发审委员隐性问责机制研究 :兼论对 IPO 注册制的启示

IPO核准制中发审委员是否会因其审核的质量而被证监会问责?文章运用2006-2012年中国 A 股市场审核发行的新股数据发现 ,在发审会的7名发审委员中,未达到最大可能任期就被撤换的人数与公司上市当年发生业绩变脸的概率之间显著正相关.这表明证监会知晓发审委员的审核质量,但并没有对审核质量不佳的"问题"发审委员进行公开问责,而是代之以隐性问责 ,即在发审委换届时将其撤换.这一发现支持了 IPO注册制中将审核权下放到交易所从而提升监管独立性的举措 ,也为注册制中聆讯委员会制度的建设提供了启示.文章认为,披露更多的审核信息 ,增加对审核人员的奖惩力度,是提升 IPO审核有效性的途径.     

市场势力测度与影响因素分析-基于我国化学药品制造业研究

如何提高投资者法律保护的执法效率是近年来财务学研究的热点问题,也是资本市场能否健康有序发展的一个关键因素.本文以2000--2010年沪深两市因违规受到处罚的A股上市公司为样本,从处罚公告前监管部门的查处及时性、处罚公告前后高管被迫离职、处罚公告时的市场反应三个维度,深入考察政治关联是否影响中小投资者法律保护的执法有效性.研究发现:(1)监管部门对政治关联公司的违规查处存在时滞效应,其惩处周期显著长于无政治关联公司;(2)在处罚公告前一年和后一年,政治关联公司高管的被迫离职率均显著低于无政治关联公司;(3)违规处罚公告时,政治关联公司的负向市场反应大于非政治关联公司,且这种现象主要表现在国有样本里.这说明,政治关联会削弱中小投资者法律保护的执法效率,且"违规查处及时性"和"高管变更"是两种重要的影响路径.     

中国上市公司国有股权对技术创新方式的影响

本文通过挖掘中国5个行业541家上市公司2000～2005年的数据,探讨了在转型经济背景下我国企业国有股权的制度特点;分析了国有股权对企业创新方式的影响,得出了国有股权主导的企业倾向于内部创新的结论。     

审计行业监管有效性研究——基于证监会处罚公告后事务所策略选择的经验证据

随着近年来审计失败案件的频发,政府对审计行业监管的作用越来越受到关注.文章基于证监会行政处罚公告,对受罚事务所与上市公司客户进行配对,研究了处罚公告对受罚事务所与未受罚事务所声誉及审计质量的影响.研究发现,受罚事务所在处罚公告后进行了声誉重塑行为,审计质量得到改善;未受罚事务所在处罚公告后保持原有审计标准,公告前后审计质量无显著变化.而处罚公告后,受罚事务所的审计质量显著高于未受罚事务所,表明证监会的监管改善了行业的审计质量.文章为证监会行政处罚的有效性提供了更多的经验证据,并证实了声誉机制对注册会计师的约束作用;研究结果对证监会、中注协、财政部等监管部门具有借鉴意义,对上市公司与会计师事务所签订审计合约也有非常重要的参考作用.     

Do political connections decrease the accuracy of stock analysts' recommendations in the Chinese stock market?

This paper studies the association between the accuracy of analysts' recommendations and political connections in the Chinese stock market. As most brokerage firms in China are state-owned, it raises concerns about conflicts of interest among their employed analysts issuing recommendations for Chinese state-owned enterprises. Based on 8469 analysts' recommendations with different ratings for both state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises from 74 brokerage firms, we document that analysts' recommendations are less accurate for Chinese state-owned enterprises, which supports the hypothesis that conflicts of interest create recommendation biases. Political connections encourage analysts to be more optimistic on SOEs and even to generate misleading “Buy” and “Hold” recommendations. Our results demonstrate the existence of an optimism bias among politically connected analysts on state-owned enterprises in China.     

董事来源地特征、政治关联等级与公司价值*——基于“18号文”董事政策性辞职的经验证据

董事政治关联对于公司价值的影响一直是学者们关注的重要问题。中组部2013年10月30日发布了《关于进一步规范党政干部在企业兼职（任职）问题的意见》（以下简称“18号文”）,禁止现任及尚未办理离职手续的政府官员在企业兼职任职。基于此,本文以2013年10月30日-2014年10月30日期间我国股市所有辞职董事为样本,研究了董事政治关联等级与公司价值的关系,以及该关系受到的董事来源地特征的影响。本文发现：（1）董事政治关联等级越高,辞职引发的公司价值的下跌程度越显著;（2）考虑辞职董事来源地特征后发现,异地董事、京城董事或者异地且京城的董事辞职后,其政治关联等级对公司价值下跌的影响更显著。进一步分析表明,“18号文”公布时也有显著的市场反应,表现为聘有政治关联董事的公司价值下跌更明显。本文研究表明,聘任政治关联等级较高的董事,特别是异地或权力中心的董事,是公司建立政治联系、影响公司价值的重要途径。     

