地方政府性债务治理与上市企业投融资*——基于我国247座城市的初步证据

本文利用中国社科院披露的我国247座城市地方政府性债务对金融稳定影响的评价指数,分析了地方政府性债务治理对上市企业债务融资与资本性投资效率的影响及其传导机理。研究发现,与地方政府性债务治理较好地区相比,处于地方政府性债务治理较差地区的地方政府控股国企,其杠杆率均显著较高,但企业资本性投资效率却显著较低,企业产能过剩的财务特征十分明显。这表明,地方政府性债务治理会显著影响微观企业的投融资,并且地方政府性债务治理越差,透过政府对经济活动的控制或干预,通过预算外举债,政府“杠杆”有转化为企业“杠杆”的风险。本文明确了“去杠杆”究竟应去谁的“杠杆”问题,对理解地方政府性债务治理转变为“内涵型”经济增长的微观基础具有重要的理论和现实意义。     

Credit market discipline: Theory and evidence

Popular in the academic literature and financial press, the credit market discipline hypothesis holds that credit markets, through risk premia increasing in debt level, constrain governments from borrowing and thus, impose fiscal discipline on sovereign borrowers. While several papers document rising risk premia, none have investigated the consumption response. This paper fills this gap by using data on U.S. states' risk premia from 1973–98. An optimizing model is formulated, whereby states intertemporally smooth consumption in the face of interest rates which increase with debt. Deviations from optimality are considered by allowing for governments which consume out of contemporaneous resources. In both cases, credit market discipline is rejected. Rejection is robust to sample splits based on ideology and the stringency of balanced budget requirments.     

Lending policies of informal, formal and semiformal lenders

This paper compares lending policies of formal, informal and semiformal lenders with respect to household lending in Vietnam. The analysis suggests that the probability of using formal or semiformal credit increases if borrowers provide collateral, a guarantor and/or borrow for business‐related activities. The probability of using informal credit increases for female borrowers. It also appears that the probability of using formal credit increases in household welfare up to a certain threshold, but at a decreasing rate. In addition, the paper discerns the determinants of probability of default across lender types. Default risk of formal credit appears to be strongly affected by formal loan contract terms, e.g., loan interest rate and form of loan repayment, whereas default risk on informal loans is significantly related to the presence of propinquity and other internal characteristics of the borrowing household. Overall, the study raises several important implications for the screening, monitoring and enforcement instruments that may be employed by different types of lenders.     

Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information

We study a competitive credit market equilibrium in which all agents are risk neutral and lenders a priori unaware of borrowers' default probabilities. Admissible credit contracts are characterized by the credit granting probability, the loan quantity, the loan interest rate and the collateral required. The principal result is that in equilibrium lower risk borrowers pay higher interest rates than higher risk borrowers; moreover, the lower risk borrowers get more credit in equilibrium than they would with full information. No credit is rationed and collateral requirements are higher for the lower risk borrowers.     

Adverse selection as an explanation of credit rationing and different lender types

An adverse selection model is utilized to demonstrate that informational asymmetry may make it wealth optimal for the financial intermediary (FI) to credit ration and to rationalize the existence of different lenders in the credit market. The crucial assumption is that borrowers differ in their tolerance for a lender-imposed default penalty, the severity of which also varies with the lender. The credit rationing portion proves that the FI will: 1) be forced by a binding regulatory constraint to overinvest in capital; 2) ration its worst risk class borrowers; 3) establish its optimal loan interest rate on the basis of the average quality of its loans and the interest rate elasticity of the borrower demand in its best risk category; and 4) decrease the total loan volume and increase the loan interest rate due to an increase in the capital requirement, but the effect on the default risk quality of its loan portfolio is ambiguous. The existence result is that if a lender has a high default penalty, he can charge a lower rate and attract only “good” borrowers, i.e., heterogeneous lender types encourage the screening of borrowers and vice versa.     

地方政府融资平台的举债 行为及其影响分析 ——双冲动下的信贷加速器效应分析

本文在地方政府和商业银行双冲动的框架下讨论地方政府融资平台的举债行为，联系到地方政府积累的巨额债务及可导致的金融风险，以及融资平台与信贷市场和房地产市场的紧密联系，本文将金融加速器的概念引入到分析中来。经过建立理论模型分析发现，地方政府和商业银行双冲动下地方政府融资平台实际上拥有信贷加速器效应，这种信贷加速器效应有可能导致风险不可控，应该引起高度重视。     

Less fiscal oversight,more adjustment

In Norway, a reform in 2001 lifted budget and borrowing approval for local governments that comply with the balanced budget requirement (BBR). It was a concern that less fiscal oversight would lead to less fiscal discipline. A neglected effect however, was that the reform implicitly introduced sanctions for violating the BBR. In addition a register informing financial institutions about authorities in need of borrowing approval provides voters with reliable information about fiscal performance. We find evidence of stronger fiscal adjustment after the reform, in particular for local governments with past deficits that are at risk of being enrolled in the register. Moreover, an important finding is that this result also holds for local government with past deficits that do not end up in the register. Local governments with past surpluses are less affected by the reform, but there is some evidence in the direction of lower surpluses for this group.     

