中国高技术产业生产率影响 因素实证检验*

本文使用微观层面的企业数据,对中国高技术产业生产率的影响因素进行实证检验,发现资产增长、人力资本、企业利润、企业规模对生产率具有显著的促进作用,而资本劳动比、企业存货起明显的负向作用,外国直接投资等变量几乎不起作用。研发投入、银行贷款与政府补贴的实证结论与人们的正常预期不同,研发投入对生产率要么不起作用、要么起负向作用,银行贷款与政府补贴对生产率起着扭曲与阻碍作用,中国的一些特殊情况导致了上述结论。     

R&D Policies and Endogenous Growth: A Dynamic General Equilibrium Analysis of the Case for Canada*

This paper utilizes a general equilibrium R&D model of endogenous growth via increasing capital variety to examine the impact of alternative policies on productivity and economic growth. The model is calibrated using data from the Canadian economy. Findings reveal that direct incentives such as subsidies to R&D activities would have the highest productivity impact on the Canadian economy, that an increase in subsidies to the users of R&D capital (output) would have a positive but smaller impact, and trade liberalization would have minimal effects on productivity growth via its impact on international R&D spillovers.     

出口导向贸易政策与发展中国家间FDI竞争——基于寡占竞争模型的理论分析

文章建立了一个两国竞争模型,重点分析了进口关税与出口补贴等战略贸易政策对发展中国家吸引FDI竞争的影响。研究发现:(1)当两国都采取出口补贴的外资激励政策时,工资水平和进口关税对发展中国家间FDI竞争并没有直接影响;(2)对全要素生产率较高的国家来说,当两国的关税水平都较高时,出口补贴政策增加流向本国的FDI,而当两国关税水平大幅下降后,出口补贴政策反而不利于本国FDI竞争。文章的结论对当前我国战略引资和出口退税等政策的调整具有重大的指导意义。     

Government subsidy and aggregate productivity dynamics: Evidence from China

Based on data for Chinese manufacturing firms from 1999 to 2007, this study explores the dynamic evolution of aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) from the perspective of firmsʼ entry and exit. It also quantifies how government subsidies influence the aggregate productivity growth. By decomposing aggregate productivity growth into components, including technological progress, reallocation, entry, and exit effects, we found that aggregate TFP growth in Chinese manufacturingfollows an upward trend during the sample period. This tendency originates from the contribution of technological progress, reallocation, and exit effects. Moreover, the effects of these four components on aggregate TFP growth of different industries, regions, and ownership types are different. Furthermore, technological progress, reallocation, and exit effects are important pathways for government subsidies to promote aggregate TFP growth in Chinese manufacturing.     

Trade and market selection: Evidence from manufacturing plants in Colombia

We examine the link between trade liberalization and aggregate productivity, with a focus on improved market selection resulting from a reduction in trade barriers and in the dispersion of these barriers across producers. Our analysis exploits tariff changes across sectors after the Colombian trade reform. An additional advantage of our analysis is that our TFP measure does not include demand and price effects. We find that reduced trade protection makes plant survival depend more closely on productivity. Using a dynamic simulation, we find that enhanced selection increases aggregate productivity substantially. Trade liberalization also increases productivity of incumbent plants and improves the allocation of activity. We find larger effects on allocative efficiency with our TFP measure than with a traditional measure including price effects.     

Who benefits from China’s coal subsidy policies? A computable partial equilibrium analysis

Using a computable partial equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and based on global coal production, trade and consumption data in 2014, this study simulates the economic and welfare impacts of China’s coal subsidies at the industry level. Simulation results show that, first, the government’s subsidies have greatly promoted China's coal output, but may aggravate the overcapacity in China’s coal industry. Second, China's coal subsidies have significant trade destruction effects and its coal imports fall by more than 20% annually. Third, if considering the environmental cost, China's coal subsidies cause not only huge net welfare loss to China, but also harm to the global environment, thus no country benefits from China's coal subsidies.     

A general equilibrium analysis of price controls and subsidies on food in mexico

In this paper we present a general equilibrium model that permits a thorough analysis of the effects of government pricing policies. In particular, we study the effects of price controls and subsidies on agricultural and food items in Mexico. We analyze alternative policies for reducing the government deficit by cutting subsidies and increasing indirect taxes. Our results indicate that, although food subsidies need to be reduced, maintaining some subsidies would have a favorable impact on income distribution.     

政府补贴、行业竞争与企业出口技术复杂度

政府补贴作为经济发展的"有形之手",在我国出口技术结构升级中扮演何种角色呢?其内在影响机制又是如何呢?文章基于中国工业企业数据和中国海关统计数据库,利用倾向得分匹配法(PSM)和倍差法考察了政府补贴和行业竞争对企业出口技术复杂度的影响效应及渠道.研究表明:政府补贴抑制了企业出口技术复杂度的提升,而行业竞争促进了企业出口技术复杂度的提升;不同竞争程度的企业样本中,政府对低竞争行业的企业出口技术复杂度的抑制效应显著高于中高竞争行业,这说明行业竞争度的提高有利于纠正政府补贴对出口技术复杂度的抑制效应.进一步的影响机制分析表明:政府补贴促进出口技术结构升级的渠道为研发激励效应,且这种激励效应只在中高竞争行业样本中是显著存在的;从成本渠道考察发现,政府补贴有利于企业出口价格指数的降低,从而对出口技术复杂度的提升产生显著的成本扭曲效应.文章的结论意味着,不能一味地对企业进行补贴,而应该构建有效的激励机制与成本倒逼机制,让企业通过内生动力而非价格竞争形成企业出口技术复杂度的升级.     

