An Experimental Study of Electronic Bulletin Board Trading for Emission Permits

This paper reports a laboratory experiment that studies several features of a tradable emission permit program recently implemented in the Los Angeles area. The experiment focuses on the new Electronic Bulletin Board trading institution, in which firms publicly post proposed terms of trade. Potential trading partners can review this information online, and transactions are executed following bilateral negotiation. The experiment includes trading restrictions implemented in the regulations due to the geography of Los Angeles. We find that the bulletin board market performs well and that prices reflect market conditions as accurately as in the continuous double auction trading institution.     

Price clustering on the Shanghai Stock Exchange

We investigate price clustering of intraday trades and negotiated block trades on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) from 2003 to 2009. Prices of traded assets tend to cluster on certain final digits, such as 0 and 5. In Chinese culture, 8 is associated with good luck and 4 with death so these numbers may be attractive or avoided. We find that price clustering on the final digit of 0 is significantly higher during the morning call auction and early in the trading day. We find no evidence of price clustering for the digit 8, but there is a significant dearth of prices ending in the inauspicious number 4. Price clustering is significantly higher for negotiated block trades, for which about 28% end with 0. Multivariate analysis shows that price clustering is lower for more liquid firms, but higher for firms with higher return volatility, a higher price level, or when the market is volatile. Our evidence supports the costly negotiation hypothesis. Our results also support the attraction hypothesis in that we document significant price clustering at round numbers and even numbers even after controlling for factors that are associated with price uncertainty.     

Commissions Matter: The Trading Behavior of Institutional and Individual Active Traders

We examine how commissions influence trading behavior by analyzing a unique data set of the equity trades of both individual and institutional active traders. Individual traders pay higher trading costs than institutional traders. As a result, they engage in more risky trading behaviors in order to cover these costs. Individual traders also trade significantly less because of their higher cost of trading. Individual traders tend to trade higher-priced stocks, hold their trades longer, and they experience much larger price swings than institutional traders. This leads individual traders to realize more dramatic gains and losses on their round-trips.     

Liquidity and Liquidation

The manager of a firm that is selling an illiquid asset has discretion as to the sale price: if he chooses a high (low) selling price, early sale is unlikely (likely). If the manager has the option to default on the debt that is collateralized by the illiquid asset, the optimal selling price depends on whether the manager acts in the interests of owners or creditors. We model the former case. In equilibrium the owner will always offer the illiquid asset for sale at a strictly higher price than he paid, and will default if he fails to sell. As a result, upon successful sales the illiquid asset changes hands at successively higher prices. We also consider a generalization of the model which permits sellers to finance sales using either debt or preferred stock, or both. This allows derivation of an optimal capital structure. We are indebted to seminar participants at the University of California, Los Angeles; University of California, Santa Barbara; Utah State University; University of Miami; Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta; Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. We have received helpful comments from Tom Cooley.     

Price dynamics in an exchange economy

The pure exchange model is the foundation of the neoclassical theory of value, yet equilibrium predictions and price adjustment dynamics for this model remained untested prior to the experiment reported in this paper. With the exchange economy replicated several times, prices and allocations in most experiment sessions adjust toward the competitive equilibrium in continuous double auction trading, though adjustment is much slower than in previous commodity flow (or perishable good) double auction market experiments. Price adjustment is evaluated by comparing its extent within each market replication (or trading period) to its extent across trading periods. More price adjustment occurs within trading periods than across trading periods, so price adjustment data are evaluated with the disequilibrium Hahn process model (Hahn and Negishi in Econometrica 30:463–469, 1962) of within-period trades. This paper introduces a stochastic version the Hahn process model and demonstrates that a linear approximation to this stochastic model yields an autoregressive process with a near unit root when the adjustment rate is low. In effect, the autoregressive price adjustment model studied extensively by time series econometricians over the past 30 years can be viewed as a reduced form of a stochastic disequilibrium exchange economy price adjustment model. Estimation of the model demonstrates that price adjustment in the exchange economy experiment is considerably slower than in economies without income effects, which suggests that the price discovery process may be a significant factor in the slow adjustment documented by applied econometricians.     

Estimation of house price differential of urban tree cover: an application of sample selection approach

Hedonic valuation of urban forest amenities tends to assume that these attributes are exogenous to sample selection, which might render the estimated results misleading. This article intends to estimate the house price differential of urban tree cover by considering the sample selection issue. The main hypothesis is that houses with high tree cover generates higher utility to consumers, and thus leads to higher house price, ceteris paribus. It may attribute to the fact that consumers self-select into purchasing houses with high- or low-density tree cover based on some unobserved systematically different characteristics. As a result, estimates from sample selection models confirm the hypothesis that purchasing a house with high-density tree cover leads to a positive price differential compared with the low-density tree cover in Napa, Los Angeles, and that buying a low-density tree cover house results in negative price differential in Napa, Los Angeles.     

