THE TRANSITION TO EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION AND THE EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTITUTE

The European Monetary Institute (EMI) will prepare a framework for European Monetary Union (EMU) monetary policy during the transition to the EMU. This involves a trade-off between deepening financial market integration and harmonizing central bank instruments, a choice between centralized and decentralized monetary strategies with significant welfare implications, and a trade-off between expected welfare and certainty of policy outcomes. As a result of being dominated by national central bankers and of the conflict between the core and the periphery of the European Community (EC), the EMI is biased toward an inefficient solution. Enlargement of the EC by the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) group would raise the probability of a more efficient, two-track EMU, which initially would involve only the core group.     

The Intertemporal Equilibrium Modeling of Intra-EMU and Global Trade Imbalances

The intertemporal equilibrium approach to current accounts analyzed the impacts of respective intra-European Monetary Union (intra-EMU) and Asian-U.S. financial integration between 1999 and 2007 on the intra-EMU current account and global trade imbalances. Moreover, Farmer and Ban (2014) find in a three-country, two-region overlapping generations model that financial integration between both the EMU core and periphery and between Asia and the U.S. induce trade surpluses in the EMU core and Asia, while in the EMU periphery and in the U.S., trade balances become negative when the global economy is dynamically inefficient. In this paper, we first show that in a numerically specified Farmer-Ban model, steady-state trade balance to gross domestic product ratios are too low compared to the empirically observed counterparts. We suggest avenues to ameliorate this problem.     

Macroeconomic Consequences of the EMU

European Monetary Union was sold to the German public on the claim that the common currency would make the European economy stronger and that this would yield significant welfare gains. Such claims are commonly based on three propositions. (1) The common currency will be a strong international currency and the real appreciation of the euro against other currencies will make the EMU citizens richer. (2) The common currency will change labor market relations and increase labor market flexibility, and this will reduce the high rate of structural unemployment in Europe. (3) The common currency will create competition among the governments in the dimension of regulatory and tax policies and induce governments to undertake structural reforms which are long overdue, and this will set the EMU economy on a higher growth path.In this paper we discuss these three claims. We agree with the basic ideas of each of them. But the suggested result of a stronger EMU economy remains questionable. The euro may lead to more or to less labor market inflexibility, and competition among governments in the EMU has a high and a low-regulation equilibrium. Where the euro takes the European economy depends largely on the political willingness to engage in reforms.     

The price of the euro: evidence from sovereign debt markets

The objective of this article is to ascertain how the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe has affected its members’ long-term government bond yields. In order to estimate the effect, this article utilizes a synthetic control approach. The main finding is that the majority of the member countries did not receive economic gains from the EMU in sovereign debt markets. Synthetic counterfactual analysis finds strong evidence that Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and the Netherlands have paid a positive and substantial euro-premium in their 10-year government bonds since the adoption of the single currency. After the most recent financial crisis, government bond yields have been higher in all member countries compared to the situation that would have occurred without the monetary unification. This article concludes that from the viewpoint of sovereign borrowing, it would be beneficial for a country to maintain its own currency and monetary policy.     

External Influences on Business Cycle Synchronization in the Euro Area

Most studies of business cycle synchronization in the EMU identify a core set of counties with high synchronization and a periphery set of countries with low synchronization. Using a structural VAR with model uncertainty, we identify spillover effects from shocks that originate in the United States, the EMU, and the rest of the world to test whether external influences can explain the existence of the core and periphery. Most countries typically found in the core respond to external spillovers in similar ways, leading to more synchronized business cycles. The response to external influences in the countries traditionally found in the periphery, on the other hand, help explain their exclusion from the core.     

