Schooling choices: Preferences, discount rates, and rates of return

This paper develops an empirical model to identify the structural parameters of schooling preferences and human capital production. Our model distinguishes between consumption and investment motives with regard to schooling. The results show that both motives matter. Preferences for schooling vary with social background and ability. Children from poorer social backgrounds and of lower ability have a lower preference for schooling. The discount rate that enters the net value of lifetime income varies with social background as well. The marginal rate of return to schooling decreases with ability and schooling. On average the marginal rate of return is 7.3 per cent, which can be contrasted with a `Mincerian' rate of return equal to 4.8 per cent. This indicates that the usual OLS estimate underestimates the true rate of return. First version received: November 1997/Final version received: February 1999     

The Marglin-McFadden-Mishan debate on public investment criteria: Some Clarifications

This paper reviews the post 1963 debate on public investment criteria stemming largely from Marglin's work. At issue here, are the two main propositions of Marglin, namely, that the social marginal rate of time preference is the appropriate social rate of discount (SRD) for public projects, and that the social opportunity cost (SOC) of capital raised to facilitate public investment is, in general, in excess of the money cost of such investment. Both supported and challenged by different writers, this debate does not provide any clear consensus as to the current status of these propositions. The central purpose of this paper is to put the series of apparent claims and counterclaims found in the literature to an analytical test, and draw the appropriate conclusions. This we do by explicitly considering the technology, fiscal policy and savings reinvestment behavior in a simple model of maximizing the present discounted value of the marginal net consumption stream generated by the public project. We argue that given Marglin's assumptions, the criterion that the marginal social rate of time preference be the SRD is valid as has already been demonstrated by Diamond (1968) and McFadden (1972). His other conclusion that the SOC should generally exceed unit v is seen to be correct only in special cases.     

Pareto optimal redistribution and private charity

When private charity exists and is motivated by utility interdependence a non-Pareto optimal outcome, the ‘free-rider’ problem, typically arises. Nevertheless, incremental fiscal redistribution cannot achieve a Paretian welfare improvement so long as private charity continues at positive levels. Donors respond to incremental fiscal redistribution by reducing their voluntary contributions by exactly a dollar for every dollar transferred in this way. No net transfer is achieved unless incremental fiscal redistribution is pursued to the point where private contributions have been driven to zero. Alternatively, a net transfer may be achieved by fiscal measures which affect donors' marginal incentives to donate.     

关中地区清洁能源供暖方案的经济环境效益研究

使用清洁能源进行供暖,对关中地区治污减霾、改善能源结构具有积极的意义,但关于关中地区清洁能源供暖经济效益的研究鲜有报道。根据关中地区的供暖需求,论文制定了煤改电、煤改气和浅层地热能三种清洁能源供暖方案,构建了办公建筑、商业建筑和居住建筑三类典型模型,计算了这三类模型使用煤改电、煤改气和浅层地热能方案的投资、成本、净现值、内部收益率及投资回收期。浅层地热能方案净现值最大,盈利总量最大,其次为煤改电方案,最后为煤改气方案。煤改电方案内部收益率最高,煤改气方案最低,但对比差额投资内部收益率,浅层地热能供暖方案优于煤改电方案,煤改电方案优于煤改气方案。根据模型参数,评价了不同方案的污染物排放量和节能性,浅层地热能方案节能性最优,煤改电次之,煤改气较差。论文旨在为推动陕西省清洁能源事业的科学、有序发展提供理论依据。     

货币时间价值在投资决策中的应用

货币时间价值的客观存在不仅在理论界得到了公认,而且其产生的作用时刻影响着人们的日常经济生活。不管是企业的项目投资,还是个人的理财投资,都不可忽视货币时间价值。在进行方案抉择的时候,要优先选用包含货币时间价值的动态指标(净现值、获利指数和内涵报酬率)进行评价,选择最优方案,做出科学的投资决策。企业和个人要牢固树立货币时间价值观念,利用它为企业和个人决策服务,促进企业和个人合理利用有限资金,创造更高的效益。     

Regulation of common property resources under private information about resource externalities

Optimal marginal investment incentives and optimal entry regulations are developed for a case where heterogeneous firms exploit a common property natural resource. The government’s objectives are to correct for resource externalities and to tax away the resource rent. Both individual output and efficiency levels are subject to private information, i.e. it is a model with multi-agency, externalities, and countervailing incentives. There are asymmetric information about the net revenue of the firm and the size of the resource externalities that the firm inflicts on the other firms in the industry. The latter implies that external effects are present both in the firms’ net incomes and in the information rents.     

The gender difference in wages and the returns to schooling over the great recession in the U.S.

