The effect of financial development on economic growth: a meta-analysis

In this article, we contribute to the current debate on the sign and size of the finance–growth relation. To this purpose, we use a meta-analysis with 551 estimates from 68 empirical studies that take private credit to GDP as a measure for financial development. We distinguish between linear and logarithmic specifications. First, we find evidence of significantly positive publication bias in both the linear and log-linear specifications. It suggests the literature has exaggerated the size of the finance–growth effect in the past. Second, we find suggestive evidence that the logarithmic specification is superior to the linear specification. In the logarithmic specification when accounting for publication bias, a 10% increase in credit to the private sector increases economic growth with 0.09 percentage points. For the linear estimates, no significant effect of credit to the private sector on economic growth is found on average. Overall, the evidence points to a positive but decreasing effect of financial development on growth and supports the ‘too much’ finance hypothesis.     

Foreign direct investment under a weak rule of law

We have developed a self‐enforcing contract model to show that better economic fundamentals can help an area or a region under a weak rule of law – but with order – to attract foreign direct investments (FDIs), whereas lowering taxes does not necessarily help. Using a cross‐region Chinese dataset, we find evidence consistent with our theoretical analysis. Regional variations in tax rates and the perceived quality of formal contracting institutions are not correlated with regional FDI inflows, but leadership characteristics are. Most conventional economic factors have the predicted effects on FDIs. The finding that FDI is lower in locations where domestic private firms have better access to finance and where the air quality is poor is also new to the literature.     

The Methodological and the Ethical Context of Positive Economics: Comment on McKenzie

This article employs the number of rule recipients in order to explain the transformation of some customs into laws. The publication of rules may mark the reaching of the threshold number beyond which the spontaneous rule leaves room for the State intervention. In addition, the publication resolves a couple of questions that Hayek left unresolved. Examples are provided from ancient merchant customs and contemporary international law.     

上市公司财务指标分析与投资价值判断

上市公司的财务报告具有公布集中、数量庞大、行业复杂的特点。根据主要财务报表的基本分析原理，运用公司的优选模型选择具有投资价值的上市公司，以简化繁。详解了如何以各种财务指标对上市公司进行投资价值的分析和判断。     

The Institutional Quality Effect on Credits Provided by the Banks

Research on developing economies is deficient in analysing institutional quality dimensions that are beyond standard determinants of the provision of credits by banks. This study fills this gap by adopting a broad-based modelling approach in examining the effects of institutional quality on credit provided by banks for a large sample of developing economies. A structural model, including balanced annual panel data from the World Bank World Development Indicators and Worldwide Governance Indicators for the period 2004 to 2017, was estimated using panel-corrected standard errors and two-stage least squares estimation techniques. The core variables determining the credit provided by banks were controlled for in the estimation phase. The findings showed that the rule of law, regulatory quality and the strength of legal systems are significant determinants of credit provided by banks, among other factors. Investments in improving institutional quality can be beneficial for credit diffusion by the banks. This study is distinct from previous empirical studies of the developing economies as it directs attention to institutional quality measures on bank credit expansion in an inclusive modelling framework. It makes a significant positive contribution to the finance institutional nexus literature in terms of understanding the value and role that institutional quality plays in fostering bank credit provision in developing economies.

     

金融释放论

本文提出一种解释经济体金融能量释放的理论。本文认为 ,金融能量是由经济体所拥有的金融资源规模及其单位金融资源的产出能力所决定的。金融能量的释放程度是决定GDP水平的关键因素。本文建立了分析金融能量释放的理论模型 ,运用这个模型分析了金融能量释放的内在机制。在此基础上 ,本文进一步探讨了中国金融能量抑制的主要原因。本文的基本结论是 :要使经济体完全释放其所拥有的金融能量 ,关键是金融资源的使用权要实现竞争性配置。     

Comovement among returns of the private Chilean pension system

Abstract

The measurement of comovement among economic variables is key in several areas of economics and finance. This article examines the comovement among Pension Fund Administrators (AFPs) in the Chilean private pension system from 2005 to 2016. We use several statistical methods to assess the comovement among the returns during this period. We found evidence of strong comovement among the returns of all AFPs; the higher the percentage of risk rate of the investment instrument, the higher the comovement was. The introduction of a new AFP in 2010 did not change the comovement patterns. The comovement analysis study shows that the quality attributes of the products offered by the AFPs are homogeneous, supporting the idea that concentrated markets with homogeneous products could incentivize tacit collusive behavior, which could distort the functioning of the pension market, thereby affecting the aggregate well-being of workers.     

