Ownership structure,monitoring, and market value of companies: evidence from an unusual privatization mode

This study analyses the impact of ownership structure and market liquidity on company value. We investigate different aspects of ownership: the risk of political interference, private investors vs. the state acting as influential blockholders, and preferential political treatment of companies. Using a unique dataset of Polish partial privatizations initiated by shares transfers to entities under limited government influence, we find that government divestments can enhance company value, due to reduction in risk of political interference. A potential increase in the liquidity of trades in transferred companies’ shares also boosts their market value. On the other hand, an increased likelihood of the emergence of private blockholders able to expropriate minority shareholders reduces the firm’s market value. Our results support the political view of privatization: governments have objectives different to profit maximization, which leads to suboptimal investment from this point of view and lower market value of companies. We also develop a model to empirically distinguish between different aspects of ownership on company value.     

Estimating the effect of board independence on managerial ownership using a quasi-natural experiment

Grounded in agency theory, this article investigates the effect of board independence on managerial ownership. We exploit the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the associated exchange listing requirements as an exogenous regulatory shock that raises board independence. Our difference-in-difference estimates show that board independence leads to significantly higher managerial ownership. In particular, firms forced to raise board independence exhibit managerial ownership that is 26.35% higher, relative to firms not required to raise board independence. Thus, board independence and managerial equity ownership constitute governance mechanisms that act as complements, rather than substitutes. Our empirical strategy relies on a quasi-natural experiment and is far more likely to show a causal effect than what has been documented in the literature. Finally, an instrumental-variable analysis reinforces our conclusion.     

Co-opted directors and powerful CEOs: evidence from the CEO pay slice (CPS)

We explore the effect of co-opted directors on chief executive officer (CEO) power. Co-opted directors are those appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office and are found by prior research to represent a weakened governance mechanism. Our evidence reveals that co-opted directors lead to less powerful CEOs, consistent with the substitution effect. Because co-opted directors impose less stringent oversight, the CEO is able to exercise a great deal of latitude in running the firm. Therefore, it is less necessary for the CEO to command so much power where more directors are co-opted, hence leading to less powerful CEOs. In other words, co-opted directors substitute for strong CEO power. Crucially, we find that board co-option exhibits much more explanatory power than does board independence, which has been the primary measure of board effectiveness in the literature.     

Convertible bonds issued in the bear market period: evidence from Taiwan

We argue that the behaviour of enterprises might be modified or even changed completely after black swan events occur. We explore why high-tech firms preferred to issue convertible bonds in 2001–2003, the bear market period after the tech bubble in Taiwan. We show that firms issuing convertible bonds are those with low directors’ holding ratio and high debt ratio. Results also reveal that corporate governance was worse in the firms that issued convertible bonds, as revealed by the finding that the directors’ holding ratio of these issuing firms declined considerably. This finding also implies that corporate governance issues become more serious after black swan events.     

第一大股东对公司治理、企业业绩的影响分析

本文以 1 997年以前在中国上市的 50 8个上市公司 1 997— 2 0 0 0年 4年间的2 0 3 2个观察值为样本 ,研究了第一大股东的所有权性质、第一大股东的变更对公司治理效力和企业业绩的影响。本文的研究发现 ,上市公司第一大股东的所有权性质不同 ,其公司业绩、股权结构和治理效力也不同。第一大股东为非国家股股东的公司有着更高的企业价值和更强的盈利能力 ,在经营上更具灵活性 ,公司治理的效力更高 ,其高级管理层也面临着更多的来自企业内部和市场的监督和激励。另外 ,本文的研究还发现 ,对于不同性质的公司 ,第一大股东的变更带来的影响也有所不同 ,但基本上都是正面的。第一大股东的变更有利于公司治理效力的提高 ,有利于公司规模的扩大和管理的更加专业化。本文的研究为国有股减持和股权多元化提供了经验证据 ,论证了控制权转移市场对深化改革和完善公司治理的重要性     

董事会治理绩效:研究现状与基本路径

国内学术界关于董事会治理绩效的研究,虽然涌现了不少的实证文献,研究的结论却不够稳定。在对国内外主要文献进行回顾的基础上,分析国内现有研究存在的问题,并提出改进董事会治理绩效研究的基本思路,以期为今后的研究提供一点有益的启示。     

