Forward Markets and the Behaviour of the Competitive Firm with Production Flexibility

This paper examines the production and hedging decisions of the competitive firm under output price uncertainty when a forward market for its output is available. The firm possesses production flexibility in that it makes its production decision after the resolution of the output price uncertainty, albeit subject to a capacity constraint on production. We show that the firm optimally acquires a higher level of capacity investment than an otherwise identical firm with no production flexibility. We further show that production flexibility allows the firm to implicitly hedge against its output price risk exposure by the ex post production decision. The firm as such under‐hedges its output price risk exposure in the forward market wherein the forward price contains a non‐positive risk premium.     

中国生猪市场整合程度研究

本文利用2000—2008年全国30个省、自治区和直辖市的生猪批发价格月度数据,采用共聚合检验以及δ收敛检验,评价了中国相邻省份的生猪市场整合程度以及全国整体市场一体化程度的演变趋势。得出的主要结论如下:中国生猪市场实现了良好的长期整合和短期整合,市场能够实现自身的价格调整;随着时间推移,全国生猪市场一体化程度逐渐加强,政府不需要对生猪价格进行干预。     

Interest rates and investment coordination failures

The theory of capital developed by Bohm-Bawerk and Wicksell emphasized the roundabout nature of the production process. The basic insight is that production necessarily involves time. One element of the production process is to determine the period of production, or the length of time from the start of production to its completion. Bohm-Bawerk and Wicksell emphasized the role of the interest rate in determining the period of production. In this paper, I develop an option games model of the decision to invest. Two firms have an opportunity to enter a market, but production takes time. Firms face a two-dimensional decision. Along one dimension, they determine the period of production and the prospective profit therefrom. Along another dimension, they determine whether or not they want to enter the market given the amount of time it will take to start generating revenue from production. Within this option games approach, the period of production can be understood as an endogenous time-to-build and I argue that this framework provides a tool for evaluating the claims of Bohm-Bawerk and Wicksell against the backdrop of competition and uncertainty. I evaluate the period of production decision and the option to enter decision when the real interest rate changes. I show that investment coordination failures are more likely to occur at lower levels of profitability when real interest rates are low. I conclude by discussing the implications of low interest rates for boom-bust investment cycles.     

从过度投资到产能过剩:理论与经验证据

过度投资与产能过剩是长期困扰中国经济发展的严峻问题,然而现有研究往往笼统地将二者视为一体。实际中,过度投资与产能过剩分别指向企业投资生产过程中的不同决策阶段,前者与需先行做出的长期投资决策有关,而后者则是后发的即期生产决策的结果。通过引入一个包含投资和生产两阶段的动态实物期权模型,尝试性地刻画从过度投资到产能过剩的形成机制,以及经济与政策这两种异质不确定性对这一形成机制的影响,进一步基于2003-2018年中国企业的微观数据进行了实证检验。理论与实证结果表明:(1)尽管产能过剩总是源自前期投资的过度扩张,但并不是所有的过度投资最终都会导致产能过剩;(2)不确定性是导致过度投资与产能过剩的重要因素,但过度投资更多地源于政策不确定性,而产能过剩则主要源于经济不确定性;(3)不确定性对产能过剩的影响要强于对过度投资的影响。因此,对过度投资的治理应以政策不确定性为主,保持政策调节的稳定性和连续性;对产能过剩的治理则应以经济不确定性为主,维护市场运行体系的稳定性。     

Investment-based optimal capital structure

This paper extends the classical capital structure model by introducing the output of firm with ‘AK’ production technology dynamically depends on the endogenous investment decision and capital accumulation. Based on our calibration, it shows that the flexibility of dynamic investment and capital accumulation induces the firm to take the lower leverage at financing time and makes the leverage estimate closer to empirically observed leverage ratios, which provides an effective explanation for the ‘under-leverage puzzle’. In addition, this model predicts that the market leverage behaves in a U-shaped manner with capital liquidity, which provides a novel empirical test.     