PRESCRIPTIVE PUBLIC CHOICE: APPLICATION TO RESIDENTIAL WATER RATE REFORM

Peltzman's model of price regulation predicts inefficient prices for regulated firms; based on a constraint giving the trade-off between economic profit and the regulated price, the price will be set between a competitive industry price and a monopoly price. This article generalizes the model for application to a wider class of trade-offs, including municipal utilities that are not legally permitted to make a profit. Extending Peltzman's idea of political support functions, this article defines political feasibility relative to economic efficiency. A Pareto superior change with compensation is sufficient but not necessary for political feasibility; the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is neither necessary nor sufficient for political feasibility. The generalization of Peltzman's model of public choice and the concept of political feasibility together explain why Tucson in 1976 and Los Angeles in 1993 adopted efficient water rates during droughts and why, 1 yr later, Tucson rescinded the rates and Los Angeles almost rescinded them. The concept of political feasibility explains why and how, after the drought, the Los Angeles innovations to rate design achieved efficiency and political feasibility, avoiding reversion to the previous, inefficient rates, by separating economic efficiency from political feasibility in both the rate design and the rate reform process. ( JEL D42, D70, H00, L38, L51, L97, Q25, Q28, Q48, Q58)     

On the Stochastic Properties of Carbon Futures Prices

Pricing carbon is a central concern in environmental economics, due to the worldwide importance of emissions trading schemes to regulate pollution. This paper documents the presence of small and large jumps in the stochastic process of the CO $_2$ futures price. The large jumps have a discrete origin, i.e. they can arise from various demand factors or institutional decisions on the tradable permits market. Contrary to the existing literature, we show that the stochastic process of carbon futures prices does not contain a continuous component (Brownian motion). The results are derived by using high-frequency data in the activity signature function framework (Todorov and Tauchen in J Econom 154:125–138, 2010; Todorov and Tauchen in J Bus Econ Stat 29:356–371, 2011). The implication is that the carbon futures price should be modeled as an appropriately sampled, centered Lévy or Poisson process. The pure-jump behavior of the carbon price might be explained by the lower volume of trades on this allowance market (compared to other highly liquid financial markets).     

Factor Price Equalization in a World of Many Trading Countries

Conditions sufficient for factor price equalization within any non‐trivial subset of trading countries are provided. The conditions are that (a) the factor endowment ratios of countries in the subset are all bounded by the factors‐in‐use ratios in an equilibrium of the hypothetical world economy in which factors are perfectly mobile within the subset, and that (b) in dimensions higher than two, either the rank of the factors‐in‐use matrix is 2 or products do not outnumber factors and the factors‐in‐use matrix is of full rank.     

A three-objective social welfare function for cost–benefit analysis

This article applies quantile regression to assess the factors that influence the risk of incurring high trading costs. Using data on the equity trades of the world's second largest pension fund in the first quarter of 2002, we show that trade timing, momentum, volatility and the type of broker intermediation are the major determinants of the risk of incurring high trading costs. Such risk is increased substantially by either high or low momentum and by strong volatility. Moreover, agency trades are substantially more risky in terms of trading costs than similar principal trades. Finally, we show that the quantile regression model succeeds well in forecasting future trading costs.     

Price movement and trade size on the National Stock Exchange of India

Using data for the National Stock Exchange of India, we examine three hypotheses about which trades move prices. The Stealth Trading Hypothesis proposes that cumulative price changes (CPCs) are concentrated in particular trade sizes due to the strategic trading of informed traders. We find that depending on market conditions, from 60% to 80% of the CPC is concentrated in small trade sizes, with almost all of the remaining price change concentrated in medium trade sizes. These results support the Stealth Trading Hypothesis.     

OTC trades and liquidity in the European carbon market more than meets the eye

ABSTRACT

This study investigates whether the previously reported price impact of OTC trades in the EU ETS can be attributed to their distinctively larger size (liquidity related) or to their discretionary feature (information related). The findings suggest that OTC trades induce volatility shocks that are higher in magnitude and faster resolved than those of solely high trading-intensity trades, which appears to be driven mainly by their presence, rather than by their size. An analysis of intraday price premia reveals that they are strategically placed by interacting with the organized market whenever their price and volatility impact is lower.     

Market Efficiency Reloaded: Why Insider Trades do not Reveal Exploitable Information

Abstract. Several studies have emphasized a slow price adjustment to reported insider trades for Germany. The results presented in this paper, though, show that this is mainly caused by a subset of high arbitrage risk stocks. In fact, the abnormal return difference between the quintiles of stocks with highest and lowest idiosyncratic risk is in the range of 2.99–4.90% over a 20‐day interval. These results are robust even in the context of a joint generalized least squares approach. By developing a simple zero‐investment arbitrage trading strategy mimicking insider trades, it turns out that such a trading strategy, in most cases, generates significant positive returns as long as transaction costs are neglected. However, the outperformance disappears in all risk quintiles, if bid/ask spreads are taken into account. We conclude that the market's under‐reaction to reported insider trades can mainly be explained by the cost of risky arbitrage and is therefore not exploitable.     

