Economies of scale and scope in the European banking sector

In this article, using the data of 2008, we try to describe the impact of scale and product differentiation in 282 European banks. While evidence of the economies of scale is less clear, the results obtained using a translogarithmic function system show that significant economies of scope do exist even for new banking products like derivatives.

Competition and risk in South East Asian commercial banking

This article investigates the effects of competition on bank risk taking behaviour in four South East Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam). Our main finding is that competition does not increase bank risk-taking behaviour and the results appear robust to different model specifications, estimation approaches and variable construction. We also find that concentration is inversely related to bank risk whereas regulatory restrictions positively influence bank risk-taking.     

寡头竞争、银行资金管理与存款准备金政策

利率和存款准备金政策是影响商业银行资金管理的重要因素.在一个统一的金融市场中,一家银行的利率变动必然受到其它银行利率变动及证券市场利率变动的影响,并且利率也会受到存款准备金政策变动的影响.分析表明,在古诺、勾结和准竞争的市场结构中,证券市场利率和存、贷款利率以及存款准备率和存款利率都具有一致的比较静态效应.     

Assessing market power in the U.S. commercial banking industry under deregulation

This study attempts to investigate market power in the U.S. commercial banking industry since the U.S. government began to deregulate the banking sector in the early 1990s using the static Bresnahan–Lau model (SBLM) and dynamic Bresnahan–Lau model with error corrections (DBLEC). In particular, panel unit root and panel cointegration techniques are utilized to examine the dynamic model. The empirical results of the SBLM show that the banking industry is highly competitive. The empirical results of DBLEC also suggest that the commercial banking industry is close to being perfectly competitive in the short run. By contrast, the adjustment speeds of the supply and demand sides towards the long-run equilibrium are quite slow in that market, which implies that the U.S. commercial banks enjoy a certain degree of long-run market power.     

Technical efficiency and returns to scale in Austrian commercial banking: 1987–1991

In a pooled time-series cross-section study covering the period 1987–1991, the technical efficiency of Austrian all-purpose banks is analysed. The sample covers banks of all size classes, among them the largest 18 banks as well as some of the very small banks. The empirical results show that local banks and nationwide operating banks are technically most efficient while regional banks are least efficient. Moreover, it can be shown that the technical efficiency of nationwide operating banks improved substantially in the period analysed relative to that of local and regional banks.I wish to thank an anonymous referee for his helpful comments. Financial support from the Vienna Chamber of Commerce is gratefully acknowledged.     

Evolution of banking efficiency within an unstable macroeconomic environment: the case of Turkish commercial banks

This paper analyses the efficiency performance of the Turkish banking sector between 1988 and 1999, a period characterized by increasing macroeconomic instability. The technical and scale efficiencies of Turkish commercial banks are measured with the use of nonparametric Data Envelopment Analysis. The empirical results suggest that over the sample period both pure technical and scale efficiency measures show a great variation and the sector did not achieve sustained efficiency gains. It is also reported that the sector suffers mainly from scale inefficiency and scale inefficiency, in turn, is due to decreasing returns to scale. There are also reported differences in the efficiency performance of commercial banks with different ownership status. In addition, the relationships between profitability, asset quality, size and the two definitions of efficiency are considered. Efficient banks are more profitable, and pure technical efficiency and scale inefficiency are positively related to size. The trend in the performance levels over the period suggests that macroeconomic conditions had a profound influence on the efficiency measures.     

Modelling non-performing loans probability in the commercial banking system: efficiency and effectiveness related to credit risk in Italy

In this article, we model the effect of the non-performing loans on the cost structure of the commercial banking system. With this aim, we comment on an increase in the non-performing loans by studying the consequences of such a change on the cost function and compute the probability of failure of maintaining a performing loan as such. In doing so, we are convinced that geography does matter and evaluate the risk propensity of the bank towards the non-performing loans accordingly. We finally stress that traditional efficiency indicators of cost elasticity do not fit properly with such a problem and propose a measure based on the costs for managing and monitoring the loans which, according to the related density function, will reveal effectively as non performing.     

金融危机对巴塞尔新资本协议和商业银行风险管理的挑战

正在影响着世界的金融危机,在考验商业银行自身的风险管理能力的同时,也挑战了全球银行业赖以为标准的巴塞尔新资本协议。本文旨在从危机爆发的原因出发,封新资本协议关于银行的风险管理方面的规定进行分析,以及在金融全球化的大环境下,中国的银行业应该如何应对危机。     

Free banking and the stability of early joint-stock banking

Proponents of free banking argue that systems adopting theirpolicies will be stable. In this paper, we present evidencesuggesting that, in general, early joint-stock banking systemsdid not adopt free banking, and those that did proved to beunstable. In particular, we demonstrate that those systems imposingregulations were generally stable. We rationalise the successof regulation as a pragmatic solution to the time-inconsistencyproblem arising from the peculiar nature of the banking firm.Notably, we find that the ‘golden age’ of free bankingstability can be attributed to restrictions on the organisationalform of the early banking firm.     

Efficient Allocations in Club Economies

We explore the characteristics of Pareto‐optimal allocations in the context of local public goods or clubs. A set of first‐order conditions for Pareto optimality is provided. Classical treatments apparently neglect an important term related to migrant compensation, and thus are incorrect. A Pareto optimum is shown to exist.     

Price Stability in Open Economies

This paper studies the theoretical conditions under which price stability is the optimal policy in a two-country open-economy model with imperfect competition and price stickiness. Special conditions on the levels of country-specific distortionary taxation and the intratemporal and intertemporal elasticities of substitution need to be satisfied. These restrictions apply to both cooperative and non-cooperative settings. Importantly, we show that cooperative and non-cooperative solutions do not coincide despite market completeness and producer currency pricing. We study the conditions under which quadratic approximations of single countries' welfare can be correctly evaluated by relying only on log-linear approximations of the equilibrium conditions.     

Indeterminacy Arising in Multi-sector Economies

We characterize a large class of constant-returns-to-scale economies with standard Cobb–Douglas production technologies, which, when perturbed to incorporate external effects, exhibit indeterminacy or multiple equilibria. The perturbations are constrained to maintain overall constant returns to scale. We characterize the magnitude of the external effects that yield multiple equilibria in terms of the parameters of the unperturbed economy. We show that it is very easy to construct large and plausible classes of economies that exhibit indeterminacy with constant returns to scale, and with external effects that are arbitrarily small.
JEL Classification Numbers: E00, E3, O40.     

Central banking,free banking,and financial crises

A Summary View In the Keynesian view, the central bank is a part of an extramarket remedy to a market malady. Investment markets are inherently unstable; government control of the economy's money supply is an important element in macroeconomic stabilization policy. The case against central banking—and for free banking—reverses the characterization of both remedy and malady. Free banking is a part of a market remedy to an extramarket malady. Even this stark reversal understates the case for free banking. It would remain valid even if we take the dramatic and chronic fiscal irresponsibility of the Treasury as given. Periodic crises that will inevitably occur in such a debt-ridden economic environment would be more ably countered by the market forces of free banking than by the policy moves of a central bank. But the extent of the Treasury's fiscal irresponsibility is itself dependent upon whether the Treasury can count on an accommodating central bank. Free banking limits the scope of this potential source of instability while at the same time enhancing the market's ability to deal with whatever instabilities that may persist.