Unidimensionality,asymmetry and (S,s) rules in labour demand

We analyse the conditions under which an (S,s) rule may be implemented in the case of labour demand. The (S,s) rule implies a specific ordering of choices: downward adjustment, nonadjustment and upward adjustment with the decision of inaction lying crucially in the middle. This requires an exact negative relation between the choice-specific error terms. The particular ordering of choices implied may be estimated by an ordered probit. We test the (S,s) rule nesting the ordered probit within a multinomial model with correlated error terms. The restriction to a univariate error distribution is rejected by the data.     

Sharing Rules in Teams

We examine the problem of output sharing in a moral hazard in team situation. Although we do not consider any particular procedure, we assume that the team uses some procedure to decide a sharing rule before actual production takes place (for example, this may be a bargaining process or a team welfare maximization problem). This must take into account that the team will play a noncooperative game in the production process conditional on the chosen sharing rule. We show that the procedure for deciding the sharing rule does not have to look for anything more complicated than simple linear sharing rules. We also show that, when there is limited liability, the procedure needs to consider only the slightly more complicated piecewise linear rules. As a consequence of the linear sharing rule result, we are also able to provide a characterization of implementable outcomes. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, D2, C72, J54.     

ON THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: THE CASE FOR A GOLDEN RULE

This paper uses the SVAR methodology to investigate the effects of public investment on GDP and, more specifically, the effects of the introduction of a golden rule of public finance. We extend the existing literature by estimating a model for the British economy that takes into account long-run factors such as public debt accumulation and policy interactions. We find that in such a long-run framework, public investment has a significant and permanently positive effect on GDP; this result runs counter to the most recent literature on the topic using SVAR, which was limited to a short-run specification. We further find, by comparing different subsamples, that the introduction of the golden rule in 1997 strengthened the positive effect of public investment.     

Strategy-proof preference aggregation: Possibilities and characterizations

An aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings over a set of alternatives into a social ordering over that set. We call such a rule strategy-proof if misreporting one's preference never produces a different social ordering that is between the original ordering and one's own preference. After describing two examples of manipulable rules, we study in some detail three classes of strategy-proof rules: (i) rules based on a monotonic alteration of the majority relation generated by the preference profile; (ii) rules improving upon a fixed status-quo; and (iii) rules generalizing the Condorcet–Kemeny aggregation method.     

村级财务体制改革的条件约束与路径选择

财务基础工作薄弱、会计人员素质低和财会队伍不稳定、财务内部监控制度缺失或无效以及会计主体模糊对村级财务管理体制改革构成现实的条件约束。目前推行的“村财乡管”体制虽然对规范和加强村级财务管理起到了一定的积极作用，但仍存在着不可小觑的问题。进一步深化村级财务体制改革，应在明确村民的财务监督的主体地位基础上，建立健全以“三大制度”为支撑的村民监督制度体系、明确会计核算主体和建立一个分工明确的多元监督体系。     

The effect of lender and loan type on a borrowing firm’s equity return

Past empirical studies appear to support the idea that banks and finance companies do not differ in their ability to resolve adverse selection problems associated with issuing new debt. In this article, we find there is a difference. More specifically, using an event study we find larger abnormal returns for secured loan disclosures to lower quality borrowers when the lender is a finance company versus a bank. This suggests the market views finance companies as more effective than banks in evaluating/monitoring lower quality borrowers obtaining secured loans. We posit this is due to finance companies’ greater expertise in this type of lending, resulting from specialization. Our findings extend the literature on how lender identity can influence signals about firm value from loan disclosures. Our results also support recent findings that positive abnormal returns to borrowing firms may not be a general feature across the loan population, but may be restricted to smaller, lower quality borrowers. Finally, we are the first to provide evidence that the market takes loan type into account, not just lender and borrower type, when considering the information embedded in loan disclosures.     