CREDIT CONSTRAINTS IN THE MARKET FOR CONSUMER DURABLES: EVIDENCE FROM MICRO DATA ON CAR LOANS*

We investigate the significance of borrowing constraints in the market for consumer loans. Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey on auto loan contracts we estimate the elasticities of loan demand with respect to interest rate and maturity. We find that, with the exception of high income households, consumers are very responsive to maturity and less responsive to interest rate changes. Both elasticities vary with household income, with the maturity elasticity decreasing and the interest rate elasticity increasing with income. We argue that these results are consistent with the presence of binding credit constraints in the auto loan market.     

地方政府债务规模影响因素及化解对策

不断蔓延的欧洲债务危机,加重了各界对国家主权债务问题的担忧.而近期中国各级地方政府的债务问题,同样引人关注.尽管我国法律法规对地方政府举债限制比较严格,但这并不意味着地方政府债务规模合理.事实上,地方政府通过公开或隐蔽渠道,直接或间接地举借了大量债务.现在,地方政府债务风险在某些局部已经显现,潜在的风险也不可忽视.本文在分析中国地方政府债务规模后,提出了化解地方债务风险的对策.     

Do interest rate controls work? Evidence from Kenya

This paper reviews the impact of interest rate controls in Kenya, introduced in September 2016. The intent of the controls was to reduce the cost of borrowing, expand access to credit, and increase the return on savings. However, we find that the law on interest rate controls has had the opposite effect of what was intended. Specifically, it has led to a collapse of credit to micro‐, small‐, and medium‐sized enterprises; shrinking of the loan book of the small banks; and reduced financial intermediation. Because of their adverse effects on bank lending, we estimate that the interest rate controls have reduced economic growth by ¼–¾ percentage points on an annual basis. We also show that interest rate caps reduced the signaling effects of monetary policy. These suggest that (1) the adverse effects could largely be avoided if the ceiling was high enough to facilitate lending to higher‐risk borrowers and (2) alternative policies could be preferable to address concerns about the high cost of credit.     

Loan guarantees and the cost of debt: evidence from China

In this article, we examine the potential influence of loan guarantees and the nature of ownership on a company’s cost of debt. Using data on Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2014, we find that guaranteeing another entity’s debt significantly increases the guarantor’s cost of its own debt. Regarding the nature of ownership, our results indicate that the cost of debt for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is lower than that for non-SOEs. Among SOEs, firms controlled by the central government have lower cost of debt than firms controlled by local governments. We also find some evidence that local government ownership mitigates the effects of loan guarantees on the cost of a guarantor’s own debt.     

DEALER PRICING OF CONSUMER CREDIT*

Price discrimination incentives may induce dealers to bear the financial cost of their customers' credit purchases. We focus on how financial market imperfections make it possible to segment the customer population. When borrowing and lending rates differ from each other and from the rate of interest on a durable good purchase, the structure of those rates influences customers' choices to purchase on credit or cash terms, and the scope for dealers' price discrimination. Empirical analysis of a set of installment‐credit, personal‐loan, and regional interest rate data offers considerable support to the assumptions and implications of our theoretical framework.     

Evaluating credit risk and loan performance in online Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending

Online Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending has emerged recently. This micro loan market could offer certain benefits to both borrowers and lenders. Using data from the Lending Club, which is one of the popular online P2P lending houses, this article explores the P2P loan characteristics, evaluates their credit risk and measures loan performances. We find that credit grade, debt-to-income ratio, FICO score and revolving line utilization play an important role in loan defaults. Loans with lower credit grade and longer duration are associated with high mortality rate. The result is consistent with the Cox Proportional Hazard test which suggests that the hazard rate or the likelihood of the loan default increases with the credit risk of the borrowers. Finally, we find that higher interest rates charged on the high-risk borrowers are not enough to compensate for higher probability of the loan default. The Lending Club must find ways to attract high FICO score and high-income borrowers in order to sustain their businesses.     

Heterogeneity of farm loan packaging term decisions: a finite mixture approach

This article revisits the minority borrowers’ discrimination issue in farm lending by departing from traditional loan approval-rejection or default rate-based analytical models to focus on loan packaging decisions. This study analyses such decisions using a Finite Mixture Model that optimally separates the borrowers into two sub-classes allowing for a priori unspecified heterogeneity in borrowers’ data, which has not been accounted for in previous loan discrimination analyses. Results show that non-white farm borrowers tend to receive larger loans among those in the lower loan latent class, but receive relatively lower loans in the larger loans borrower category. These farmers are also charged higher interest rates vis-à-vis their peers in both the low and high interest rate latent classes. This study’s results also indicate that male borrowers are accommodated with larger loans and longer maturities in all loan amount and maturity latent classes. This study validates the interplay among significant trends in loan packaging terms for racial and gender minority borrowers that seems logical from the lenders’ credit risk management perspective.     

