房市场月度数据为样本,实证检验通货膨胀预期对未来住房价格的影响。实证检验结果表明,通货膨胀预期会导致住房价格上涨,即生产者和消费者对通货膨胀预期将推动住房价格的不断上涨,因此,稳定通货膨胀预期对于稳定住房价格具有十分重要的作用。     

Rational expectations and fixed-event forecasts: An application to UK inflation

This paper tests a version of the rational expectations hypothesis using ‘fixed-event’ inflation forecasts for the UK. Fixed-event forecasts consist of a panel of forecasts for a set of outturns of a series at varying horizons prior to each outturn. The forecasts are the prediction of fund managers surveyed by Merrill Lynch. Fixed-event forecasts allow tests for whether expectations are unbiased in a similar fashion to the rest of the literature. But they also permit the conduct of particular tests of forecast efficiency - whether the forecasts make best use of available information - that are not possible with rolling-event data. We find evidence of a positive bias in inflation expectations. Evidence for inefficiency is much less clear cut.First version received: June 2002/ Final version received: November 2003We would like two anonymous referees and an editor for comments that have significantly improved the paper. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of England.     

Inflation surprises and inflation expectations in the Euro area

In the second half of 2012, euro area inflation started declining and reached historical lows at the end of 2014. Market-based measures of inflation expectations also declined to unprecedented levels. During this disinflationary period, inflation releases have often surprised analysts on the downside. We provide evidence that inflation ‘surprises’ have significant effects on inflation expectations. The sensitivity of inflation expectations to the surprises, which has varied over time, disappeared after the introduction of the Asset Purchase Programme by the European Central Bank.     

The New Keynesian Phillips curve and the role of expectations: Evidence from the CESifo World Economic Survey

We provide evidence on the fit of the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve for selected Euro zone countries, the US and the UK. Instead of imposing rational expectations and estimating the Phillips curve by the Generalized Method of Moments, we use direct measures of inflation expectations from the CESifo World Economic Survey. Our main findings are as follows: (i) The use of survey data gives empirical results, which are more reliable than those obtained from the GMM approach. (ii) The purely forward-looking Phillips curve can be rejected in favor of the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve. (iii) The estimated coefficients on past inflation are higher when using survey expectations than when using the rational expectations GMM approach. (iv) It remains unclear whether real unit labor costs or a measure of the output gap should be used as a proxy for real marginal costs. (v) Theory-based restrictions lead to an improvement of the empirical results.     

Nominal Interest Rates as Indicators of Inflation Expectations

The properties of nominal interest rates as indicators of inflation expectations are evaluated. Are they unbiased? How precise are they? To arrive at robust results, a range of different methods are applied on several US and UK data sets. The results show that the interest rate level is a reasonably good indicator of the level of inflation expectations. However, changes in interest rates are poor indicators of changes inflation expectations.     

Expected inflation, expected stock returns, and money illusion: What can we learn from survey expectations?

We show empirically that survey-based measures of expected inflation are significant and strong predictors of future aggregate stock returns in several industrialized countries both in-sample and out-of-sample. Empirically discriminating between competing sources of this return predictability by virtue of a comprehensive set of expectations data, we find that money illusion seems to be the driving force behind our results. Another popular hypothesis – inflation as a proxy for aggregate risk aversion – is not supported by thedata.     

Inflation expectations of Brazilian consumers: an analysis based on the FGV survey

ABSTRACT

An accurate assessment of inflation expectations is crucial for the management of monetary policies. However, expectations are not directly observed and are hence normally inferred either from the interest rate structure or from surveys of professional forecasters. Alternatively, a direct measure may be obtained from consumer surveys. The aim of this paper is to study the formation of inflation expectations in Brazil, using a novel dataset based on the FGV/IBRE consumer survey. Basing our model on the rational inattention hypothesis, we find that individual heterogeneity plays a very significant role in shaping individual expectations; also, Brazilians adjust expectations to current inflation and to a fixed reference value, while professional forecasts do not play a very relevant role.     