智能制造业创新产出：政府补助与市场竞争是否协同助力

基于2015—2019年中国智能制造行业上市公司数据，探讨政府补助与市场竞争对创新产出的协同作用，研究不同产业类别、不同市场竞争环境以及不同区域下政府补助的异质性效果。结果表明，政府补助和市场竞争对企业创新产出均有显著激励作用，市场竞争正向调节政府补助与企业创新产出的关系；政府补助对智能制造四大行业的创新产出均具有正向激励效应，其中对高端装备和新材料产业的促进作用更显著；在高市场竞争环境下，政府补助对高质量创新产出的促进作用更加显著；分区域看，东、中部地区政府补助对企业创新产出的促进作用更显著，且东部地区政府补助与市场竞争的协同促进作用更强，中部地区次之，西部地区较弱。结论对政府制定智能制造业补助政策、完善创新市场环境、促进政府与市场发挥协同创新作用等具有参考价值。     

The more subsidies,the longer survival? Evidence from Chinese manufacturing firms

How do government subsidies affect firm survival? By using Chinese firm‐level data for 1998 to 2007, we show that, on average, there is a positive and significant impact of government subsidies on firm survival. We also investigate the heterogeneous effects of government subsidies with different intensities on firm survival, and find that moderate‐intensity government subsidies exert a positive impact on firm survival, while high‐intensity government subsidies increase the exit probabilities, the underlying mechanisms via subsidy‐seeking investment and innovation incentive weakening are supported by empirical evidence. Furthermore, we explore the role of governance institutions in the subsidy–survival relationship, and find that the positive impact of government subsidies on firm survival is more pronounced in regions with better governance institutions.     

Reforming state owned enterprises in China: Effects of WTO accession

In December 2001 China became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). By signing the accession protocol, China not only agreed to reform its trade policy, but it also accepted regulations that implied reductions on government subsidies to the state-owned sector. In this paper we claim that the latter, largely ignored in the literature, generate important welfare gains that need to be attributed to WTO accession. We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with state and private enterprises. We calibrate the model to the Chinese economy and we quantitatively assess the economic effects of reducing subsidies to the state sector as required by the WTO. We find the welfare benefits of such reduction in subsidies to be substantial. Using the context of China, this paper identifies a new channel through which WTO accession increases a country's welfare: it induces reforms on domestic subsidies which lead to an increase in economic efficiency.     

产业政策提升中国数字企业的全要素生产率了吗？

提升数字企业全要素生产率是促进数字经济高质量发展的必要方式,而产业政策的有效使用将对这一过程起到重要的推动作用。本文利用2007-2020年中国数字行业上市企业的面板数据,实证检验了政府补贴、税收优惠、信贷支持和市场准入四类产业政策对数字企业全要素生产率的影响。研究发现,信贷支持显著促进了数字企业全要素生产率的提升,市场准入则起到显著的负向作用,政府补贴和税收优惠对数字企业全要素生产率的增长无明显效果,该结论在进行一系列稳健性检验后仍保持稳健。异质性和作用机制检验的结果表明,产业政策对数字企业全要素生产率存在产权、企业规模和企业生命周期方面的异质性作用,信贷支持和市场准入则分别通过缓解企业融资约束和加剧企业过度投资的方式影响数字企业的全要素生产率。本文的研究结论对于政府制定更为精准有效的产业政策具有一定的启示意义。     

Trade Policy in the Presence of Technology Licensing*

We consider strategic trade policy when a high‐cost and a low‐cost firm belonging to two different countries compete in quantities in a third country, and technology is transferable via licensing. We characterize the effects of subsidies on (i) licensing payments—a new source of rents, (ii) the decision to license, and (iii) the subsidy bill difference (compared to when licensing is infeasible). We find that, in the presence of licensing, optimal strategic trade policy has several interesting features. For example, even under Cournot competition, optimal policy can be an export tax instead of an export subsidy. Also, unlike results in strategic trade policy with asymmetric costs, we find that optimal export subsidies are not necessarily positively related to the cost‐competitiveness of firms. In other words, governments need not necessarily favor “winners” when licensing is possible. Furthermore, there exist parameterizations such that a government, if it can, might ban licensing.     

Unions, progressive taxes, and education subsidies

Progressive income taxes moderate distortionary wage demands by trade unions and thereby reduce unemployment, and at the same time underlie disincentives to acquire skills and decrease labour productivity. Governments can respond by combining progressive taxes with subsidies to investment in human capital. A system of generous education subsidies and steep progressive tax rates is more likely to emerge, the greater the market power of trade unions and the better the ability of governments to influence private education decisions. Empirical analysis for several OECD countries provides results consistent with these propositions. A policy mix of high education subsidies and relatively progressive income taxes is found in countries where union membership is significant.     

