Bundling, product choice, and efficiency: Should cable television networks be offered à la carte?

We conduct a numerical analysis of bundling’s impact on a monopolist’s pricing and product choices and assess the implications for consumer welfare in cable television markets. Existing theory is ambiguous: for a given set of products, bundling likely transfers surplus from consumers to firms but also encourages products to be offered that might not be under à la carte pricing. Simulation of “Full À La Carte” for an economic environment calibrated to an average cable television system suggests that consumers would likely benefit from à la carte sales. If all networks continued to be offered, the average household’s surplus is predicted to increase by $6.80 (65.6%) under à la carte sales (despite a total bundle price that almost doubles) and reduced network profits would have to be such that 41 of 50 offered cable networks have to exit the market to make her indifferent. Simulation of a “Theme Tier” scenario provides intermediate benefits. The incremental marginal costs to cable systems of à la carte sales and its impact in the advertising market and on competition are important factors in determining consumer benefits.     

Competition and the price of municipal cable television services: An empirical study

This paper investigates the effect of competition in the provision of cable television services on social welfare. We develop a simple theoretical model that suggests that competition will be welfare enhancing so long as it results in lower market prices. We empirically test for the presence of this condition by estimating a five equation system: First, the local franchising authority is viewed as self-selecting into a competitive or non-competitive environment in order to maximize its rents. Given this selection, the remaining four equations specify basic service and pay service penetration rate and price equations. Following Mayo and Otsuka (1991), the resulting system is estimated by two-stage least squares. We find that competition among suppliers lowers average basic cable rates by about $3.85 and the typical pay service rate by about $1.10, certis paribus. Mutatis mutandis estimates of these effects imply that monopoly franchising of cable service results in roughly $3.6 billion per year national welfare loss.     

The demand for pay service on cable television

A probability model is developed for consumer choice among three television programming options, free over-the-air television, basic cable television service, and pay cable serve which consists of basic service plus a single channel of premium entertainment programming. Estimating equations for the demand for pay service are derived from the probability model and then estimated by applying regression techniques to data from a large sample of U.S. cable systems. The estimated parameters of the demand equation show that the demand for pay service is affected by the prices charged for both basic and pay service, by demographic characteristics of the households served by a cable system, and by the quality of programming offered on both basic and pay services. The demand estimates suggest that the introduction of pay service has substantially enhanced the likelihood of profitable operation for cable systems in major television markets.     

City objectives in monopoly franchising: the case of cable television

This paper employs an approach from the labour literature to determine relative weights which cities place on alternate service proposals when selecting cable television operators. Using contract proposals for 27 franchise auctions which took place across the US between 1979 and 1981, a probit model is estimated which corrects for firm self-selection into the auctions. Cities are found to select firms with local or regional advantages, and to prefer relatively fewer unprofitable services and relatively higher basic tier prices. The results suggest that monopoly franchising may serve private interests at the average consumer's expense.     

The problem of market size for Canadian cable television regulation

The policy of the Canadian radio television and telecommunications commission of awarding an exclusive right to provide cable television (CATV) service within a given licensed service area (LSA) rests partly on the presumption that CATV costs reflect economies of scale that are large relative to market size. Cost estimates from crosssections of CATV operations from 1985–1991 show increasing returns to scale and suggest that many LSAs were too small to capture these economies. The results also indicate that economies of scale for basic service declined over the 1980s and that the ‘natural monopoly’ characteristics of CATV may be eroded by further technological and regulatory changes.     

我国劝诱性医疗的成因:管制、市场结构还是信息不对称?

本文使用一个价格管制背景下的医疗信号博弈模型讨论了我国劝诱性医疗现象的成因,以及管制、市场结构和信息不对称在导致资源配置扭曲中的作用机制和相互关系。研究表明,在无管制市场中,医生存在以价格承诺实现医疗资源最优配置的动机和可能。在政府对各项医疗收费实施全面价格管制的制度背景下,过低的诊断价格上限将使市场自发的事前价格承诺机制失灵,并诱发欺骗性的诊断结果,而药品和医疗器械使用的价格上限管制则诱使医生以增加药品和医疗器械使用量的数量决策来维持自身的垄断抽租能力。这两种机制的共同作用最终导致了双重劝诱性医疗均衡。在此均衡下,由于公立医院的垄断地位未受影响,故价格管制无法改善患者的福利状况,反而会导致社会的净福利损失。     

Cable Service and Its Implicit Marginal Valuation

The objective is to estimate the implicit marginal value of channel offerings by cable systems in the USA. Hedonic analysis is a convenient framework in which to explore the relationship between the price of cable service and the channels offered by a cable system. Two separate hedonic equations are estimated-- one for the price of analog cable service and one for the price of digital cable service. With regard to the price of analog cable service, the implicit marginal valuation is statistically significant and positive for just 15 of 106 channel offerings and negative for seven channels. For the price of digital cable service, the implicit marginal valuation is statistically significant and positive for just eleven of 105 channel offerings and negative for five channels. The results suggest that a subscriber's utility would be enhanced by a pricing structure different from the typical approach used by cable systems today of offering a bundled package consisting of several channels. One alternative is to allow consumers to subscribe to just those programming services for which they have a positive implicit marginal value (i.e. an a la carte pricing structure).     

