THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL OUTSOURCING ON LABOUR MARKET DYNAMICS IN GERMANY

Using an administrative data set containing daily information on individual workers' employment histories, we investigate how workers' labour market transitions are affected by international outsourcing. In order to do so, we estimate hazard rate models for match separations, as well as for worker flows from employment to another job, to unemployment, and to nonparticipation. Outsourcing has a positive but small impact on overall job stability in the manufacturing sector, and considerably increases job stability in the service sector. However, the effect of outsourcing varies strongly across skill levels and age groups, with negative effects for some workers. This is especially the case in the manufacturing sector, where the hazard of transiting to nonemployment rises with international outsourcing for medium‐skilled and older workers.     

A decomposition of training probabilities

The determinants of workers' training probabilities are analysed. A distinction is made between the unconditional probability that a worker is employed by a firm that provides any training opportunities at all, and the conditional probability that the worker receives training given that s/he works for a firm that provides training. For this analysis a censored version of the bivariate probit model is applied. The results indicate that establishment size, industry dummies, type of schooling, age and experience affect only the unconditional probability, whereas the type of labour contract, working hours and job level affect only the conditional probability. Years of formal schooling affect both probabilities; more highly educated workers are both more likely to work for training-providing firms and, given that they work for such a firm, to be selected for training programmes.     

DYNAMIC CONTRACTS WITH WORKER MOBILITY VIA DIRECTED ON‐THE‐JOB SEARCH

This article proposes a model with dynamic incentive contracts and on‐the‐job search in a frictional labor market. The optimal long‐term contract exhibits an increasing wage–tenure profile. With increasing wages, worker effort also increases with tenure. These two features imply that the probabilities of both voluntary and involuntary job separation decrease with both job tenure and the duration of employment. Given these results, workers experience differing labor market transitions—between employment, unemployment, and across different employers—and the equilibrium generates endogenous heterogeneity among ex ante homogeneous workers.     

Search costs and efficiency: Do unemployed workers search enough?

Many labor market policies affect the marginal benefits and costs of job search. The impact and desirability of such policies depend on the distribution of search costs. In this paper, we provide an equilibrium framework for identifying the distribution of search costs and we apply it to the Dutch labor market. In our model, the wage distribution, job search intensities, and firm entry are simultaneously determined in market equilibrium. Given the distribution of search intensities (which we directly observe), we calibrate the search cost distribution and the flow value of non-market time; these values are then used to derive the socially optimal firm entry rates and distribution of job search intensities. From a social point of view, some unemployed workers search too little due to a hold-up problem, while other unemployed workers search too much due to coordination frictions and rent-seeking behavior. Our results indicate that jointly increasing unemployment benefits and the sanctions for unemployed workers who do not search at all can be welfare-improving.     

Discrimination and Job Quality: the youth labour market in the 1980s

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent to which discrimination early in one's career can have lasting effects on job quality even after the discrimination itself disappears. The results show that for young workers in the 1980s, discrimination is a short run phenomenon, and furthermore, the effects disappear relatively quickly. This research makes two contributions to the existing empirical literature on labour market discrimination. First, we broaden the measure of discrimination beyond wages by utilizing the Duncan Index of job quality to measure differences in labour market outcomes. Second, most empirical work has been concentrated on the effects of discrimination at a point in time using cross-sectional data. We develop a dynamic model to measure changes in job quality over time as workers gain experience over their first three years in the permanent labour market. From the results found in our empirical work, we are able to analyze the long run impact of initial discrimination. In other words, our methodology allows us to examine time dependent effects that are not observed in cross-sectional studies.     

AN EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH MODEL WHEN FIRMS OBSERVE WORKERS' EMPLOYMENT STATUS*

This article considers an equilibrium search model, where firms post wages using information on workers' employment status. Earnings differentials between workers of different employment statuses are driven by firms' ability to discriminate workers' reservation wages. I study how these wage policies depend on firms' and workers' characteristics, and how these policies affect the wage distribution. The model delivers new predictions for the amount of wage dispersion that can be generated with search models and provides a better representation of the left tail of the wage distribution in the presence of a legal minimum wage than standard equilibrium search models.     

DIRECTED SEARCH ON THE JOB AND THE WAGE LADDER*

We model a labor market where employed workers search on the job and firms direct workers' search using wage offers and employment probabilities. Applicants observe all offers and face a trade‐off between wage and employment probability. There is wage dispersion among workers, even though all workers and jobs are homogeneous. Equilibrium wages form a ladder, as workers optimally choose to climb the ladder one rung at a time. This is because low‐wage applicants are relatively more sensitive to employment probability than to wage and thus forgo the opportunity to apply for a high wage, with a lower chance of success.     