上市公司股权结构问题研究综述

股权结构是公司治理结构的重要内容 ,目前围绕股权结构的形成与变动、股权结构与公司治理及经营绩效的关系、我国股权结构改革等问题 ,理论界的意见分歧较大 ,本文就现有的主要观点进行归纳并加以评论。     

论上市公司股权结构的调整与优化

当前,中国上市公司的股权结构普遍不合理,严重阻碍了公司治理和经营绩效的提高,因此,优化上市公司股权结构显得十分迫切和必要。文章在分析了中国上市公司股权结构存在的主要问题的基础上,结合中国的实际.提出了优化上市公司股权结构的对策建议。     

Effects of corporate governance on the decision to voluntarily disclose corporate social responsibility reports: evidence from China

This article investigates effects of corporate governance on the decision to voluntarily disclose corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports. By using a unique longitude data set of Chinese publicly traded manufacturing firms from 2010 to 2016, this study finds that ownership structure and board characteristics are significantly associated with firms’ decisions to voluntarily disclose CSR reports. In particular, our study finds that state ownership, institutional ownership, managerial ownership and board size are positively and significantly associated with the decision to voluntarily disclose CSR reports. However, board independence is not related to the decision. We also find CEO duality is negatively and significantly related to the decision. Our findings highlight the role of corporate governance in firms’ transparency by influencing the voluntary disclosure of additional information on firms’ CSR activities.     

上市公司因素与股票市场风险关系实证研究

文章应用横截面数据,定量分析了我国上市公司业绩、治理结构、股权分置和信息披露等公司因素对股票市场风险的影响,以及总体公司因素对我国股票市场风险的影响程度,并得出了相应的结论。     

中国银行业的治理结构:基于案例视角的分析

治理结构是企业内控制度的重要组成部分,是企业经营管理的微观基础,关乎企业行为和市场价值。以处于转型和变革期的中国银行业为背景,选取12家代表性商业银行研究我国银行业的治理结构。通过对样本银行股权结构、董事会构成以及高管激励机制等几方面的分析,结果发现：当前银行业股权集中度仍然过高,大股东的股东性质比较单一,尤以国有股东为主;董事会机构健全,组织完善而激励不足。因此,体现我国银行业治理特征的不是传统企业治理范畴的内容,而是由产权结构决定的治理特点,或曰,产权结构的差异可以包容治理结构的主要特征。     

Stock market reactions to environmental disclosures: new evidence from China

We study how the stock market in China responds to announcements by an environmental risk index and find that China’s stock market penalizes firms associated with unfavourable environmental news if the information is provided directly to investors in a manner that is easily understood. We also find that the negative impact on stock prices fades after multiple disclosures of the same information.     

Professionals inside the board room: accounting expertise of directors and dividend policy

Directors’ personal attributes have significant impacts on governance effectiveness. We study whether directors’ accounting expertise affects corporate financial policy and investigate dividend in specific. We construct a dataset of audit committee directors’ accounting expertise for Standard & Poor 500 firms from 2005 to 2012. We first verify directors’ monitoring roles by showing that firms with accounting expert sitting on their audit committees demonstrate stronger accounting conservatism. In our main tests, we find that these firms maintain lower dividend payment level, which are less sensitive to earnings volatility. This suggests directors’ advisory roles in financial policy. We further show that our accounting expertise cannot be subsumed by management ability. In additional test, we further examine the baseline results conditional on analyst forecast error. Our findings highlight the importance of directors’ professional expertise in fulfilling their governance roles.     

电力行业上市公司治理结构与公司绩效关系的实证研究

本文运用深沪两市57家电力行业上市公司2006年的数据,采用多元线性回归分析方法,从内外两种治理机制对公司绩效的影响进行了实证分析。结果发现,电力行业上市公司的治理结构中,对公司绩效影响较显著的因素分别是:第一大股东的持股比例、前五大股东持股比例之和、反映控制权市场的系数Masc以及高管人员的报酬等四大因素。而对于其他反映治理结构的变量,尤其是反映董事会特征的变量,对公司绩效没有显著的影响作用。     

