大股东隧道行为对中小投资者信心及行为的影响研究——基于问卷调查

本文利用问卷调查的方法,研究了普通中小投资者对大股东隧道行为、投资者保护等问题的认识和理解,以及隧道行为对中小投资者的信心、行为、投资策略等的影响。通过对问卷结果进行统计与分析,发现大股东的隧道行为会造成中小投资者信心缺失,并使投资者做出相应的行为调整,改变他们对市场发展的判断和看法,最终给资本市场带来负面影响。     

Does debt curb controlling shareholders' private benefits? Modelling in a contingent claim framework

Debt is not frequently analyzed in relation to the conflict between controlling and outside shareholders. At the same time, debt leverage stands as a key variable in the design of a control contract as it has a strong disciplinary role. A simple option valuation model is used to show that debt is also a governance variable because it can moderate or enhance private benefits. It is argued that an asymmetrical self-regulation mechanism may develop in the case of control by a dominant shareholder. The joint questions of control, private benefits, and debt levels are linked within an inside corporate governance framework. At low levels of leverage, debt is relatively less disciplinary compared with a non-private benefits case. When leverage exceeds a threshold point, it becomes strongly disciplinary. We show that under given conditions, a self-regulation mechanism develops where the controlling shareholder is incentivized to hold less debt when he/she wants to increase his/her private appropriation rate.     

Excessive continuation and dynamic agency costs of debt

This paper analyses the incentives of the equityholders of a leveraged company to shut it down in a continuous time, stochastic environment. Keeping the firm as an ongoing concern has an option value but equity and debt holders value it differently. Equityholders’ decisions exhibit excessive continuation and reduce firm's value. Using a compound exchange option approach, we characterise the resulting agency costs of debt, derive the “price” of these costs and analyse their dynamics. We also show how agency costs can be reduced by the design of debt.     

The effects of China’s split-share reform on firms’ capital structure choice

China’s split-share structure reform in 2005–2006 mitigates agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders and thus may bring substantial changes to corporate financing behaviour. This article examines the impact of that reform on the capital structure decisions of firms by applying a variety of trade-off and pecking-order models. Using data from 1176 non-financial Chinese listed firms during the period 2000–2012, we present empirical evidence indicating that equity tracks the financing deficit better than debt in Chinese firms, a finding which is not consistent with pecking-order theory. This phenomenon is more prominent after 2006 as share reform increases trading activity in the secondary stock market and improves the transparency of financial markets. In addition, Chinese firms have an optimal leverage ratio and they adjust below-target leverage ratios faster than above-target leverage ratios after the implementation of share structure reform, although they make symmetric adjustments towards the target leverage ratio before 2007. Finally, recent share reform has prompted Chinese firms to more quickly address the divergence of actual leverage ratios from long-term target levels, but has slowed their response to short-term target leverage divergence.     

Interactions of the firm's real and financial decisions

This paper provides an integrated approach to the theory of the firm. Under technological uncertainty, corporate taxes, risky debt and risk neutrality it is shown that the firm's investment production and financing decisions are made simultaneously. It is demonstrated that the relationship between optimal capital (or labour) and debt is not strictly negative as in Dotan and Ravid (1982) nor strictly positive as in Hite (1977). The direction of this relationship depends on the characteristics of debt and the characteristics of the firm's production function. Given the simultaneity of the real and financial decisions, it is shown that an interior optimum exists for the firm's value as a function of debt.     

Debt as a collusive device in an oligopoly supergame

This paper explores the impact of debt holdings on the output decisions of firms in an oligopoly supergame with stochastic demand fluctuations. It is demonstrated that when perfect collusion is not feasible then there exist circumstances in which increased debt holdings may facilitate tacit collusion. This occurs because higher debt levels act as a credible commitment device which lowers the payoffs accruing to a firm when it defects from the tacitly collusive equilibrium. It is further shown that in these circumstances firms may have an incentive to hold debt for strategic purposes which promote collusion.     

企业多元化战略与财务决策的关系：一个多视角的分析框架

本文试图从理论上系统分析在不同的多元化战略下(相关多元化和无关多元化)应采取何种财务决策。在结合不同理论视角的同时,分析企业不同的参与者类群(债权人,股东,高层管理者、部门管理者)的心理和行为决策。财务决策采用常用的分类:投资(长期和短期)、融资(权益融资和债务融资)和股利分配(高股利和低股利)。理论分析认为,相关多元化的公司倾向于进行长期投资,使用股权融资和低现金股利政策;无关多元化的公司倾向于进行短期投资,使用债权融资及高现金股利政策。     

