The impact of economic sanctions on international trade: How do threatened sanctions compare with imposed sanctions?

We draw on established theoretical works in international political economy to compare the empirical effect of threatened and imposed economic sanctions on international trade. To deepen the analysis, we analyze whether there are any differential effects when different instruments of sanctions are employed, as well as whether the effect of sanctions is product specific. To do this, we use the gravity model and recent detailed disaggregated data on sanctions spanning the period 1960–2009. Our results show that the impact of threatened sanctions differs qualitatively and quantitatively from imposed sanctions. Whereas imposed sanctions lead to a decrease in the trade flow between the sender and its target, a threat of sanctions leads to an increase. The positive impact of the threat may be due to economic agents in both the sender and its target resorting to stockpiling prior to the actual imposition of sanctions to minimize any adverse consequences of the sanctions. These differential effects of threatened and imposed sanctions also extend to food and medicinal products, as well as when different instruments of sanctions are employed.     

Morale,performance and disclosure

We study the optimal disclosure policy in a sender–receiver communication game where the receiver's morale, defined as his expected state of the world, affects his performance. The sender observes the state and chooses whether to disclose it to the receiver, who then decides whether to participate in a task. The receiver wins if his performance in the task meets a target. No disclosure is optimal if the receiver wins with average morale in each state. Otherwise, in the threshold disclosure equilibrium that Pareto-dominates full disclosure, the receiver quits as the sender discloses the worst states and wins as the sender withholds the rest. The receiver wins in more states in the Pareto-optimal equilibrium as the sender chooses a non-monotonic disclosure policy. Our theory reveals a trade-off between transparency and efficiency when morale affects performance. It has applications in a broad range of areas including military, family, education and business.     

Do economic sanctions affect protectionism? Evidence from agricultural support

The objective of this paper is to examine whether economic sanctions contribute to influencing the target countries’ protectionist policies in the agricultural sector. Using pooled mean group estimations in a dynamic heterogeneous panel setting, we find robust empirical evidence that, in the long‐run, economic sanctions decrease agricultural protection in the target counties, and this effect is mitigated by the wealth of the target's economy. However, the relationship is insignificant in the short run. Furthermore, our results also suggest that the impact of sanctions on agricultural protection (a) increases with the severity of economic sanctions, (b) is greater for multilateral sanctions than unilateral sanctions, and (c) is more severe on agricultural protection when sanctions span a longer duration.     

International sanctions’ impact on energy efficiency in target states

This paper investigates the impact of international sanctions on energy efficiency by employing the panel fixed effect as well as average marginal effect from the Tobit model via data on 30 sanctioned states over the period 1996–2015 with international sanctions including unilateral, plurilateral, U.S., EU, UN, economic, and non-economic cases. Overall, we find that the imposition of unilateral sanctions leads to a 0.067% decrease in energy efficiency, but that of plurilateral sanctions positively contribute to energy efficiency in the case of the full sample of countries. Moreover, the imposition of UN sanctions has a greater decrease on energy efficiency in the target states than the 0.042% reduction of energy efficiency when the sanctionist is the U.S. For robustness, empirical results indicate that the imposition of plurilateral sanctions results in a drop of energy efficiency in Islamic countries, but an increase in non-Islamic countries, while there are also negative shocks induced by the imposition of EU sanctions on energy efficiency in Asian countries, but not for non-Asian countries. We also consider endogenous problems and dynamic specification by using indicator variables and System GMM. In summary, our empirical findings provide policy suggestions for those sanctioned countries about how to maintain energy efficiency when facing international sanctions.     

Donor Altruism and the Transfer Paradox in an Overlapping Generations Model

This paper examines the transfer problem between two countries when a donor exhibits altruistic utility toward a recipient in a one‐sector overlapping generations model. We demonstrate that if the donor has a larger marginal propensity to save than the recipient, the donor's altruism never contributes to donor enrichment irrespective of the degree of the donor's altruism. Donor enrichment occurs only if the donor has a smaller marginal propensity to save and a sufficiently high level of altruism. These findings imply that the altruism of a donor toward a recipient does not necessarily explain the motivation to voluntarily provide a transfer.     

Coasean bargaining with symmetric delay costs

Delay costs play a role in Coasean bargaining over environmental conflicts when an injunction restricts actions until a settlement is reached. Results from the lab suggest that efficiency remained relatively robust to discrete and increasing marginal delay costs, but declined significantly with nonincreasing marginal delay costs. Bargainers appear to deal with probability and consequences separately rather than in combination as maintained by expected utility theory, and as such, neglect ends over means. How the distribution of wealth is best organized depends on perspective: constrained self-interest best organizes behavior if expected utility is maintained; pure self-interest dominates if we acknowledge the probability–consequence heuristic.     