Evaluating wind-following and ecosystem services for hydroelectric dams in PJM

Hydropower can provide inexpensive, flexible fill-in power to compensate for intermittent renewable generation. Policies for hydropower dams maintain multiple services beyond electric generation, including environmental protection, flood control and recreation. We model the decision of a hydroelectric generator to shift some of its power production capacity away from the day-ahead energy market into a “wind-following” service to smooth the intermittent production of wind turbines. Offering such a service imposes both private and social opportunity costs. Since fluctuations in wind energy output are not perfectly correlated with day-ahead energy prices, a wind-following service will necessarily affect generator revenues. Seasonal wind patterns produce conflicts with the goal of managing rivers for “ecosystem services”—the maintenance or enhancement of downstream ecosystems. We illustrate our decision model using the Kerr Dam in PJM’s territory in North Carolina. We simulate the operation of Kerr Dam over a three-year period that features hydrologic variability from normal water years to extreme drought conditions. We use an optimization framework to estimate reservation prices for Kerr Dam offering wind-following services in the PJM market. Wind-following may be profitable for Kerr Dam at low capacity levels during some time periods if ecosystems services are neglected and if side payments, or reserves-type payments, are provided. Wind-following with ecosystem services yields revenue losses that typically cannot be recovered with reserves market payments. Water release patterns are inconsistent with ecosystem-services goals when Kerr Dam dedicates significant capacity to wind-following, particularly in drought years.     

An experimental study of coordination and learning in iterated two-market entry games

Summary. Tacit coordination in large groups is studied in an iterated market entry game with complete information and multiple market capacities that are varied randomly from period to period. On each period, each player must decide independently whether to enter any of the markets, and if entering, which of the two markets to enter. Across symmetric and asymmetric markets, we find remarkable coordination on the aggregate level, which is accounted for by the Nash equilibrium, together with considerable individual differences in frequency of entry and decision rules. With experience, the decisions of most players converge to decision rules with cutoff values on the combined market capacity that determine whether or not to enter but not which of the two markets to enter. This latter decision is determined probabilistically by the differential market capacities. The aggregate and individual results are accounted for quite well by a reinforcement-based learning model that combines deterministic and probabilistic elements.     

Decentralizing hydro power production

Abstract.  We analyse the production of electricity from n power stations in a dynamic model. Each power station's production of electricity is constrained by the quantity of water available to it (supply constraint) as well as limitations on reservoir capacity (storage constraint). We show that hydro power production can lead to two sources of welfare loss: suboptimal management of water resources and the exercise of market power. A monopolist minimizes the first source of inefficiency, whereas decentralized production in a competitive environment minimizes the second. The decision to introduce competition in hydropower production must account for these two opposite effects. JEL Classification: L11, Q48     

German Exports to the Euro Area

This paper analyzes the determinants of German exports to the euro area, which is the biggest market for German products. Three conditional error-correction models based on regionally disaggregated data are developed. One specification includes EMU industrial production and a real external value based on consumer prices, the other two use different EMU investment aggregates, the orresponding real external values and a proxy for European market integration to explain exports. The models perform equally well in a number of diagnostic tests. For short-term forecasts, however, the model using industrial production seems to be the best, since it outperforms the other models in terms of one-step ahead out-of-sample forecasts.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual 2002 congress of the Verein für Socialpolitik.     

基于质量安全的生猪产业链纵向契约关系分析

分别运用混合战略模型和重复博弈模型分析了生猪产业链中市场契约和生产契约的履行情况。分析结果表明:市场契约的履行与关系租金正相关,与抽检成本、遵守契约所付出的额外成本负相关;生产契约的履行与关系租金、专用性资产投资和贴现率正相关,与遵守契约所付出的额外成本负相关。提出建议:政府应扶持猪肉产品品牌建设,促使优质猪肉产品在市场上实现优质优价;政府应增加对屠宰加工企业的抽检补贴;屠宰加工企业在进行专用性资产投资的同时也应要求养殖场户进行专用性资产投资。     

Life cycle employment and fertility across institutional environments

In this paper, we formulate a dynamic utility maximization model of female labor force participation and fertility choices and estimate approximate decision rules using data on married women in Italy, Spain and France. The estimated decision rules indicate that first-order state dependence is the most important factor determining female labor supply behavior in all three countries. We also find that cross-country differences in state dependence effects are consistent with the order of country-level measures of labor market flexibility and child care availability. Counterfactual simulations of the model indicate that female employment rates in Italy and Spain could reach EU target levels were French social policies to be adopted in those countries.     