经营者股权激励的治理效应研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文运用我国上市公司的经验证据来考察公司治理特征、经营者股权激励与公司经营业绩提高的关系。研究结果表明 :(1 )实行股权激励的公司 ,在实行股权激励前业绩普遍较高 ,存在选择性偏见。 (2 )经营者因股权激励增加的持股数与由第一大股东选派的董事比例显著正相关。董事长和总经理由同一人兼任的公司 ,经营者因股权激励增加的持股数显著高于两职分离的公司。 (3 )成长性较高的公司 ,公司经营业绩的提高与经营者因股权激励增加的持股数显著正相关。 (4)强制经营者持股、用年薪购买流通股以及混合模式的激励效果较好。我们的研究结果还表明 ,对于那些内部治理机制弱化的公司 ,经营者存在利用股权激励机制为自己谋利掠夺股东利益的行为 ;成立相对独立的薪酬与考核委员会等类似机构作为股权激励的实施主体是重要的。     

企业的契约性质、所有权理论及公司治理结构述评

公司治理结构是一个企业所有权安排的契约,而企业所有权的制度设置是由企业的本质决定的,对企业本质的不同认识必然导致不同性质的公司治理结构.本文通过文献综述,旨在勾勒出企业的契约性质--企业所有权理论--公司治理结构三者的演进脉络和之间的对应关系,发现企业家人力资本产权与企业所有权之间的复杂联系是未来公司治理问题研究的焦点.     

Using demographic identification to estimate the effects of board size on corporate performance

Motivated by agency theory, we investigate the effect of board size on corporate outcomes. To address endogeneity, we exploit the variations in the director-age populations across the states in the US. We argue that firms with access to a larger pool of potential directors tend to have larger boards. Consistent with this notion, our empirical results show that firms located where the size of the director-age population is larger have significantly larger board size. Because the director-age population represents broad demographic trends outside of any firm’s control, it is unlikely related to firm outcomes or policies and should be exogenous. Using the director-age population as our instrument, we estimate the effects of board size on firm value and profitability. Our approach is less vulnerable to endogeneity and is more likely to show a causal effect.     

我国商业银行治理机制对经营绩效影响的实证分析

2004年,我国银行业开始了以"建立和完善良好的银行公司治理"为核心的新一轮改革.运用统计分析和计量分析的基本方法,实证研究了我国商业银行治理机制各构成要素的现状及其对银行盈利能力和风险控制能力的影响.分析发现,我国商业银行的股权结构仍不合理,依然存在"一股独大"的现象;董事会与监事会的架构基本合理;各银行高管的人均薪酬较高.独立董事比例对商业银行的经营绩效产生了积极影响;第一大股东的国家股性质对银行的净资产收益率具有正面作用;前五大股东的持股比例与资本充足率也具有显著的正相关性.     

Deciphering the motives behind corporate social responsibility (CSR) using managerial ownership: evidence from heteroskedastic identification

Motivated by agency theory, we investigate the effect of managerial ownership on CSR engagement. Exploiting a novel identification strategy and using a large U.S. sample of over 14,000 observations across 18 years, we find that higher managerial ownership diminishes CSR engagement significantly. As managers own a larger share of equity, they bear greater costs of CSR, leading to a reduction in CSR engagement. Further analysis, however, shows that not all CSR activities are motivated by agency problems. In particular, the CSR activities related to human rights and products appear to promote shareholders’ wealth. The results of this study are important as they show that there can be different motives behind different CSR activities. We contribute to the literature by shedding light on the motives behind CSR investments using a novel identification strategy.     

Determinants of corporate cash holdings: evidence from the emerging market of Turkey

This study analyses the factors that might explain the level of corporate cash holdings in a broad sample of Turkish-listed nonfinancial firms over the period 1997 to 2011. The empirical results reveal that, on average, Turkish firms hold 9.1% of their total assets as cash and cash equivalents. There is a steadily increasing trend in cash holding across the years. Both the system GMM and the difference GMM regression results are consistent; almost exactly the same variables are significant and going in the same direction. The findings indicate that the previous year’s cash holding is positive and significant determinant at the current year’s cash level, suggesting that these firms have a targeted cash level. Furthermore, the results reveal that cash flow and growth opportunities have positive and significant impact on the cash level. However, the amount of capital expenditures, liquid assets used as cash substitute, the degree of tangibility of assets, financial debt ratio and leverage have negative and significant impact on the cash level. Most of these explanatory variables were in line with our theoretical background and with previous studies as well.