Does war influence individual expectations?

We analyse the effect of mass violent conflict on individual expectations in Northern Uganda. We find that the expectations of the future economic situation are negatively affected by recent conflict while the effect on broadly defined welfare is less robust.     

Can people learn rational expectations?

In this note the stability of the rational expectations equilibrium for the Foster and Frierman (1990) version of the Blume and Easley (1982) model is investigated under the assumption that the learning mechanism used by economic agents is based on a selection mechanism on a class of competing models having a physical meaning for the agent and not on the interpolation of models having no clear physical meaning, as it is often the case in the literature on learning rational expectations. It is found that, under the standard assumption that the rational expectations model is in the information set of the uninformed trader no matter his degree of rationality, convergence to it is less likely the higher the uninformed agent's degree of rationality, in a sense to be specified in the paper. Some comments on the result are also provided.     

When are adaptive expectations rational? A generalization

This note presents a simple generalization of the adaptive expectations mechanism in which the learning parameter is time variant. Expectations generated in this way minimize mean squared forecast errors for any linear state space model.     

Are optimistic expectations keeping the Chinese happy?

In this paper we study the effect of optimistic income expectations on life satisfaction amongst the Chinese population. Using a large scale household survey conducted in 2002 we find that the level of optimism about the future is particularly strong in the countryside and amongst rural-to-urban migrants. The importance of these expectations for life satisfaction is particularly pronounced in the urban areas, though also highly significant for the rural area. If expectations were to reverse from positive to negative, we calculate that this would have doubled the proportion of unhappy people and reduced proportion of very happy people by 48 per cent. We perform several robustness checks to see if the results are driven by variations in precautionary savings or reverse causality.     

When did inflation expectations in the Euro area de-anchor?

Long-term inflation expectations in the Euro area (EA) remained well anchored during the global financial crisis. Less is known about the following period. By investigating whether inflation expectations have become sensitive to the arrival of economic news, this article empirically analyzes the behavior of inflation expectations in the EA during the most recent period. It finds evidence that the de-anchoring of expectations started in December 2011 and never reversed. This is in line with the more aggressive stance held by the European Central Bank (ECB) in the following months as well as with the pattern of ECB Professional Forecasters’ expectations.     

Bayesian–Walrasian equilibria: beyond the rational expectations equilibrium

In general rational expectations equilibrium (REE), as introduced in Radner (Econometrica 47:655–678, 1978) in an Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie setting with uncertainty, does not exist. Moreover, it fails to be fully Pareto optimal and incentive compatible and is also not implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of an extensive form game (Glycopantis et al. in Econ Theory 26:765–791, 2005). The lack of all the above properties is mainly due to the fact that the agents are supposed to predict the equilibrium market clearing price (as agent’s expected maximized utility is conditioned on the information that equilibrium prices reveal), which leads inevitably to the presumption that agents know all the primitives in the economy, i.e., random initial endowments, random utility functions and private information sets. To get around this problematic equilibrium notion, we introduce a new concept called Bayesian–Walrasian equilibrium (BWE) which has Bayesian features. In particular, agents try to predict the market-clearing prices using Bayesian updating and evaluate their consumption in terms of Bayesian price estimates, which are different for each individual. In this framework agents maximize expected utility conditioned on their own private information about the state of nature, subject to a Bayesian estimated budget constraint. Market clearing is not an intrinsic part of the definition of BWE. However, both in the case of perfect foresight and in the case of symmetric information BWE leads to a statewise market clearing; it then becomes an ex post Walrasian equilibrium allocation. This new BWE exists under standard assumptions, in contrast to the REE. In particular, we show that our new BWE exists in the well-known example in Kreps (J Econ Theory 14:32–43, 1977), where REE fails to exist. This work was done in the Spring of 2005, when EJB was a visiting professor at the University of Illinois.     

