Information and transparency in wholesale electricity markets: evidence from Alberta

We examine the role of information transparency in Alberta’s wholesale electricity market. Using data on firms’ bidding behavior, we analyze whether firms utilize information revealed in near real-time through the Historical Trading Report (HTR), which is released 10 min after each hour and contains a complete (de-identified) list of every firms’ bids into the wholesale market from the previous hour. We demonstrate that firms are often able to identify the offers of specific rivals by offer patterns adopted by those firms. For one of these firms, these patterns are associated with higher offer prices. This is consistent with allegations by Alberta’s Market Surveillance Administrator that firms may be utilizing unique bidding patterns to reveal their identities to their rivals to elevate market prices. We show that certain firms respond to rival offer changes with a lag consistent with responding to information revealed through the HTR, and that they respond differently to different firms, suggesting that they are able to infer identification.     

Pricing to Firm: an Analysis of Firm‐ and Product‐level Import Prices*

We use Hungarian Customs data on product‐level imports of manufacturing firms to document that the import price of a particular product varies substantially across buying firms. We relate the level of import prices to firm characteristics such as size, foreign ownership, and market power. We develop a theory of “pricing to firm” (PTF), where markups depend on the technology and competitive environment of the buyer. The predictions of the model are confirmed by the data: import prices are higher for firms with greater market power, and for more essential intermediate inputs (with a high share in material costs). We take account of the endogeneity of the buyer’s market power with respect to higher import prices and unobserved cost heterogeneity within product categories. The magnitude of PTF is big: the standard deviation of price predicted by PTF is 21.5%.     

Does the stock market affect investment by Chinese firms? Some new evidence

During the 1990s, the Chinese government increasingly relied on the stock market as the major tool for state‐owned enterprise (SOE) reform and for the allocation of investment resources. This paper investigates the impact of stock market development in China on firm‐level capital investment by using a panel data set constructed by the author of all Chinese listed firms for the period 1992 to 1999. The results show that stock market valuation, as measured by Tobin’s q, has a highly independent, significant and positive influence on listed firms’ investment decisions, particularly during the stock market boom from 1996 to 1999. Given the sizable real effects of the stock market, deviations of stock prices from fundamentals can have substantially negative consequences. As a result, this study suggests that sensible regulation of the Chinese stock market is needed in order to enhance the efficiency of stock prices and facilitate an effective channeling of investment funds.     

Stock price responses to the eco-points programme for electrical household appliances: evidence from Japan

This article examines the Japanese government’s ‘Project for Green Consumer Electronics to Promote Business through the Use of Eco-points’ and its economic impact on consumer electronics firms’ stock prices. There has been little research on the economic effect of this project. In order to achieve our aim, we employ event study methodology. Our results show that stock prices responded positively to programme adoption, thereby indicating that the programme had positive effects on the related firms’ performance. The results also show that the programme’s economic effects gradually decreased over each subsequent programme extension. This probably occurred because the programme targeted durable goods, which consumers do not replace frequently.     

Why Do Prices Remain Stable in the Bubble and Bust Period?

In spite of a large swing in real output growth in the bubble and bust period, aggregate prices remained relatively stable in Japan. Empirical results show that such price rigidity can be explained by the customer market model combined with financial constraints. The degree of financial constraints that firms face in the bubble and bust period fluctuates significantly, and the impact of financial positions on firms’ prices is counter-cyclical. In booms, liquidity-abundant firms invest in market share by keeping prices down, while in a recession financially constrained firms charge a high price to locked-in customers who remain loyal. Such counter-cyclicality is clearly observed in the pricing behavior of large firms that produce differentiated goods. In contrast, small firms whose product brand is not well established in the market cannot lock in customers, and hence financial constraints do not affect their pricing decisions.     

A Theory of International Strategic Alliance

As an alternative to exporting, a firm can enter a foreign market by forging a strategic alliance with its foreign counterpart. The alliance eliminates transportation costs and duplications in product distribution networks. At the same time, strategic alliance lessens competition between the firms so that it leads to smaller outputs and higher prices. The degree of lessening of competition depends on the firms’ ability to commit to output levels. In the case where the firms can credibly commit to output levels, the alliance effectively becomes a cartel, restoring prices to the monopoly level. On the other hand, if such commitment is not credible or not possible, prices will be lower than the monopoly level but will still be higher than that if firms had exported to each other's market directly. The welfare effects of the strategic alliance are in general ambiguous.     

