The Manager as a Person

Abstract Professor John Roemer has defended a future market socialist order. His model would encompass an egalitarian coupon market for the ownership of firm shares, a private sector for firms below a certain size, a system of public bank loans for the raising of capital, and an industrial policy of differential interest rates for various economic sectors. This paper argues that such a model would generate perverse incentives for firms, shareholders, public officials, and private entrepreneurs. It also argues that Roemer's contention that such a model would produce a more environmentally sensitive polity is problematic.     

也谈所有制结构问题

通过对国有企业深层次矛盾的分析 ,说明了现阶段我国发展非公有制经济的必要性。文章认为 ,搞活国有企业必须让非公有制经济参股 ,国有资产比重的下降并没有否定公有制的主体地位。     

A BROAD PERFORMANCE BENCHMARK BASED ON CITIZENS' PREFERENCES: THE CASE OF SWEDISH PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION

ABSTRACT ** :  Benchmarks have been recommended for assessing the relative performance of local government services. However, these are often narrowly defined and therefore ignore important welfare dimensions. This paper proposes a framework for benchmarking based on a combination of production and cost characteristics and citizens' subjective perceptions. An evaluation consisting of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and different regression models is applied on all 21 Swedish regional public transport authorities, covering the period 2002–2006 (n = 103). The results indicate that the industry as a whole is about 70% efficient and that efficiency can be improved by increasing the sizes of the urban and the bus vehicle-km shares. The optimal ownership structure is to have one large owner combined with about 25 small owners.     

Regulatory design and technical efficiency: public transport in France

The provision of local public transport in France involves private and public firms and the use of incentive contracts to regulate them. We study the effect of these institutional features on the sector’s efficiency using a long panel data of firms, with a two-stage estimation procedure. First, we use nonparametric data envelopment analysis techniques to estimate input usage efficiency, following a conditional approach that controls for differences in the environments in which the firms operate. Second, we estimate semiparametric censored regressions, using fixed effects to control for unobserved sources of heterogeneity. Our results point to a differential effect of private and mixed public-private companies. In particular, having the performance of public operators as the benchmark, efficiency is relatively higher for private firms, but lower when the service is delegated to a mixed public-private firm. In the latter case, the effects diverge by contract type: when the contract is of the cost reimbursement type, performance is lower than the public firm benchmark, while for other contract types, there are no statistically significant differences.     

Stochastic Cost Frontier and Inefficiency Estimates of Public and Private Universities: Does Government Matter?

Stochastic frontier analysis is used to estimate operating cost inefficiencies of public and private non-profit universities in the U.S. while also accounting for the possible effects arising from differences in the degree of government ownership. Using panel data for four academic years, 2005?C2009, inefficiencies are estimated under two model specifications. Results indicate that public universities are more cost efficient when environmental factors influence cost frontiers but private universities are the cost efficient institutions when those factors are determinants of inefficiency. Increased government funding does matter and increases private sector inefficiency but offers some efficiency improvements among public universities. Following the global financial crisis, there is evidence indicating a considerable slowdown in the inefficiency growth among both public and private universities.     

PUBLIC SERVICES IN THE AREA OF THE SOCIAL ECONOMY IN ARGENTINA

ABSTRACT*: The author describes the development of the public sector of the social economy in the last few years. The state-owned companies with significant participation in the economic activity of the country were privatized within the so-called State Reform Scheme (Law 23696), beginning in 1990. Privatizations are still being carried out, but the main activities that were formerly in the hands of the state (electricity, transport, public service) are now in the hands of the lucrative private sector (corporations, mainly of foreign origin). The policy regarding the transfer of these companies has not favoured the social economy sector.     

Privatization,Underpricing, and Welfare in the Presence of Foreign Competition

We analyze privatization in a differentiated oligopoly setting with a domestic public firm and foreign profit‐maximizing firms. In particular, we examine pricing below marginal cost by the public firm, the optimal degree of privatization, and the relationship between privatization and foreign ownership restrictions. When market structure is exogenous, partial privatization of the public firm improves welfare by reducing public sector losses. Surprisingly, even at the optimal level of privatization, the public firm's price lies strictly below marginal cost, resulting in losses. Our analysis also reveals a potential conflict between privatization and investment liberalization (i.e., relaxing restrictions on foreign ownership) in the short run. With endogenous market structure (i.e., free entry of foreign firms), partial privatization improves welfare through an additional channel: more foreign varieties. Furthermore, at the optimal level of privatization, the public firm's price lies strictly above marginal cost and earns positive profits.     

