Religion and cooperation in a public goods experiment

We test whether religion affects adult subjects' decisions in a repeated public goods experiment. Contribution levels are not influenced by religious affiliation or participation. However, the decline with repetition is smaller among religious subjects, suggesting that religion may sustain cooperation.     

Religious polarization,religious conflicts and individual financial satisfaction: Evidence from India

The extant literature finds religion to be a major determinant of life satisfaction. However, in contexts characterized by religious tensions, the outcome may be very different. In particular, the literature shows that religious polarization has a major influence on some economic outcomes. The analysis presented in the paper tries to identify the impact of religious polarization on a major component of life satisfaction: financial satisfaction. The paper inquires how belonging to a minority religion and living in areas with different levels of religious polarization affect the individual satisfaction with the financial situation of the household. The results show that the members of minority religious groups are less satisfied than the members of the dominant group, and that the financial satisfaction decreases—for a given income—as the religious polarization increases.     

Belonging,believing, bonding,and behaving: the relationship between religion and business ownership at the country level

This cross-country study adopts a competing theories approach in which both a value perspective and a social capital perspective are used to understand the relation between religion and a country’s business ownership rate. We distinguish among four dimensions of religion: belonging to a religious denomination, believing certain religious propositions, bonding to religious practices, and behaving in a religious manner. An empirical analysis of data from 30 OECD countries with multiple data points per country covering the period 1984–2010 suggests a positive relationship between religion and business ownership based on those dimensions that reflect the internal aspects of religiosity (i.e., believing and behaving). We do not observe a significant association for those dimensions that reflect more external aspects of religion (i.e., belonging and bonding). These results suggest that the social capital perspective prevails the value perspective, at least when internal aspects of religiosity are concerned. More generally, our study demonstrates the importance of distinguishing between different dimensions of religion when investigating the link between religion and entrepreneurship.     

The impacts of religion,political ideology,and social capital on religious and secular giving: evidence from the 2006 Social Capital Community Survey

Using a double hurdle model and data from the 2006 Social Capital Community Survey (SCCS2006) we examine religious and secular giving, focusing on the impacts of religion, political ideology and social capital. Our main results indicate that greater participation in religious activities positively impacts religious and secular giving, the intensity of religious belief increases religious giving at the expense of secular giving, religious giving by very conservative individuals is higher than for other ideological groups, and measures of social capital are very important in raising the level and likelihood of philanthropic giving.     

宗教信仰、政治身份与企业投资偏好

文章运用企业家宗教信仰的直接调查数据,考察了企业家的个人宗教信仰对企业投资活动的影响。研究发现,相对于研发型投资,有宗教信仰的企业家偏好于风险相对较小的关系型投资;不同类型的宗教信仰对企业投资偏好具有不同的影响,笃信东方宗教的企业家相对于笃信西方宗教的企业家更加偏好于关系型投资;企业家的宗教信仰对投资偏好的影响因企业家是否具有政治身份而有所不同,相对于有政治身份的企业家,没有政治身份的企业家的宗教信仰会更加显著地正向影响关系型投资,表明政治身份可能会弱化宗教信仰在关系型投资中的作用。     

Religion,discrimination and trust across three cultures

We propose that religion impacts trust and trustworthiness in ways that depend on how individuals are socially identified and connected. Religiosity and religious affiliation may serve as markers for statistical discrimination. Further, affiliation to the same religion may enhance group identity, or affiliation irrespective of creed may lend social identity, and in turn induce taste-based discrimination. Religiosity may also relate to general prejudice. We test these hypotheses across three culturally diverse countries. Participants׳ willingness to discriminate, beliefs of how trustworthy or trusting others are, as well as actual trust and trustworthiness are measured incentive compatibly. We find that interpersonal similarity in religiosity and affiliation promote trust through beliefs of reciprocity. Religious participants also believe that those belonging to some faith are trustworthier, but invest more trust only in those of the same religion—religiosity amplifies this effect. Across non-religious categories, whereas more religious participants are more willing to discriminate, less religious participants are as likely to display group biases.     

Religious identity and the provision of public goods: Evidence from the Indian Princely States

This paper describes a simple model of how a ruler’s religious identity affects public goods provision. Our primary insight is that rulers reduce public goods expenditures to a greater degree when there are privately-provided substitutes excludable by religion.The basic idea is that if the good is provided privately to the ruler’s co-religionists, the ruler faces weaker incentives to provide this public good because his co-religionists receive lower marginal utility from its provision. Testing such a conjecture is an empirical challenge, however, since the religious identity of rulers rarely varies over time and place. We address this problem by exploiting variation in the religion of rulers in the Indian Princely States. Using data from the 1911 and 1931 Indian censuses, we find that Muslim-ruled states had lower Hindu literacy but had no significant impact on Muslim literacy. This result is consistent with our model, as Muslim religious schools provided a substitute for public schools that served both Hindus and Muslims. The model is further substantiated by the fact that the religion of the ruler had no statistically significant impact on railroad ownership or post office provision, neither of which had privately-provided substitutes.     

