Multiple equilibrium overnight rates in a dynamic interbank market game

We analyse a two-period model of the interbank market, i.e. the market where banks trade liquidity. We assume that banks do not take the interbank interest rate as given, but instead negotiate on interest rates and transaction volumes with each other. The solution concept applied is the Shapley value. We show that there are a multiplicity of average equilibrium interest rates of the first period so that the average interest rate in this period does not convey any information on the expected liquidity situation on the interbank market. As the banks control not only the transaction volumes, but also the interest rates, they can leave the interest rates constant and adjust the transaction volumes when, for example, a liquidity deficit becomes more likely.     

Lenders on the storm of wholesale funding shocks: saved by the central bank?

We provide empirical evidence on banks’ responses to shocks in the wholesale funding market, using data of 181 euro area banks over the period from August 2007 to June 2013. Responses to funding liquidity shocks for both banks’ lending volumes and loan rates, to households and corporates, are analysed in a panel VAR framework. We thereby distinguish banks by country, extent of Eurosystem borrowing, bank size and capitalization. The results show that shocks in the securities and interbank markets have significant effects on loan rates and credit supply, particularly of banks in stressed countries of the periphery. The results also suggest that central bank liquidity has mitigated this effect on lending volumes. Lending to nonfinancial corporations is more sensitive to wholesale funding shocks than lending to households. Lending volumes of large banks that are typically more dependent on wholesale funding and banks with large exposure to sovereign bonds show stronger responses to wholesale funding shocks.     

What broad banks do, and markets don’t: Cross-subsidization

We show that interbank markets are a poor substitute for “broad” banks that operate across regions or sectors. In the presence of regional or sectoral asset and liquidity shocks, interbank markets can distribute liquidity efficiently, but fail to respond efficiently to asset shocks. Broad banks can condition on the joint distribution of both shocks and, hence, achieve an efficient internal allocation of capital. This allocation involves the cross-subsidization of loans across regions or sectors. Compared to regional banks that are linked through well-functioning interbank markets, broad banks lead to higher levels of aggregate investment, higher output, and less fluctuations within regions. However, broad banks generate endogenously aggregate uncertainty.     

What Do Data Say About Monetary Policy,Bank Liquidity and Bank Risk Taking?

This paper tests empirically the linkage between banks' investment and interbank lending decisions in response to interest rate changes. We draw conclusions for the monetary policy, which uses the interest rate as its main tool. Across European countries we find that the risk-free (i.e. monetary policy) interest rate negatively affects the liquidity retained by banks and the decision of a bank to be a lender in the interbank market. Instead, the interbank interest rate has a positive impact on these decisions. We also find that banks who lend show less risk-taking behaviour and tend to be smaller than those who are borrowers. Most importantly, the risk-free interest rate is positively correlated with loans investment and bank risk-taking behaviour.     

The Theory of the Second Best and the Competitive Equilibrium Model

We study the international transmission of bank liquidity shocks from multinational, Islamic, bank-holding companies to their subsidiaries. Based on a total sample of 120 Islamic and conventional bank subsidiaries, we test whether foreign bank lending for Islamic and conventional banks is determined by different factors. We estimate a model that includes subsidiary and parent bank characteristics as well as host and home country variables. Our empirical findings show that lending is negatively affected by the fragility of conventional parent banks' subsidiaries. Nevertheless, we show that parent Islamic banks do not significantly affect lending by subsidiaries. Finally, we examine the market discipline regarding the transmission of liquidity shocks. We also find that reduction in foreign Islamic bank lending is stronger for those that are dependent on the interbank market. We establish that the depositors react to a deterioration of bank performance and punish their institutions by withdrawing their money. We show that market discipline has a more important role for Islamic banks, whereas liquidity needs determine the change in conventional banks.     

CORPORATE CASH HOLDINGS AND CREDIT LINE USAGE

We investigate the factors driving the unprecedented rise in corporate liquidities since the 1970s. We find that an economy‐wide reduction in the cost of holding liquidities and an increase in risk best explain the rise in cash holdings and the widespread use of credit lines. The structural estimation results shed light on two widely acknowledged motives for holding cash. The precautionary motive and the liquidity motive translate risk exposure into cash holdings. Our results, however, do not suggest that firms have become more prudent over time. It is higher liquidity needs that has forced firms to hold more cash and use more credit lines.     

Interbank Lending, Liquidity and Banking Crises

In this paper, we show that abandoning the Diamond and Dybvig hypothesis of a unique bank representing the entire banking system gives rise to the possibility of endogenizing the interbank exchanges. In a system characterized by uncertainty regarding the moment of withdrawal of deposits, access to interbank liquidity decreases the bank risk of failure and bank runs. The possibility, moreover, to invest excess liquidity in the interbank market at a positive interest rate increases expected bank profits.
(J.E.L.: E52, G21).     

