Co-opted directors and powerful CEOs: evidence from the CEO pay slice (CPS)

We explore the effect of co-opted directors on chief executive officer (CEO) power. Co-opted directors are those appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office and are found by prior research to represent a weakened governance mechanism. Our evidence reveals that co-opted directors lead to less powerful CEOs, consistent with the substitution effect. Because co-opted directors impose less stringent oversight, the CEO is able to exercise a great deal of latitude in running the firm. Therefore, it is less necessary for the CEO to command so much power where more directors are co-opted, hence leading to less powerful CEOs. In other words, co-opted directors substitute for strong CEO power. Crucially, we find that board co-option exhibits much more explanatory power than does board independence, which has been the primary measure of board effectiveness in the literature.     

Convertible bonds issued in the bear market period: evidence from Taiwan

We argue that the behaviour of enterprises might be modified or even changed completely after black swan events occur. We explore why high-tech firms preferred to issue convertible bonds in 2001–2003, the bear market period after the tech bubble in Taiwan. We show that firms issuing convertible bonds are those with low directors’ holding ratio and high debt ratio. Results also reveal that corporate governance was worse in the firms that issued convertible bonds, as revealed by the finding that the directors’ holding ratio of these issuing firms declined considerably. This finding also implies that corporate governance issues become more serious after black swan events.     

第一大股东对公司治理、企业业绩的影响分析

本文以 1 997年以前在中国上市的 50 8个上市公司 1 997— 2 0 0 0年 4年间的2 0 3 2个观察值为样本 ,研究了第一大股东的所有权性质、第一大股东的变更对公司治理效力和企业业绩的影响。本文的研究发现 ,上市公司第一大股东的所有权性质不同 ,其公司业绩、股权结构和治理效力也不同。第一大股东为非国家股股东的公司有着更高的企业价值和更强的盈利能力 ,在经营上更具灵活性 ,公司治理的效力更高 ,其高级管理层也面临着更多的来自企业内部和市场的监督和激励。另外 ,本文的研究还发现 ,对于不同性质的公司 ,第一大股东的变更带来的影响也有所不同 ,但基本上都是正面的。第一大股东的变更有利于公司治理效力的提高 ,有利于公司规模的扩大和管理的更加专业化。本文的研究为国有股减持和股权多元化提供了经验证据 ,论证了控制权转移市场对深化改革和完善公司治理的重要性     

董事会治理绩效:研究现状与基本路径

国内学术界关于董事会治理绩效的研究,虽然涌现了不少的实证文献,研究的结论却不够稳定。在对国内外主要文献进行回顾的基础上,分析国内现有研究存在的问题,并提出改进董事会治理绩效研究的基本思路,以期为今后的研究提供一点有益的启示。     

上市公司股权结构问题研究综述

股权结构是公司治理结构的重要内容 ,目前围绕股权结构的形成与变动、股权结构与公司治理及经营绩效的关系、我国股权结构改革等问题 ,理论界的意见分歧较大 ,本文就现有的主要观点进行归纳并加以评论。     

上市公司因素与股票市场风险关系实证研究

文章应用横截面数据,定量分析了我国上市公司业绩、治理结构、股权分置和信息披露等公司因素对股票市场风险的影响,以及总体公司因素对我国股票市场风险的影响程度,并得出了相应的结论。     

Stock market reactions to environmental disclosures: new evidence from China

We study how the stock market in China responds to announcements by an environmental risk index and find that China’s stock market penalizes firms associated with unfavourable environmental news if the information is provided directly to investors in a manner that is easily understood. We also find that the negative impact on stock prices fades after multiple disclosures of the same information.     