This paper examines the effects of the Great Recession on the gender difference in hourly wage and the rate of return to schooling in the United States. Using data from American Community Survey 2000–2015, we find that the male-female difference in hourly wage declined during and after the recession. The Great Recession decreased earnings for both men and women, especially for those with more education. We also find there is a significant gender difference in the effects of the Great Recession on the returns to schooling. The Great Recession increased the rate of return to schooling for both men and women, and the female-male difference in the returns to schooling decreased by 0.4 percentage points in the post-recession period. The change of the gender difference in the returns to schooling can be explained by the wage structure change for men and women over the recession.     

Corporate taxation and the optimal investment decisions of firms

The effects of a corporate profits tax on the choice of technique depends on the criterion used to make this choice. Harberger concluded that it would alter the optimal techniques because he was implicitly assuming that firms try to maximise the internal rate of return on their investment. Stiglitz, using the maximisation of present value criterion, with a rate of interest lower than the rate of profits, concluded that the optimal techniques would not be affected by this tax. The appropriate criterion depends on the assumptions made about the scope for entrepreneurial activity and its relation to capital.     

Multi-unit auctions with private information: an indivisible unit continuous price model

We construct a model of multi-unit auctions in which I bidders bid for two indivisible units of a common value good. Using a first-order approach, we find that there are equilibria in which bidders bid the same price for both units in the discriminatory auction, but not in the uniform auction. When there are only two bidders, under certain conditions, there are linear equilibria for both the discriminatory and the uniform auction formats. In all equilibria, bidders equalize the expected marginal benefit of bidding to the marginal costs of bidding. We show that comparison of the seller??s expected revenue across auction formats depends only on the ratio of the precision of private information to the precision of public information.     

The role of private benefits in information acquisition

In many cases, the cost of hiring an agent to acquire information is lower than the cost for the principal to perform that task. However, because of a difference in preferences between the principal and the agent, the principal often cannot fully utilize the agent’s expertise. This paper considers the cost of motivating the agent to acquire information and inducing him to report truthfully. The larger the private benefit, the greater is the cost of eliciting true information. At the same time, a private benefit may reduce the cost of motivating information acquisition. Thus, there are cases in which an agent with a different preference is desirable.     

Training and employee mobility in the British private and public sectors

The realization of the value of training for employees can take time as the training contributes dynamically to an extended development process. This research examines the empirical returns to training in three post-training situations: when the employee remains in the same job and with the same employer; when the employee transfers to a different job but remains with the same employer (internal mobility); and when the employee moves to a different employer (external mobility). Panel data and fixed effects (FE) methodology are used to quantify the joint effects of in-job training and mobility, while minimizing the potentially biasing effect of unobserved ability. In a period when public sector employment in Britain was contracting sharply, the short-term returns to training are nonetheless greater in the public sector, while the medium-term returns for both public sector and private sector employees depend on remaining within sector. The general/specific training mix, institutional influences, adverse selection, and the concept of ‘transferable’ training, all contribute to interpretation.     

Privatization when the public firm is as efficient as private firms

The literature on mixed oligopoly shows that when production costs are quadratic the public firm is privatized if the competition in the product market is high enough. Similarly, when the public firm is less efficient than private firms and the marginal costs of production are constant, the government privatizes the public firm if its efficiency is low enough. In this paper we analyze this issue assuming that the public firm maximizes the weighted sum of consumer surplus, private profit and the profit of the public firm. If all firms have the same marginal cost of production we obtain that for some value of parameters the government does not privatize the public firm regardless of how many private firms are competing in the product market. We also obtain that the consumer surplus can be lower in the mixed oligopoly than in the private oligopoly.     

Optimal climate and fiscal policy in an OLG economy

This paper develops a climate–economy model to study the joint design of optimal climate and fiscal policies in economies with overlapping generations (OLGs). I demonstrate how capital taxation, if optimal, drives a wedge between the market costs of carbon (the net present value of marginal damages using the market interest rate) and the Pigouvian tax (the net present value of marginal damages using the consumption discount rate of successive OLGs). In contrast to deterministic infinitely lived representative agent models, at the optimum, the capital income tax is positive, the carbon price equals the market costs of carbon but it falls short of the Pigouvian tax when (i) preferences are not separable over consumption and leisure; and (ii) labor income taxes cannot be age-dependent. I also show that restrictions on climate change policy provide a novel rationale for positive capital income taxes.     