The effects of deregulating cable television: Evidence from the financial markets

This paper uses financial market data to study the effects of deregulation on the expected future profitability of United States cable television system operators. The results suggest that although deregulation has enhanced the profitability of these firms, the effect was not anticipated at the time when the deregulatory legislation was passed. Two possible explanations for the unexpected increase in economic rents accruing to cable system shareholders are offered.     

Forecasting future demand for large-screen television sets using conjoint analysis with diffusion model

The methodological framework proposed in this paper addresses two limitations of the basic Bass diffusion model: that it does not reflect competition among products nor does it forecast demand for products that do not exist in the marketplace. The model consists of four steps. First, to investigate consumer preferences for product attributes, we use conjoint analysis to estimate the utility function of consumers. Next we estimate the dynamic price function of each competing product to reflect technological changes and the evolving market environment. Then we derive dynamic utility function by combining the static utility function and the price function. Finally, we forecast the sales of each product using estimated market share and sales data for each period, which are derived from the dynamic utility function and from the Bass diffusion model, respectively.We apply this model to South Korea's market for large-screen televisions. The results show that (1) consumers are sensitive to picture resolution and cost and (2) in the near future, should the market see the introduction of liquid crystal display (LCD) TVs with screens larger than 50 inches, the high resolution and steep price drop of LCD will lead LCD TVs to capture a larger market share than TVs with other display types. Finally, our results show that TVs with 40-inch screens are preferred over TVs with larger screens.     

Cable Service and Its Implicit Marginal Valuation

The objective is to estimate the implicit marginal value of channel offerings by cable systems in the USA. Hedonic analysis is a convenient framework in which to explore the relationship between the price of cable service and the channels offered by a cable system. Two separate hedonic equations are estimated-- one for the price of analog cable service and one for the price of digital cable service. With regard to the price of analog cable service, the implicit marginal valuation is statistically significant and positive for just 15 of 106 channel offerings and negative for seven channels. For the price of digital cable service, the implicit marginal valuation is statistically significant and positive for just eleven of 105 channel offerings and negative for five channels. The results suggest that a subscriber's utility would be enhanced by a pricing structure different from the typical approach used by cable systems today of offering a bundled package consisting of several channels. One alternative is to allow consumers to subscribe to just those programming services for which they have a positive implicit marginal value (i.e. an a la carte pricing structure).     

中国公用事业价格听证中消费者参与的调查分析

价格听证是实现有效公用事业价格管制的重要内容,科学的价格听证要求消费者充分有效的参与。信息、能力和制度模型能系统解释公用事业价格听证中的消费者参与。调查数据显示,中国公用事业价格听证中的消费者参与在这三个方面都存在问题,这也是完善未来中国公用事业价格听证中消费者参与的重点所在。     

城镇消费者对有机农产品的购买意愿分析——以有机大米消费为研究对象

基于对北京市、武汉市城镇消费者对有机大米的消费行为调查,分析了有机农产品溢价购买意愿和边际购买意愿。运用联合分析法研究发现,当前消费者对有机农产品的溢价购买意愿倾向比较低,但边际购买意愿较高,价格过高限制了有机农产品的推广。另外,消费者对有机农产品的认知水平、品牌因素对消费者购买意愿有着重要的影响作用。     

Rethinking real-time electricity pricing

Most US consumers are charged a near-constant retail price for electricity, despite substantial hourly variation in the wholesale market price. This paper evaluates the first program to expose residential consumers to hourly real-time pricing (RTP). I find that enrolled households are statistically significantly price elastic and that consumers responded by conserving energy during peak hours, but remarkably did not increase average consumption during off-peak times. The program increased consumer surplus by $10 per household per year. While this is only one to two percent of electricity costs, it illustrates a potential additional benefit from investment in retail Smart Grid applications, including the advanced electricity meters required to observe a household’s hourly consumption.     

Price-Quality Tradeoffs and Welfare Effects in Cable Television Markets

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 reduced restrictions on the cable TV industry, providing completely deregulated rates in March 1999. Prior to that time the cable industry was generally allowed to increase rates so long as additional channels were supplied. In this paper we develop a simple tradeoff between price and quality in order to calculate the welfare tradeoff to consumers of the provision of one additional satellite channel. Gauging the impact of this quality change on consumers alone, we conclude that the increase in consumer gains due to an extra channel provision are almost exactly counterbalanced by reductions due to price increases. This ceteris paribus calculation does not mean, of course, that dynamic supply effects from the provision and availability of more channels will not increase future competition and potential consumer benefits.     