Optimal Currency Areas Scottish Economic Society/Royal Bank of Scotland Annual Lecture, 1999

Microeconomic efficiency and market transparency argue in favour of UK membership in EMU and for Scotland’s membership in the UK monetary union and also in EMU. UK seigniorage (government revenues from money issuance) would be boosted by EMU membership. Lender of last resort arrangements would not be substantially affected by UK membership in EMU. The UK is too small and too open to be an optimal currency area. The same point applies even more emphatically to Scotland. The ‘one‐size‐fits‐all’, ‘asymmetric shocks’ and ‘cyclical divergence’ objections to UK membership are based on the misapprehension that independent national monetary policy, and the associated nominal exchange rate flexibility, can be used effectively to offset or even neutralise asymmetric shocks. This ‘fine tuning delusion’ is compounded by a failure to understand that, under a high degree of international financial integration, market‐determined exchange rates are primarily a source of shocks and instability. Instead, opponents of UK membership in EMU view exchange rate flexibility as an effective buffer for adjusting to asymmetric shocks originating elsewhere. I know of no evidence that supports such an optimistic reading of what exchange rate flexibility can deliver under conditions of very high international financial capital mobility. The economic arguments for immediate UK membership in EMU, at an appropriate entry rate, are overwhelming. Monetary union raises important constitutional and political issues. It involves a further surrender of national sovereignty to a supranational institution, the ECB/ESCB. It is essential that this transfer of national sovereignty be perceived as legitimate by those affected by it. In addition, the citizens of the UK have become accustomed to a high standard of openness and accountability of their central bank since it gained operational independence in 1997. The ECB/ESCB must be held to the same high standard, and, while there are grounds for optimism, there still is some way to go there.     

Has the Euro increased international price elasticities?

The introduction of the Euro has been accompanied by the hope that international competition between EMU member states would increase due to higher price transparency. This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing price elasticities in international trade flows between Germany and France and between Germany and the United Kingdom before and after the introduction of the Euro. Using disaggregated Eurostat trade statistics, we adopt a heterogeneous dynamic panel framework for the estimation of price elasticities. We suggest a Kalman-filter approach to control for unobservable quality changes which otherwise would bias estimates of price elasticities. We divide the complete sample, which ranges from 1995 to 2008, into two sub-samples and show that price elasticities in trade between EMU members did not change substantially after the introduction of the Euro. Hence, we do not find evidence for an increase in international price competition resulting from EMU.     

The negative side of inflation targeting: revisiting inflation uncertainty in the EMU

ABSTRACT

This article tests the Friedman–Ball hypothesis for the European Monetary Union (EMU) countries, using a GARCH methodology. The empirical results show a positive relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty, largely supportive of the Friedman–Ball hypothesis. Furthermore, the ECB’s price stability mandate is found to have asymmetric, if not limited, effects on inflation uncertainty since 1999, with the findings different for the so-called peripheral countries when compared to the core. For the majority of the EMU countries, shifts away from the 2% target served to increase inflation uncertainty. The credibility of the ECB since the financial crisis, in attempting to meet its 2% inflation target has seen inflation uncertainty increase for some, likely driven by inflation failing to re-anchor. Furthermore, recent periods of deflation are found to generate inflation uncertainty, with short-term price variability increasing in line with observed negative price growth for the majority of the EMU countries. The results are supportive of a U-shaped relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty. Using spline techniques, we formally provide support for such a U-shaped relation where inflation uncertainty broadly increases below a certain threshold for each country’s inflation rate. Asymmetric effects across countries are found in the level of this threshold.     

Co‐Movement Towards a Currency or Monetary Union? An Empirical Study for New Zealand

This paper analyses whether New Zealand would be ready to form a currency or monetary union with either Australia, the 11 EU countries that are members of the EMU, Japan, or the US, if the criteria that have been used by researchers for the EMU are applied. The analysis is an empirical study with data from the mid 1980s to 1998, using cointegration techniques to search for co-movement and convergence in key economic variables: interest rates, inflation rates, exchange rates, real GDP, and current-account/GDP ratios.     

Deficit sustainability and inflation in EMU: An analysis from the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level

Price determination theory typically focuses on the role of monetary policy, while the role of fiscal policy is usually neglected. From a different point of view, the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level takes into account monetary and fiscal policy interactions and assumes that fiscal policy may determine the price level, even if monetary authorities pursue an inflation targeting strategy. In this paper we try to test empirically whether the time path of the government budget in EMU countries would have affected price level determination. Our results point to the sustainability of fiscal policy in all the EMU countries but Finland, although no firm conclusions can be drawn about the prevalence of either monetary or fiscal dominance.     