Appropriate contract durations in the German markets for on-line reserve capacity

This paper explores the economic implications of different contract durations in markets for on-line (primary and secondary) reserve capacity in Germany with the crucial feature of separate markets for spot energy and reserve capacity provision. The analysis is based on an equilibrium model developed by Just and Weber (Energy Econo 30:3198–3221, 2008) for reserve markets. It reveals the implicit trade-off for the bidders and implicit interdependencies between the reserve and the spot markets. Even if the markets are not explicitly coordinated, they are interrelated through the dispatch decisions of the power plant owners. The paper concludes that the current German reserve market design is inefficient and should be improved. The results clearly show that shorter periods (with resulting lower variations in overall electricity demand) lead to more efficient dispatch and market results. Not only prices in the reserve capacity markets are expected to be lower, but also spot market prices. As these benefits can be partially reaped by owners of large generation portfolios also under longer contract durations, it discriminates against smaller generation companies and can potentially deter market participation. Further, the paper takes a broader perspective and discusses security concerns against shorter contract durations. It is shown that the opportunity costs character of the reserve market implies sufficient incentives for supplying online reserve capacity. The concerns do not appear to be predominant and it should be possible to manage them appropriately.     

MARKET ECONOMIES WITH AN ENDOGENOUS SOCIAL DIVISION OF LABOR

I consider a general equilibrium model of a competitive market economy in which production is conducted through an endogenous social division of labor. I represent economic decision makers as “consumer–producers,” who consume as well as produce commodities. In this approach, the emergence of a nontrivial social division of labor is guided by Increasing Returns to Specialization (IRSpec) in production. Under IRSpec, I show existence of competitive equilibria, the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics, and characterize these equilibria. Markets equilibrate through the adjustment of the social division of labor; the production technologies completely determine the equilibrium prices.     

Withholding investments in energy only markets: can contracts make a difference?

Although there are mechanisms to control market power in the spot market, withholding investments can still increase profits and hamper adequate capacity expansion. We examine the effect on investment of one suggested approach to reducing market power, contracting longer term. We construct a stylized model of an energy-only market where two firms, each specializing in one technology, invest in a first stage, contract part of their production in the second stage and sell the rest in the spot market in the third stage. We compare this model to one of an energy-only market having two stages, investment and a spot market. We find cases where the contracts change neither capacity nor peak prices, where the foreclosing effect of one player blocking the other from contracts markets increases investments and reduces prices, and where the opportunity to foreclose the market can incentivize one firm to lower its investment and increase its pricing power to the detriment of consumers. The model relies on the simplest possible assumptions of imperfect competition (subgame perfect equilibria with Cournot agents). We illustrate the different outcomes in a numerical example with two load steps (peak and off-peak) where we change one parameter, the height of the off-peak time segment. We find cases with increased and decreased capacity as well as no change in capacity. Since there is no general characterization of the consequences of contracts in this simple example, there can be no characterization in more complicated models that contain the market structures included here, and regulators or competition authorities cannot rely on contracts to induce sufficient capacity expansion by reducing market power. One other market mechanism that has been proposed to induce investment, a capacity auction with predetermined capacity requirements, is a potential alternative to limit market power that deserves further exploration to determine the extent to which it can provide an adequate incentive to invest in the presence of market power.     