Dynamic asset allocation and consumption under inflation inequality: The impacts of inflation experiences and expectations

Differences in spending patterns and in price increases across goods and services lead to the unequal inflation experiences of households (called inflation inequality). These differences then cause disagreements in inflation expectations and eventually have a significant effect on households’ asset allocation and consumption decisions. The asset allocation model in this paper explains how inflation experiences affect household investment and consumption through corresponding inflation expectations, which are characterized by long-term expected inflation, the impact coefficient of the expected inflation and the correlation between expected inflation and the risky return. Using China's economic data, the empirical results show that significant differences in inflation expectation arise from income gap, regional inequality, different inflation measures and economic sector spending differences. Using the estimated coefficients, the calibration results have policy implications that households need more financing channels to resist inflation, especially in rural areas and in the raw material sector.     

Assessing inflation expectations anchoring for heterogeneous agents: analysts,businesses and trade unions

Forecasts of agents who are actively involved in the setting of prices and wages are less readily available than those of professional analysts but may be more relevant for understanding inflation dynamics. Here we compare inflation expectations anchoring between analysts, businesses and trade unions for one country for which comparable forecasts are available for almost two decades: South Africa. Forecasts are modelled as monotonically diverging from an estimated long-run anchor point, or ‘implicit anchor’, towards actual inflation as the forecast horizon shortens. We find that the estimated inflation anchors of analysts lie within the 3–6 percent inflation target range of the central bank. However, those for businesses and trade unions, which our evidence suggests may be the most relevant for driving the inflation process, have remained above the top end of the official target range. Our results point to challenges for central banks seeking to gain credibility with agents whose decisions directly influence inflation.     

Estimating inflation compensation for Turkey using yield curves

Inflation compensation derived from nominal and real bond yields contains market based, real time information regarding the inflation expectations and the pricing of inflation risks. In this study, we calculate inflation compensation for Turkey by using nominal and real yield curves. The findings of event study analysis on inflation compensation indicate that changes in the term structure of inflation compensation contain information regarding the credibility of monetary authority. Moreover, we find that, at daily frequency, liquidity conditions have no significant effect on inflation compensation and hence the effects of events such as monetary policy decisions and inflation surprises on inflation compensation can be attributed mainly to changes in inflation expectations and pricing of inflation uncertainty.     

A new consensus-based unemployment indicator

In this study we present a novel approach to measure the level of consensus among agents’ expectations. The proposed framework allows us to design a positional indicator that gives the percentage of agreement between survey expectations. While other aggregation methods such as the balance, which is constructed as the difference between the percentages of respondents giving positive and negative replies, explicitly omit the neutral information, the proposed metric allows synthesizing the information coming from all response categories, including the percentage of respondents who do not expect any change. In order to assess the performance of the proposed measure of consensus, we compare its ability to track the evolution of unemployment to that of the balance in eight European countries. With this aim, we scale both measures to generate one-period ahead forecasts of the unemployment rate. We find that the consensus-based unemployment indicator outperforms the balance in all countries except Denmark and Sweden, which suggests that the level of agreement among agents’ expectations is a good predictor of unemployment.     

Disentangling the Predictive Power of Term Spreads under Inflation Targeting

Under inflation targeting, S. Cho and J. Lee (2014, Inflation targeting and predictive power of term spreads. Seoul Journal of Economics, 27, 391–419), A. Estrella (2005, Why does the yield curve predict output and inflation? The Economic Journal, 115, 722–744) and P.L. Siklos (2000, Inflation targets and the yield curve: New Zealand and Australia versus the US. International Journal of Finance &; Economics, 5, 15–32) have reported that the predictive power of yield spreads for future inflation decreases in inflation targeting countries. In this paper, we decompose the yield spread into the expectations hypothesis component and the term premium, and find that the decrease in the predictability is mostly due to the deterioration of information embedded in the expectations hypothesis component. Our finding reveals that if inflation targeting is successful in achieving its main goal, then the expectations for future inflation are anchored at the target inflation rate (or range), and thereby the predictive contents of the term spreads regarding future inflation decrease.     

Anchoring of inflation expectations in the euro area: Recent evidence based on survey data

This article analyses the anchoring of inflation expectations of professional forecasters and consumers in the euro area. We study anchoring, defined as the central bank's ability to manage expectations, by paying special attention to the impact of the ECB inflation target and ECB inflation projections on inflation expectations. Our analysis indicates that in the post-crisis period longer-term inflation expectations have become somewhat more sensitive to shorter-term ones and to actual HICP inflation. We also find that the ECB inflation projections have recently become more important for short- and medium-term expectations of professional forecasters and at the same time the role of the ECB inflation target for those expectations has diminished. Overall, our analysis suggests that in recent years inflation expectations in the euro area have shown some signs of de-anchoring.