Taxes versus quotas in lobbying by a polluting industry with private information on abatement costs

We present a model of lobbying by a polluting industry with private information on pollution abatement costs and compare taxes with quotas under such conditions. We also examine the effect of private information on lobbying activity and social welfare under these two instruments. It is found that private information might improve social welfare under taxes when the government has little concern for social welfare, whereas private information does not improve social welfare under quotas. Quotas are generally socially preferred when the slope of marginal abatement costs is steeper than that of marginal damage or when the government does not concern itself with social welfare. However, private information reduces the comparative disadvantage of taxes compared to quotas when the government has little concern for social welfare. Finally, the results of numerical examples suggest that quotas are employed rather than taxes if the difference in natural emission levels between high- and low-cost industries is large.     

Endogenous Persuasion with Costly Verification

In this paper, I study a situation in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver with evidence that is generated via public or private experimentation. Under public experimentation, any experimental outcome is revealed, and under private experimentation the sender can hide adverse outcomes. The sender can design the properties of the experiments. The receiver chooses whether to verify at a cost the design of the experiment with which the revealed outcome was generated. I find that communication breaks down under public experimentation if there is no restriction on the experiment's design, and that persuasion is possible under private experimentation.     

Broadcasting Opinions with an Overconfident Sender*

We analyze a model where an altruistic, but possibly overconfident sender broadcasts one of a finite set of messages to rational receivers. If broadcasting is costless and the sender is rational, there is an informationally efficient equilibrium, but multiple equilibria may arise, and asymmetric equilibria might be more informative than the symmetric equilibrium even if the prior is symmetric. Although overconfidence on the part of the sender reduces informativeness in some cases, it may also eliminate less informative equilibria and lead to better information transmission. Overconfidence can also improve the informativeness of the message when broadcasting is costly.     

企业并购交易决策博弈分析

企业并购是并购交易双方在追求各自利益最大化的前提下所进行的博弈过程。由于企业并购交易市场的信息不对称性和不完美性，企业并购交易将会出现市场完全成功、部分成功、接近失败和完全失败四种不同性质和效率的市场均衡，其中只有市场完全成功是最理想和有效率的均衡。但在具体的企业并购交易中出现哪种均衡，主要取决于企业并购交易博弈模型中不同质量目标企业的价值、交易价格、风险成本和质量高、低比例之间的相互关系。减少出现上述三种低效率均衡机会的最有效方法是克服企业并购交易市场的信息不对称性问题，并提高并购企业的识别能力。     

The Impact of Economic Sanctions on South African Exports

In the mid‐1980s many nations imposed sanctions on South African exports, most of which were subsequently removed during 1991–3. I estimate the effect of eight industrialized economies' sanctions on their imports from South Africa. Outliers are found to strongly influence the parameter estimates. Failure to take account of them leads to the conclusion that sanctions by the (then) European Communities most adversely affected South African exports. In fact, robustness checks reveal that the United States' Comprehensive Anti‐Apartheid Act played the largest role, reducing bilateral imports by a third. The broader implications of these findings for estimating gravity equations are discussed.     

The impact of foreign and domestic remittance types and senders on education outcomes

Migration and remittances are very important for Nepal, yet the country continues to be plagued by low financial development. Increases in human capital investments, such as enrollment of school‐aged children, are a possible gain from the country's labor movements, which can be leveraged further through an understanding of the microeconomic processes involved. This study examines how remittances from both household and nonhousehold members affect school enrollment rates for children in Nepalese families. We analyze the positive and negative impacts of migration and remittances separately and consider both the type and location of the remittance sender using the Nepal Living Standards Survey (NLSS‐III) of 9,335 school‐aged children. We find enrollment more associated with an exogenous process and use this to estimate marginal effects in which remittances significantly increase children's school enrollment by about 2% points in most cases. These results suggest policymakers should encourage domestic migration (which allows proximity between senders and recipients of remittances as well as less family disruption).     

The relative importance of human resource management practices for innovation

Human resource management (HRM) practices are generally expected to stimulate a firm's innovation performance. However, which of these practices really pay off? Based on a unique dataset that includes detailed information for both a firm's innovation activities and a broad set of HRM practices, we find that primarily new workplace organization practices seem to enhance a firm's innovation activities. Flexible practices of working time management and incentive payment schemes show only small effects on both innovation propensity and innovation success. Further training does only affect innovation success, but not innovation propensity. Overall, we find a stronger linkage between HRM practices and innovation propensity than with innovation success. Further, we find that innovation propensity increases, first, with the number of combinations of HRM practices adopted by a firm but not with the number of combinations of HRM practices from different groups of HRM practices adopted by a firm.     

Technical change and wage premiums amongst skilled labour: Evidence from the economic transition

I present reduced-form and structural evidence that the reorganization of the Russian economy in the post-transitional period increased the demand on law and business graduates. This demand shock provides a novel unified explanation of the Russian wage structure for 1985–2015. I then show that this shock is a common feature of all transitional economies, and it contributed to the transformational recession. The demand behaviour is identified with a new skill-biased technical change model of demand for skills with three production inputs (high school graduates and bachelor-level educations with two majors), showing that a technology shift that favours a particular skill might emerge within the skilled group rather than between skilled and unskilled. This is relevant because similar shifts (e.g., data scientists vs. liberal arts) emerge today in the frontier economies that adopt new general-purpose technologies (e.g., machine learning). Thus, this paper informs policymakers today on tools to counteract a potential drop in economic equality and performance that result from this adoption. Lastly, because of similarities between the mechanics of the transition and the 2022 sanctions to discourage Russia's war effort, my results highlight the importance of additional sanctions against the education system to prevent the regime's structural adaptation and preservation.     