Debt, liquidity and dynamics

Summary. Money, which provides liquidity, is distinct from debt. The introduction of a bank that issues money in exchange for debt and pays out its profit as dividend to shareholders modifies the model of overlapping generations. The set of equilibrium paths, their dynamic properties, as well as the scope and effectiveness of monetary policy are significantly altered: though low rates of interest are associated with superior steady state allocations, stability of the steady state may require a nominal rate of interest above a certain minimum: without production, a decrease in the nominal rate of interest may result in explosive behavior or convergence to an endogenous cycle, while in an economy with production, an increase in the nominal rate of interest may lead to indeterminacy and fluctuations.Received: 5 October 2004, Revised: 5 November 2004 JEL Classification Numbers: E30, E32, E50, E52.C. Rochon, H.M. Polemarchakis: We thank Jean-Michel Grandmont for helpful comments. Correspondence to: C. RochonThis revised version was published online in May 2005 with a corrected abstract.     

S-based taxation under default risk

This article studies the characteristics of a S-based tax system under default risk. In particular we show that its neutrality properties depend on whether debt is protected or unprotected. In the former case, this system is neutral. In the latter case, where default timing is optimally chosen by shareholders, the S-based system is neutral with respect to real decisions only if the firm's and the lender's tax rate are equal. However, the shareholders' decision to default is always distorted.     

Financing preferences: evidence from the Korean market

We investigate the financing decisions of Korean firms during the period of 1996–2015. Korean firms follow a matching strategy for funding their cash needs. Cash inflows from investing activities are the primary source of funding for capital expenditures, and cash inflows from financing activities are the major means of covering cash outflows from financing activities. We also find that Korean firms’ financing practice of handling cash deficits can be described by the pecking order model modified and augmented by cash flow variables. Cash inflows from investing activities account for the major portion of financing to make up for cash deficits, followed by short- and long-term debt, and then equity financing.     

Optimal size, optimal timing and optimal financing of an investment

Corporate investment is an important determinant of economic well-being. The existing literature identifies optimal investment size and timing without the possibility of debt financing, as well as the effect of debt financing on investment timing without the option to choose investment size. This paper contributes to the literature by identifying the optimal size, optimal timing and optimal financing for an investment when the firm controls all three decisions (as it usually does in practice). The investment size and investment trigger are generally positively related: when investment is delayed (accelerated) it is larger (smaller) in size, thus the overall effect on investment is ambiguous. However, when tax rate or bankruptcy cost is increased, the trigger rises and size falls, hence the effect on investment is unambiguously negative. The effect of debt financing on investment depends on the amount of debt used; with the optimal amount of debt, investment is delayed relative to the no-debt case, and this delay can be economically significant; however, the investment, when eventually made, will be larger in size. Overall, it is not appropriate to ignore either the firm’s ability to choose investment size or its option to use debt financing, when modeling the investment decision.     

股权结构对资本结构选择的影响--来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文采用一系列OLS回归从公司治理角度经验检验了股权结构对资本结构选择的影响.本文提供的经验证据表明:(1)股权结构是影响资本结构选择的重要因素;(2)管理者持股与债务比率负相关,但不显著;(3)股权集中度与债务比率正相关;(4)股东人数与债务比率负相关;(5)第一大股东持股比率和其他三大股东持股比例之差与债务比率负相关;(6)国家股比例与债务比率成U型关系;(7)法人股比例与债务比率正相关,但不显著,且它们间不存在非线性关系;(8)流通股比例与债务比率成三次曲线关系.     

Uncertainty and Investment Dynamics

This paper shows that with (partial) irreversibility higher uncertainty reduces the responsiveness of investment to demand shocks. Uncertainty increases real option values making firms more cautious when investing or disinvesting. This is confirmed both numerically for a model with a rich mix of adjustment costs, time-varying uncertainty, and aggregation over investment decisions and time and also empirically for a panel of manufacturing firms. These "cautionary effects" of uncertainty are large—going from the lower quartile to the upper quartile of the uncertainty distribution typically halves the first year investment response to demand shocks. This implies the responsiveness of firms to any given policy stimulus may be much weaker in periods of high uncertainty, such as after the 1973 oil crisis and September 11, 2001.     

Lender's risk incentive and debt concession

This paper demonstrates that a lender's risk incentive may render it difficult to conduct efficient debt renegotiation. When a lending bank has a risk incentive, the bank is not likely to make a debt concession, even though such a concession could resolve inefficiencies caused by a borrower's risk incentive. If the lender refrains from renegotiation the debt, then the borrowing firm chooses a value-decreasing risky project. As a result, the cash flow that the lending bank collects becomes risky, and the wealth of the bank's shareholders increases. The lender's risk incentive thus accelerates the borrower's risk incentive.     