Inflationary expectations,“endogenous money,” and economic growth

This paper introduces a neoclassical growth model with money in which (1) money is explicitly treated as both a consumer and a producer good, and (2) the money supply is an endogenous factor resulting from real sector changes rather than an exogenous factor determined by the wisdom of the central bank. The major findings include, first, the effect of an increase in money on growth is positive if a real balance effect on production is greater than on consumption, and second, for the economy to stay in the golden-rule path, the rate of growth of per capita real money balances should be equal to the rate of growth of nominal money.     

Rational expectations in the foreign exchange market? Some survey evidence

Although many papers have already proposed empirical models of currency crises, the timing of such crises has received relatively little attention so far. Most papers use indeed a static specification and impose the same lag structure across all explanatory variables. This, by construction, prevents from specifically timing the crisis signals sent by the leading indicators. The objective here is to fill this gap by considering a set of dynamic discrete choice models. The first contribution is to identify how early in advance each explanatory variable sends a warning signal. Some indicators are found to signal a crisis in the very short run while others signal a crisis at more distant horizons. The second contribution is to show that state dependence matters, albeit mostly in the short run. The results have important implications for crisis prevention in terms of the timeliness and usefulness of the envisaged policy response.     

What matters when? The impact of ECB communication on financial market expectations

This article analyses financial markets’ reaction to European Central Bank's (ECB) communication. We apply a novel indicator that quantifies the contents of the ECB's introductory statements and allows disentangling ECB statements on prices, the real and the monetary sector. We provide evidence that it matters what issue the ECB is speaking about: especially, the ECB's statements on price developments represent important news to financial markets. It also matters when the ECB affects markets: communication drives maturities above 4 months.     

Does monetary policy affect the long-run expectations of non-stationary real interest rates?

In this article, we analyse whether the monetary policy affects the long-run expectation of the non-stationary real interest rate. The analysis is conducted through Beveridge–Nelson trend decomposition within a cointegrated vector autoregressive model based on the New Keynesian framework. We suggest an augmented test of the conventional co-integration test on the non-stationarity of the real interest rate, which checks whether the co-integration coefficient of inflation is one and the output gap affects the co-integration equilibrium of the nominal interest rate. We further suggest decomposing the long-run expectation of the non-stationary real interest rate into three trends: the interest rate shock (including the monetary shock), inflation shock and output gap shock. According to empirical analyses using monthly US data after the Korean War, the long-run expectation of the non-stationary real interest rate contains an interest rate shock trend and the impulse of the federal fund target rate induces a significant response of the interest rate shock trend. However, the interest rate shock trend has a very small portion of the long-run expectation of the non-stationary real interest rate, which may explain why the monetary policy was not particularly effective in the economic recovery after the global financial crisis.     

Are more risk averse agents more optimistic? Insights from a rational expectations model

We analyse a model of partially revealing, rational expectations equilibrium with diverse information, endogenous beliefs formation and uncertain distribution of risk aversion. More risk averse agents are then more optimistic. Such a positive correlation is important for collective decision analysis.     

News shocks or parametric indeterminacy? An observational equivalence result in linear rational expectations models

This paper studies identification in linear rational expectations models with news shocks. We show that news-driven models and indeterminate equilibrium economies with i.i.d. fundamentals are observationally equivalent. This finding calls for carefully designing empirical investigations of news shocks in estimated DSGE models.     

Assessment of the effect of the financial crisis on agents’ expectations through symbolic regression

Agents’ perceptions on the state of the economy can be affected during economic crises. Tendency surveys are the main source of agents’ expectations. The main objective of this study is to assess the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on agents’ expectations. With this aim, we evaluate the capacity of survey-based expectations to anticipate economic growth in the United States, Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom. We propose a symbolic regression (SR) via genetic programming approach to derive mathematical functional forms that link survey-based expectations to GDP growth. By combining the main SR-generated indicators, we generate estimates of the evolution of GDP. Finally, we analyse the effect of the crisis on the formation of expectations, and we find an improvement in the capacity of agents’ expectations to anticipate economic growth after the crisis in all countries except Germany.     

