Industrial actions in schools: strikes and student achievement

Many jurisdictions ban teacher strikes on the assumption that they negatively affect student achievement, but there is surprisingly little research on this question. The majority of existing studies make cross‐section comparisons of the achievement of students who do or do not experience a strike. They conclude that strikes do not have an impact. I present new estimates of this impact of strikes using an empirical strategy that controls for fixed student characteristics at the school cohort level, and a sample of industrial actions by teachers in the province of Ontario. The results indicate that teacher strikes in grades 5 or 6 have a negative, statistically significant impact on test score growth between grade 3 and grade 6. The largest impact is on math scores: 29% of the standard deviation of test scores across school/grade cohorts.     

How accountability pressure on failing schools affects student achievement

Although an emerging body of evidence has shown that the threat of sanctions on low-performing schools can raise student test scores in the short run, the extent to which these test score improvements are due to schools' manipulation of the accountability system has remained uncertain. In this paper, I provide two new strands of evidence to evaluate the relative importance of educational reforms and gaming behavior in generating test score gains by threatened schools. First, using a regression discontinuity design that exploits Florida's system of imposing sanction threats on the basis of a cutoff level of performance, I estimate medium-run effects on student test scores from having attended a threatened elementary school. Threat-induced math improvements from elementary school largely persist at least through the first 1 to 2 years of middle school, while evidence for persistence of reading improvements is less consistent. Second, I analyze the effects of sanction threats on various features of educational production, and I find that sanction threats raise school spending on instructional technology, curricular development, and teacher training. Both strands of evidence are consistent with a predominant role for educational reforms in generating test score gains by threatened schools.     

Bonus pay for teachers,spatial sorting,and student achievement

Bonus pay policy for teachers in the U.S. is analyzed in this paper. We quantitatively argue that, because of the decentralized education finance system in the U.S., this policy may lead to higher teacher and household sorting across school districts. This then may lead to higher variance of achievement and lower mean achievement. Formally, we use an equilibrium political economy model of education at which households, heterogeneous in exogenously set income, and teachers, heterogeneous in exogenously set quality, are endogenously allocated across two school districts. Public education expenditures, which includes teachers’ wage payment and non-teacher related education spending, are financed through local income taxation. Income tax rate in each district is determined via majority voting. Achievement depends on the efforts chosen by teachers and non-teacher related education spending. Teacher efficiency wage per unit of quality is determined at the national teacher labor market. We first calibrate our benchmark model by matching certain statistics from the U.S. data. Then in a computational experiment, we introduce bonus pay for teachers which rises with average achievement. We find that for the recently observed level of average bonus pay (6.59% of average base salary), variance of achievement is 2.46% higher and mean achievement is 1.79% lower than the benchmark. Variance of achievement reaches its peak when average bonus pay is 14.06% and then it starts falling. Also, mean achievement always falls as average bonus pay rises.     

Institutional arrangements in educational systems and student achievement: a cross-national analysis

Given the lack of evidence supporting the view that variation in observable educational inputs affect student achievement, many policymakers and researchers have tried to unearth the salient determinants of student learning. To that end, several recent studies have made use of international data on student achievement to assess the role played by institutional arrangements within the educational system. We revisit this literature using the 1999 TIMSS data—covering over 100,000 students from 22 countries—to analyze the association between different institutional arrangements and the distributions of science and math test scores. The results yield a number of interesting conclusions, as well as highlight the gains to analyzing student achievement within a distributional framework.     

Time to learn? The organizational structure of schools and student achievement

Utilizing parametric and nonparametric techniques, we asses the impact of a heretofore relatively unexplored ‘input’ in the educational process, time allocation, on the distribution of academic achievement. Our results indicate that school year length and the number and average duration of classes affect student achievement. However, the effects are not homogeneous – in terms of both direction and magnitude – across the distribution. We find that test scores in the upper tail of the distribution benefit from a shorter school year, while a longer school year increases test scores in the lower tail. Furthermore, test scores in the lower quantiles increase when students have at least eight classes lasting 46–50 min on average, while test scores in the upper quantiles increase when students have seven classes lasting 45 min or less or 51 min or more.     