The “sugar rush” from innovation subsidies: a robust political economy perspective

The governments of most advanced countries offer some type of financial subsidy to encourage firm innovation and productivity. This paper analyzes the effects of innovation subsidies using a unique Swedish database that contains firm level data for the period 1997–2011, specifically informa tion on firm subsidies over a broad range of programs. Applying causal treatment effect analysis based on matching and a diff-in-diff approach combined with a qualitative case study of Swedish innovation subsidy programs, we test whether such subsidies have positive effects on firm performance. Our results indicate a lack of positive performance effects in the long run for the majority of firms, albeit there are positive short-run effects on human capital investments and also positive short-term productivity effects for the smallest firms. These findings are interpreted from a robust political economy perspective that reveals that the problems of acquiring correct information and designing appropriate incentives are so complex that the absence of significant positive long-run effects on firm performance for the majority of firms is not surprising.     

Systematic Political Grass–Root Support for Tariffs

The leading political–economy–of–trade models are virtually silent on two fundamental questions raised by Rodrik in 1995. Why are trade policies systematically biased against trade? And why are tariffs rather than more efficient production subsidies adopted to redistribute income? This paper shows that systematic political grass–root support for trade–restricting and inefficient tariffs emerges when the government has a revenue goal and collecting taxes is costly. Even if no tax instrument enjoys an advantage with respect to collection costs and the factor ownership distribution is unbiased, more people support tariffs than import or production subsidies. More generally, the presence of tax–collection costs creates a grass–root support bias for taxes over subsidies as instruments to redistribute income.     

TARIFFS AND IMPORTS MISINVOICING UNDER OLIGOPOLY

Mismatch of trade statistics between developed and developing countries indicate a substantial misinvoicing of trade figures, primarily by developing country traders. This is due to the inflexible exchange rate regimes, severe import restrictions and export subsidies prevailing in Less Developed Countries (LDCs). In this paper, we focus on import underinvoicing due to high tariff barriers in a market where domestic producers compete with importers. Specifically, we examine how tariff levels, market structure and government intervention (in the form of intensity of monitoring and severity of penalties) affect the levels of underinvoicing. We also look at the optimal levels of import tariff and instruments of government intervention in these circumstances.     

Trade Liberalization, Exit, and Productivity Improvements: Evidence from Chilean Plants

This paper empirically investigates the effects of liberalized trade on plant productivity in the case of Chile. Chile presents an interesting setting to study this relationship since it underwent a massive trade liberalization that significantly exposed its plants to competition from abroad during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Methodologically, I approach this question in two steps. In the first step, I estimate a production function to obtain a measure of plant productivity. I estimate the production function semiparametrically to correct for the presence of selection and simultaneity biases in the estimates of the input coefficients required to construct a productivity measure. I explicitly incorporate plant exit in the estimation to correct for the selection problem induced by liquidated plants. These methodological aspects are important in obtaining a reliable plant-level productivity measure based on consistent estimates of the input coefficients. In the second step, I identify the impact of trade on plants' productivity in a regression framework allowing variation in productivity over time and across traded- and nontraded-goods sectors. Using plant-level panel data on Chilean manufacturers, I find evidence of within plant productivity improvements that can be attributed to a liberalized trade for the plants in the import-competing sector. In many cases, aggregate productivity improvements stem from the reshuffling of resources and output from less to more efficient producers.     

Private insurance subsidies and public health care markets: evidence from Canada

In this study I examine the effects of government subsidies to employer-provided health insurance on the decision to purchase insurance, and on utilization of publicly funded health services. Using unique variation in tax subsidies across Canadian provinces as an instrument, I estimate the effects of these subsidies on the demand for supplemental health insurance and their extended effects on the decision to use publicly-funded health services. My results show that government subsidies through tax exemptions have significant effects on the decision to purchase insurance. Furthermore, additional insurance policies lead to moral hazard in the use of publicly funded health services. JEL Classification: H2,H4, I1     

The wealth effects of premium subsidies on moral hazard in insurance markets

Insurance premium subsidies are present in many insurance markets. The Swiss government, for example, paid out CHF 4.26 billion or 0.72% of the Swiss GDP for health insurance premium subsidies in 2011. Analyses of premium subsidies have often highlighted that the increased insurance demand due to premium subsidies increases the effects of moral hazard in the market. Other consequences of premium subsidies, however, have mostly been neglected by the literature. We show in our theoretical model that the wealth effects of premium subsidies decrease the sensitivity of the insured towards the monetary consequences of losses. This leads to less prevention efforts by the insured and thus increases moral hazard in the market. The effect is preserved if the subsidy is financed through proportional taxation. Using two alternative models, we show that providing state-dependent subsidies can either increase or reverse this effect, depending on which state subsidies are paid. We argue that whether demand effects or wealth effects of premium subsidies will dominate the insured׳s behavior depends on the market structure.