股权激励与代理成本

传统以管理费用率作为代理成本的替代不能恰当地反映管理者在职消费和职务侵占的真实水平,本文用经过Jones模型纠正的费用率作为代理成本的替代,考察了所有权性质、总经理持股与否及持股比例对代理成本的影响。本文提供了私有制下总经理适当持股有利于降低代理成本的可靠证据,为中国上市公司即将展开的股权激励计划提供证据的支持。     

Bertrand versus Cournot competition in a downstream mixed oligopoly with foreign ownership

Focusing on foreign ownership in the private firm, we examine the Cournot-Bertrand comparison in a mixed oligopolistic market with vertical market structure. We have found that if public and private firms were charged with uniform price for their inputs, then Cournot-Bertrand ranking in market outcomes confirms those obtained by Ghosh and Mitra (2010). This implies that under uniform pricing in the upstream sector, the vertical market structure does not have substantial influences on Cournot-Bertrand ranking. However, if discriminatory pricing is adopted, firm's profits, output, and social welfare are often reversed to those obtained from uniform pricing in the upstream sector. Given the closeness of products, if the share of foreign ownership is sufficiently low, social welfare in Cournot competition can exceed that of Bertrand competition, contrasting with the standard welfare ranking that Bertrand welfare is strictly higher than Cournot. This implies that Cournot competition can be more socially desirable than Bertrand in mixed oligopoly with vertical market structure if discriminatory pricing scheme is adopted by foreign upstream monopolists.     

Ownership and Cost‐Sharing Contracts

We discuss the relative merits of public and private ownership in an incomplete contract framework developed by Hart, Shleifer and Vishney (HSV). We add two new elements to their model. First, the government may offer cost‐sharing contracts when procuring the good. Second, the owner of a private firm may divert resources that increase their own profit/utility but increase total costs. The cost sharing contract allows the government to reduce the private firm's incentives to dump quality in order to save on costs. However, this also leads to resource diversion, which increases total costs. We derive the preferred mode of ownership when the government optimally chooses the power of the cost sharing scheme. We find that the presence of quality‐reducing cost reductions only favours government ownership if the scope for resource diversion is substantial. A discussion of when resource diversion is likely to be important is also provided.     

SEGMENTED DEVELOPMENT AND THE WAY PROFITS GO: THE CASE OF INDONESIA*

In most developing countries profits account for a large proportion of national income, but their origin and use are widely divergent, related to the nature of ownership of the enterprise. Here an institutional classification of productive activities is developed and illustrated by the way profits go in Indonesia. By branch of industry they accrue to four categories of owners (foreign, public, private national incorporated, unincorporated). Next imputed labour income of the self-employed is separated in order to arrive at the functional distribution of income by sector, and lastly the destination (depreciation, interest, taxes, dividends, retained earnings) of each type of corporate capital income is shown. The estimates indicate a segmentation of activities, with regard to ownership as well as factor shares.     

Intrinsic Motivations of Public Sector Employees: Evidence for Germany

We examine differences in altruism and laziness between public sector employees and private sector employees. Our theoretical model predicts that the likelihood of public sector employment increases with a worker's altruism, and increases or decreases with a worker's laziness depending on his altruism. Using questionnaire data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel Study, we find that public sector employees are significantly more altruistic and lazy than observationally equivalent private sector employees. A series of robustness checks show that these patterns are stronger among higher educated workers; that the sorting of altruistic people to the public sector takes place only within the caring industries; and that the difference in altruism is already present at the start of people's career, while the difference in laziness is only present for employees with sufficiently long work experience.     

Substitution Between Private and Public Consumption in Australia*

Large increases in the private sector's savings ratio during a period of rapid growth in the relative size of the public sector has led to the suggestion that substitution between private and public consumption may be an important fcature of the Australian economy (Clements 1979). In this paper, empirical estimates are presented which indicate that no such substitution exists The estimates are derived from a theoretical model of consumption which is based on inter-temporal optimization in a stochastic environment. The estimates also suggest that private sector consumption behaviour is consistent with the joint hypothesis of rational expectations and Ricardian equivalence     

Ownership structure,monitoring, and market value of companies: evidence from an unusual privatization mode

This study analyses the impact of ownership structure and market liquidity on company value. We investigate different aspects of ownership: the risk of political interference, private investors vs. the state acting as influential blockholders, and preferential political treatment of companies. Using a unique dataset of Polish partial privatizations initiated by shares transfers to entities under limited government influence, we find that government divestments can enhance company value, due to reduction in risk of political interference. A potential increase in the liquidity of trades in transferred companies’ shares also boosts their market value. On the other hand, an increased likelihood of the emergence of private blockholders able to expropriate minority shareholders reduces the firm’s market value. Our results support the political view of privatization: governments have objectives different to profit maximization, which leads to suboptimal investment from this point of view and lower market value of companies. We also develop a model to empirically distinguish between different aspects of ownership on company value.     

