Firm-financed training: Firm-specific or general skills?

In this article we analyse the specificity and generality of firm-financed training in Norway. Compared to most other OECD countries Norway has a compressed wage structure. According to non-competitive theories of training we should expect to find much firm-sponsored training in such an economy, and furthermore we should expect to find relatively much firm-sponsored general training. The results in this paper suggest that firm-financed training in Norway contain much general skills. We find that training paid for by previous employers has a positive effect on current wages, and the effect is at least on par with the impact on wages from training paid for by the present employer. We use two methods to control for selection bias in training; an instrument variable (IV)-approach and a fixed-effect approach. The IV-approach suggests that the original training estimate is biased downward. However, our training variable may be subject to measurement error, and recent research has shown that the IV-estimate will be biased upward when a mismeasured variable is binary (as in our case). This finding receives support when using a fixed-effect approach. The IV-estimate for training considerably exceeds the fixed-effect estimate. The fixed-effect estimate is also lower than the original OLS-estimate indicating that some selection bias in training is present.First revision received: January 2002/Final revision received: October 2003The paper is financed by grant 108728/510 from the Norwegian Research Council. The financial support is gratefully acknowledged. The author thanks Erling Barth and Hege Torp at the Institute for Social Research, Yngve Willassen at the Department of Economics, University of Oslo, Håkan Regnér at the Swedish Institute for Social Research, two anonymous referees, and participants at the Seminar for education and labour market in Stavern June 2000 for valuable comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are my own     

Labour market outliers: Lessons from Portugal and Spain

Spain has the highest unemployment rate (22.2%) of any European Union country, Portugal one of the lowest (7.3%). Superficially, these countries share many labour market features: the toughest job security rules in the OECD, an apparently similar architecture of wage bargaining, and comparable generosity of their unemployment insurance systems, at least since 1989. We address the puzzle by examining Portuguese and Spanish labour market institutions, in particular job security, unemployment benefits and the system of wage bargaining. We then conduct empirical analysis of Spanish and Portuguese unemployment outflows and wage distributions, using micro data. We find differences in unemployment benefits (non-existent in Portugal until 1985, and less generous nowadays), differences in wage flexibility (wage floors by category established by collective agreements are set at a lower relative level in Portugal), and, in practice, higher firing costs in Spain. A key explanation of the difference in Portuguese and Spanish unemployment rates is the wage adjustment process. Generous benefit levels may have been necessary for the path Spanish unions took, but this was not the sole explanation of different wage setting in Spain and Portugal.     

Gender wage gap across the wage distribution in different segments of the Indian labour market, 1983–2012: exploring the glass ceiling or sticky floor phenomenon

Women’s participation in the Indian labour market is not only low but they are also engaged in low-productivity and low-paying jobs. Further, the labour market is segmented by gender, type of employment, sector and location of residence. This study makes an important contribution by examining gender wage gap in India across different segments of the labour market over the wage distribution using national-level representative data spanning the period 1983 to 2012. The empirical results suggest that (i) the male–female raw wage gap has declined over time across the wage distribution, (ii) the gender wage gap attributable to differing returns to characteristics has increased over time and there is evidence of convergence of productive characteristics of men and women, (iii) sticky floor rather than glass ceiling phenomenon is observed in all segments of the labour market and (iv) the adjusted wage gap suggests that women at the bottom of the distribution face higher discrimination than those at the top and this has increased over the years.     

Wage inequality in a developing country: decrease in minimum wage or increase in education returns

In this paper we analyze the increase in wage inequality observed in the Uruguayan labour market during the last decade, by studying how the changes in minimum wage and returns to education affected the wage structure. Although in most developed countries a significant proportion of the increase in wage inequality is explained by a fall in the real minimum wage, this is not the case for the Uruguayan labour market. We observe that returns to education increased significantly, which could explain the increase of wage dispersion by its effects on the upper tail of the wage distribution. To derive these conclusions we follow a parametric and nonparametric quantile regression approach.     

Institutions,capital stock and wage setting in Spain

This article confronts two distinct perspectives of the labour market: the institutionalist view?–?highlighting equilibrium and labour market institutions?–?and the Chain Reaction Theory?–?emphasizing dynamics and the growth drivers’ role in labour market performance. We consider the ratio of public to private capital stock as a growth driver relevant to the labour market; provide different economic rationales for this ratio to exert a negative influence in wage setting; and explore its empirical relevance in the context of a wage setting curve for Spain comprising the standard variables. There are two main results. First, several institutional variables taken to be critical to explain unemployment in the mainstream literature are not relevant for the Spanish wage setting curve. Second, there is a negative and significant influence of the ratio of public to private capital stock, which is robust to different specifications of the wage setting equation.     

