Key market values for bottled wine in an emerging market: product attributes or business strategy?

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on the emerging bottled Chilean red wine market and studies the main determinants of the consumer price of wine sold on the domestic market. A hedonic price function was estimated for a sample of 810 wines using a quantile regression (QR) model. The database contains three variable groups to explain price: objective variables (national, international and vine quality designations), subjective variables (wine score) and business strategies used by wine producers. Results show that some objective variables have a greater impact on price than the wine score (a subjective variable) and business strategies, which vary for each quartile of prices analysed. Finally, this information will allow companies to design and implement marketing strategies to inform the consumer about the importance of some variables in the price of their product.     

Relative importance of sticky prices and sticky information in price setting

The relative importance of price and information stickiness in price setting to model and explain inflation dynamics is investigated in this study. A structural model of inflation is developed and used which combines two different models of price setting behavior: the sticky price model of the New Keynesian literature and the sticky information model of Mankiw and Reis. In a framework similar to the Calvo model, I assume that there are two types of firms. One type of firm chooses its prices optimally through forward-looking behavior—as assumed in the sticky price model. It uses all available information when deciding on prices. The other type of firm sets its prices under the constraint that the information it uses is “sticky”—as assumed in the sticky information model. It collects and processes the information necessary to choose its optimal prices with a delay. This leads to the sticky price–sticky information (SP/SI) Phillips curve that nests the standard sticky price and sticky information models. Estimations of this structural model show that both sticky price and sticky information models are statistically and quantitatively important for price setting. However, the sticky price firms make up the majority of the firms in the economy. The results are robust to alternative sub-samples and estimation methods.     

How Applicable is the Dominant Firm Model of Price Leadership?

In this paper, we examine the usefulness of the dominant firm model of price leadership to serve as a benchmark for organizing behavior in laboratory markets. This well established model, whose origins can be traced back over a hundred years, has been recently applied to such landmark antitrust cases as Standard Oil and Alcoa and more recently to the analysis of deregulated markets for electric power. Our results indicate that in posted offer markets the dominant firm quite often produces more than the model's benchmark and sometimes at much greater prices. With sealed offer auction rules and a low elasticity of fringe supply, the dominant firm produces the theoretical output at a price greater than the prediction. However, with a high elasticity of fringe supply, the dominant firm produces more output over a wide range of prices that includes the predicted price.     

Learning and Noisy Equilibrium Behavior in an Experimental Study of Imperfect Price Competition*

We consider a duopoly pricing game with a unique Bertrand–Nashequilibrium. The high‐price firm has a nonvanishing market share, however, and intuition suggests that observed prices may be positively related to this market share. This relationship is implied by a model in which players make noisy (logit) best responses to expected payoff differences. The resulting logit equilibrium model was used to design an experiment in which the high‐price firm's market share varies. The model accurately predicts the final‐period price averages. A naive learning model predicts the observed differences in the time paths of average prices.     

Price leadership and firm size asymmetry: an experimental analysis

We use laboratory experiments to examine the effect of firm size asymmetry on the emergence of price leadership in a price-setting duopoly with capacity constraints. Independent of the level of size asymmetry, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of our timing game predicts that the large firm is the price leader. Experimental data show that price leadership by the large firm is frequent, but simultaneous moves are also often observed. Profit outcomes in the previous period affect the subjects’ decisions to announce or wait in a way that hampers convergence to the equilibrium. Furthermore, while both small and large firms display a strong tendency to wait to announce their price when firm size asymmetry is low, they often set prices early when size asymmetry is high. Prices are higher when price setting is sequential rather than simultaneous and when firm size asymmetry is high. Hence, price leadership by either type of firm has an anti-competitive effect that is more pronounced when the size difference between firms is large.     

Competition and confidentiality: Signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information

We model non-cooperative signaling by two firms that compete over a continuum of consumers, assuming each consumer has private information about the intensity of her preferences for the firms' respective products and each firm has private information about its own product's quality. We characterize a symmetric separating equilibrium in which each firm's price reveals its respective product quality. We show that the equilibrium prices, the difference between those prices, the associated outputs, and profits are all increasing functions of the ex ante probability of high safety. If horizontal product differentiation is sufficiently great then equilibrium prices and profits are higher under incomplete information about quality than if quality were commonly known. Thus, while signaling imposes a distortionary loss on a monopolist using price to signal quality, duopolists may benefit from the distortion as it can reduce competition. Finally, average quality is lower since signaling quality redistributes demand towards low-quality firms.     