Nexus between economic sanctions and inflation: a case study in Iran

Conventional studies have applied dummy variables to analyse the relationship between economic sanctions and inflation while we construct an index which is called Trade-Financial Sanctions (TF index). TF Index is a liner combination of indices which includes trade openness and foreign investment by applying the principal component model. Through the TF index and market exchange rate the impact of economic sanctions on inflation is analysed in the three phases of sanctions; free sanctions, heavy sanctions, and light sanctions. The results illustrate that the TF index decreases inflation when the Iran’s economy experiences free sanctions or light sanctions relative to when the economy is in heavy sanctions. Heavy sanctions create instability in the market exchange rates and widening the gap between the market and the official exchange rates. Furthermore, economic sanctions increase expected inflation among the people and drive higher inflation. Therefore, these results suggest that the government should work more seriously to solve the main obstacles of trade and investment inflows imposed by the economic sanctions.     

On the economics of regulated early closing hours: some evidence from Canada

In many countries such as Australia, Canada and Britain, the hours of daily retail operation are controlled through the political process. This paper tests one hypothesis for why regulation is adopted. The hypothesis is that early closing hours are a low cost institutional response to net social costs that can arise when time is used competitively to redistribute customers spatially. Competition produces this result when stores's marginal customers value longer shopping hours more highly than the average customer. Evidence is presented on the characteristics of 45 Ontario cities that had the choice of whether or not to adopt early closing hours and logit analysis is used to test the model's predictions. The estimates of the probability of choosing early closing hours are then used to test the model's prediction on store density. In general, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that municipal control over shopping hours in Ontario is appropriate.     

Targeting the biotechnology clusters in North Carolina and Israel: lessons from successful and unsuccessful policy making

This paper analyses the development of biotechnology clusters in North Carolina (NC) and Israel. In both NC and Israel, when the biotechnology was identified as a potential strategic priority, the framework conditions were suitable for successful policy-targeting. NC presents a case of a successful transition from a traditional manufacturing economy to a knowledge economy. The most successful part of this transition was a policy-led development of a biotechnology cluster in the Research Triangle. While Israel also presents a case of a successful transition from a low-tech economy to a knowledge-intensive economy, Israel failed to develop a successful biotechnology cluster. We suggest that this failure is mostly due to a failure to implement policy to encourage such development. We argue that the elements, which separate NC's success from Israel's failure, are: a clear vision and strategic planning; timely response, long-term commitment; strong leadership; cooperation between the government, private sector and academia, and an adjustable policy-making process.     

Cost incentives for doctors: A double-edged sword

If doctors take the costs of treatment into account when prescribing medication, their objectives differ from their patients' objectives because the patients are insured. This misalignment of interests hampers communication between patient and doctor. Giving cost incentives to doctors increases welfare if (i) the doctor's examination technology is sufficiently good or (ii) (marginal) costs of treatment are high enough. If the planner can costlessly choose the extent to which doctors take costs into account, he will opt for less than 100%. Optimal health care systems should implement different degrees of cost incentives depending on type of disease and/or doctor.     

The impact of local unemployment rates on reservation wages and the duration of search for a job.

Evidence about the relationship of local unemployment rates and individuals' reservation wages and duration of search for a job if unemployed is sparse and mixed. This study uses US data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to test whether relatively high local unemployment rates reduce the reservation wages of area residents or increase the duration of search. Labour search theory provides the grounding for the sample selection corrected simultaneous equations econometric model. In neither OLS nor 2SLS results is evidence found that local unemployment rates affect either reservation wages or the duration of search. These results suggest that policies targeted at alleviating unemployment should focus on increasing the demand for labour rather than hope that such policies will be beneficial if pursued in high-unemployment areas because of their effects on labour force characteristics.     

Applying conjoint analysis in economic evaluations: an application to menorrhagia

The increased demand for health care, coupled with limited resources, means that decisions have to be made concerning the allocation of scarce health care resources. This paper considers how conjoint analysis (CA) can be used to aid this decision making process. It is shown how the technique can be used to estimate marginal rates of substitution between attributes, willingness to pay (WTP) if cost is included as an attribute and overall utility scores for different ways of providing a service. The technique is applied to consider women's preferences for two surgical procedures in the treatment of menorrhagia: hysterectomy and conservative surgery. The results suggest conservative surgery is preferred to hysterectomy, as indicated by higher utility scores for the former and a marginal WTP of 7593 to have conservative surgery rather than hysterectomy. The internal validity of CA was also shown. It is concluded that CA is a potentially useful instrument for policy makers. However, numerous methodological issues need addressing before the technique becomes an established instrument within economic evaluations.