中国股票市场再融资监管规则变迁的制度经济分析

中国证监会一直试图通过再融资规则的改变来调控上市公司行为，实现市场的有序发展。配股、增发以及可转换债券等途径的创设及其准入门槛的“宽紧”调整成为中国再融资监管的核心。以额度分配为核心的证券发行制度决定了1999年之前的再融资监管规则的整体架构，而当核准制实施后，市场化规则的引入尽管强化了外部约束，但股权分置制度的存在一度使再融资监管陷入困境。当股权分置改革初步完成后，危机驱动的信贷扩张迫使监管当局重新设计再融资监管架构，在净资产收益率要求基础上引入了现金股利分配要求。中国现行再融资规则带有明显的过渡性，应在未来重新定位。     

监管存在“扶贫效应”吗*——基于我国上市公司处罚事件的研究

本文以我国2001—2015年被中国证监会及其下属证监局处罚的上市公司为样本，研究了我国证券市场监管是否存在“扶贫效应”。研究发现，违规企业所在地区的经济发展水平越低，它们受到的处罚程度越轻，即监管机构会相对弱化对落后地区上市公司的监管力度。这表明我国证券市场监管可能存在“扶贫效应”。并且，与行政处罚相比，非行政处罚性监管措施更容易成为监管“扶贫”的手段。在控制了内生性问题后，上述结论仍然成立。本文以我国上市公司为例，初步揭示了监管“扶贫效应”的存在性，丰富了选择性执法领域的研究。同时，本文的分析框架和研究结论对于我国深化多层次证券市场改革具有重要的参考价值。     

监管存在“扶贫效应”吗——基于我国上市公司处罚事件的研究

本文以我国2001—2015年被中国证监会及其下属证监局处罚的上市公司为样本,研究了我国证券市场监管是否存在"扶贫效应"。研究发现,违规企业所在地区的经济发展水平越低,它们受到的处罚程度越轻,即监管机构会相对弱化对落后地区上市公司的监管力度。这表明我国证券市场监管可能存在"扶贫效应"。并且,与行政处罚相比,非行政处罚性监管措施更容易成为监管"扶贫"的手段。在控制了内生性问题后,上述结论仍然成立。本文以我国上市公司为例,初步揭示了监管"扶贫效应"的存在性,丰富了选择性执法领域的研究。同时,本文的分析框架和研究结论对于我国深化多层次证券市场改革具有重要的参考价值。     

我国股票发行制度变迁及若干思考

股票发行是资本市场的核心环节之一。本文从制度变迁的角度考察了我国股票市场发展的特定背景,总结分析了股票发行制度从额度制到核准制的演变、相关制度的特点、利弊及其市场化改革的成效。研究发现,我国转轨经济环境、市场文化和市场流动性问题是进一步改革股票发行制度需要重点考虑的因素。     

会计师事务所受监管部门处罚的因素分析——来自中国资本市场审计监管的经验证据

通过研究中国证监会的审计监管行为,文章发现客户质量和事务所专业性是影响会计师事务所是否受到证监会处罚的重要因素。事务所审计客户的平均盈利水平越高,应收账款的水平越低,事务所被证监会处罚的概率就越小。事务所业务的行业集中度越高,被证监会处罚的概率也越低。上述发现在剔除了四大会计师事务所之后仍然存在,而且不随变量度量方式的变化而改变,也不随证监会监管体制的变化而改变。     

Political connections and corporate performance: Evidence from Pakistan

This study seeks to understand how political connections affect firm performance. Using a hand‐collected dataset of Pakistani firms from 2008–2014, our firm fixed effects and Heckman two‐stage regression results show that connected firms outperform those without political ties. Moreover, we show channels through which political benefits are realized in terms of greater access to debt, lower financing costs and lower tax rates. These benefits are found to be particularly large when firms are connected to politicians who held political positions most recently and firms connected through their owners. Finally, we do not find evidence for differences in political favours across regulated and unregulated industries.     

政治关联与社会责任:自觉回馈还是战略选择

以我国化工行业上市公司为样本,手工收集关键高管的代表委员类和政府官员类政治关联的数据,实证检验不同政治关联方式对企业社会责任整体及其各维度的影响。结果表明,代表委员类政治关联能提高企业社会责任的整体表现,而政府官员类政治关联对其影响并不显著。进一步研究发现,代表委员类政治关联能提高股东责任、债权人责任和公众责任,但对政府责任、员工责任没有显著影响;政府官员类政治关联,除政府责任外,对企业其他维度的社会责任没有显著影响。政治关联企业承担社会责任过程中具有战略选择现象,政府部门应加强对政治关联企业的监管。     

独立审计社会信用奖惩机制效应实证分析

以商务部公布的会计信息质量检查公告及证监会处罚公告检查结果作为研究背景,选取2003—2012年会计师事务所的客户量及综合收入为研究数据,从激励和惩罚两个机制对数据进行实证研究,并从信息论、监督论和保险论3个方面描述了独立审计的功能。通过市场整体对被处罚会计师事务所的反应情况得出结论,认为在我国资本市场中,独立审计社会信用惩罚机制发挥着有效与失效并存的作用。     