Pricing to Firm: an Analysis of Firm‐ and Product‐level Import Prices*

We use Hungarian Customs data on product‐level imports of manufacturing firms to document that the import price of a particular product varies substantially across buying firms. We relate the level of import prices to firm characteristics such as size, foreign ownership, and market power. We develop a theory of “pricing to firm” (PTF), where markups depend on the technology and competitive environment of the buyer. The predictions of the model are confirmed by the data: import prices are higher for firms with greater market power, and for more essential intermediate inputs (with a high share in material costs). We take account of the endogeneity of the buyer’s market power with respect to higher import prices and unobserved cost heterogeneity within product categories. The magnitude of PTF is big: the standard deviation of price predicted by PTF is 21.5%.     

Real and financial effects of insider trading with correlated signals

Summary. In this paper we study the real and financial effects of insider trading in a Static, Kyle-type model. In our model the insider is also the manager of the firm. Hence the insider chooses both the amount of the real output to be produced and the amount of the stock of the firm to trade. The aim of the paper is to study the relationship between financial decisions and real decisions. In particular, we examine how insider trading on the stock market affects the real output and price and how the real decision making affects the financial variables, such as the extent of insider trading, stock prices, and the stock pricing rule of the market maker. In the model, the market maker observes two correlated signals: the total order flow and the market price of the real good. We study the informativeness of the stock price and the effects on insider's profits. We also construct a compensation scheme that aligns the interests of the insider and the firm. Finally, we generalize the pricing rule set up by a competitive market maker and analyze the comparative statics of the model. Received: October 3, 1999: revised version: December 1, 1999     

An experimental study of price dispersion

We report an experiment examining a simple clearinghouse model that generates price dispersion. According to this model, price dispersion arises because of consumer heterogeneity—some consumers are “informed” and simply buy from the firm offering the lowest price, while the remaining consumers are “captive” and shop based on considerations other than price. In our experiment we observe substantial and persistent price dispersion. We find that, as predicted, an increase in the fraction of informed consumers leads to more competitive pricing for all consumers. We also find, as predicted, that when more firms enter the market, prices to informed consumers become more competitive while prices to captive customers become less competitive. Thus, our experiment provides strong support for the model's comparative static predictions about how changes in market structure affect pricing.     

Accounting for Growth in the Australian Wine Industry, 1987 to 2003

A computable general equilibrium model of the Australian economy is used to account for the dramatic growth in Australia's wine industry between 1987 and 1999, and to project grape and wine volumes and prices to 2003. Export demand growth has made a major contribution to total output growth in premium wines, and accounts for most of the increase in the producer price of premium red wine. Domestic consumer preferences have shifted, mainly towards premium red wine, but there is also some evidence of growing demand for premium white wine since the mid 1990s. From the perspective of producers, productivity growth, while being less important than growth in domestic demand, appears to have more than offset the negative effects on suppliers of wine consumer tax increases. From the domestic consumers' perspective, however, tax hikes have raised retail prices much more than productivity gains have lowered them. The high and sustained levels of profitability resulting from export demand growth have led to a massive supply response in Australia. Even so, by 2003 Australian wine output will still be less than 5 per cent of global production.     

Can oil prices help predict US stock market returns? Evidence using a dynamic model averaging (DMA) approach

Crude oil price behaviour has fluctuated wildly since 1973 which has a major impact on key macroeconomic variables. Although the relationship between stock market returns and oil price changes has been scrutinized excessively in the literature, the possibility of predicting future stock market returns using oil prices has attracted less attention. This paper investigates the ability of oil prices to predict S&P 500 price index returns with the use of other macroeconomic and financial variables. Including all the potential variables in a forecasting model may result in an over-fitted model. So instead, dynamic model averaging (DMA) and dynamic model selection (DMS) are applied to utilize their ability of allowing the best forecasting model to change over time while parameters are also allowed to change. The empirical evidence shows that applying the DMA/DMS approach leads to significant improvements in forecasting performance in comparison to other forecasting methodologies and the performance of these models are better when oil prices are included within predictors.     