中国银行业的治理结构:基于案例视角的分析

治理结构是企业内控制度的重要组成部分,是企业经营管理的微观基础,关乎企业行为和市场价值。以处于转型和变革期的中国银行业为背景,选取12家代表性商业银行研究我国银行业的治理结构。通过对样本银行股权结构、董事会构成以及高管激励机制等几方面的分析,结果发现：当前银行业股权集中度仍然过高,大股东的股东性质比较单一,尤以国有股东为主;董事会机构健全,组织完善而激励不足。因此,体现我国银行业治理特征的不是传统企业治理范畴的内容,而是由产权结构决定的治理特点,或曰,产权结构的差异可以包容治理结构的主要特征。     

电力行业上市公司治理结构与公司绩效关系的实证研究

本文运用深沪两市57家电力行业上市公司2006年的数据,采用多元线性回归分析方法,从内外两种治理机制对公司绩效的影响进行了实证分析。结果发现,电力行业上市公司的治理结构中,对公司绩效影响较显著的因素分别是:第一大股东的持股比例、前五大股东持股比例之和、反映控制权市场的系数Masc以及高管人员的报酬等四大因素。而对于其他反映治理结构的变量,尤其是反映董事会特征的变量,对公司绩效没有显著的影响作用。     

企业的契约性质、所有权理论及公司治理结构述评

公司治理结构是一个企业所有权安排的契约,而企业所有权的制度设置是由企业的本质决定的,对企业本质的不同认识必然导致不同性质的公司治理结构.本文通过文献综述,旨在勾勒出企业的契约性质--企业所有权理论--公司治理结构三者的演进脉络和之间的对应关系,发现企业家人力资本产权与企业所有权之间的复杂联系是未来公司治理问题研究的焦点.     

Using demographic identification to estimate the effects of board size on corporate performance

Motivated by agency theory, we investigate the effect of board size on corporate outcomes. To address endogeneity, we exploit the variations in the director-age populations across the states in the US. We argue that firms with access to a larger pool of potential directors tend to have larger boards. Consistent with this notion, our empirical results show that firms located where the size of the director-age population is larger have significantly larger board size. Because the director-age population represents broad demographic trends outside of any firm’s control, it is unlikely related to firm outcomes or policies and should be exogenous. Using the director-age population as our instrument, we estimate the effects of board size on firm value and profitability. Our approach is less vulnerable to endogeneity and is more likely to show a causal effect.     

我国商业银行治理机制对经营绩效影响的实证分析

2004年,我国银行业开始了以"建立和完善良好的银行公司治理"为核心的新一轮改革.运用统计分析和计量分析的基本方法,实证研究了我国商业银行治理机制各构成要素的现状及其对银行盈利能力和风险控制能力的影响.分析发现,我国商业银行的股权结构仍不合理,依然存在"一股独大"的现象;董事会与监事会的架构基本合理;各银行高管的人均薪酬较高.独立董事比例对商业银行的经营绩效产生了积极影响;第一大股东的国家股性质对银行的净资产收益率具有正面作用;前五大股东的持股比例与资本充足率也具有显著的正相关性.     

Financing preferences: evidence from the Korean market

We investigate the financing decisions of Korean firms during the period of 1996–2015. Korean firms follow a matching strategy for funding their cash needs. Cash inflows from investing activities are the primary source of funding for capital expenditures, and cash inflows from financing activities are the major means of covering cash outflows from financing activities. We also find that Korean firms’ financing practice of handling cash deficits can be described by the pecking order model modified and augmented by cash flow variables. Cash inflows from investing activities account for the major portion of financing to make up for cash deficits, followed by short- and long-term debt, and then equity financing.     

Competition and ownership structure: Substitutes or complements? Evidence from the Warsaw Stock Exchange

In this paper we analyse the impact of product market competition and ownership structure on firm performance. Our results show that product market competition has a positive and significant impact on performance. Concerning the effect of ownership concentration, we find a U–shaped relationship with performance. Firms with relatively dispersed and relatively concentrated ownership have higher productivity growth than firms with an intermediate level of ownership concentration. This correlation between concentration of ownership and productivity growth is not explained by the type of the controlling shareholder. Finally, product market competition and good governance tend to reinforce each other rather than to be substitutes. Competition has no significant effect on performance for the firms with ‘poor’ governance; on the contrary, it has a significant positive effect in the case of firms with ‘good’ corporate governance. JEL classification: D24, G32, L1, P2.     