Firm ownership and internal labour practices in a transition economy

One feature common to many post‐socialist transition economies is a relatively compressed wage structure in the state‐owned sector. We conjecture that this compressed wage structure creates weak incentives for work effort and worker skill acquisition and thus presents adverse consequences for the entire transition economy if a substantial portion of the labour force works in the state sector. We explore firm wage incentives and worker training, as well as other labour practices and outcomes, in a transition setting with matched firm and worker data collected in one of the largest provinces of Vietnam – Ho Chi Minh City. The Vietnamese state sector exhibits a compressed wage distribution in relation to privately owned firms with foreign ownership. State wage practices stress tenure over worker productivity and their wage policies result in flatter wage–experience profiles and lower returns to education. The state work force is in greater need of formal training, a need that is in part met through direct government financing. In spite of the opportunities for government financed training and at least partly due to inefficient worker incentives, state firms, by certain measures, exhibit lower levels of labour productivity. The private sector comparison group to state firms for all of these findings is foreign owned firms. The internal labour practices of foreign firms are more consistent with a view of profit‐maximizing firms operating with no political constraints. This is not the case for Vietnamese de novo private firms that exhibit much more idiosyncratic behaviour and whose labour practices are often indistinguishable from state firms. The exact reasons for this remain a topic of on‐going research yet we conjecture that various private sector constraints, including limited access to formal capital, play an important role.     

Wages in and voluntary quits from an establishment internal labour market

This paper analyses wage rates in and quit rates from two production departments in an establishment based structured internal labour market in which labour allocation between grades and the wage rate of these grades are managerially determined. First, it is assumed that management makes effective use of the ‘private’ information about individual employees collected through time, proxied by tenure, to allocate them to the most appropriate tasks. However, in an OLS regression the elasticity of the wage rate with respect to tenure, although statistically significant, is not economically important. Further, it is assumed that this labour allocation process together with the wage structure will facilitate labour retention. However, in a probit model analysing the quit probability, the probability of quitting increases with the wage rate. Both results are compatible with an internal labour market labour allocation process and wage structure that is not competitive with wage rates prevailing in the external labour market.     

Labour market segmentation and union wage gaps

Abstract

There has been a great deal of research regard the effects of unions on union – non-union wage gap. Most of the studies regarding the impact of unions on wages have assumed that apart from the division between union and non-union workers, the labour market is relatively homogeneous. A number of economists, however, have argued that the labour market is segmented, implying that there are distinct labour markets and that some workers employment opportunities are concentrated in “bad jobs” while other workers employment opportunities are concentrated in “good jobs” which are rationed.

This paper will explore whether the relative wage differential between union and non-union workers differs between the independent primary, subordinate primary and secondary labour markets. Labour market segments are defined using “job zones”. “Job zones” are distinct groups defined by the level of specific vocational preparation necessary for a particular occupation, allowing for the comparison of skill levels and training for each occupation. The data on “job zones” comes from the Occupational Information Network database (O?Net). We estimate separate equations for union and non-union workers in each segment using data from the Current Population Survey and calculate union non-union differentials for each labour market segment. The findings of this paper suggest that the greatest differentials are in secondary labour markets followed by differentials in the subordinate primary labour market and that the smallest wage differentials are in the independent primary labour market.     

The Effect of Further Training on Wage Growth in West Germany, 1984–1992

In this paper, we use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) to examine the effect of further training on wage growth in West Germany for the period 1984 to 1992. After controlling for the endogeneity of the training participation decision and the presence of unobserved fixed effects, we estimate a wage growth equation which reveals that further training positively affects wage growth. However, significant differences regarding the effectiveness of further training exist between male and female workers. Our results complement the findings of previous studies supporting the view that further training enhances gender inequality in the German labour market.     

Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labour Markets

In this paper, we survey non-competitive theories of training. With competitive labour markets, firms never pay for investments in general training, whereas when labour markets are imperfect, firm-sponsored training arises as an equilibrium phenomenon. We discuss a variety of evidence which support the predictions of non-competitive theories, and we draw some tentative policy conclusions from these models.     

The Gender Wage Gap in Paid- and Self-Employment in Australia

This paper presents an analysis of the gender wage gap in the highly regulated Australian labour market. It compares wage outcomes in the wage and salary sector with those for the self-employed. Comparisons with the United States are provided. The large gender pay gap in self-employment suggests that the aggregate gender wage differential will not be eliminated solely through wage determination for wage and salary earners. The greater gender wage gap in the self-employed sector may reflect liquidity constraints that are more difficult for self-employed women to overcome relative to self-employed men. The comparisons with the United States suggest that women will experience deterioration in relative earnings as the Australian labour market is deregulated.     

Against the Wind: Bargaining Recentralisation and Wage Inequality in Norway 1987–91

In the late 1980s, Norway's labour market experienced similar supply and demand shifts for skills to other countries', but unlike other OECD nations, Norway's wage setting system became more centralised. The pay distribution in Norway became more compressed at the bottom from 1987 to 1991, while low wage workers in other countries lost ground relatively. Using Norwegian microdata for 1987 and 1991, I found that changing labour market prices helped cause this wage compression. Further, the less educated had declining relative overall employment but increasing relative public sector employment, both possible labour market responses to the wage compression     

Marx Inside the Circuit: Discipline device,wage bargaining and unemployment in a sequential monetary economy

The aim of this paper is to show that Marxian labour theory of value can be consistently interpreted in terms of the monetary circuit model, where firms need initial finance to start production and where the money supply is endogenous. In contrast to the recently revived Marxian monetary models, in particular the New Interpretation, it is argued here that although the money wage is bargained for on the labour market, the real wage is determined by firms' choices, since firms autonomously determine the structure of production and hence real consumption for the working class as a whole. This does not mean that firms are able to set the real wage without economic and social constraints. Starting from our circuitist reading of the labour theory of value and distribution, a model is developed in order to determine the level of employment and income distribution, on the assumptions that (i) the industrial reserve army affects wage bargaining and labour effort and that (ii) workers react to the failure of their expectations on the real wage by reducing their work intensity. In this context, it is shown that firms may increase their share of profits over time only be means of innovations.     