Afterlife incentives in charitable giving

There is an expanding literature that examines the influence of religion on economic behaviour. Researchers typically do not distinguish among religions, masking important variation across doctrines. Our article adopts a typology of religions based on the construct of salvific merit. Major religious doctrines are ordered based on their linkage between charitable behaviour in this life and condition in the afterlife. Using the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study (COPPS), we exploit variation in household marginal tax rates (a subsidy to charitable giving) to test the influence of major religious doctrines on charitable giving. We find that charitable giving by adherents to high-salvific-merit religions are less sensitive to changes in charitable subsidies. Adherents to low-salvific-merit religions behave more like nonreligious households. Our results suggest that religious households optimize according to specific doctrines rather than a broad notion of religion.     

Religious fragmentation,social identity and cooperation: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment in India

We study the role of village-level religious fragmentation on intra- and inter-group cooperation in India. We report on data on two-player prisoners׳ dilemma and stag hunt experiments played by 516 Hindu and Muslim participants in rural India. Our treatments are the identity of the two players and the degree of village-level religious heterogeneity. In religiously heterogeneous villages, cooperation rates in the prisoners׳ dilemma, and to a lesser extent the stag hunt game, are higher when subjects of either religion play with a fellow in-group member than when they play with an out-group member or with someone whose identity is unknown. Interestingly, cooperation rates among people of the same religion are significantly lower in homogeneous villages than in fragmented villages in both games.     

Exploring the causal effect of religious piety on dividend policy: evidence from historical religious identification

Theory suggests that religious piety is associated with greater risk aversion and more conservative financial policies. Returns to shareholders through dividends are much more certain than returns through capital gains expected to be realized far into the future. We hypothesize that religious piety leads to a higher likelihood of dividend payments. We exploit the variation in religious piety across the US counties and estimate the effect of religion on dividend policy. To draw a causal inference, we use historical religious piety in 1971 as the instrument. Our two-stage least squares results confirm that religious piety induces firms to pay larger dividends.     

The causal effect of religious piety on shareholder wealth: evidence from acquirer returns and historical religious identification

Prior research shows that religion promotes honesty. Honesty in turn motivates managers to view an expropriation from shareholders as self-serving, opportunistic and unethical, thereby alleviating the agency conflict. Religious piety is thus expected to discourage agency-driven acquisitions that reduce shareholder wealth. We exploit the variation in religious piety across US counties (and states) and show that firms located in a more religious environment are indeed less likely to make poor acquisitions, measured by the stock market reactions to the acquisition announcement. To draw a causal inference, we use historical religious piety as far back as 1952 as our instrument. The two-stage least squares (2SLS) analysis confirms that religious piety induces firms to make better acquisitions. Our analysis based on propensity score matching also corroborates the conclusion.     

State and religion over time

State and religion, two of the oldest institutions known to mankind, have historically had a close relationship with each other, but the disestablishment of state religions has been one of the most drastic institutional transformations that has taken place in the modern era. We offer a systematic analysis of the development of secular states based on a political economy approach that is centered on the notion of legitimacy. Viewing religion as a legitimizing force for political leaders, we consider the factors affecting the cost and benefits of alternative sources of legitimacy, such as the differential abilities of religious and secular sources to legitimize political rulers and historical inertia that shaped the cost of monitoring legitimizing agents. To examine this argument empirically, we built a cross-national time-series dataset for the relationship between state and religion since the year 1000. We first use the data to examine the evolution of secularism over time and its variation across religious traditions. We then use regression analysis and an instrumental variables approach to identify the influences on the adoption of secular state, such as concentration in the religion market, religious differences between rulers and the general population, historical inertia of a state, and the prevailing political regime. We address endogeneity concerns regarding the relationship between religious concentration and state secularism by exploiting variation among territories in their geographic distance to religious “capitals” of the world as an instrument.     

宗教信仰与信任:一个实验经济学的研究

本文采用实验方法研究宗教信仰对个人信任行为的影响.本文首次以佛教徒、基督教徒、穆斯林和非宗教信仰者四类群体为研究对象进行信任实验,并通过虔诚度问卷调查,全面分析宗教影响个体信任行为的内在机制.研究结果表明:(1)当把三类宗教被试合并为一个整体时,其与非宗教信仰者在信任行为上没有显著差异,也不存在明显的组间效应;(2)但...     

Religion and unproductive entrepreneurship: The role of risk aversion

Institutions can shape the reward structure in the economy and thereby influence the allocation of entrepreneurship between productive and unproductive activities. This paper investigates the effect of religion, one important component of informal institutions, on unproductive entrepreneurship. Using a nationally representative survey on private enterprises in China, we find that religious entrepreneurs devote more of their resources, both in terms of money and time, to unproductive activities such as building social relations than their nonreligious peers. We further find that religion plays a significant role only in regions with weak regulatory institutions and/or for entrepreneurs vulnerable to institutional risks. Drawing on the close link between risk-aversion and religion, our results suggest that religious entrepreneurs engage in unproductive activities so as to reduce institutional risks in their business operations.     