The role of global financial conditions for credit supply in EMU periphery countries

The article analyses the role of global financial conditions for credit supply and growth performance in individual member states of the European Monetary Union (EMU). In line with the risk-taking channel of monetary policy, we find that in the short run, the Fed and European Central Bank (ECB) interest rate policy compensate for changes in global risk assessment thereby supporting net private credit flows to the European periphery. However, in later periods, a worsened risk sentiment weighs on credit flows to these countries. In contrast, EMU core countries are generally less affected by global financial shocks. This asymmetric influence of global conditions on EMU member states are smoothed by the uniform access of commercial banks to the Eurosystem’s open market operations in conjunction with the redistribution of liquidity via the TARGET mechanism.     

Thoughts on a Fiscal Union in EMU

Using an estimated large‐scale New Keynesian model, we assess the consequences of introducing a fiscal union within EMU. We differentiate between three different scenarios: public revenue equalisation, tax harmonisation and a centralised fiscal authority. Our results indicate that no country would significantly benefit from introducing any form of fiscal union. Comparing long‐term, that is, steady state, effects we have winners and losers depending on the scenario. Differences in terms of business cycle statistics as well as in terms of risk sharing of asymmetric shocks are minor. This also explains why welfare differences are small across the fiscal union scenarios. A counterfactual exercise indicates that with a fiscal union regime already installed at the start of EMU, key macroeconomic variables would have reacted very similarly while debt dynamics would have changed notably.     

The political economy under monetary union: has the euro made a difference?

Economic and monetary union (EMU) has transformed Europe and has created an integrated pan-European economy. Much research has focused on understanding this integration process and what benefits and costs it entails. This paper identifies a political economy channel of EMU as the monetary union implies that member states had to transfer or at least curtail their policy autonomy in several areas, such as monetary policy and fiscal policy. The paper shows that EMU has helped reduce the impact of political shocks on the domestic economy of member states but magnified the transmission of political shocks within the euro area. Equally importantly, economies with weak domestic policies and institutions exhibited a significantly higher sensitivity to domestic political shocks before EMU, but not thereafter. While this may entail that EMU has brought benefits to countries with weaker policies and institutions by insulating them from adverse political developments at home, a potential drawback is that it may provide weaker market discipline for domestic political stability.
— Marcel Fratzscher and Livio Stracca     

Modeling Financial Integration,Intra-EMU and Asian-US External Imbalances

Intra-EMU external imbalances in the pre-crisis period up to 2008 are traditionally explained by EMU-oriented factors, e.g. euro-related financial integration. Chen et al. (2013) also emphasize external trade shocks, such as the competitive challenge of emerging Asia and oil exporters to EMU-periphery’s exports. Moreover, Asian-U.S. external imbalances are attributed to financial integration between East Asia and the USA in the aftermath of the East-Asian currency crises in the late 1990s (Angeletos and Panoussi 2011). Acknowledging these empirical facts this paper develops a Buiter (1981) three-country (EMU, Asia, US), two-region (EMU core, EMU periphery) OLG model to investigate the effects of both intra-EMU and Asian-U.S. financial integration on intra-EMU, Asian and U.S. external imbalances. We find that the widening of the intra-EMU external imbalances, in particular of trade imbalances, is related to the growth in Asian-U.S. imbalances and the dynamic inefficiency of the world economy, caused by excessive saving in Asia.     