引入职业高管与家族企业治理特征的演变

作者以我国324家家族控股上市公司为研究样本,对家族公司引入职业高管后,其治理特征及公司绩效的演变进行了实证分析.分析结果表明:引入职业高管的家族公司与家族成员担任高管的家族公司相比,其股权结构、高管薪酬、董事会结构和公司绩效均发生了显著的变化.     

股权结构与股权代理成本关系的实证研究——基于2011年创业板上市公司的数据研究

公司治理的基础是股权结构,核心问题就是如何降低代理成本,但是由于特殊的历史原因,我国股权分置制度存在的弊端严重影响着公司治理。根据代理理论,股权代理成本可以划分为管理层与股东之间利益冲突引起的第一类代理成本和控股股东与中小股东之间利益冲突引起的第二类代理成本。所以本文就基于股权分置改革后的视角,以2011年创业板上市公司为样本,采用理论与实证相结合的分析方法来分析股权结构与股权代理成本之间的关系,得出股权集中度可以降低第一类代理成本和第二类代理成本;股权制衡度在一定程度上可以降低第二类代理成本,但会提高第一类代理成本;负债也会有助于降低第一类代理成本;而管理层和机构投资者持股并未起到降低代理成本的作用。     

Soft budget constraint theories: From centralization to the market

This paper surveys the theoretical literature on the effect of soft budget constraints on economies in transition from centralization to capitalism; it also reviews our understanding of soft budget constraints in general. It focuses on the conception of the soft budget constraint syndrome as a commitment problem. We show that the two features of soft budget constraints in centralized economies – ex post renegotiation of firms' financial plans and a close administrative relationship between firms and the centre – are intrinsically related. We examine a series of theories (based on the commitment-problem approach) that explain shortage, lack of innovation in centralized economies, devolution, and banking reform in transition economies. Moreover, we argue that soft budget constraints also have an influence on major issues in economics, such as the determination of the boundaries and capital structure of a firm. Finally, we show that soft budget constraints theory sheds light on financial crises and economic growth.     

Enterprise restructuring and adjustment in the transition to market economy: lessons from the experience of Central and Eastern Europe

Some aspects of the process of enterprise restructuring and adjustment in the Central and Eastern European countries are analysed on the basis of evideance from recent empirical research on microeconomic performance in these transition economies. The paper outlines a stylized picture of some types of enterprise behaviour which occur in this period and highlights a number of issues related to the process of enterprise restructuring and adjustment such as the problem of micro budget constraints, the motivation for enterprise restructuring, the issues of corporate governance. Some of the current impediments to enterprise restructuring as well as some of the determinants of enterprise performance in the transition periód are also featured in the paper.     

The impact of trading floor closure on market efficiency: evidence from the Toronto Stock Exchange

On 23 April 1997, the Toronto Stock Exchange closed its trading floor, making it at that time the second-largest stock exchange in North America to choose a purely electronic trading environment for its equities. Exploiting this natural experiment, we find that the move to electronic trading resulted in a higher cost of immediacy (bid–ask spreads), increased information asymmetry and an overall deterioration of short-horizon return predictability from past order flows, reducing the efficiency of price discovery. Our results suggest that the human element plays an important role in order execution and complements automated electronic trading by improving the efficiency of incorporating new information into prices.     

控制权私利、公司业绩与CEO变更——兼评上市公司内部治理机制的效率

文章在理论分析的基础上,提出大股东控制框架下CEO变更的五大假设,并以此为视角,基于上交所上市公司2004-2006年公司治理的实践,在运用Logistic回归模型进行实证检验的基础上,对上市公司内部治理机制的效率进行评价。研究发现:(1)能力假设获得证实,表明内部治理机制治理效应的存在;(2)合谋假设获得支持,大股东控制权私利弱化其对CEO的监督;(3)董事会独立性假设得以证实,且董事会履职倾向保守和谨慎;(4)就现阶段的股权结构而言,大股东的利益协同与利益模糊假设同时获得证实。