POLONIA dynamics during the years 2006–2012 and the effectiveness of the monetary Policy of the National Bank of Poland

In the study we investigate the effectiveness of the National Bank of Poland in counteracting the negative results of the financial crisis in the Polish interbank market. The situation was exceptional in a sense, that during the period of the financial crisis the Polish interbank market experienced liquidity surplus, and the main problem of the central bank was to regain confidence among commercial banks and stimulate interbank transactions. We concentrate on the spread between the rate of overnight interbank loans and the reference rate and based upon its dynamics we assess the monetary policy of the Polish central bank. Using econometric techniques we study how the central bank influenced the spread, when its control over it weakened and when was it strengthened. The study is supported by the results of the survey directed to the headquarters of commercial banks. We conclude that the ability of the central bank to control overnight rate was temporarily lost during the first phases of the financial crisis, but gradually regained after implementation of the confidence pact.     

EXIT OPTIONS AND DIVIDEND POLICY UNDER LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS

We introduce a post‐entry liquidity constraint to the standard model of a firm with serially correlated profitability and an irreversible exit decision. We assume that firms with no cash holdings and negative cash flow must either exit or raise new cash at a transaction cost. This creates a precautionary motive for holding cash, which must be traded off against the liquidity cost of holding cash. We characterize the optimal exit and payout policy. The direct effect of financial frictions is to impose inefficient exit, but there is also an indirect effect through higher equilibrium price that leads to inefficient survival.     

Do foreign-owned banks affect banking system liquidity risk?

Existing empirical research shows that foreign-owned banks play a stabilizing role in emerging economies’ banking systems. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this stabilizing role can be attributed to transnational banks’ access to more diversified sources of liquidity. There exists, however, no empirical evidence so far on transnational banks’ liquidity behavior and its effect on aggregate banking system liquidity. This paper aims at closing this gap. First, we look at the liquid assets holdings of transnational banks and show that in “normal” times they are significantly lower but in crises times higher than those of single-market banks. Second, we find evidence that transnational banks’ presence significantly reduces the risk of aggregate liquidity shortages in emerging economies.     

Inefficiency of bilateral bargaining in interbank markets

Many countries have interbank markets that are over the counter (OTC) instead of exchange mediated. In OTC systems, bilateral bargaining takes place over the rate of interest on the (interbank) loan. This article characterizes such bilateral bargaining for loans between banks under asymmetric information and shows that bargaining outcomes maybe inefficient. The article suggests two sources of inefficiency. In a one-period model, bargaining between two banks may fail due to incomplete information even if gains to trade exist. Intertemporal issues examined in this article reveal that repeated interaction could create distorting effects through reciprocal contracts. Both cases are shown to require active liquidity management by the regulatory authority to restore the first best allocation.     

Bank lending and interest on excess reserves: An empirical investigation

This paper econometrically tests for effects on bank lending of the Federal Reserve’s policy of paying interest on excess reserves (IOER). Following the 2008 financial crisis, US banks decreased their loan allocations and increased holdings of excess reserves. A model of bank asset allocation shows that when the rate of IOER is higher than other short-term rates, banks will switch from zero excess reserves to a regime with higher excess reserves and lower lending. Using a sample of panel data on US banks from 2000 through 2018, we find evidence of a switch to a positive excess reserve regime in the post-crisis period. Controlling for market interest rates, loan demand, and economic activity, we find that IOER accounts for the majority of the decline in bank lending after the financial crisis.     

Liquidity risk and bank portfolio management in a financial system without deposit insurance: Empirical evidence from prewar Japan

Using data from prewar Japan, this paper investigates the impact of a liquidity shock induced by depositors' behavior on bank portfolio management during financial crises in a system lacking deposit insurance. It is found that banks reacted to the liquidity shock sensitively through an increase in their cash holdings not by liquidating bank loans but by selling securities in the financial market. Moreover, banks exposed to local financial contagion adjusted the liquidity of their portfolio mainly by actively selling and buying their securities in the financial market. Finally, there is no evidence to conclude that the existence of the lender of last resort mitigated the liquidity constraints in bank portfolio adjustments.     

The intraday liquidity management game

We use a game theoretical framework to analyze the intraday behavior of banks with respect to settlement of interbank claims in a real-time gross settlement setting. The game played by banks depends upon the intraday credit policy of the central bank and it encompasses two well-known game theoretical paradigms: the prisoner's dilemma and the stag hunt. The former arises in a collateralized credit regime where banks have an incentive to postpone payments when daylight liquidity is costly, an outcome that is socially inefficient. The latter arises in a priced credit regime where the postponement of payments can be socially efficient. Banks are risk neutral, but we show that most of the results are unaffected by risk aversion.     

