Do younger CEOs really increase firm risk? Evidence from sudden CEO deaths

This study uses sudden deaths of CEOs to provide causal evidence on the relation between CEO age and firm risk. I find that CEO age negatively influences firm risk, measured by stock return volatility, but has no effect on policy choices related to risk taking. These findings contrast prior studies, and suggest that the higher volatility is caused by uncertainty about the younger replacement CEOs' contribution to firm value, rather than changes to risk-related corporate policies.     

Do foreign banks take more risk? Evidence from emerging economies

This paper addresses the impact of foreign ownership on the risk-taking behavior of banks. Using bank-level panel data of more than 1300 commercial banks in 32 emerging economies during 2000–2013, we find that foreign owned banks take on more risk than their domestic counterparts. We further examine several factors that may potentially contribute to foreign banks’ differentiated riskiness from four perspectives, namely, foreign banks’ informational disadvantages, agency problems, the contagious effect of parent banks’ financial conditions and the disparity between home and host markets. We find supportive evidence that these factors play a significant role in affecting foreign banks’ risk-taking.     

Do boutique investment banks have the Midas touch? Evidence from M&As

We study whether the meteoric rise of boutique advisors in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) is justified by their buy-side performance. We find that acquiring firms represented by boutique advisors generate superior short- and long-run abnormal returns over those employing full-service advisors. This effect is mainly prominent in private deals, interindustry mergers, and deals involving inexperienced acquirers, where valuation uncertainty tends to be higher. Overall, our results reflect that acquirer shareholders benefit from boutique investment banks' high level of industry expertise and independent advice, supporting the rising demand for their financial advisory services.     

Do stock prices influence corporate decisions? Evidence from the technology bubble

We study the capital investment, stock issuance, and cash savings behavior of non-tech manufacturers (old economy firms) during the 1990s technology bubble. Our empirical results show that high stock prices affect corporate policies because they relax financing constraints. During the tech bubble, constrained non-tech firms' investment responded strongly to “high stock prices” (specifically, the component of price that is not captured by fundamentals). They also issued stock in response to that overvaluation effect, saving part of the proceeds in their cash accounts. We find no such patterns for unconstrained non-tech firms, nor for tech firms. Our findings are not consistent with the notion that managers systematically issue overvalued stocks and invest in ways that transfer wealth from new to old shareholders. More broadly, they suggest that what appears to be overvaluation in one sector of the economy may have positive externalities for other sectors.     

Do subordinated debt holders discipline bank risk-taking? Evidence from risk management decisions

I test the market discipline of bank risk hypothesis by examining whether banks choose risk management policies that account for the risk preferences of subordinated debt holders. Using around 500,000 quarterly observations on the population of U.S. insured commercial banks over the 1995–2009 period, I document that the ratio of subordinated debt affects bank risk management decisions consistent with the market discipline hypothesis only when subordinated debt is held by the parent holding company. In particular, the subordinated debt ratio increases the likelihood and the extent of interest rate derivatives use for risk management purposes at bank holding company (BHC)-affiliated banks, where subordinated debt holders have a better access to information needed for monitoring and control rights provided by equity ownership. At non-affiliated banks, a higher subordinated debt ratio leads to risk management decisions consistent with moral hazard behavior. The analysis also shows that the too-big-to-fail protection prevents market discipline even at BHC-affiliated banks.     

How are political connections valued in China? Evidence from market reaction to CEO succession

Using a sample of listed Chinese firms between 2000 and 2010, the paper analyzes the stock market reaction to CEO succession. We document significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns when CEO succession is accompanied with increased political connections. We also show that the market reaction to political connections is significantly stronger for external successors and for poorly performing firms, while it is significantly weaker for firms in high-tech industries and firms located in more developed regions. Finally we find that political connections are valued significantly less in state owned enterprises than in privately controlled firms. Our findings suggest that Chinese investors do value political connections, and such valuation is conditioned by successor origin, prior firm performance, industry, region, and ownership structure.     

