Intergovernmental transfers and procyclical public spending

This paper tests the predictions that (i) sub-central government expenditures are procyclical and (ii) sub-central government expenditures are likely to be more procyclical than central government spending. The predictions are based on the importance of ‘voracity effects’ and on the proposition that they are systematically more pervasive if spending is financed by intergovernmental transfers. Evidence from 23 OECD countries between 1995 and 2006 indicates that sub-central government spending is more procyclical than central government expenditure.     

Capability and opportunism: Evidence from city officials in China

Opportunism is prevalent in political competition and public policy making. This paper investigates how opportunism is mitigated by capabilities among city leaders in China. Taking advantage of China’s institutional setup with ample bureaucratic transfers, the paper estimates leaders’ capabilities as their personal contributions to local economic growth. The paper finds strong evidence of political business cycles – a typical form of political opportunism – as manifested by a significant boost in the growth rate preceding the Communist Party’s national congress. However, more capable leaders are found to generate more modest political business cycles than less capable ones do. The findings suggest that, to the extent that political selections are associated with the long term reputation of officials, career-concerned opportunism is at least partially moderated by the selection of capable officials in China. The paper provides supportive evidence for the reputation model of political business cycles as well as enriches the study of government officials in weak institutional environments.     

论分税制下财政转移支付与地方财政努力差异——基于功能与地区多重分类考察的另类荷兰病分析

文章主要研究分税制下政府间转移支付与地区财政努力差异的关系.通过理论模型推导和对转移支付的实证检验发现:中国现行转移支付制度在总体上抑制了地方政府的财政努力.就区域效果而言,转移支付在促进东部发达省份财政努力的同时,抑制了中、西部落后地区的财政努力;就转移支付的功能类型而言,以税收返还为主的条件性转移支付会激励地方政府努力征税,而非条件性转移支付,包括财力性和专项转移支付将不同程度地抑制地方财政努力.这就产生了挤出效应与另类"荷兰病"的问题.     

Do formula-based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting? Evidence from Ghana

Various countries have adopted formulas for determining intergovernmental transfers as a strategy to limit the role of political considerations in resource allocation. In this paper, we investigate a formula-based system of allocating resources from a central government to local governments to determine whether the political characteristics of recipient areas have any bearing on their allocation. Specifically, we study the sharing of resources of the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) in Ghana amongst the country's district governments over the period 1994 to 2005. We find evidence that the mechanism does not eliminate politically motivated targeting of the grants. Per capita DACF grants were higher in districts where vote margins in the previous presidential election were lower, suggesting that swing districts were targeted. We find evidence that DACF formula indicators and their weighting were chosen and amended to produce politically desired patterns of transfers.     

Intergovernmental transfers and political competition measured by pivotal probability - Evidence from Hungary

I estimate the effects of political competition on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers to Hungarian municipalities between 1998 and 2006. The intergovernmental transfers were intended to finance schooling, elder care, and administrative needs in municipalities. Rather than use closeness of the dominant blocks' vote share, which is the standard measure of political competition, I instead employ (Myerson, 2000)'s pivotal probabilities, calculated at the municipality level. As a result, the number of voters, in addition to the vote difference, is taken into account when describing political competition at the municipal level. I argue that under mixed-member proportional systems, as well as under proportional systems in general, pivotal probability reflects the political reality better than closeness can. I find evidence that swing municipalities in villages are targeted and, ceteris paribus, that poorer regions receive larger transfer amounts than other areas.     

Intergovernmental grants in Russia

Two hypotheses about the determinants of Russian intergovernmental grants are tested. According to the first hypothesis, federal transfers to regions correlate with recent voting behaviour of regional electorates. The second hypothesis states that transfers are higher in regions with politically powerful governors. I find a strong confirmation for the first hypothesis and no evidence for the second hypothesis for the years 1995–99. This result is robust across specifications. However, in the years 2000–2004 electoral variables show no effect on transfers. The only significant political variable is Putin’s visits to regions.     

Municipal Finance in Poland,the Slovak Republic,the Czech Republic and Hungary: Institutional Framework and Recent Development

The recent process of political and economic transition in eastern European countries has not only contributed to the decentralisation of political structure but also significantly enhanced the fiscal autonomy of municipalities in these countries. In this context many similar types of public activities have recently been assigned to local governments, and some taxes were also declared to be local taxes. To be sure, this type of fiscal decentralisation has caused some additional problems, particularly for safeguarding the quality of publicly provided goods and services and for co-ordinating intergovernmental fiscal transfers between the central and local governments. For instance, some criticise that many small-sized municipalities in the transition economies have suffered from financial bottlenecks and have not been able to receive sufficient financial support from the central government. However, such a fiscal devolution trend appears to continue. This study primarily deals with issues surrounding the impact of national fiscal policy and the regulatory framework on local governments' expenditure behaviour and their ability to mobilise necessary revenues under the particular consideration of the institutional and administrative co-operation with the central government and of the less well-developed financial market in Poland, the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic and Hungary.     