Measuring market response to regulation of the cable TV industry

During the 1988–1990 period, the cable television industry was subject to a number of regulatory events. These centered on possible reregulation of rates for basic service and reduction of entry barriers for potential competitors. Using the event study methodology on a portfolio of cable firms, we find evidence that news of no reregulation caused significant positive abnormal returns. News of reregulation caused insignificant negative abnormal returns. These findings provide some support for the traditional consumer protection theory of regulation. News related to entry barriers generally had no significant effect on returns, which suggests that elements of natural monopoly may exist in the industry.     

Price effects of independent transmission system operators in the United States electricity market

In 1996, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) sought to “remove impediments to competition in the wholesale bulk power marketplace and to bring more efficient, lower cost power to the Nation’s electricity consumers” through a series of market rules. A product of these rules was the establishment of regional transmission organizations (RTOs) and independent system operators (ISOs) charged with facilitating equal access to the transmission grid for electricity suppliers. Whether these changes in market structure have succeeded in achieving FERC’s goal to provide “lower cost power to the Nation’s electricity consumers” remains an open question. This paper utilizes a panel data set of the 48 contiguous United States and a treatment effects model in first differences to determine whether there have been changes in delivered electric prices as a result of the establishment of ISOs and RTOs. To avoid the confounding effects of electric restructuring, the model is estimated with the full panel data set, and then again without the states that have restructured their electric markets. This estimation shows that electricity prices fall approximately 4.8 % in the first 2 years of an ISO’s operation and that this result is statistically significant. However, this result is dependent on the presence of states that restructured their electricity markets. When these restructured states are removed from the data set the price effects of RTOs become indistinguishable from zero. The paper concludes that rate agreements are the principal source of the observed decrease in prices and that RTOs have not had the desired effect on electricity prices.     

TALKING,SEARCHING, AND PRICING*

I study the implications of interpersonal communication for incentives for consumers to acquire information and firms’ pricing behavior. Firms market a homogeneous product and choose its price; consumers acquire price information at some cost to themselves. Also, each consumer accesses the information acquired by a sample of other consumers—interpersonal communication. An exogenous increase in the level of interpersonal communication decreases the information that consumers acquire, and, when search costs are low, firms price less aggressively. In an extension, consumers may choose to invest in interpersonal communication at some cost. A decrease in the costs of interpersonal communication decreases firms’ competition.     

Regulation and the provision of quality to heterogenous consumers: The case of prospective pricing of medical services

This paper analyzes the welfare implications of fixed-price regulation of services in a model in which consumers are heterogenous and a firm can endogenously quality discriminate. We consider two different scenarios: The first scenario is when the consumer is also the payer. The second scenario is when the payer (usually the government) is not the consumer. Our major result is that fixed-price regulation causes a distributional welfare loss. We show that it is not possible for fixed-price regulation to induce providers to supply all consumer types with the first-best quality even under perfect information, under either pricing scenario. We show that high and low demand types may receive more than their respective first-best qualities, less than their first-best qualities, or one type may receive more and the other type less depending on the level of the regulated price. It is always true that when consumers are payers, quality is higher for both types than when consumers are not the payers. In this paper, we motivate and discuss the results in terms of price regulation of hospitals where consumers are patients and patient types vary by severity of illness.     

Complementarity of willingness to pay and cost heterogeneity under vertical product differentiation: A welfare analysis

Due to the fact that a consumer’s willingness to pay differs between segments, many unregulated industries are price constrained, although the specific costs of market segments also differ. If the product quality is endogenously chosen, we find that third-degree price discrimination increases welfare if a sufficiently pronounced complementarity between the willingness to pay and variable cost heterogeneity is given. This is due to the fact that the monopolist’s incentive for employing a pronounced price dispersion strategy is directly influenced by the consumers’ willingness to pay for the quality of a product. With endogenous product quality, the paper shows that the standard welfare result of third-degree price discrimination compared to uniform monopoly pricing (e.g. that total welfare and consumer surplus both fall if total output does not rise) can be only reversed given the complementarity is sufficiently pronounced.     

ARE CONSUMERS MORE LOYAL TO NATIONAL BRANDS THAN TO PRIVATE LABELS?

The evolution of private labels (PLs) can be understood in terms of a strategy adopted by the retail industry with the aim of competing with national brands (NBs). In the 1990s, this strategy led to the development of ‘me too’ products, which currently represent the largest share of store brand products. Since the early 2000s, retailers have widened the range of their store brands by introducing high‐quality products. The aim of this study was to estimate consumers’ attachment to ‘me‐too’ and niche PLs respectively, as compared to NBs. We captured the degree of maturity of these PLs through their price‐elasticities, computed for three staple goods offered by three mass retail companies. It was found that price sensitivity does not differ much between the ‘me‐too’ PLs and the corresponding NBs. This result confirms that ‘me‐too’ products are now considered reliable quality brands. However, in the high quality segment, consumers remain more sensitive to the price of PLs than to that of NBs, a characteristic which may relate to their recent introduction on the market.