Innovative performance effects of institutional quality: an empirical investigation from the Triad

ABSTRACT

Using data for a set of 823 R&D-intense manufacturing firms within the Triad and the Quality of Government (QoG) dataset over the 2002–2010 period, this article investigates the effects of institutional quality upon firms’ inefficiency, through the application of a Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA). Empirical evidence, which is robust to alternative specifications of the technology employed and different lag structures in R&D activities, reveals that improvements in the quality of institutions significantly reduce firms’ inefficiency and suggests that, among the set of relevant institutional factors considered, a pre-eminent role is found for the rule of law.     

国有企业经营者激励与约束机制探讨

国有企业改革是我国经济体制改革的中心环节,建设一支高素质的经营管理者队伍,是深化国有企业改革的重要任务之一,而建立健全国有企业激励与约束机制是完成这一重要任务的重中之重。要按照市场经济原则,建立健全国有企业的激励与约束机制,真正做到责、权、利既相互对称、又相互制衡。通过这种机制的作用,造就一支高素质的经营管理者队伍,为国有企业的改革和发展做出贡献。本文通过对国有企业激励与约束机制问题的分析,从激励机制与约束机制两方面谈了改进的办法,为切实解决目前国有企业中存在的这种问题提供了思路。     

农业信贷与我国农村经济增长的相关性分析与政策建议

三农问题已经成为制约我国经济整体发展的“瓶颈”问题,农村经济发展缓慢既有政策制度性因素,又有经济性因素。农村金融供给不足在我国表现非常突出,农民贷款难就是其例证。本文从金融供给角度给出了农村经济发展缓慢的经济解释,并且在政策性金融、商业性金融和合作性金融的框架内提出了相关对策建议。     

The dynamic adjustment of local government budgets: does Spain behave differently?

The aim of this article is to analyse whether Spanish municipalities adjust in response to budget shocks and (if so) which elements of the budget they are more likely to adjust. The methodology we use to answer these questions is a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), estimated with data from a panel of Spanish municipalities during the period 1988 to 2006. Our results confirm that Spanish municipalities do indeed make adjustments in response to fiscal shocks (i.e. the deficit is stationary in the long run). We compare our results with those obtained for US and Germany to evaluate if the viability of local finance depends on the institutional arrangement and to analyse how it affects the adjustment patterns. We observe that grants have a more important role in the adjustment process in environments where either they have an equalization objective or where there is no clear rule that determines their distribution. This fact can generate a moral hazard problem: governments tend to spend more due to the expected intervention by the central government. Own revenues have a lower adjustment capacity in environments where subcentral governments have limited fiscal autonomy. These results, however, suggest that the viability of the local finance system is feasible with different institutional arrangements.     

Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities

A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We characterize the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among “interest groups”. We characterize the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, avoid the no-show paradox, strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Any such rule can also be viewed as a collection of generalized peak-selection median rules, that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.     

Viewpoint: Decision-making in committees

Abstract .  This article reviews recent developments in the theory of committee decision-making. A committee consists of self-interested members who make a public decision by aggregating imperfect information dispersed among them according to a pre-specified decision rule. We focus on costly information acquisition, strategic information aggregation, and rules and processes that enhance the quality of the committee decision. Seeming inefficiencies of the committee decision-making process such as over-cautiousness, voting, and delay emerge as partial remedies to these incentive problems.     

中国金融规模、金融结构与经济增长——基于省区面板数据的实证研究

本文运用我国省区1999至2008年的面板数据,系统考察了金融规模、银行集中度、直接融资比例以及其他相关控制变量对各地区经济增长的作用和影响。通过运用固定效应模型、工具变量法以及动态面板数据模型,我们发现,目前金融规模扩张不利于经济增长,而改善金融结构,降低银行集中度,提高中小金融机构在银行业中所占的比重,会增加银行业内部的竞争,促进经济增长。直接融资对经济增长的作用不显著。我们还发现,改善我国所有制结构有利于经济增长,固定资产投资和对外贸易依然是拉动经济增长的重要因素。