Forecasting Bordeaux wine prices using state-space methods

Generic Bordeaux red wine (basic claret) can be regarded as being similar to an agricultural commodity. Production volumes are substantial, they are traded at high frequency and the quality of the product is relatively homogeneous. Unlike other commodities and the top-end wines (which represent only 3% of the traded volume), there is no futures market for generic Bordeaux wine. Reliable forecasts of prices can to large extent replace this information deficiency and improve the functioning of the market. We use state-space methods with monthly data to obtain a univariate forecasting model for the average price. The estimates highlight the stochastic trend and the seasonality present in the evolution of the price over the period 1999 to 2016. The model predicts the path of wine prices out of sample reasonably well, suggesting that this approach is useful for making reasonably accurate forecasts of future price movements.     

RETAIL PRICE REGULATION AND THE OPTION TO DELAY

ABSTRACT ** :  This paper examines a two-period model of an investment decision in a network industry characterized by demand uncertainty, economies of scale and sunk costs. In the absence of regulation we identify the market conditions under which a monopolist decides to invest early as well as the underlying overall welfare output. In a regulated environment, we consider a monopolist who faces no downstream (final good) competition but is subject to retail price regulation. We identify the welfare-maximizing regulated prices when the unregulated market outcome is set as the benchmark. We show that if the regulator can commit to ex post regulation – that is, regulated prices that are contingent to future demand realization – then regulated prices that allow the firm to recover its total costs of production are welfare-maximizing. Thus, under ex post price regulation there is no need to compensate the regulated firm for the option to delay that it foregoes when investing today. We argue, however, that regulators cannot make this type of commitment and, therefore, price regulation is often ex ante – that is, regulated prices are not contingent to future demand. We show that the optimal ex ante regulation, and the extent to which regulated prices need to incorporate an option to delay, depend on the nature of demand uncertainty.     

Incentive Regulation of Prices When Costs are Sunk

We present a model featuring irreversible investment, economies of scale, uncertain future demand and capital prices, and a regulator who sets the firm’s output price according to the cost structure of a hypothetical replacement firm. We show that a replacement firm has a fundamental cost advantage over the regulated firm: it can better exploit the economies of scale because it has not had to confront the historical uncertainties faced by the regulated firm. We show that setting prices so low that a replacement firm is just willing to participate is insufficient to allow the regulated firm to expect to break even whenever it has to invest. Thus, unless the regulator is willing to incur costly monitoring to ensure the firm invests, revenue must be allowed in excess of that required for a replacement firm to participate. This contrasts with much of the existing literature, which argues that the market value of a regulated firm should equal the cost of replacing its existing assets. We also obtain a closed-form solution for the regulated firm’s output price when this price is set at discrete intervals. In contrast to rate of return regulation, we find that resetting the regulated price more frequently can increase the risk faced by the firm’s owners, and that this is reflected in a higher output price and a higher weighted-average cost of capital.     

The choice of a foreign price measure in a Bayesian estimated new-Keynesian model for Israel

We estimate a small DSGE model by full information Bayesian techniques on the basis of Israeli data from 1995 to 2006. The model was first developed and estimated by means of classical GMM in Argov and Elkayam (2010), and since then it has been used at the Bank of Israel for monetary policy analysis. It is widely believed that in 2007 (out of sample year) as elsewhere worldwide, inflation rose in Israel due to high commodity prices in global markets. However, our baseline model attributes most of the high inflation in 2007 to supply shocks. One conjecture is that this model's result derives from the inappropriate original use of the unit value of imported consumer goods (which do not include unprocessed food and energy) as the main foreign price measure. We test this conjecture by re-estimating the model with various other foreign price measures that typically do reflect the global rise in commodity prices and compare the log-marginal likelihoods. We find that no other price measure outperforms the original choice in the sample period. Only the foreign trade-weighted CPI equals the performance of the original choice while improving the 2007 interpretation of inflation, and should therefore be considered the main foreign price measure. The proposed methodology for comparing the suitability of alternative measures for observable variables can be applied to any model with exogenous variables that are characterized by univariate equations.     