税负抑制了公司投资吗?——基于国有股权私有收益的解释

文章分析了税负对公司投资决策的影响.与民营控股股东不同,作为国有企业的最终股东,政府不仅可以获得与股权投资相关的收益,而且可以获得独占性的税收,独占性的税收收入越高,政府控股的私有收益越大.因此,国有企业在投资决策时不仅考虑税后现金流量,而且会关注相关的预期税负,这提高了国有企业的投资?预期税负敏感性;政府对税收的需求越大,国有企业的投资?预期税负敏感性越高.实证结果表明:(1)与民营控股上市公司相比,国有控股上市公司的投资与预期税负之间的负相关关系更弱;(2)随着注册地基础设施投资回报率的增加,国有控股上市公司的投资与预期税负之间的负相关性显著下降.因此,最大化税收收入也是国有企业投资决策的重要考虑因素.文章为我国股权结构在公司财务决策中的作用提供了新的研究视角.     

沉默的债权人与大股东的控制权升水

近年来,关于大股东与小股东之间的代理冲突成了学术研究中的一个热点问题.然而,纵观这些文献可以发现,几乎所有的研究都是仅仅局限于冲突的双方,即仅仅局限于股权融资的主体,而将企业资金来源的另一重要渠道的债务主体--债权人几乎完全置于一边了.与此同时,学术研究中通常认为债务融资对企业具有积极的治理效应,即利用债务融资降低股权融资的代理成本,从而可以提升企业的价值.为此,本文提出一个重要的思想并从理论上对其进行了证明,即在债权人的利益得到保护的条件下,债权人有可能保持沉默,坐视大股东对小股东的利益侵占行为,甚至与大股东合谋来共同侵占小股东的利益.笔者通过对模型的进一步分析表明,大股东与债权人的合谋行为不但侵占了小股东的利益,而且减少了企业的价值,降低了企业金融资源的使用效率,甚至对其他企业的发展造成了严重的制约,并最终减缓整个金融市场的良性发展以及导致整个金融资源的低效率使用.     

大股东占用资金行为的成因、后果及治理对策

作为转轨经济国家,高度集中的股权结构是我国上市公司的重要特征。集中的股权结构在一定程度上缓解了管理层与外部股东之间的代理问题,但伴随而来的是大股东利用控制权“掏空”上市公司,侵害中小股东利益。2006年以来,我国证券市场刮起了一场“清欠”风暴。在清欠过程中,边清边欠,年中占用,年末偿还等现象说明,一场清欠风暴并没从根本上制止大股东占用资金行为,大股东占用上市公司资金仍是我国公司治理中最为严重的问题之一。     

The Perverse Effect of Debt Tax Benefits on Firm Investment Decisions

In this paper we question the idea that the deduction of debt interest is always an effective policy instrument to spur firm investment. We analyse the investment decision in presence of a borrowing constraint on the amount of debt that the firm can raise. We show that if the debt interest rate is decreasing in the firm's capital accumulation and another financial resource more expensive than debt is available (at least for levels of debt lower than the upper bound), then the deduction of the debt interest from taxes on capital income may reduce firm investment. This theoretical result is relevant for economic policy decisions when financial intermediaries are not willing to finance beyond a certain threshold but firms have access to other sources of finance.     

Household’s optimal mortgage and unsecured loan default decision

How do households make optimal borrowing and default decisions when they have the option to borrow in multiple ways? In this paper, I analyze households’ optimal mortgage and unsecured loan borrowing and default decisions in the context of the recent recession. I model households as able to default on mortgage debt to walk away from capital losses, at the price of foreclosure. However, a household can also default on unsecured debt to maintain its home, in exchange for a longer exclusion from credit markets following default. Depending on the costs of each alternative, financially constrained households exhibit heterogeneity in optimal default decisions.Next, I analyze how mortgage loan modification policies, after a sudden drop in house prices, affect household choices in the mortgage and unsecured loan markets. The quantitative exercise shows that the government-driven mortgage modification program, initiated in 2009, reduces the mortgage default rate by 0.27% points. However, this increases the unsecured loan charge-off rate by 0.66% points.     

The Finnish Corporate Income Tax Reform and the Financial Strategy of Firms: A General Equilibrium Approach

This paper simulates the effects of the recent Finnish corporate tax reform with a computable general equilibrium model. It shows that the impact of the reform on the capital stock depends on the reactions of firms. If the financial strategy is changed to prefer dividend distribution and share issues, the cost of capital falls and the capital stock increases. On the other hand, if the criterion of financial policy is to minimise the welfare loss of current shareholders, the earlier financial behaviour should be continued. In that case,the induced higher cost of capital leads to a lower capital stock. The overall welfare evaluation of the tax reform is not sensitive to the regime shift: the reform should not have been implemented. This is because the increase in interest income taxation distorts saving decisions, expands the net foreign debt of the economy and weakens the terms of trade.