Centralization and the size of government in Canada

The determinants of the growth of government in Canada over the period 1926–90 are examined. Of particular interest is whether changes in the degree of centralization have affected the public sector's share of GDP. Unlike other studies using time-series data, the effect of decentralization toward the provincial/state and toward the local levels of government are measured separately. Empirical estimates provide strong support for the conclusion that citizen mobility acts as an important constraint on the growth of government.     

Fiscal federalism,jurisdictional competition,and the size of government

Fiscal federalism is commonly held to reduce the size of government, but how does it do so: through shrinking the welfare state, cutting government consumption, or reducing public investment? This paper examines tax competition under fiscal federalism through the lens of imperfect competition theory, derives new empirical implications from different theories of fiscal federalism, and tests those hypotheses with new variables and data. Cross-national statistical results show that jurisdictional competition under fiscal federalism is associated with reductions in the administrative expense of government but not the size of the welfare state. Moreover, the apparent impact of fiscal federalism with a high degree of jurisdictional competition is larger than that estimated in previous research. Once the models have been appropriately specified, the United States is no longer an outlier among high-income democracies on either government consumption or social spending. Close examination of the data reveals that some fiscally federal systems better approximate a “market-preserving model” and others a “capital-privileging” or “state-corroding” model.     

Chinese import competition,crime, and government transfers in US

This paper exploits the exogenous rise of Chinese imports in US to investigate the effect of import competition on crime at the county level. The results indicate that counties with high exposure to Chinese import competition have high crime rates. The exposure effect on property crime is much larger than that on violent crime. A one standard deviation increase in exposure causes 32 more violent crimes in the county, while such increase in exposure causes 256 more property crimes. Interestingly, we find that the crime impact of exposure to Chinese import competition becomes smaller in counties with high government transfers.     

The effects of taxation,price control and government contracts in oligopoly and monopolistic competition

Many government contracts with or policies towards oligopolistic sectors essentially involve private firms selling a given proportion (ϑ), or quantity, of output to the government at a fixed price (P_R) with the remainder being sold on the open-market. Often this is combined with consumer rationing. Examples include cement and sugar in India, and health, housing and defence in many countries. The paper investigates the effects of these schemes (including sales and excise taxation) on prices, output and household welfare under oligopoly and monopolistic competition. Less government control (reduced ϑ) may raise prices and tax shifting can be above or below 100 percent.     

财政资源集中与预算偏离

地方政府的经济发展追求常常伴随着突破财政预算约束的冲动.当地方政府财政资源控制和集中程度提高时,地方经济发展和突破预算约束的两方面冲动也随之增强,其重要表现就是财政支出预算偏离程度扩大.我国自改革开放以来持续进行的撤县设区改革,在优化了政府间行政管理体制的同时,也强化了地级市政府对辖区内财政资源的集中程度,由此会对地方财政预算偏离产生影响.本文基于撤县设区改革的准自然实验,实证检验了财政资源集中对地级市支出预算偏离的影响效果,发现前者对后者有显著的正向影响,而财政透明度的增加有利于抑制支出预算偏离行为.本文的研究有助于阐明地方财政体制变动对地方预算行为的影响,也有助于阐明推进省以下政府间财政关系法治化建设、建立现代预算制度的重要意义.     

Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization

This paper studies the choice between centralization and decentralization of fiscal policy in a political economy setting. With centralization, regional delegates vote over agendas comprising sets of region–specific projects. The outcome is inefficient because the choice of projects is insufficiently sensitive to within–region benefits. The number of projects funded may be non–monotonic in the strength of project externalities. The efficiency gains from decentralization, and the performance of "constitutional rules" (such as majority voting) which may be used to choose between decentralization and centralization, are then discussed in this framework. Weaker externalities and more heterogeneity between regions need not increase the efficiency gain from decentralization.     

产业集群理论研究述评

围绕产业集群概念,检索出109篇文献,对我国近五年来的理论研究成果进行梳理和归纳,指出了产业集群理论研究的不足和未来发展趋势,并建立了产业集群的研究体系。     

Entrepreneurial innovations,competition and competition policy

We construct a model where an entrepreneur can innovate for entry or for sale. It is shown that increased product market competition tends to increase the relative profitability of innovation for sale. Increased competition not only reduces the profits of entrants and the acquirer of the inventions in a similar fashion, but also reduces the profit of non-acquirers. Therefore, incumbents' valuations of innovations are less negatively affected by increased competition, and the incentive for innovation for sale can increase with increased competition. Moreover, a stricter, but not too strict, merger policy is shown to increase the incentive for innovations for sale by ensuring the bidding competition for the innovation.     