Convenient prices,cash payments and price rigidity

Recent works suggest that convenient prices that match monetary denominations exhibit above-average price rigidity and are set up by firms that have incentives to be paid in cash. The relationship between convenient prices and cash usage has however never been explicitly examined. This paper proposes a model that relates convenient prices to cash usage and exploits to test it a unique dataset in 2011 on cash payments and prices by a representative sample of French consumers. In line with the model, estimation results bring direct evidence that individuals' shares of cash payments increase with convenient prices. This finding confirms that price rigidity can be in part explained by the use of cash to pay convenient prices.     

Heterogeneity and fine wine prices: application of the quantile regression approach

ABSTRACT

This study addresses the price heterogeneity of the five first growths of Bordeaux. We apply the quantile regression (QR) approach with market segmentation based on wine bottle price quantiles. We compute the hedonic price of wine attributes for various price segments in the market. This approach is applied to a major dataset comprising approximately 50,000 transactions over the 2003–2017 period. The findings indicate that the relative hedonic prices of several wine attributes differ significantly among deciles. The implications of our results are manifold. Vintage and Parker grades have a strong impact on the variation in wine prices, and there is a hierarchy among the five first growths of Bordeaux. There is also a premium commanded by the reputation and experience of an auction house. Since the financial crisis of 2012–2013, investors have considered that the five first growths are overrated, save for the most expensive wines; for those most expensive ones, investors prefer scarcity to liquidity. These results are of import to several actors in the fine wine market: investors, for example, could use the findings herein to better diversify their wine portfolio, while auction houses could better anticipate their future sales based on consumers’ expectation.     

Two-period trading sentiment asset pricing model with information

We present a dynamic asset pricing model with investor sentiment and information, which shows that the investor sentiment plays a systematic and important role in the asset prices and the information is gradually incorporated into prices. The model has an analytical solution to the sentiment equilibrium price. We find that sentiment trading quantity not only increases the market liquidity, but also causes the asset prices' overreaction if the intensity of sentiment demand is more than a constant value. Therefore, the continuing overreactions result in a short-term momentum and a long-term reversal. The model could offer a partial explanation to some financial anomalies such as price bubbles, high volatility, asset prices' overreaction and so on.     

Price as a quality signal in a strategic competition context: The role of a disclosure law

This paper analyses a firm's incentive to use price as a signal of quality in a duopoly competition, even though she can credibly and costlessly disclose her true quality. When a firm sets a higher price to signal higher quality, it has strategic effects on the price chosen by her rival. This could result in higher equilibrium prices and profits. Hence, a mandatory disclosure law is useful to prevent the practice of using of higher price as a device to signal higher quality, and in turn equilibrium prices would be lower. From a welfarist point of view, this argument justifies the establishment of such disclosure law.JEL Classification: D43, D82, K29I would like to thank Dolors Berga, Nicolas Boccard, Ramon Caminal, Carmen Matutes, José Luis Moraga and Ricard Torres for their useful comments. This paper has benefited from the comments of two anonymous referees. All the surviving mistakes are mine. Financial support from SEC2001-2793-C03-03 is gratefully acknowledged.     

Welfare effects of pricing in anticipation of Laspeyres price-cap regulation: an example

A monopolist in a simple two-period model knows that a price cap will be imposed on a Laspeyres index of the firm's prices in the second period. (Tariff basket regulation is relevant to some UK utilities.) A simple example is developed to study the welfare changes that result from strategic weight manipulation by the firm as a consequence of its ability to adjust first-period revenue shares and interperiod price relatives. Uniform regulation requiring an equal percentage reduction in all of the regulated firm's prices provides a natural standard for comparison. One particular configuration of parameters induces identical pricing and welfare under the two forms of regulation in the example. Otherwise, compared with uniform regulation in the example, Laspeyres index regulation raises producer welfare but reduces consumer welfare in the first period and may also reduce consumer welfare in the second period. A numerical illustration shows that total welfare may also be lower under Laspeyres regulation.