Why is the public sector more labor-intensive? A distortionary tax argument

Government-run entities are often more labor-intensive than private companies, even with identical production technologies. This need not imply slack in the public sector, but may reflect a wage tax advantage, stemming from the fact that government entities (partly) pay their taxes to themselves. A tax-induced cost advantage of public production precludes production efficiency and reduces welfare when labor supply is inelastic. With an elastic labor supply, a wage tax advantage of the public sector may improve welfare if it allows for a higher net wage.      

Municipalizing American Waterworks, 1897-1915

We consider three explanations for public ownership: publicinterest, regulation, and a transaction cost interpretation.We employ a large dataset containing information on the municipalacquisition of U.S. private water companies between 1897 and1915. Those data allow us to isolate the effects of high waterrates, water quality, financial difficulties, extensivenessof distribution system, and the like in determining the probabilityof subsequent municipal takeover of companies that were privatein 1897. After controlling for such factors, we find evidenceconsistent with a transaction cost interpretation of municipalacquisition. We find relatively little support for regulation-basedor public interest interpretations. Our evidence indicates thatmunicipalities were unable to credibly precommit to not expropriatingvalue from private water companies once investments were made,resulting in a rational reduction in investment in water provisionby private companies. Local governments, in turn, used thisrational underinvestment as a pretext for municipalizing privatewater companies.     

Private ownership form and productive efficiency: Electric cooperatives versus investor-owned utilities

Property rights theory predicts that private firms whose ownership shares are not tradable will not be managed efficiently. This paper tests that theory by comparing the costs of rural electric cooperatives (RECs) and investor-owned electric utilities (IOUs). Separate translog cost functions are estimated for the RECs and the IOUs. The estimated costs of producing several three-product output bundles are then compared across ownership form under the assumption that all firms face identical input prices. The empirical results suggest that the cooperative sector of the electric power industry produces its output in a much less efficient manner than does the investor-owned sector.I would like to thank David Kaserman, Steven Caudill, T. Randolph Beard, Daniel Gropper, and David Laband for their many helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. This research was partially funded by the Auburn University Utilities Research Center. The views expressed here are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the New York State Public Service Commission.     

Privately Owned Railways' Cost Function,Organization Size and Ownership

This paper aims to find the optimal size of an urban private rail organization as well as to evaluate cost difference by ownership. First, after selecting privately owned rail companies, we explore explanatory variables which affect the cost of rail service. Second, keeping in mind previous cost studies of the urban passenger rail industry, we estimate variable cost function with the translog cost function and we construct the total cost function. Third, based on the average cost function, conditions are pinpointed which attain minimum average cost. Finally, based on estimated results, we calculate the size of an urban private rail company and the ownership effects on cost. We conclude that optimal size is about 231 million vehicle-km per year, with a network of 63.8 km length. In terms of total costs, public railways have higher costs than private railways. There is no cost difference, however, in terms of variable costs.     

London bus tendering: the impact on costs

Bids for cost contracts in London Regional Transport bus routes between 1986 and 1993 are analysed for three purposes: to estimate costs for different types of bus operation; to test hypotheses about bidding under competition; to estimate cost savings attributable to tendering. There is no statistically significant difference in costs of operation between public and private sector operators on the tendered network. Bidding behaviour conforms to some features predicted by theoretical models. The estimated cost saving from tendering is 20%.     

The Post Office vs. Parcel Delivery Companies: Competition Effects on Costs and Productivity

The main purpose of this study is to evaluate whether the competition factor affects cost reduction or TFP growth, even when ownership is maintained by the public sector. For empirical investigation, we selected the parcel delivery market in Japan. Formerly monopolized by the Post Office, the parcel delivery market was dramatically affected by the entry of the privately owned Yamato in 1976, an event which saw the share of the Post Office begin its decline to only 14.9% by 1998. In this study, we estimate the total cost function of goods transported by using a pooled data set, and the hedonic specification of output is formulated in order to consider output characteristics. Our conclusion is that competition has contributed to cost reduction and TFP growth in the case of private companies but not in the case of the Post Office.