How do advertised brands benefit from private labels? An application of rational expectations models

Private labels have traditionally been viewed as a threat to advertised brands. Contrary to traditional wisdom, this study uses a two-asset rational expectations model to show that advertised brands could benefit from private labels. While the manufacturer’s advertising creates product differentiation, the retailer’s synchronous pricing strategy further enhances the product differentiation and raises profits as well as the efficiency of price discounts for the advertised brand. In addition, the existence of private labels improves the advertising efficiency, especially for newly introduced brands. The economic role of private labels is not limited to taking a free ride on the manufacturer’s advertising efforts, and this role cannot be replaced by another advertised brand.     

Job satisfaction and disability: lower expectations about jobs or a matter of health?

This article focuses on the analysis of the reported differentials of job satisfaction for disabled and non-disabled individuals. Using the Spanish data of the European Community Household Panel during the period 1995–2001, we estimate a job satisfaction equation for each group and evaluate job satisfaction differentials through the Oaxaca-Blinder methodology. The results show that disabled individuals are more likely to be more satisfied in their jobs than non-disabled ones, but only after controlling for other variables. Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition shows the greater importance of the returns in job satisfaction for disabled people, which is supported by explanations based on the lower expectations about jobs of disadvantaged groups.      

Making profits working on patients’ expectations, a behavioral analysis of pharmaceutical clinical research

This paper presents a model that demonstrates how pharmaceutical companies can make profits from human experimentation by working on patients?? expectations and physicians?? inability to evaluate innovations in medical knowledge. In order to understand how profits can be made, it is important to analyze the effect the physician??s expectations have on patients, both in the enrolment process and in the collected effectiveness, as well as the nature of the physician??s interest in producing this effect. Starting from the process through which companies collect clinical evidence, the analysis will focus on the economic use of that data on the drug market and the national drug agency??s role. A model illustrates the companies?? potential opportunistic strategies as well as what the public stakeholder??s target should be. Is public intervention really necessary in order to regulate the imperfect market of drugs? In other words, taking imperfection due to the expectation process in human experimentation into account, is there another practicable path? The final normative analysis will try to answer these questions.     

Do we reject rational expectations models too often?: Interpreting evidence using Nagar expansions

In a recent paper Mankiw and Shapiro presented Monte Carlo evidence assessing the over-rejection of the orthogonality condition which characterizes rational expectations models. The purpose of this note is two-fold — first, to construct a small sample approximation of the expected value of the t-statistic and second, to get a feeling for why the critical values obtained by MS are so disparate.     

What is the future of cancer care? A technology foresight assessment of experts’ expectations

ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to generate qualified information on technologies that are expected to be relevant to cancer care over the next thirty years (2017–2037). Drawing on the concepts of technology foresight, a methodology was developed for future technology research. Future technologies were identified by consulting editorials of journals specializing in oncology. Nine technologies were selected with the potential to impact cancer care in the future. Additionally, a method was developed for consulting a large number of experts from articles indexed in Thomson Reuters Web of Science. In this survey, more than 83,000 cancer specialists were invited to answer a web survey in which they expressed their expectations about the future of cancer care. The questionnaire was answered by 2408 specialists, 56% of whom stated they were highly knowledgeable experts. Our results show that antibody-related therapies, molecular imaging, and tumor delivery systems are the technologies most likely to be used in cancer care in the next thirty years. The main reasons pointed out for the choice of these technologies were improvements in the prognosis of the disease and improved diagnostic reliability. Meanwhile, knowledge and scientific barriers were highlighted as the main obstacles to the development of the technologies deemed to have more limited chances of success.     

Do expectations matter? Reassessing the effects of government spending on key macroeconomic variables in Germany

This article contributes to the debate on how to properly identify exogenous fiscal shocks in the data. We include expectations held by consumers and firms into the standard vector autoregression (VAR) framework based on information from historical issues of the German political magazine Der Spiegel. The findings underscore the need to account for expectations, as failing to do so leads to significant misinterpretation of the effects of government spending. When neglecting anticipation effects, our results support the recent findings for Germany by pointing to a rather positive effect of government spending on GDP. However, inclusion of expectations yields a change in this effect, suggesting that government spending is much less beneficial for GDP, as it crowds out private consumption and investment.