Subsidies for renewable energy in inflexible power markets

This paper analyses how short-term operational efficiency and the \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) emissions of a power system depend on different subsidies for wind power and on the flexibility of the power system. This is analysed in the framework of a numerical power market model, calibrated to Danish data, where the start-up costs and other constraints in fossil-fuelled power plants are taken into account. The main conclusion is that flexibility is crucial for the costs of integrating wind power in an existing system. If thermal power plants are inflexible, subsidies for wind power should strive to increase the flexibility of the market by passing market signals to wind power. A subsidy that conceals market signals from wind power producers (a production subsidy) or disconnects wind power incentives from the market signals altogether (a fixed price) increases costs considerably. An inflexible power system should aim to introduce optimal subsidies (an investment subsidy) instead of production subsidies or a fixed price. The design of the subsidy scheme should take into account both the characteristics of the existing system and the characteristics of renewables.     

The impact of provincial marketing boards on price relations and pricing dynamics in the North American slaughter hog market

Canadian Provincial hog marketing boards act as sales agents for hog producers. The hypothesis that the introduction of marketing boards in Alberta. Manitoba and Saskatchewan between 1969 and 1972 created seller side market power is tested and supported:their hog prices rose to levels comparable to Ontario where a marketing board had been in place. Organized sellers can also influence pricing dynamics because of the linked spatial oligopsonistic nature of the hog packing industry. Cointegration tests and variance decompositions indicate that establishing boards in the surplus producing western provinces made them relatively less isolated from pricing innovations in deficit producing eastern Canada.     

Strategic technology choice in regulated markets with demand uncertainty

This paper presents a simple model of a non-competitive market with demand uncertainty in which firms can choose their technology of production. Technology is characterised by two parameters: capacity and flexibility. The first has a strong commitment value while flexibility is needed to face uncertainty. Lack of competition requires active regulation to ensure that the price is not set at excessive level. When choosing their technology, firms take into account not only the effects of this choice on the opponent(s) but also the effect on the regulated price. In this framework, and because of regulation, firms have an incentive to strategically manipulate their cost (cost padding). This causes monopoly regulation aiming at improving allocative efficiency to be ineffective. In fact, by “tying its hand” to a low level of capacity, the monopolistic firm is able to get round the constraint imposed by the regulator. Increasing the number of firms in the market may restore regulation effectiveness. The reason is that if demand is sufficiently volatile, then firms strategically choose flexible techniques and this effect dominates over the incentive to manipulate costs in order to escape regulation. In this case, regulation is effective precisely because cost padding is hampered by firms’ non-cooperative behaviour.

中国生猪产业扶持政策的满意度及敏感性分析

利用湖南省生猪养殖户的调查数据,对中国生猪产业扶持政策的总体满意度、分项满意度以及两者的相关关系进行了测算,并以Pearson相关系数衡量敏感性。结果显示:现阶段中国生猪产业扶持政策的总体满意度较高;在11项生猪产业扶持政策中,生猪产业扶持政策总体满意度的改变对生猪生产和市场统计监测制度满意度的变化最敏感,其次是屠宰环节病害猪无害化处理和重大疫病强制扑杀补偿。提出:要进一步提高中国生猪产业扶持政策的满意度,需要健全生猪价格监测预警机制、适度提高补贴标准、加大对生猪污染治理的投入和加快推出生猪期货。     

Currency Hedging For Export-Flexible Firms *

This paper examines the production and hedging decisions of a competitive exporting firm under exchange rate uncertainty. The firm possesses export flexibility in that it can distribute its output to either the domestic market or a foreign market, after observing the true realization of the exchange rate. It is shown that the separation theorem does not hold under export flexibility, i.e., the firm's optimal output depends on the firm's preference and on the underlying exchange rate uncertainty. Furthermore, the export- flexible firm underhedges its exchange rate risk exposure in a currency forward market where in the forward exchange rate contains a non-positive risk premium. [D21, F31]     

A collaborating inventory model in a supply chain

The present article investigates an economic order quantity/ economic production quantity model in three-layer (manufacturer, vendor and retailer) supply chain management. In each stage, the products may undergo non-conforming quality items which have less value in the market. This model maximizes a collaborating expected profit function while production rate, order quantity, number of shipments with equal sizes are decision variables and unit production cost is a function of production rate. Numerical example is illustrated to test the model.