PRECAUTIONARY DEMAND FOR LABOUR AND FIRM SIZE

This paper studies firms' job creation decisions in a labour market with search frictions. A simple labour market search model is developed in which a firm can search for a second employee while producing with a first worker, and this creates the equilibrium size distribution of firms. A firm expands employment even if the instantaneous payoff to a large firm is less than that of staying small – a firm has a precautionary motive to expand its size. In addition, this motive is enhanced by a greater market tightness. Because of this effect, firms’ decisions become interdependent – a firm creates a vacancy if it expects other firms to do the same, creating strategic complementarity among firms and thereby self‐fulfilling multiple equilibria. An increase in productivity can cause a qualitative change in labour market tightness and the rate of unemployment.     

JOB FLOWS AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN AN EQUILIBRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT MODEL WITH FIRM‐SPECIFIC SKILL TRAINING*

We introduce productivity enhancing firm‐specific skill training into the labour search model in which the firm‐specific skill training intensity and the job destruction rate are endogenously determined. It is shown that the higher the intensity of such training, the lower the rates of unemployment, job creation and job destruction. The paper's model provides a theoretical framework to understand the often mentioned peculiarity of the Japanese labour market; prevalently low rates of unemployment, job creation and job destruction in Japan are due to its training system which promotes workers to acquire firm‐specific skills.     

Estimating British workers' demand for safety

This paper estimates workers' demand function for job safety using the British General Household Survey data. The estimation employs Rosen's two-stage procedure. The main difference between our study and those done in the past is that we estimate hedonic price equations with data sets from two labour markets. Our approach overcomes the usual identification problems associated with the application of Rosen's method. The estimation shows that there is a significant wage compensation for job risk in the UK. The willingness-to-pay for a 1/100 000 decrease of annual job fatal accident rate from our estimated workers' demand function is about £6 in 1973 prices. The estimation of a demand function for safety also enables the derivation of workers' willingness-to-pay for non-marginal change of job risk, and this can be used for cost-benefit analysis on projects involving such non-marginal changes.     

Where to go? Workers' reasons to quit and intra- vs. interindustry job mobility

We show that workers' reasons for quitting their job affect their decision to stay in or leave their industry, using survey data among public sector employees in the Netherlands. Workers quitting for e.g. pay, work pressure, or job duties move relatively often to another industry, in contrast to workers quitting for commuting time or the atmosphere at work. This suggests that workers use their experience in the initial job to update their expectations on other jobs in the industry, as the first set of job aspects is more likely to be related among jobs within an industry than the latter. Furthermore, it is shown that workers' reasons to quit fully explain the differences in wage growth between intra- and interindustry job movers. Lastly, we find that workers who quit for pay or management often leave the public sector altogether.     

Interindustry part-time and full-time wage differentials: regional and national analysis

This paper provides more evidence that the wage differential is far smaller than is suggested by simple comparison of gross wages of full-time and part-time workers. It is noted that to obtain a more reasonable measure of the full-time and part-time wage differential, it is necessary to adjust for differences in workers' characteristics, labour market conditions and sample selection. It is found that, in general, full-time and part-time workers exhibit different personal characteristics. In particular, full-time workers possess more human capital and experience than part-timers. Also, labour market conditions such as unions and pension plans favour full-timers. These differences may partly account for the wage disparity between full-time and part-time workers. It was noted that the nonrandomness of the workers into full-time and part-time jobs influences the wage determination of both full-time and part-time workers. The results indicate that the adjustment of the wage equations to reflect the above mentioned differences reduces the national wage differential between full-time and part-time workers by 10%. The reduction is even larger across regions and industries. Another finding was that the wage determination processes between full-time and part-time workers do differ.     

Games of status and discriminatory contracts

Following recent empirical evidence which indicates the importance of rank for the determination of workers' wellbeing, this paper introduces status seeking preferences in the form of rank-dependent utility functions into a moral-hazard framework with one firm and multiple workers, but no correlation in production. We show that workers' concern for the rank of their wage in the firm's wage distribution induces the firm to offer discriminatory wage contracts when its aim is to induce all workers to expend effort.     

TRAINING, JOB SECURITY AND INCENTIVE WAGES

This paper considers the optimal level of firm‐specific training by taking into account the positive effect of training on the expected duration of workers' current employment. In the framework of an efficiency wage model, a short expected job tenure represents a disamenity that reduces the penalty from shirking. As this disamenity increases, workers have an incentive to continue providing a positive level of effort only if they are compensated by a higher wage. We endogenize the employment separation rate by introducing firm‐specific training. Firm‐specific training creates a rent that is lost if the worker is separated from the firm. As a result, the firm will be more reluctant to fire its trained workforce in a recession. This implies that firm‐specific training can decrease current wages because it represents a commitment to lower future labour turnover.     