The importance of government commitment in attracting firms: A dynamic analysis of tax competition in an agglomeration economy

Agglomeration tendencies of industrial firms significantly affect the nature of tax competition. This paper analyzes tax competition between two countries over an infinite time horizon in an economy with trade costs and internationally mobile industrial firms. Most of the previous studies on tax competition in the ‘new economic geography’ framework employ static models. In this study, two governments dynamically compete with each other to attract firms through their choices of taxes and subsidies. It is shown that the commitment of the governments to their policies is crucial in determining the distribution of firms in the long run. Specifically, if governments find each others׳ tax policies credible, then one country will attract all the firms when trade costs are low enough to make agglomeration forces dominant. If policies are not credible, both countries may attract an equal share of firms even when trade costs are low, as the lack of commitment by governments acts as a dispersion force.     

Centralization,Fiscal Federalism,and Private School Attendance*

A CGE model is used to analyze the impact of public school financing on private school attendance. The common perception that public school finance centralization will necessarily lead to greater private school attendance is not correct in such a model—even when that centralization involves an extreme equalization as in California. Furthermore, if centralization is less dramatic (as in most states), declines in private school attendance are even more pronounced. This weakens the speculation that low exit rates to private schools in centralizing states imply that general public school quality does not drop as a result of such centralization.     

Does Centralization Affect the Number and Size of Lobbies?

Previous research has shown that the effect of fiscal centralization is to reduce lobbying. However empirical evidence suggests that this is not always the case. This paper attempts to explain the empirical evidence in a two‐jurisdiction political economy model of endogenous lobby formation and policy determination. We measure lobbying in two ways: (i) the number of lobbies formed under the two settings and (ii) their impact on policy decisions. We show that, contrary to the predictions of the preference dilution effect, the effect of centralization on lobbying are ambiguous with respect to both measures of lobbies.     

非营利组织财务治理模式:集权与分权选择初探

财务治理采取集权式、分权式抑或二者的结合,将对非营利组织获取和使用资源的经济性、效率和效果产生重要影响.由于集权和分权各有优缺点,非营利组织管理当局应当依据财务管理的具体运行情况,在充分考虑组织内外部各种因素的基础上,实行一种集权和分权均衡结合的"适度分权"模式.     

Centralization vs. Decentralization: A Principal-Agent Analysis

The decision to allocate policy jurisdictions to different levels of government is related to a number of trade‐offs between the advantages and disadvantages of centralized versus decentralized provision of public services. A trade‐off central to many discussions is that between the internalization of externalities under centralization versus an “accountability” advantage of decentralization. In this paper we formalize this trade‐off in the context of a class of principal–agent models known as common agency.     

“政治集权,经济分权”与政府差别化税收策略研究

基于1998~2010年中国工业企业微观数据,本文研究了"政治集权,经济分权"规制下政府对企业的差别化征税行为对企业有效税率的影响。研究发现,"政治集权"与"经济分权"的政府都会降低企业税负以吸引或留住资本,促进区域经济发展,但"政治集权"下政府的征税参考因素更加多元化。在控制相关变量后,企业有效税率的高低主要受企业对区域经济增长贡献、企业空间移动能力和企业政治游说能力三方面因素的影响:企业对区域经济增长贡献越大,有效税率越低;企业的空间移动能力越强,有效税率越低;企业的政治游说能力越强,影响层级越高,有效税率越低。     

Nationalism and government effectiveness

Nation-building is believed to have a positive influence on economic and political outcomes, especially in countries with ethnically fragmented populations. Yet nationalism, an indicator of successful nation-building, has been empirically linked to protectionism and intolerance, which suggests that dismal performance is a more likely outcome. This paper empirically identifies an inverted U-shaped relationship between nationalism and government effectiveness. The results suggest that the level of nationalism in the population is higher than optimal in most countries. It is further shown that nationalism may mitigate the negative effects of ethnic heterogeneity in former colonies. We find no clear linkages between nationalism and trade openness.     

The Process of Government Centralization: A Constitutional View

Government centralization is not a law of nature. It can be explained on the one hand by the endeavor of locally elected representatives of national assemblies to form tax and expenditure cartels, on the other hand by the constitutional power of the federal government to take over state tax legislation and to act as a cartel enforcer. A case study provides empirical evidence and moreover shows that such cartels generate a higher tax level and perform badly in interregional equalization of per capita income. The relevance of constitutional power for explaining centralization seems to be confirmed in various countries.     

服务业集聚与产业结构优化关系探究

随着全球化进程的不断加快，服务业集聚已经成为人们普遍关注的话题。产业集聚在获得规模效应的同时避免了垄断现象的产生，服务业集聚不但拥有这样的优势，而且还有自己独特的形成和发展特点。从产业结构的优化角度切入，借助区位商和专门化率等分析指标，以江苏省和上海市为例，对服务业集聚的形成进行理论和实证分析，提出产业结构的优化对于服务业集聚的形成和发展有着积极的作用。合理的产业结构能够为服务业集聚提供坚实的基础，各地区应该根据各自的产业特点积极的进行优化，催生服务业集聚，加快本地区经济的进一步发展。