The impact of technology and trade upon the returns to education and occupation

This paper considers how technological change and globalization has influenced the return to education and occupation in Great Britain over the period 1973 to 1994. A number of papers in the literature have documented increasing demand for individuals who possess higher skill endowments than their peers. Both education and occupation can be interpreted as an individual's observable skills and how technology and trade have actually influenced returns to different educational and occupational levels is something that has not been investigated in Great Britain. For the empirical analysis estimates are based upon pooled cross sections over time and also pseudo panel techniques to control for unobservable heterogeneity.     

Public investment,the rate of return,and optimal fiscal policy in a stochastically growing economy

This study examines the optimal fiscal policy in a stochastic endogenous growth model with private and public capital. The government is willing to actualize a socially optimal equilibrium using a lump-sum tax and government debt linked to public investments, subject to the budget constraint under the golden rule of public finance. A socially optimal fiscal policy states that a deterministic rate of return on government bonds sets the marginal product of public capital. Moreover, public investments optimally adjust the ratio of private capital to public capital to equate the rates of return on such capital. The presence of stochastic disturbances results in a disparity between the optimal marginal products of the two types of capital, as reported in previous empirical studies. This disparity significantly affects the socially optimal growth rate in response to investment risk.     

An empirical examination of long-run purchasing power parity as theory of international commodity arbitrage

An empirical analysis of long-run purchasing power parity (PPP) as a theory of international commodity arbitrage between UK and US prices and the sterling/US dollar exchange rate for the period 1975–1980 is presented. Econometric techniques concerning the cointegration of economic time series are applied to a sample of 35 manufactured commodities which in 1977 constituted approximately a quarter of the net output of all manufacturing industry in Great Britain. Our results are extremely unfavourable to the PPP hypothesis as a stable long-run proportionality between exchange rates and disaggregated prices.     

Taxes versus quotas in lobbying by a polluting industry with private information on abatement costs

We present a model of lobbying by a polluting industry with private information on pollution abatement costs and compare taxes with quotas under such conditions. We also examine the effect of private information on lobbying activity and social welfare under these two instruments. It is found that private information might improve social welfare under taxes when the government has little concern for social welfare, whereas private information does not improve social welfare under quotas. Quotas are generally socially preferred when the slope of marginal abatement costs is steeper than that of marginal damage or when the government does not concern itself with social welfare. However, private information reduces the comparative disadvantage of taxes compared to quotas when the government has little concern for social welfare. Finally, the results of numerical examples suggest that quotas are employed rather than taxes if the difference in natural emission levels between high- and low-cost industries is large.     

Attracting private investment: Tax reduction,investment subsidy,or both?

This paper uses a real-option model to examine the net benefit to a government from using tax cut and/or investment subsidy as incentives to induce immediate investment. Although earlier papers generally concluded that investment subsidy dominates tax cut, it is observed that many governments use a combination of subsidy and tax cut. We show that, when the government uses a different discount rate from private firms, and when it has to borrow money to provide an investment subsidy, it is possible to get an internal optimum; that is, it might be optimal for the government to provide an investment subsidy as well as charge a positive tax rate on the profits from the project. Thus, we provide an explanation for the puzzling fact that many governments provide an investment subsidy to a firm while simultaneously taxing its profits.     

Self-fulfilling patience

This paper explores macroeconomic implications of investment in patience in a standard neoclassical growth model with Becker-Mulligan endogenous time preferences. The endogenous discount rate acts as a new margin for inter-temporal decisions, in addition to the standard margin that hinges on the marginal return of capital. This time preference margin alters the equilibrium dynamics and stability of the neoclassical growth model substantially. When the discount rate is positive, there may exist multiple steady states that are either saddle-point stable or unstable. When the discount rate is negative, the unique steady state is locally indeterminate due to self-fulfilling patience investment. Interestingly, the existence of the local indeterminacy does not need any externality. When the discount rate is zero, various types of bifurcations can happen, leading to rich equilibrium dynamics such as limit cycles and chaos. We show that opening up the closed economy can cause aggregate instability.     

The tax advantage of public firms over private firms in the German household solid waste disposal industry

We measure the tax advantage of public firms over private firms, which operate at municipality level in the German household solid waste disposal industry. Public firms with sovereign duties pay no taxes, but equivalent private firms have to. In a simple risk-free setting, we develop a measure of the percentage difference of the charges of both types of firms demanded under their respective tax treatments. We model a cost-covering public firm and a net present value maximizing private firm. For sensible model parameters from the German waste disposal industry the private firm has to demand an about 16% to 18% higher charge. The by far biggest impact on the measure has the value added tax, with revenues as a much larger tax base than profits. Tax savings, which directly affect pre-tax profits, only alleviate the disadvantage bit. There is some evidence that at least one type of private firms—that is, private law firms that are also majority privately owned, are productive enough to overcome the tax advantage of public firms and be able to charge a lower price than public firms.