Political Connectedness and Firm Performance: Evidence from Germany

Abstract. This paper investigates politically connected firms in Germany. With the introduction of a new transparency law in 2007, information on additional income sources for all members of the German parliament became publicly available. We find that members of the conservative party (CDU/CSU) and the liberal party (FDP) are more likely to work for firms than members of left‐wing parties (SPD and The Left) or the green party (Alliance 90/The Greens). Politically connected firms are larger, less risky and have lower market valuations than unconnected firms. They also have fewer growth opportunities, but slightly better accounting performance. On the stock market, connected firms significantly outperformed unconnected firms in 2006, i.e. before the publication of the data on political connections. Differences in stock market performance were much smaller in 2007.     

Market risk disclosures,corporate governance structure and political connections: evidence from GCC firms

This paper investigates the joint effect of political connections, in the form of the royal family member on board, and corporate governance on the market risk disclosures of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) financial firms from 2007 to 2011. Previous research suggest that politically connected firms reduce the level of transparency in the GCC. However, we find that better corporate governance improves transparency and can be used as an effective tool in curbing the potentially adverse impact of politically connected board members on firms’ transparency. Our results have important implications for policy makers and can be generalized to other emerging markets.     

Political Connections,Government Regulations and Risk-Taking — Evidence From China

Sufficient evidence suggests that enterprises under strong government regulations suffer the economic effects of political connections, which not only leads to competitive disadvantages and loss of innovation, but also less willingness to take risks. This paper explores the relationship between political connections and corporate risk-taking behavior in corporate governance. Specifically, in 2008, the Chinese government announced new policies to regulate government officials concurrently holding the positions of independent directors in firms. We sample publicly listed firms in the Chinese A-share market over the period of 2005–2010 and investigate changes in risk-taking behavior due to the new policies. Our findings indicate that a reduction in politically connected independent directors may encourage risk-taking behavior subject to the factors of state ownership, industry regulations, local government control, and corporate characteristics.     

政治关联与企业的契约实施环境

本文基于世界银行2003年和2005年的调查数据,对不同所有制企业的契约实施环境进行了比较。研究发现,民营企业的契约实施环境显著差于其他所有制类型的企业。在此基础上,我们进一步考察了政治关联对企业契约实施环境的影响。实证结果表明:(1)与掌握实权的政府官员建立政治联系能够改善民营企业的契约实施环境,而且这些官员的地位越高,其影响越显著;(2)政治关联是否能够改善企业的契约实施环境与官员的类型有关,如果官员属于"帮助企业发展"类型的,则与此类官员的政治关联能够改善企业在本省和外省的契约实施环境;(3)董事会中有政府官员以及总经理是由政府任命不利于企业契约的实施环境的改善;(4)随着法律制度的不断完善和市场化进程的推进,各类政治关联对企业契约实施环境的积极作用正在被其消极作用所抵消。因此,消除阻碍民营企业发展的各种制度和政策障碍仍然是推动民营企业发展的根本之道。     

Dimensions of international expansions by US firms to China: Wealth effects,mode selection,and firm-specific factors

China's recent efforts to attract foreign investment have been viewed favorably by US firms, who have explored a variety of strategies for expanding to China. This paper provides evidence related to a comprehensive set of strategies used by US firms to expand to China. For the 302 announcements of expansion by US firms into the Chinese market, several firm-specific factors are found to affect both the choice of mode entry and the reaction of investors to the announcement of the expansion. The results suggest that firms with a high investment in proprietary assets prefer foreign direct investment (FDI) modes to non-FDI modes, as do firms with high levels of geographic diversification. Firms entering the Chinese market utilize non-FDI modes, while those who have established a presence in China prefer FDI modes. The reaction of the stock market to expansions to China is positive; average excess returns of 0.75% are observed for the two days surrounding the announcement. Both FDI and non-FDI categories of expansion have statistically significant excess returns. Analysis by mode of expansion shows that expansions through joint ventures (JVs) and contracts are the most desirable alternatives. Other modes of expansion do not result in significant excess returns. Finally, a firm's prior financial performance has a significant influence on its ability to profitably expand to China.     

内部控制在增发融资中的作用：中国的证据*

本文基于中国特有的融资环境,考察内部控制在增发融资中的作用以及受到政府监管的影响。本文对于2008—2011年提出增发申请的上市公司进行研究发现,由于公开增发比定向增发受到的监管更加严格,选择公开增发申请的公司偏少,但是其内部控制质量普遍高于选择定向增发申请的公司。然而,高质量的内部控制并没有提高公开增发申请的证监会审核通过率,而是提高了定向增发申请的审核通过率。并且,在增发申请方式的选择上,内部控制质量高的公司倾向于选择公开增发的方式。最后,高质量的内部控制提高了定向增发后的经营业绩。这表明,尽管受到政府监管的差异化影响,内部控制在公司增发融资中仍然扮演着积极的作用。