Economic growth and religious production efficiency

Moral institutions, religions and ethics affect the economic development, as for example, trust and honesty are essential requirements for emerging economic activity. Religious production efficiency measure is constructed and used in economic growth regressions for 8 OECD countries. By using panel estimation methods and additionally time‐series estimations for each country, more information is gained concerning the country specific growth and religion characteristics. Empirical evidence from the panel data estimations seems to suggest that religious beliefs attain more relevance than religious attendance. Religious production efficiency, containing both belief and activity aspects, was not found statistically significant with panel data or with individiual 8 OECD countries growth model, except for Finland. Significant coefficient for Finland can be explained by referring to Finland's unique religious market properties, as the level of religious beliefs have historically been unusually high in Finland. On the other hand, attendance in religious activities has followed the typical Northern‐European decreasing trend. More exact understanding on the links between these concepts are essentially needed to better model the economic consequences of cultural, religious and moral variables.     

Politics of religiously motivated lending: An empirical analysis of aid allocation by the Islamic Development Bank

We investigate whether lending by the Islamic Development Bank mirrors Saudi Arabia's political interests based on religious affinity using panel data for its 56 member countries over the 1970–2007 period. Our results indicate that Sunni regime countries receive favorable treatment in terms of loan allocation, as well as Shia majority populated countries in exceptional occasions of conflict with other religious minority groups, while non-Muslim countries are the least favored. There is also evidence that lending by the World Bank to the same group of countries and over the same time frame does not respond to the political stance of Saudi Arabia founded on religion. These findings reveal the advantage that Saudi Arabia gains by assuming the leadership of a Regional Development Bank in contrast to coordinating common strategies in a global International Financial Institution with other large shareholders for whom religion might not be essential for political alliances.     

风险、社会保障与农村宗教信仰

遵循理性选择研究范式,本文研究了农村社会保障与农村信教行为之间的关系.实证分析结果表明,风险是宗教选择和宗教参与的一个重要决定因素;目前农村社会保障水平对信仰量变有显著影响,但对信仰质变尚不够构成显著影响;"新农合"的开展能够有效地降低农村宗教信仰的增长速度.这些结果可以对农村"宗教热"现象进行解释:世俗社会对于农村居民所面临风险的不作为或者弱作为,是宗教在农村颇具吸引力的一个重要原因.     

Correlates of fertility in Eastern Nigeria

The relative influences of marriage patterns, education, and religion on the high level of fertility in the East-Central state of Nigeria are examined, with data drawn from a KAP survey of 755 men and 916 women (745 rural and 171 urban). Polygynous marriages existed in 31% of rural and 7% of urban households surveyed. Fertility was relatively lower in all marriage duration groups among polygynists, but the differences were not significant (contingency coefficient 0.01000). Results are limited, however, by the instability of polygyny status, the subfecundity factor, the index of fertility used, and the older age of polygynously married women. 53% of rural women surveyed were Catholic, and their fertility was higher than that of non-Catholics (contingency coefficient 0.01217). But it cannot be ensured that the religious differential is solely a function of pronatalist religious belief or partly a reflection of ethnic differences or an attempt by the Ibos to ensure an increase in population to maximize their share of federal allocations. Uneducated women were more fertile than their educated counterparts (contingency coefficient 0.03129), implying that fertility will decline as the literacy level in the state improves. The potential of education to effectuate a decline in fertility is illustrated by the observation that education tends to give religious people the same liberal attitudes toward family planning as are held by those who are less religious. The gap between knowledge of birth control methods and the practice of family planning is a greater obstacle to fertility control than religiousity, and this gap is greater among those with lower levels of education.     

浅析道教思想与成都古典园林

目前,对中国园林文化的研究多局限于园林内部,常常从一些纯建筑的景观角度去观察园林,没有能够跳出园林看园林,将园林与所在的城市的文化之间联系起来研究。以成都古典园林为例,分析了道教文化对园林文化的影响,从宗教哲学思想在城市古典园林中的体现可以看出城市宗教文化对于园林的形成、发展以及园林的文化内涵有着较强的作用。同时,园林文化中的多个因素也都能清晰地反映所处城市的宗教哲学思想。     

Effect of religious priming in prosocial and destructive behaviour

In this paper, we study the behavioural impact of religious priming by showing participants religious words in a scrambled sentence task before a dictator game and a joy‐of‐destruction game. We also elicited data on individual religiosity and religious affiliation using a questionnaire. Priming religious words significantly increased prosocial behaviour in the dictator game, and the effect was especially striking among those reporting no religion, atheists and agnostics. The religious prime has no significant effect in mitigating destructive behaviour or own expectations of the other's destruction choice, but both destructive behaviour and expectations correlate positively with the multi‐dimensional religiosity measure.