Temporary grant programmes in Sweden and central government behaviour

The purpose of this paper is to study whether the central government in Sweden approves applications for temporary grants from municipalities according to political objectives. We also study factors that determine the municipal decision to apply for temporary grants. Two hypotheses are tested, that the central government supports municipalities with many swing voters in order to influence voters, and that the central government provides benefits to groups that share its ideology and that provide political support. Data is used from three election years 1982, 1985, and 1988. Under the Socialist governments municipalities with a high share of Socialist voters were more likely to apply for grants. The same pattern does not apply to the 1982 Conservative government. There is evidence that Socialist governments approved temporary grants on the basis of party tactical criteria. However, there is no indication of vote purchasing behaviour by the 1982 Conservative government.     

Applying a third party access model for China’s gas pipeline network: an independent pipeline operator and congestion rent transfer

This paper investigates third party access regulatory issues in China’s natural gas industry. We study the development of China’s gas market-oriented reform and how third party access becomes a pressing issue in that context. This paper aims to report stakeholders’ benefit and distributional effects during a hypothetical third party access process. To that end, we apply an oligopolistic equilibrium model, based on the mixed complementarity problem, to China’s gas pipeline network. We compare two scenarios: a scenario without third party access and the other scenario where an independent pipeline operator optimizes flows. This latter scenario aims to guarantee that the maximum social benefit is achieved. In addition, the latter scenario transfers the congestion rent to former integrated gas companies to compensate their actual loss control of the pipeline operation, in order to minimize the adverse distributional effects for pipeline companies. The solution of the model indicates that operational separation is feasible with Pareto improvement in China’s context. Moreover, it merits particular attention from policy makers in China that pipeline capacity scarcity should be properly evaluated and managed.     

Does delegation of fiscal policy to an independent agency make a difference? Evidence from intergovernmental transfers in India

One area of fiscal policy in which several countries have delegated responsibility to an independent agency is the distribution of national resource transfers across regional and local governments. Such delegation is expected to promote equity and efficiency, and mitigate distortions created by political incentives. This paper tests whether delegation to an independent agency indeed makes a difference by contrasting the impact of partisan politics on two types of fiscal transfers to states in the Indian federation over a period of time, 1972–1995. The pattern of evidence shows that, while the transfers that are determined by the central political executive are indeed distributed to favor particular states that are politically important for the central ruling party, the transfers that are delegated to an independent agency serve to constrain such partisan impact.     

The Effect of Political Alignment on Transfers to Portuguese Municipalities

I investigate if political alignment between central and local governments brings financial benefit to local governments, using financial data from Portuguese municipalities (1992–2005). I use regression discontinuity design to determine the effect of political alignment per se on transfers to municipalities. Municipalities aligned with the central government receive 19% more targetable transfers than unaligned municipalities. I test for electoral motivation of this transfer bias: extra transfers increase the vote share of incumbents in local elections for one of the two Portuguese major parties; however, municipal incumbency does not lead to better results in national elections.     

政治关联、慈善捐赠与政府补助*--来自中国亏损上市公司的经验证据

文章以2009－2012年中国亏损上市公司作为研究样本,运用社会网络理论,分析和检验了高管的政治关联对亏损企业通过慈善捐赠行为获得政府补助的影响。研究结果表明：第一,有政治关联的亏损企业比无政治关联的亏损企业更容易出于获取政府支持而进行慈善捐赠,高管的政治关联广度相对于其政治关联深度对亏损企业慈善捐赠的正向影响更大,同时高管的地方政治关联相对于其中央政治关联对亏损企业慈善捐赠的正向影响也更大;第二,基于“利益互惠”的原则以及对企业积极履行社会责任的鼓励,政府通常会倾向于对进行慈善捐赠的企业给予更多的补助;第三,相对于无政治关联的亏损企业,有政治关联的亏损企业的慈善捐赠能够帮助其获得更多的政府补助,相对于中央政治关联,地方政治关联对亏损企业通过慈善捐赠获得政府补助的“支持效应”更加明显,同时政治关联广度更宽的亏损企业也通过慈善捐赠获得了更多的政府补助。文章的研究结论深化了对中国亏损上市公司慈善捐赠的动机及其经济后果的认识,为相关部门规范企业慈善行为也提供了有益的启示。     

Power struggle and pork barrel politics in authoritarian countries: Evidence from China

This paper examines how power struggle among cliques within ruling parties shape public policies. We develop a simple model of bargaining among ruling elites to study government staffing and use it to explain why the number of subnational government staff in China has increased rapidly despite repeated government streamlining programs initiated by the central authority. Using provincial‐level panel data in China from 1992 to 2011, we show that the subnational government headed by a politically weaker party secretary, in terms of the size of the opposition of elites in the provincial standing committee, tends to have a larger number of senior cadres and public employees. Notably, the party secretary's power from the centre mitigates the tendency to expand government staff. We also provide suggestive evidence that the local government finances government expansion by selling more land.     