On the Effects of Suggested Prices in Gasoline Markets

There is a widespread suspicion that suggested prices act as a focal point for individual firms when setting their prices. Oil companies announce suggested prices for gasoline stations in the Dutch retail market. We show that, compared to the gasoline spot market price, suggested prices contain additional information that explains retail price changes. We conclude that suggested prices have a horizontal coordinating effect in the sense that retail prices react to information that suggested prices contain and that is unrelated to firms’ costs (i.e., the information that firms use under normal competitive conditions).     

Kreps & Scheinkman with Product Differentiation

Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)’s celebrated result is that in a two-stage model of a market with homogeneous products in which firms noncooperatively pick capacities in the first stage and set prices in the second stage, the equilibrium outcome is that of a one-shot Cournot game. This note derives capacity best response functions for the first stage and extends the Kreps and Scheinkman result to the case of differentiated products.     

PRICE SETTING PRACTICES IN GREECE: EVIDENCE FROM A SMALL‐SCALE FIRM‐LEVEL SURVEY

The paper documents the price setting practices followed by some 400 or so firms operating in Greece. Survey replies reveal a low percentage of firms changing prices with frequency higher than annual and staggering of price changes during the year. As to firms’ reactions to unexpected shocks, prices appear to adjust sluggishly to cost shocks with asymmetries in price adjustment across positive and negative shocks. Adjustments to increases in costs appear speedier than those to reductions in demand. The data confirm a result found for other countries: the existence of cross‐sectional variations in price setting strategies and in the extent to which prices are adjusted in reaction to unexpected shocks. The results suggest a positive association between, on the one hand, product market competition and, on the other hand, state‐dependent pricing, frequent price changes and the likelihood of a price adjustment following an adverse demand shock.     

A DYNAMIC ENTRY AND PRICE GAME WITH CAPACITY INDIVISIBILITY

Strategic market interaction is here modelled as a two‐stage game in which potential entrants choose capacities and next active firms compete in prices. Due to capital indivisibility, the capacity choice is made from a finite grid and there are economies of scale. In the simplest version of the model with a single production technique, the equilibrium turns out to depend on the ratio between the level of total output at the long‐run competitive equilibrium and the firm's minimum efficient scale: if that ratio is sufficiently large (the market is sufficiently ‘large’), then the competitive price emerges at a subgame‐perfect equilibrium of the capacity and price game; if not, then the firms randomize in prices on the equilibrium path. The role of the market size for the competitive outcome is shown to be even more important if there are several available production techniques.     

Trade Flows Versus Capital Flows: Are China’s Trade Surpluses Overestimated?

China has received massive foreign capital inflows after experiencing capital flight earlier in the last decade. The present paper offers estimates of capital inflows into China through the misinvoicing of trade after having outlined a model describing how trade prices could be manipulated by firms. In fact, the widely perceived undervalued Yuan has fueled expectations of a future revaluation of the Chinese currency. In a panel gravity modeling framework, we show that, China’s export and import prices for some commodities are sensitive to the non-deliverable forward exchange rate for the RMB in Hong Kong. In light of the evolution of this rate, which has rather systemically reflected anticipated revaluation of the Chinese currency, it is contended that the persistent Chinese trade imbalances may actually camouflage hidden ‘hot money’ inflows. Our findings provide evidence for export over-invoicing and import under-invoicing.     

A Mixed Duopoly With Switching Costs

We examine the effects of switching costs in a two‐period Hotelling‐type model where a profit‐maximising private firm competes with a welfare‐maximising public firm. We show that, in contrast with the case in which both firms are private, where switching costs raise prices in both periods, in the mixed duopoly they raise prices in the second period but reduce them in the first period. Moreover, the first‐period price reduction is of such magnitude that switching costs reduce firms’ profits and raise consumer welfare. We also find that switching costs affect the consequences of privatisation in favour of firms and against consumers.     