Is firm-sponsored training a palliative? A common agency approach

We analyse the issue of firm-sponsored training under product market imperfections. In this setting, qualification becomes a public good for firms when their profits are increasing in the stock of skilled workers but remains a private good to students/workers. Students have to pay a tuition fee but at the same time firms sponsor education: universities sell training to both. We prove that the proportion of skilled workers is larger in more competitive economies/industries while the share of firms in the financing of training is a monotonically decreasing function of the degree of competition. An increase of the latter indeed increases the equilibrium skilled wage while reducing its sensitivity to an increase of the supply of skilled workers. The firms’ aggregate expenditures on training per worker are nevertheless a nonmonotonic function of the competitiveness of the economy.     

General training and oligopsony

I consider a duopsony model of a general skilled labour market. The source of the market power of the firms is the mobility cost of the workers. In the model general training is inefficient and the firms bear a share of the general training cost. If capital market imperfections prevent workers from investing in human capital, the imperfect competition in the skilled labour market compared with the perfect competition promotes general training. In order to remove the inefficiency of personnel training it is necessary to link together a minimum wage for skilled workers and loans to apprentices.     

On the Benefits From Rigid Labour Markets: Norms, Market Failures, and Social Insurance

The common view that far-reaching labour market deregulation is the only remedy for high European unemployment is too simplistic. First, the evidence suggests that deeply rooted social customs are an important cause of wage rigidity, going beyond the legal constraints emphasised in the political debate. Second, in a second-best setting, a compressed wage structure may generate an efficiency gain. Finally, based on simple plots of the relation between labour market institutions and openness in OECD countries, I conclude that the globalisation of economic activity may lead to increased demand for various labour market rigidities.     

Does Price Stability Exacerbate Labour Market Rigidities in the EMU?

How will the commitment to price stability affect labour market rigidities in the European Monetary Union? I explore a model where firms choose between fixed wage contracts (where the employer cannot lay off the worker, and the wage can only be changed by mutual consent), or contracts where employment is at will, so that either party may terminate employment (with strong similarities to temporary jobs). A fixed wage contract provides better incentives for investment and training, while employment at will facilitates efficient mobility. Inflation erodes the real value of a fixed contract wage over time, and badly matched workers are more likely to quit for other jobs. Disinflation has opposing effects on labour market rigidity: fixed wage contracts become more rigid in real terms, but fewer firms will choose fixed wage contracts.     

Segmented labour markets and the estimation of wage functions

This paper uses a stratified random sample of private sector employees to estimate wage equations for both the male labour market as a whole and six ‘segments’ of the labour market, segement which are defined with respect to the industry and size characteristics of the employing establishmen. Highly conventional results are obtained when wage equations are estimated for the male labour market as a whole, or within two segements, comprising almost half the survey population. However, one can reject conclusively the hypothesis that the same estimating equation is appropriate for modelling wage determination in all segments and if a ‘human capital’ (HK) model is, within segements, tested against more appropriate alternative hypotheses for wage determination using the Davidson and Mackinnon (1981) methodology for the testing of non-nested hypotheses, the conclusion is that one should reject the HK specification and not reject the alternative.

It is therefore argued that the disaggregation of labour market data reveals differences in the wage determination process that are not consistent with the view that labour markets are ‘dualistic’ but are consistent with the view that are segmented.     

Market Rigidities and Labour Market Flexibility: An International Comparison

The effects of product and labour market rigidities on labour market dynamics are analysed using a panel of two-digit ISIC level data for seven OECD countries. As expected, employment protection was found to slacken labour market flows. Centralized wage bargaining also reduced the degree of job turnover, although a priori the effect of centralized wage bargaining on labour market flexibility is not clear. Industry subsidies have a positive impact on job reallocation by increasing job creation. The labour market dynamics are also compared in detail for two economies regarded as extremes in terms of regulations, the U.S. and Norway.     

Collective bargaining and regional wage differences in Spain: an empirical analysis

This article analyses the importance of labour market institutions and, in particular, collective wage bargaining in shaping regional wage differences in the Spanish labour market. Using microdata from the Spanish Structure of Earnings Survey, our results reveal that there are significant inter-regional wage differences for similarly skilled workers. These differences are present throughout the whole wage structure and can be explained by both competitive and non-competitive factors, such as insufficient competition in product markets. In this context, industry-level collective bargaining plays a major role in accounting for regional wage differences, a role that in the Spanish case is enhanced due to its unusual regional dimension.