企业家社会资本与企业并购的关系研究

随着市场体制的不断完善,中国企业并购的潜力被释放,由于企业家是并购决策的主要发起者与领导者,企业家社会网络对并购也会产生影响,这在转型经济的中国尤为突出.基于627家中国上市公司研究企业家社会资本与企业并购之间的关系.结果显示:行业内、外的企业家社会资本分别与行业内并购、多元化并购正相关的假设得到部分支持.企业家与地方政府的政治关联对于企业的省内并购、企业家与中央政府的政治关联对省外并购均具有正向影响.     

Revenue decentralization,central oversight and the political budget cycle: Evidence from Israel

This paper examines whether revenue decentralization and direct external financial supervision affect the incidence and strength of political budget cycles, using a panel of Israeli municipalities during the period 1999–2009. We find that high dependence on central government transfers – as reflected in a low share of locally raised revenues in the municipality's budget – exacerbates political budget cycles, while tight monitoring – exercised through central government appointment of external accountants to debt accumulating municipalities – eliminates them. We also find that this pattern is predominantly accounted for by development expenditures. These results suggest that political budget cycles can result from fiscal institutions that create soft budget constraints: that is, where incumbents and rational voters can expect that the costs of pre-election expansions will be partly covered later by the central government.     

Political Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants: Evidence From Argentina

This paper explores the determinants of federal grants allocation across provincial states in Argentina. Our analysis suggests that the redistributive pattern implicit in the federal system of intergovernmental grants cannot be explained on normative grounds exclusively. In order to understand the rationale behind federal grants distribution, a positive approach could render better results. Specifically, we claim that the distribution of federal grants could be associated with political variables such as the political representation of jurisdictions at Congress. The econometric analysis suggests that the significant disparity observed in the per capita representation across different provinces is an important factor explaining the allocation of those transfers. In this respect, overrepresented provinces, both at the senate and at the lower chamber, have received, on average, higher resources from the national government compared to more populous and less represented states. These results are consistent with those observed in other countries.     

Sovereign default risk and decentralization: Evidence for emerging markets

We study the impact of decentralization on sovereign default risk. Theory predicts that decentralization deteriorates fiscal discipline since subnational governments undertax/overspend, anticipating that, in the case of overindebtedness, the federal government will bail them out. We analyze whether investors account for this common pool problem by attaching higher sovereign yield spreads to more decentralized countries. Using panel data on up to 30 emerging markets in the period 1993–2008 we confirm this hypothesis. Higher levels of fiscal and political decentralization increase sovereign default risk. Moreover, higher levels of intergovernmental transfers and a larger number of veto players aggravate the common pool problem.     

Revisiting the redistribution effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: evidence from Taiwan

This paper employs a panel of 23 local governments in Taiwan over 1998–2010 to re-estimate the redistribution effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers by considering a self-financing resources of local government as the transition variable in panel smooth transition regression models. Empirical results show that the income (or tax revenues) redistribution effects of fiscal transfer policies are nonlinear and vary with time and across local governments. The grants from central government can improve income and tax revenues distribution of local governments; however, the centrally allotted tax revenues have inverse effects and the total fiscal transfers have ambiguous effects. The total fiscal transfer is a proper policy instrument for improving income redistribution, and the grants for improving tax revenues redistribution. However, high self-financing resources ratios are harmful for these redistribution effects.     

Electoral competition with environmental policy as a second best transfer

This paper explains why some governments fail to adopt policies that are sufficiently strong, while others adopt policies that are too stringent. Constructing a political economy model in which voters face uncertainty due to the types of politicians and the risk of environmental damage, we show that there is an equilibrium in which a politician uses a weaker environmental policy rather than efficient direct transfers for redistribution. We also show that there is an equilibrium in which a stricter environmental policy can be implemented by a politician who has no incentive to make transfers. Then, we discuss which equilibrium should be more plausible. We conclude that the latter equilibrium in which a too stringent environmental policy emerges can dominate the former unless the citizen’s estimate of environmental risk is sufficiently low.     

Electoral goals and center-state transfers: A theoretical model and empirical evidence from India

We construct a model of redistributive politics where the central government is opportunistic and uses its discretion to make transfers to state governments on the basis of political considerations. These considerations are the alignment between the incumbent parties at the central and state levels and whether a state is a swing state or not. A testable prediction from the model is that a state that is both swing and aligned with the central government is especially likely to receive higher transfers. We test this prediction using Indian data for 14 states from 1974–75 to 1996–97. We find that a state which is both aligned and swing in the last state election is estimated to receive 16% higher transfers than a state which is unaligned and non-swing.