Bank size,competition and risk in the Turkish banking industry

This paper investigates the impact of bank size and competition on earnings volatility and insolvency risk using quarterly data for commercial banks operating in the Turkish banking industry for the period 2002Q1–2012Q2. The main result of the paper indicates that bank size and earnings volatility are negatively related, suggesting that larger banks are less risky. The results also indicate that competition measured by the Boone indicator increases earnings volatility. The results further suggest that higher capitalized banks, banks with a higher share of non-interest income in total income and efficient banks face lower earnings volatility. Finally, insolvency risk measured by Z-score and bank size are positively related, suggesting that larger banks are more stable.     

Democracy,regulation and competition in emerging banking systems

This paper develops a political economy framework to analyse the relations among democracy, financial regulation and banking competition in the emerging banking systems of Central and Eastern Europe. We develop extensive new yearly non-structural indices of bank competition instead of concentration indices as in the previous literature that show its evolution over time with the level of democracy. In addition, we directly test for linkages between democracy, financial regulation and banking competition. Using an unbalanced panel data set over the period 1994–2016 for 617 banks, we show that more democratic countries with better regulatory framework lead to the enhancement of competition. We also find significant support for the core hypothesis that financial regulatory framework in a “partially” democratic environment is inadequate. Given that financial regulatory framework in a “partially” democratic environment can be inadequate we find a U-shaped relation in the sense that there is a threshold level of democracy beyond which banking systems in those countries are more competitive.     

Structure and performance in the Portuguese banking industry in the nineties

In this paper we study the structure-performance relationship in the Portuguese banking industry during the nineties. The hypothesis of pure collusion, efficient structure, modified efficient structure and hybrid collusion/efficiency are tested using a direct measure of efficiency. Our results endorse the hybrid collusion/efficiency hypothesis in the first half of the nineties. However, after 1994 results lend some support to the modified efficient structure hypothesis. Competition at the local level remains important throughout the decade, suggesting that banks in less competitive local markets exert some level of market power and exhibit superior performances.Received: November 1999, Accepted: February 2003, JEL Classification: C21, L11Correspondence to: Victor MendesThe authors wish to thank Pedro Pita Barros and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies. Financial support from JNICT - Junta Nacional de Investigação Científica e Tecnológica (grant PCSH/ECO/938/95) is acknowledged.     

Economies of scale and scope in the European banking sector

In this article, using the data of 2008, we try to describe the impact of scale and product differentiation in 282 European banks. While evidence of the economies of scale is less clear, the results obtained using a translogarithmic function system show that significant economies of scope do exist even for new banking products like derivatives.

Privatization and optimal share release in the Chinese banking industry

This paper establishes a mixed oligopoly model to explore how the government determines the percentage of shares of the state-owned banks to be released to foreign investors under the goal of seeking to maximize social welfare. The theoretical model finds that the release of shares of state-owned banks to foreign investors will reduce the outputs of the state-owned banks. The direction of the change in the profitability of the state-owned banks depends on the percentage of the shares released. The direction of the changes in the levels of social welfare also varies. If the gap in production efficiency between the state-owned banks and private banks is not large enough, we can be certain that a partial release of shares is the government's best policy.     

Public service and competition in the European Union

In recent years, the Treaty of the European Union and the European institutions have had a rapidly increasing impact on the reorganization of commercial public services within the Member States. The trend has been dual—toward liberalization and toward harmonization of standards and national legislations. Progress is reported and analyzed in telecommunications, rail services, and electricity. A general concern is to reconcile legitimate public service obligations with the rules of competition that are prominent in the Treaty. New forms of regulation are tested in various countries preparing for the emergence of a European regulation framework.     

Growth,profits and foreign ownership in the Brazilian banking industry

The deregulation of the financial markets and their progressive globalization has favoured the internationalization of banking. Moreover, during the international financial crisis, the presence of foreign banks has increased in countries experiencing faster economic growth, such as Brazil. In this context, the aim of this study is to analyze the growth and profitability of the financial institutions in Brazil, taking into account the possible non-linearity of the relationship, the differences between Brazilian and foreign institutions and the effect of the crisis. Our results indicate that the entry of foreign institutions has a direct effect on the Brazilian banking industry.     

A comparative study of efficiency in European banking

This paper investigates whether there has been an improvement in and convergence of productive efficiency across European banking markets since the creation of the Single Internal Market. Using efficiency measures derived from DEA estimation, the determinants of European bank efficiency are evaluated using the Tobit regression model approach. The established literature on modelling the determinants of bank efficiency is then extended by recognizing the problem of the inherent dependency of DEA efficiency scores when used in regression analysis. To overcome the dependency problem, a bootstrapping technique is applied. Overall, the results suggest that since the EU's Single Market Programme there has been a small improvement in bank efficiency levels, although there is little evidence to suggest that these have converged. The results also suggest that inference on the determinants of bank efficiency drawn from non-bootstrapped regression analysis may be biased and misleading.     

Financial development and financial openness nexus: the precondition of banking competition

We examine the dynamic relationship between financial development and financial openness using the pooled mean group estimator developed by Pesaran et al. (1999). Our results show that financial openness has a positive effect on financial development in the long run, but may have a negative effect in the short run. Using estimates of country-specific short-run coefficients, we also find that the adverse short-run effects of financial openness are associated with a lower degree of banking competition. The system GMM estimator also supports these findings, suggesting that the financial development and financial openness nexus is contingent on the degree of banking competition. A key policy implication is that a higher degree of banking competition is a precondition for financial openness to promote financial development.     