The impact of teacher subject knowledge on student achievement: Evidence from within-teacher within-student variation

Teachers differ greatly in how much they teach their students, but little is known about which teacher attributes account for this. We estimate the causal effect of teacher subject knowledge on student achievement using within-teacher within-student variation, exploiting a unique Peruvian 6th-grade dataset that tested both students and their teachers in two subjects. Observing teachers teaching both subjects in one-classroom-per-grade schools, we circumvent omitted-variable and selection biases using a correlated random effects model that identifies from differences between the two subjects. After measurement-error correction, one standard deviation in subject-specific teacher achievement increases student achievement by about 9% of a standard deviation in math. Effects in reading are significantly smaller and mostly not significantly different from zero. Effects also depend on the teacher-student match in ability and gender.     

Threat of grade retention,remedial education and student achievement: evidence from upper secondary schools in Italy

We use a reform in Italy to investigate the effects on academic achievement of more stringent requirements for grade progression at secondary school. Geogr     

Entrepreneurial innovations,competition and competition policy

We construct a model where an entrepreneur can innovate for entry or for sale. It is shown that increased product market competition tends to increase the relative profitability of innovation for sale. Increased competition not only reduces the profits of entrants and the acquirer of the inventions in a similar fashion, but also reduces the profit of non-acquirers. Therefore, incumbents' valuations of innovations are less negatively affected by increased competition, and the incentive for innovation for sale can increase with increased competition. Moreover, a stricter, but not too strict, merger policy is shown to increase the incentive for innovations for sale by ensuring the bidding competition for the innovation.     

Job search and academic achievement

The paper develops a structural model for the labor market behavior of students entering the labor market. We explicitly model the trade-off between devoting effort to studying and to job search. Furthermore, we allow for on-the-job search. The model is estimated using a unique data set of individuals who completed undergraduate education in the Netherlands between 1995 and 2001. Our estimation results show that labor market returns of high grades are low. Wage increases between jobs are explained by labor market friction rather than returns of early work experience. Our results indicate that a 1 percentage point decrease in the unemployment rate increases wage offers on average by 3 percent, but that the amount of job search effort is not very sensitive to business cycle fluctuations. Policy simulations show that study effort and hence academic achievement are much more sensitive to financial incentives than job search effort and labor market outcomes.     

Patience and achievement test results

I investigate the relation between high-stakes achievement test scores and students’ patience. I use an experimentally validated measure of time preferences to assess patience in a large sample of Dutch students in secondary school. A one SD increase in the achievement test at the age of 12 predicts 26% of an SD greater level of patience at the age of 15. The results hint at the fact that education can shape preferences.     

Teacher characteristics and academic achievement

Identifying the impact of teacher characteristics on academic achievement has been a salient and reoccurring topic in education. We employ a twin-by-year identification strategy using matched teacher-student data from North Carolina to credibly estimate the impact of teacher characteristics such as experience, certification, and advanced degrees on academic achievement in math and reading. By using within-family variation the estimates from our model improve upon on earlier work by for time varying unobservable family shocks to non-schooling inputs. Our findings reveal that teacher experience and National Board certification have positive and significant effects on achievement in reading and math; however, we find inconclusive effects for advanced degrees. Notably, we show that teacher experience has the largest effects on student achievement, but our effects are smaller than the standard estimates in the literature. Overall, our estimates provide lower upper bounds for these key teacher characteristics.     

Scarcity and appropriative competition

This paper formalizes the commonsensical hypothesis that resource scarcity causes a large allocation of time and effort to appropriative competition. Our main innovation is to model explicitly the positive intertemporal effect of consumption on the probability of survival. The critical assumption is that this effect becomes stronger as resources become scarcer. We also show that anticipated future resource abundance increases the incremental value of survival and, consequently, amplifies the current allocation of time and effort to appropriative competition. Interestingly, if resources are currently scarce, then larger anticipated future abundance can cause a big enough increase in the time and effort allocated to appropriative competition to result in a decrease in the sum of current and expected future utility, a “paradox of anticipated abundance”.     