Multiple reserve requirements in a monetary growth model

Summary. This paper considers a monetary growth model in which banks provide liquidity, and in which a government finances a deficit by printing money and selling bonds. In this context, I examine the possibility that the government may want to impose binding reserve requirements on banks' holdings of both money and government bonds. Conditions are established under which doing so increases steady state welfare and reduces the scope for indeterminacies. Furthermore, under a binding system of multiple reserve requirements we have that money is superneutral. On the other hand, if reserve requirements are imposed on cash holdings alone, increases in the steady state inflation rate adversely affect capital accumulation and long run real activity. Thus systems of multiple binding reserve requirements can insulate real activity from the consequences of inflationary taxation. Received: June 30, 2000; revised version: January 31, 2001     

银行流动性过剩的自愿性与非自愿性因素辨析——兼论对货币政策的影响

本文将很行的流动性资产分为自愿性(预防性)流动资产和非自愿性流动资产两部分,并建立银行自愿性流动资产需求模型,进一步的实证分析表明:自愿性因素和非自愿性因素共同促使我国银行流动性过剩,自愿的预防性流动资产过剩和非自愿的流动资产过剩并存,银行的部分流动性过剩资产是为了规避融资成本、汇率风险和存款波动风险而自愿持有的.脉冲响应分析表明银行流动性过剩制约了我国贷币政策有效性的发挥.     

Assessing Interbank Contagion Risk Using Consolidated Data

This study uses the maximum entropy method to estimate bilateral interbank exposure in order to simulate the contagion effect in the UK interbank market using consolidated data. Almost all existing studies use unconsolidated data, which could significantly distort the real contagion effect as the banking sectors of most countries are highly concentrated with most large banks owning a significant number of subsidiaries. The results show that exposure is much more severe using consolidated data, implying that some money center banks or systematically important banks were underestimated by the contagion model before the 2008 financial crisis.     

Bank-lending channel and non-financial firms: evidence for Spain

During the 1990s, liquidity was relatively abundant in the European Union and the European central banks mostly developed a relaxed monetary policy. While the bank lending channel view of the monetary policy would have suggested an increase in loans to firms in this context, the demand for bank corporate lending, however, slowed down, suggesting that monetary policy was not effective in this area. This article analyses how the financing behaviour of Spanish firms during 1992–2003 is related to their liquidity holdings and how this relationship may affect the effectiveness of the bank lending channel. The empirical evidence provided suggests that firms holding high liquid assets may replace bank lending by other sources of financing. Hence, higher liquidity holdings allow firms to invest in attractive investment projects in the event of a tightening of monetary conditions.      

What are the bank-specific and macroeconomic drivers of banks’ leverage? Evidence from Luxembourg

We investigate the leverage cycle in Luxembourg’s banking sector using individual bank-level data for the period 2003 Q1–2010 Q1. One of our findings is that Luxembourg’s banks have a procyclical leverage. This procyclicality is not due to marking-to-market but because Luxembourg’s banks are liquidity providers to the EU banking sector. We then empirically investigate the role of bank characteristics as well as real, financial and expectation variables that proxy for macroeconomic conditions in the pre-crisis and crisis period. We find that off-balance sheet exposures have different effects in the pre-crisis and crisis period, and that the share of liquid assets in the portfolio only affects security holdings. As for macroeconomic variables, we find that the Euribor-OIS spread is a significant driver of the build-up in leverage in the pre-crisis period. The reason is that most banks in Luxembourg are either branches or subsidiaries. This makes leverage a less relevant indicator of riskiness for investors. It also implies that in times of liquidity shortages, mother companies or groups demand further liquidity from their branch or subsidiary. The downturn in leverage during the crisis can be accredited to reductions in expectations, which we proxy by an economic sentiment indicator. It can also be explained by increasing bond prices which induce depositors to shift their funds from bank deposits into bonds. We find no important role for GDP growth.     

The credit squeeze during Russia's early transition: A bank-based view

This paper asks whether Russia's protracted inflation stabilization might have caused a credit squeeze and hence might have contributed to the output collapse in the first three years of the Russian transition. Russian monetary policy was not restrictive as a whole. Still, the occurrence of a credit crunch is not excluded, because of the Russian central bank's heavy reliance on required reserves to curb the inflationary effects of monetized budget deficits. Due to methodological limitations, we are forced to concentrate on a cross-sectional analysis of bank liquidity in 1994, in order to find possible indications about Russia's monetary stance from the point of view of the lending channel. We cannot reject that the huge excess reserves of Russian banks in 1994 were at least partially due to excess liquidity. This suggests that there is no direct relation between the monetary policy of high required reserves and the observed credit crunch. The question of why banks preferred to hold excess liquidity deserves further attention. This question is still relevant, because Russian commercial banks have again accumulated excess reserves in 1999, in the aftermath of the banking crisis, triggered by the August-1998 crisis.