Do rating agencies’ decisions impact stock risks? Evidence from European markets

This article analyses the effect of rating agencies’ decisions on stock risks for European issuers concerning five kinds of events. Our approach is an extension of dummy variable regression event study methodology, using a GARCH(1,1) estimation to capture simultaneously the impact on both systematic and specific stock risks. This new methodology allows us to obtain both global results by categories of rating decisions and individual results, event by event. We document, globally, a positive impact of upgrading on systematic risk, a negative impact of rating confirmation on specific risk, and no significant impact in all other cases. Regarding event-by-event results, the proportion of rating actions exhibiting a significant effect on risk is almost always observed between 20% and 30%. The weak evidence of a global effect on systematic risk may be due to the lack of informational content of the rating decisions on the stocks’ risk, or the existence of rebalancing effects between systematic and idiosyncratic risks. Furthermore, it should be noticed that the decline in volatility in case of a rating affirmed is an insight of the certification role played by the agencies.     

Do banks price environmental transition risks? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China

This paper assesses the risk arising from transition toward a low-emission economy and examines its transmission channels within the financial system. The environmental dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (E-DSGE) model shows that tightening environmental regulation impairs firms' balance sheets in the short term, as it enforces firms to internalize the pollution costs, which consequentially escalates the risks facing the financial system. For the empirical analysis, we employ the Clean Air Action that the Chinese government launched in 2013 as a quasi-natural experiment. The analysis on a unique dataset containing more than one million loans indicates that the default rates of high-polluting firms rose by around 80% along their environmental policy exposure. Further analysis shows those joint equity commercial banks with lower degree of government intervention and better corporate governance structure were able to appropriately manage their exposure to transition risks, while the state-owned banks failed to factor in such risks when extending credit to the borrowers targeted by the environmental regulation.     

Do foreign institutional investors monitor opportunistic managerial behaviour? Evidence from real earnings management

Employing a large sample of 13,860 firms in 41 economies from 2000 to 2017, we document that the ownership by foreign institutional investors (FIIs) is negatively associated with firms' real earnings management (REM) but unrelated to their accrual earnings management (AEM). We adopt a few identification strategies to tackle the endogeneity issues, including firm- and year-fixed effects regression, two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression, and difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation based on the passage of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA). In addition, we show that the role of FIIs in curbing REM is achieved through the expertise channel and the monitoring channel. These results suggest that when facing disadvantages in curbing AEM, FIIs make the most of their monitoring strengths by curbing firms' REM, where they have both incentives and capabilities to monitor. Overall, this study highlights the important role of FIIs in monitoring opportunistic managerial behaviour.     

Do financial analysts compel firms to make accounting decisions? Evidence from goodwill impairments

Review of Accounting Studies - This paper examines whether financial analysts’ presence compels recognition of goodwill impairments. Analysts could impact managers’ impairment decisions...     

Do banks’ overnight borrowing rates lead their CDS price? Evidence from the Eurosystem

We construct a measure of a bank's relative creditworthiness from the Eurosystem's proprietary inter-bank loan data: average overnight borrowing rate relative to an overnight rate index (AOR). We then investigate the dynamic relationship between AOR and the credit default swap price relative to the corresponding market index of 60 banks during 2008–2013. Price discovery mainly takes place in the CDS market, but AOR also contributes to it. The lagged daily changes of AOR help predict CDS. This indicates that AOR includes private information, which the CDS market does not immediately incorporate. We further show that the private information advantage is concentrated on days of market stress and on banks, which mainly borrow from relationship lender banks. Such borrower banks are typically smaller, have weaker ratings, and are likely to reside in crisis countries. Competent authorities can use AOR as a complementary indicator of banks’ concurrent health.     

Do foreign banks increase competition? Evidence from emerging Asian and Latin American banking markets

In this paper we examine the impact of foreign bank penetration on the competitive structure of domestic banking sectors in host emerging economies. We focus our analysis on Asia and Latin America during the period 1997-2008. Using bank-level panel data to identify foreign banks and to estimate measures of banking competition, we are able to provide robust empirical evidence that an increase in foreign bank penetration enhances competition in these host countries’ banking sectors. We find that this positive foreign bank penetration and banking competition link is associated with a spillover effect from foreign banks to their domestic counterparts. This spillover effect becomes stronger when more efficient and less risky foreign banks enter into less concentrated host country markets. We also find that the spillover effect is greater when foreign banks enter in the form of ‘de novo penetration’ than through mergers or acquisitions of domestic banks (‘M&A penetration’).     