International trade,job training,and labor reallocation

A large literature studies the impact of increased import competition on workers' outcomes, however, relatively few studies examine which policies can aid workers displaced by trade. In this article, we evaluate the impact of an industrial job training program in Brazil on workers displaced from manufacturing sectors. We find that industrial training increases the probability of re-entry into the formal labor market 1 year after displacement by about 17 percentage points and is even more effective for workers displaced from sectors exposed to high import competition. This effect is mainly associated with workers switching sectors and occupations after training.     

Starting Your Career With a Fixed-Term Job: Stepping-Stone or “Dead End”?

This paper uses panel data from the UK and Germany to investigate the difference in the learning effect between workers who enter the labour market with a fixed term and a permanent job. Our results verify the existence of a wage penalty for entering the labour market with a fixed-term contract for the British males (7.1%) and especially for the British females (21.2%). British females also have a very strong learning effect that is especially large for temporary starters. In Germany, the initial wage penalty for temporary starters is smaller than in the UK—4.5% for the males and 3% for the females—and is persistent only for the males. Although initial wage differences are mitigated through the accumulation of skills on the job, this process differs between temporary and permanent starters. This suggests that the type of the starting contract may be a feature of labour market segmentation.     

A note on long-term contracts

The purpose of this paper is three-fold: (i) to interpret Townsend's (1982) long-term contract model as a labor contract model where a value of job matching for a worker is a private information, (ii) to contrast Townsend's long-term contract model with Holmstrom's (1983) long-term contract model in a common framework, and (iii) to explore the effect of workers' mobility on the contract configuration of the two models.Both Holmstrom and Townsend construct models in which a single-period contract is not viable, but a long-term contract is. However, reasons for this characteristic in the two models are quite different. This paper proposes a simple framework of labor contracts with illustrates the essential difference of the two models, and the role of mobility costs. Mobility costs in the two types of long-term contracts are shown to be beneficial for both workers and the firm. Results of comparative statics show how contract configurations in two models are influenced by changes in mobility costs.     

Job Security,Financial Security and Worker Well‐being: New Evidence on the Effects of Flexible Employment

This paper uses panel data drawn from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey to provide new evidence of the links between unemployment, wages, job security, financial security and workers' well‐being for workers in flexible employment. Our findings indicate that workers in flexible employment encounter more unemployment and experience increased job insecurity; unemployment is associated with wage penalties. Lower wages, job insecurity and financial insecurity affect well‐being. However, these negative outcomes are mitigated by longer job tenure. Our results have implications for moves towards a flexicurity model of employment     

On the optimality of a minimum wage: New insights from optimal tax theory

We build a theoretical model to study whether a minimum wage can be welfare-improving if it is implemented in conjunction with an optimized nonlinear income tax. We consider this issue in a framework where search frictions on the labor market generate unemployment. Workers differ in productivity. The government does not observe workers' productivity but only their wages. Hence, the redistributive policy solves an adverse selection problem. We show that a minimum wage is optimal if the bargaining power of the workers is relatively low. However, if the government controls the bargaining power, then it is preferable to set a sufficiently high bargaining power.     

WORKERS'CO-OPERATION

The first draft of this paper was put forward for consideration within the Labour Movement in April 1975 and was amended as a result of subsequent discussion. The paper examines the present movement for workers' co-operation in the light of the historical development of producers' co-operation in Britain. It concludes that the relative failure of producers' co-operation in the past has been due to the unfavourable economic environment in which it has tried to function – and that as a result it has been unable to compete with aggressive entrepreneurial capitalism in the accumulation of capital. Producers' co-operation has already demonstrated undoubted advantages. It is potentially more efficient in the use of labour and less socially divisive; it provides a model for the future transformation of industry in which workers can play a full part as equal partners rather than hired hands; it may also assist in maintaining existing, and creating new employment. In the present changed circumstances in which the free market economy is breaking down under accelerating inflation and major firms are turning to the government to solve their liquidity problems, it is suggested that workers' co-operation has an important part to play in the regeneration of British industry and that it should be encouraged as a matter of public policy. There are two major requirements for the growth of the producers' co-operative sector: 1. There must be a demand for, and ideological commitment to workers' co-operation on the shop floor. While this can be helped by government action it must develop primarily by the self-education of workers through their trade unions. 2. The state must create a climate favourable to workers' co-operation in the economy by the provision of capital, advice and specialist educational and technical assistance.