Twin deficits and fiscal spillovers in the EMU's periphery. A Keynesian perspective

The objective of this paper is to shed light on the twin deficit hypothesis in Southern Europe and the MENA region, taking into account fiscal spillovers from the core during the global crisis. Using Godley and Lavoie (2007)'s baseline model, we first show that fiscal shocks from a core region could aggravate macroeconomic imbalances in the periphery. We then gather data from the period 1977–2016 for ten MENA and peripheral EMU countries, and model the twin deficit hypothesis in the presence of fiscal spillover with a P-VARX methodology. Our results highlight that fiscal balance, current account, and GDP growth rates in the EMU's periphery are negatively affected by fiscal consolidations in the core. Fiscal discipline in surplus countries is tantamount to a ‘beggar thy neighbor’ effect on the periphery, in times of crisis. We discuss the implications of our results to propose further international coordination of macroeconomic policies.     

Does the Single Currency Affect Foreign Direct Investment?*

Does the creation of the euro partly explain the sharp increase in European investments? To address this question, we derive a simple gravity‐like model for bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI). Using this model, we find that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has increased intra‐EMU FDI stocks on average by around 30 percent. This effect varies over time and across EMU members. It is found to be larger for the outward investments of the less‐developed EMU members. Moreover, contrary to early expectations of FDI diversion effects, EMU countries have invested more in non‐EMU countries since the launch of the euro.     

Overborrowing and Balance of Payments Imbalances in a Monetary Union

The sources of the balance of payments imbalances in the Euro area can be characterized by a combination of four phenomena: (i) the credit imbalances between the core and the periphery of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (ii) the credit misallocation between the tradable and the nontradable sectors in the periphery (iii) the rapid increase in the output and the price of nontradable goods in the periphery since the beginning of the EMU and (iv) the current account imbalances within the EMU. This paper explains all four of these stylized facts within a single model as a result of the interaction between the common monetary policy, inflation heterogeneity and a relaxation of the credit constraint in the nontradable sector of the periphery. When nontradable goods are used as collateral, an increase in their prices can initiate an overborrowing spiral and lead to a balance of payment imbalances. Furthermore, the model endogenizes differences in unit labor costs between the core and the periphery of the Euro area.     

Voting requirements, concessions, international side payments and the European Monetary Union

This paper addresses the question of criteria for selection of EMU members. We identify two factors in the decision process: (1) The costs and benefits which the individual countries attribute to alternative EMU arrangements (`hard-core', medium-sized, all EU members), and (2) the binding institutional restrictions, i.e., the distribution of votes in the European Council and the minimum vote requirements. Within this framework the EU countries are assigned to different groups according to their degree of convergence. Based on stability concessions and side payments these groups decide on the final EMU composition. We show that minimum vote requirements can lead to a suboptimal size of the EMU and can threaten the feasibility of a multi-speed monetary union.     

In or out? The welfare costs of EMU membership

Sweden and the UK have repeatedly refused to join the European and Monetary Union (EMU). Surprisingly, there is very little work on the welfare consequences of the loss of monetary policy flexibility for these countries. This paper fills this void by providing a framework to evaluate quantitatively the economic costs of joining the EMU. Using a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with sticky prices we investigate the economic implications of the loss of monetary policy flexibility associated with the EMU for each country. The main contribution of our general equilibrium approach is that we can evaluate the effects of monetary policy in terms of welfare. Our findings suggest that these economies may experience sizable welfare losses as a result of joining the EMU. Results show that the cost associated with the loss of the monetary policy flexibility is higher in the presence of persistent government consumption shocks and small trade shares with the EMU.     

Measuring the end of the European financial crisis

In 2013 it was declared that ‘the eurozone crisis is over’. However, in fact, the series of financial crises since 2008 may have interrupted the process of EMU enlargement, which in turn triggered a continuing crisis of confidence in the euro. In this paper we extend the sigma‐convergence test to provide a more precise understanding of real interest rate parity (RIP) convergence. On the basis of this, we predict the timing for eliminating the cost of economic asymmetric shocks. Our estimation indicates the RIP among EMU members and accessions were still valid after the disruptions of the 2008 financial crisis. However, the situation has been even worse since the 2010 European sovereign debt crisis, and ceteris paribus, symmetry cannot be achieved without further policy actions. This implies that the EMU authority must do its best to strengthen symmetry and thereby solidify the EMU, at which point it will be better able to re‐start the process of enlargement.