A conduct parameter model of price discrimination

We consider a conduct parameter model where firms price discriminate based on the consumers’ willingness to pay. For any conduct, the average price is invariant to the extent of price discrimination. Moreover, when the number of prices goes to infinity, there is a linear relationship between market power, measured by conduct, and range of offered prices. Hence, when the firms face competition, some of the high valuation customers are charged below their valuations, which contrasts with perfect price discrimination results for a monopoly.     

R&D,TECHNOLOGY SPILLOVERS AND STOCK PRICES†

Abstract. Theories of endogenous growth suggest that technological progress is driven by firms’ own R&D effort and knowledge spillovers. Using panel data for US firms over the period from 1990 to 1999 this paper tests the influence on stock prices of technological spillovers through firms’ purchase of intermediate products from other firms. The empirical results show that stock prices are significantly positively affected by knowledge spillovers through the input of intermediate products.     

Firms’ investment decisions in response to demand and price uncertainty

We investigate the effect of demand and price uncertainty on firms’ planned and realized investment from a panel of manufacturing firms. Uncertainty measures are derived from firms’ own expectations about demand and prices and firm's sales. We find that demand uncertainty at the time of planning depresses planned and subsequent realized investment. Firms do not revise their plans due to demand uncertainty at the time of spending, suggesting that reducing demand uncertainty will only have lagged effects on investment. We do not find any effect of price uncertainty. Our results are consistent with the behaviour of monopolistic firms with irreversible capital.     

Welfare effects of monetary policy in an economy with vertical production and trade: An analysis based on the perspective of local currency pricing

By incorporating the factor of firms' asymmetric price setting behavior into the two-country model with vertical production and trade, we analyze how one country's monetary policy affects the welfare of both countries. We show that an expansionary monetary policy has (i) a beggar-thyself effect if the ratio of the non-expanding country's intermediate goods firms that set their export prices in the local currency is significantly low and (ii) a prosper-thy-neighbor effect in our model regardless of the ratio of either country's intermediate goods firms that set their export prices in the local currency.     

Entry and exit echoes

While aggregate data do not show the investment echoes predicted by vintage-capital models, echoes arise in rates of entry and exit of firms at the industry level. Moreover, industries where prices decline rapidly experience early ‘shakeouts’. The relation emerges naturally in a vintage-capital model in which exit of firms sometimes accompanies the replacement of their capital, and in which a shakeout is the first replacement ‘echo’ of the capital created when the industry is born.     

Credence Goods,Misleading Labels,and Quality Differentiation

Due to differences in information disclosure mechanisms, consumer misinformation about the quality of many credence goods is more endemic at intermediate levels of the quality spectrum rather than at the extremes. Using an oligopoly model of vertical product differentiation, we examine how consumers’ overestimation of the quality of intermediate-quality products affects firms’ incentives to improve product quality. The firms non-cooperatively choose the quality of their product before choosing its price or quantity. Irrespective of the nature of second stage competition, Bertrand or Cournot, we find that quality overestimation by consumers increases profit of the intermediate-quality firm, and motivates it to raise its product’s quality. In response, the high-quality firm improves its product quality even further but ends up with lower profit. Overall, average quality of the vertically differentiated product improves, which raises consumer surplus. Social welfare increases when the firms compete in prices but falls when they compete in quantities.     

China’s competition and the export price strategies of developed countries

This paper analyzes the impact of Chinese competition on developed countries’ export prices. The empirical application is on Italy, one of the main European manufacturing exporters with exports at high risk of competition from China. Our results show that, following China’s entry into the WTO, the price strategies of Italian firms has been affected. While in general the increasing Chinese export competition resulted in an upgrading of products exported, the impact has been different according to the sector and technological level. The incentives to upgrade have been stronger for low technology sectors, where competition is tougher and varieties of products sold lower. To highlight quality differentials, and isolate the effects on the different segments of the distribution of Italy’s export prices, we run quantile regressions. We find that are mainly those products sold at low prices to face a strong pressure to upgrade.     

Can a decline in search cost increase prices?

This paper provides a new explanation of why a decline in consumers’ price search cost may not lead to lower prices. In a duopoly with price competition, I show that when some consumers are captive to one firm, there may be a non‐monotonic relationship between search cost and market power; firms may charge high prices with higher probability and the average price charged may be higher when consumers’ price search cost falls below a critical level. Furthermore, when firms have asymmetric captive segments, expected prices charged by each firm may move in opposite directions as search cost declines.