重新审视国际银行业并购

20世纪后期以来,金融全球化以强劲的势头迅速发展,资本流动全球化、金融机构全球化、金融市场全球化,极大地改变了并且将继续改变国际银行业的经营环境和运行方式。银行业的并购在金融业的发展中始终占据着重要地位,而这种变化使国际银行业的发展出现了新的趋势:国际银行业并购     

Uncertainty,trust, and the regulation of the banking industry

This paper suggests that, in presence of uncertainty, individual choices are made on the basis of subjective evaluations, and the transmission of information is too expensive, so that the decision-making process must largely be based on other agents’ knowledge. Banks operate by developing a network of personal relationships, based on trust, that allows agents to make use of the subjective knowledge of others. The deregulation process of the financial industry of the 1990s was based on the principle that information disclosure would make the market for securities more efficient, increasing risk diversification, and making the financial system safer. Many innovative financial contracts, however, were not backed by trust and reputation mechanism as traditional banking activities. The shadow banking system emerging from these market-based transactions was thus much more risky and fragile than the traditional one, based on private information and unwritten rules of conduct.     

Testing the relationship between competition and efficiency in banking: A panel data analysis

The relationship between competition and efficiency in the banking sectors of five EU countries is investigated using Granger-type causality test estimations. We find positive causation between market power and efficiency, whereas the causality running from efficiency to competition is weak.     

Primary market and aftermarket competition in the bicycle component industry

This study examines the bicycle component industry. This industry is characterized by one dominant firm, Shimano Inc., and four or five smaller players. Firms in the component industry produce components for sale in two related markets, the market for original equipment manufacturers (OEM) and the component aftermarket. A unique data set containing information on aftermarket prices and OEM market shares is used to determine whether or not market power in the aftermarket is a function of OEM market power. The results indicate that concentration in the OEM market is positively related to aftermarket price, while an individual firm's OEM market share is inversely related to aftermarket price.     

Information production, banking industry structure and credit allocation

We analyse credit allocation when limited-liable banks can engage in costly information production about borrowers. When perfectly diversified credit portfolios cannot be constructed, we show that credit allocation depends on bank capital and the number of banks that can operate in the same market. A concentrated banking industry, one where bank capital is held by few banks, is shown to lead to credit allocation closer to the social optimum. Moreover, in the absence of banking industry consolidation, we find that the removal of intra-state entry barriers reduces welfare and not all independent banking organizations that were viable in formerly protected markets remain so when markets are integrated.     

Inter-linkages between competition and stabilisation policies in the banking sector and stock market development in Europe

The banking sector and the stock market in Europe have been adversely impacted by a series of global financial crises over the last two decades. Major financial reforms were implemented to enhance the stability and competition within the banking sector. Measures were also implemented to create a vibrant stock market in Europe to stimulate economic growth in Europe. This study examines the interactions between stock market development, banking competition, and banking stability in European countries from 1996 to 2016. The purpose of the study is to understand the inter-linkages between these variables to ascertain the spillover impact of policy reforms in the banking sector on the stock market and vice-versa. Using a vector error-correction model, the study finds long-run and short-run inter-linkages between banking competition, banking stability, and stock market development in European countries. The study’s most robust result is that banking competition and banking stability stimulate stock market development in the long run. There is also some evidence that healthy competition in the banking sector and stock market development instils greater stability in the banking sector. The results suggest that policy measures put in place to create a vibrant stock market must include elevating banking competition and banking stability, with policymakers being cognizant that causality may be bidirectional.     

Federal banking regulators' competition in laxity: Evidence from CRA audits

The U.S. banking industry has three federal regulators in addition to the 50 state regulators. Through choices regarding its chartering source, joining the Federal Reserve System, and having deposit insurance, a bank also selects which office or agency serves as its primary regulator. Federal regulators gain status and authority from the number of banks over which they have primary supervision. It has long been suspected, therefore, that they compete with each other to entice banks to make choices that increase the number of banks reporting to them. This competition which includes less stringent enforcement and broad interpretation of the laws as favored by the banks is known as competition in laxity. The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) is enforced by each of the three federal banking regulators. Since 1990, their ratings of banks' CRA performance have been published. This published data provides an opportunity to test accuracy of the competition in laxity theory.     

Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition

We study the impact of competition on banks’ risk-taking behavior under different assumptions about deposit insurance and the dissemination of information. While financial opening increases banks’ riskiness, a risk-based deposit insurance or, alternatively, the public disclosure of financial information, are likely to mitigate this effect. Moreover, the limiting cases of uninsured but fully informed depositors, and risk-based full deposit insurance, yield the same equilibrium risk level. Although the welfare consequences of increased competition depend on its impact on risk, financial opening unambiguously improves welfare as we approach the limiting cases.     

Product quality and competition: evidence from the broadband industry

Access to high-quality broadband internet is important in many different respects such as in communication, education, commerce and information acquisition. We investigate the relationship between the number of broadband providers in an area and the quality of broadband service provided where download speed is used as a proxy for quality. We find that increased competition in an area positively affects the access to fast download speeds. This finding is robust to three different top download speeds tested. Additionally, a theoretical model is provided which shows that competition can decrease the profits associated with offering slow speeds; this gives an incentive for providers to offer higher speeds as a way to increase profits.