中国农村信贷情况初步统计——来自“北京大学-花旗银行”农村金融调研的证据

本文回顾了之前有关农村借贷的文献。基于“北大一花旗中国农村金融调查”数据，我们对数据结果进行初步描述。根据调查，大多数农村家庭可以在需要时获得信贷；他们会根据不同用途通过不同渠道进行借款。家族间的零利率贷款和向农村信用合作社贷款是信贷的两个主要来源；超过一半的贷款是亲朋问的免息贷款。调查也显示出，很多家庭对于申请贷款没有信心。另外，“利率太高”和“申请程序繁琐”、“没有足额贷款保证”也成为贷款的障碍。研究还发现，从农村合作信用社获得贷款的决定性因素是“偿付能力”和“个人信誉”，而后者其实也可以被解释为“偿付能力”。除了这两个因素，能够提供担保人或抵押品，甚至有内部人（例如农村信用社职员）的帮助都可以对获得农村合作信用社贷款起到积极作用。最后一部分，我们为今后的研究方向提出两个建议。     

利率市场化能解决小微企业融资难问题吗*——基于行为金融学视角的分析

本文研究了银行信贷集中问题的成因,讨论了利率市场化背景下小微企业融资问题难的解决思路。本文首先以行为前景理论和心理账户理论为基础,考察授信者行为因素对银行授信决策的影响,以探讨小微企业融资困境形成和银行信贷集中问题产生的机制。然后本文讨论了分析信贷集中和小微企业融资问题所依赖的假设和变量,从收益和风险两个方面对商业银行信贷决策做出了研究。研究发现利率市场化改革可以有效缓解小微企业融资难和信贷资金集中于大中型企业的问题。     

Credit union loan rate determinants in the United States

ABSTRACT

Credit union participation in the consumer lending market continues to grow as an increasing number of consumers and small businesses become members and open accounts. This study investigates the determinants of credit union loan rates during a period of economic expansion in the United States using fourth quarter 2015 data for 5,942 credit unions. Five different interest rate categories are analysed using nine potential loan rate determinants. Results indicate that loan rates tend to be lower as credit union size increases, while high ratios for net charge-offs and operating costs cause interest rates to increase. Opposite to what is expected, loan rates are positively correlated with regional unemployment rates. A possible explanation for this outcome is that weak labour markets are associated with elevated loan delinquency rates and, therefore, greater default risks resulting in higher interest rates.     

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE: A LOAN MECHANISM-DESIGN APPROACH

International Financial Institutions (IFIs) tie resource transfers to capital-scarce countries to improvements in their economic policies and institutions. The objective of this assistance is twofold: to augment the recipient's capital base and to improve its allocation of resources. This paper offers a political-economy explanation for the limited success of some of these loan programs. In our model, governments select policies under the influence of interest groups. Their capacity to absorb IFI loans and their reform efforts are both unobservable to the IFI. An optimally designed loan mechanism must create sufficient incentives – in the form of rewards and punishments – to counter the influence of interest groups on economic policy choices. The loan mechanism is, however, constrained in two ways: it cannot punish a country so severely as to threaten its political stability and it must remain affordable to the IFI. Whenever reform incentives are inadequate, a government will accept the loan but cheat on the implementation of reforms. If, on the other hand, the mechanism design is optimal, it might be so costly to the IFI that a well-entrenched interest group can block the reform program. Nonetheless, the availability of properly designed loan mechanisms will push governments to implement partial reforms even if the optimal mechanism is too costly for the IFI.     

个人住房贷款的风险管理

我国个人住房贷款的风险可能成为未来银行不良贷款增加的主要来源之一。个人住房贷款所面临的风险包括：银行的流动性风险、个人的信贷风险、贷款中的操作风险等：为了应对相关的风险，商业银行应当从多方面完善个人住房贷款的风险管理。商业银行应当改善个人信用风险的识别与评估环境，并且积极鼓励商业银行采取市场化的手段转移风险，从各方面推进房地产抵押贷款证券化，其作用可以有效地分散和转移风险。商业银行还应以预警机制预防风险，防患于未然。同时，金融管理机构在政策制定方面也应适应并引导个人住房贷款的健康发展。     

Peer Group Formation in an Adverse Selection Model

This paper develops an adverse selection model where peer group systems are shown to trigger lower interest rates and remove credit rationing in the case where borrowers are uninformed about their potential partners and ex post state verification (or auditing) by banks is costly. Peer group formation reduces interest rates due to a 'collateral effect', namely, cross subsidisation amongst borrowers acts as collateral behind a loan. By uncovering such a collateral effect, this paper shows that peer group systems can be viewed as an effective risk pooling mechanism, and thus enhance efficiency, not just in the full information set up.