Liquid markets and competition

A market is liquid if no individual's actions have a big effect on the prices of goods traded in that market. Perfectly competitive markets are therefore perfectly liquid. It is well known that market liquidity can be achieved by increasing the number of traders so that individual trades are small compared to total trades. We show that even when there are only few traders, market liquidity can be achieved through large short sales in which net trades are small relative to gross trades. In particular, for a natural variant of the market game which permits unlimited short sales, we show that there is always a Nash equilibrium allocation arbitrarily close to a competitive equilibrium allocation. Of course, not all NE are near competitive. Only the large-short-sales NE are nearly liquid and hence close to CE.     

Price distributions and competition

This paper utilizes an equilibrium search model to investigate market structure and price dispersion. In a market with one large firm and a competitive fringe, the large firm offers the highest price. Fringe firms offer a distribution of lower prices.     

Sequential bargaining and competition

Summary This paper studies a sequential bargaining model of a decentralised market. A main objective is to explore the conditions under which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the market game approximates the Walrasian outcome of the market. The three main messages that emerge from our results are as follows. First, contrary to conventional wisdom, frictionless markets need not be Walrasian. Second, the relative magnitudes of frictions can have a profound impact on the market outcome even in the limit as the absolute magnitudes of the frictions become negligible. And third, the relative magnitudes of certain types of frictions may have to be significantly large in order for markets to be Walrasian, reflecting that certain types of frictions are needed in the market in order to induce the Walrasian outcome.This paper is based on a chapter of my Ph.D. thesis. I would like to thank Ken Binmore, David Canning, Partha Dasgupta and Frank Hahn for their helpful comments. I owe special thanks to Ariel Rubinstein for his comments, remarks and encouragement. The comments and suggestions of an anonymous referee have significantly improved the exposition at several places.     

Tax evasion and competition

Using a Cournot oligopoly model with an endogenous number of firms and evasion of indirect taxes, we show that more intense competition may have the negative side effect of increasing tax evasion, thereby, lowering public revenues and welfare. This will be the case if market entry costs decrease. A similar result will hold if marginal production costs fall and demand is either weakly concave, or convex and inelastic. The result of more competition, less evasion and higher public revenues will be obtained if (a) marginal production costs fall and demand is convex and elastic or (b) the demand elasticity increases. As a policy implication, we prove that tax enforcement should be intensified if there is a negative trade‐off between competition and evasion.     

Monopolistic competition and non-neighboring-goods

Summary This paper studies price games played by a continuum of differentiated producers who face demands generated by additively separable preferences exhibiting a non-neighboring goods property. The examples of exact equilibria show that an asymmetric Chamberlian outcome is compatible with nonzero profits for nonmarginal firms and also with constant average costs, contrary to long sustained views. The paper tries also to short out the structure behind this class of examples and identify as general features the presence of nonperfectly elastic demands facing individual firms and the existence of an approximate Chamberlinian equilibrium.I am indebted to J. Ostroy for very helpful comments and to L. Jones, P. Romer and W. Zame for several conversations.     

Agglomeration and tax competition

Tax competition may be different in ‘new economic geography settings’ compared to standard tax competition models. If the mobile factor is completely agglomerated in one region, it earns an agglomeration rent which can be taxed. Closer integration first results in a ‘race to the top’ in taxes before leading to a ‘race to the bottom’. We reexamine these issues in a model that produces stable equilibria with partial agglomeration in addition to the core-periphery equilibria. A bell-shaped tax differential also arises in our model. Therefore, the ‘race to the top’ result generalises to a framework with partial agglomeration.     

Pandering and electoral competition

We study an election with two perfectly informed candidates. Voters share common values over the policy outcome of the election, but possess arbitrarily little information about which policy is best for them. Voters elect one of the candidates, effectively choosing between the two policies proposed by the candidates. We explore under which conditions candidates always propose the voters' optimal policy. The model is extended to include strategic voting, policy-motivated candidates, imperfectly informed candidates, and heterogeneous preferences.