Race,Affirmative Action,and Women's Employment in US Highway Construction

This paper analyzes employment hours, supplemented by interview data, from large highway construction sites in Boston, Los Angeles, and Oakland in the 1980s and 1990s. This study suggests that affirmative action positively affects the employment of women in construction and where there is more pressure, there are strongr results. Second, white women and women of color tend to work in trades that reflect the existing racial hierarchies among men. Therefore race as well as gender should be reflected in the design and measurement of the impacts of employment programs. Community organizing, advocacy for women and men of color, judicial oversight and positive efforts by unions and employers are still critical to bridging the gap between policy intentions and outcomes.     

Does money impede convergence?

Inspired by Clower’s conjecture that the necessity of trading through money in monetised economies might hinder convergence to competitive equilibrium, and hence, for example, cause unemployment, we experimentally investigate behaviour in markets where trading has to be done through money. In order to evaluate the properties of these markets, we compare their behaviour to behaviour in markets without money, where money cannot intervene. As the trading mechanism might be a compounding factor, we investigate two kinds of market mechanism: the double auction, where bids, asks and trades take place in continuous time throughout a trading period; and the clearing house, where bids and asks are placed once in a trading period, and which are then cleared by an aggregating device. We thus have four treatments, the pairwise combinations of non-monetised/monetised trading with double auction/clearing house. We find that: convergence is faster under non-monetised trading, implying that the necessity of using money to facilitate trade hinders convergence; that monetised trading is noisier than non-monetised trading; and that the volume of trade and realised surpluses are higher with the double auction than the clearing house. As far as efficiency is concerned, monetised trading lowers both informational and allocational efficiency, and while the double auction outperforms the clearing house in terms of allocational efficiency, the clearing house is marginally better than the double auction in terms of informational efficiency when trade is through money. Crucially we confirm the conjecture that inspired these experiments: that the necessity to use money in trading hinders convergence to competitive equilibrium, lowers realised trades and surpluses, and hence may cause unemployment.     

Intraday stock prices, volume, and duration: a nonparametric conditional density analysis

We investigate the distribution of high-frequency price changes, conditional on trading volume and duration between trades, on four stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange. The conditional probabilities are estimated nonparametrically using local polynomial regression methods. We find substantial skewness in the distribution of price changes, with the direction of skewness dependent on the sign of trade. We also find that the probability of larger price changes increases with volume, but only for trades that occur with longer durations. The distribution of price changes vary with duration primarily when volume is high.     

Portfolio choice and pricing in illiquid markets

This paper studies portfolio choice and pricing in markets in which immediate trading may be impossible. It departs from the literature by removing restrictions on asset holdings, and finds that optimal positions depend significantly and naturally on liquidity: When expected future liquidity is high, agents take more extreme positions, given that they do not have to hold those positions for long when they become undesirable. Consequently, larger trades should be observed in markets with more frequent trading. Liquidity need not affect the price significantly, however, because liquidity has offsetting impacts on different agents' demands. This result highlights the importance of unrestricted portfolio choice. The paper draws parallels with the transaction-cost literature and clarifies the relationship between the price level and the realized trading frequency in this literature.     

Search and endogenous concentration of liquidity in asset markets

We develop a search-based model of asset trading, in which investors of different horizons can invest in two assets with identical payoffs. The asset markets are partially segmented: buyers can search for only one asset, but can decide which one. We show the existence of a “clientele’’ equilibrium where all short-horizon investors search for the same asset. This asset has more buyers and sellers, lower search times, and trades at a higher price relative to its identical-payoff counterpart. The clientele equilibrium dominates the one where all investor types split equally across assets, implying that the concentration of liquidity is socially desirable.     

Tradable Discharge Permit System for Water Pollution: Case of the Upper Nanpan River of China

A discharge permit system for water pollution of theupper Nanpan River has been tested since 1992. Thispaper proposed the shift of the current non-tradablepermits to tradable permits to attain the samepollution reduction targets at a lower cost. It wasfound that this river appeared good for trading. Apilot trading program for point sources was thenrecommended to a smaller trading zone. There would beten potential trades for chemical oxygen demanddischarge, gaining an annual cost-saving of ChineseYuan 2.4 million, or saving 18.4% of the total annualcost to attain the reduction target without trading.The marginal pollution reduction cost was estimated atChinese Yuan 959 for one kilogram chemical oxygendemand per day. Meanwhile, `without trading' and `withtrading' scenarios would bring about 900.9 kg/day and51.5 kg/day of redundant reduction respectively. Thenet annual benefit arising from trading, about ChineseYuan 1.6 million, would still be significant. At last,the study recommended that compliance monitoring andexecuting institution requirements be kept in mindwhile designing the program. An information systemneeds to be established to provide potentialparticipants relevant information. The method ofpermit allocation and lifespan of permits should alsobe addressed later.