Do banks price discriminate spatially? Evidence from small business lending in local credit markets

In this paper we explore the effects of bank–borrower physical proximity on price and non-price aspects of small business lending in local credit markets. Along the price dimension, our analysis reveals that interest rates increase with bank–borrower distance and decrease with the distance between borrower and other competing banks. Along the quantity dimension, we observe that more distant borrowers are more likely to experience binding credit limits. We also show that the quantity effects of bank–borrower distance are concentrated among less transparent firms. Our findings are consistent with pricing based on marginal costs that reflect information-based factors, and are in contrast to the established paradigm, where banks adopt spatial discriminatory pricing rules when lending to small-sized enterprises.     

Do banks appraise internal capital markets during credit shocks? Evidence from the Greek crisis

Using data of bank loans to Greek firms during the Greek crisis we provide evidence that affiliated firms, having access to the internal capital markets of their associated group, are less likely to default on their loans. Furthermore, banks require lower loan collateral coverage from affiliated firms and are less likely to downgrade the affiliates’ credit profile. Finally, banks are more likely to show forbearance to affiliated firms with non-performing loans. The results are consistent with the view that banks manage their relationships with firms in a business group jointly, as opposed to viewing each firm as an independent entity. Our findings also suggest that the value of risk sharing through internal capital markets increases when external financing is scarce.     

What determines the profitability of banks? Evidence from Spain

This paper empirically analyses the factors that determine the profitability of Spanish banks for the period of 1999–2009. We conclude that the high bank profitability during these years is associated with a large percentage of loans in total assets, a high proportion of customer deposits, good efficiency and a low doubtful assets ratio. In addition, higher capital ratios also increase the bank’s return, but only when return on assets (ROA) is used as the profitability measure. We find no evidence of either economies or diseconomies of scale or scope in the Spanish banking sector. Finally, our study reveals differences in the performance of commercial and savings banks.     

Do dividends signal safety? Evidence from China

Our paper examines whether dividends convey information about future cash-flow volatility in the Chinese stock markets. We observe that dividend changes are followed by cash-flow-volatility changes in the opposite direction. Taking advantage of the unique context of China, we show, in both the two-way sorting analysis and the regression analysis, that the strong relation between changes in dividend and cash-flow volatility is robust after controlling for potential confounders, including firm-level financial market frictions, macroeconomic and market conditions, and government intervention in firms' decision-making, and holds after we control for endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, we perform the theoretic mechanism tests of the relation and present supporting evidence on the signaling theory under the setting of asymmetric information, instead of the free cash flow theory based on the assumption of agency conflict. This study enriches our understanding of the source and nature of cash-flow information contained in dividends.     

Do CEOs Matter? Evidence from Hospitalization Events

Using variation in firms’ exposure to their CEOs resulting from hospitalization, we estimate the effect of chief executive officers (CEOs) on firm policies, holding firm-CEO matches constant. We document three main findings. First, CEOs have a significant effect on profitability and investment. Second, CEO effects are larger for younger CEOs, in growing and family-controlled firms, and in human-capital-intensive industries. Third, CEOs are unique: the hospitalization of other senior executives does not have similar effects on the performance. Overall, our findings demonstrate that CEOs are a key driver of firm performance, which suggests that CEO contingency plans are valuable.     

Does female management influence firm performance? Evidence from Luxembourg banks

In this study, we examine the relationship between the proportion of women in top management positions at banks and these institutions’ financial performance. Using prudential data from supervisory reporting for all credit institutions in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg from 1999 to 2013, we find a positive association between female management and firm performance. The economic effect is substantial: a 10 % increase in women in top management positions improves the bank’s future return on equity by more than 3 % p.a. Moreover, we show that this positive relationship is (i) almost twice as large during the global financial crisis than in stable market conditions and (ii) non-linear, with banks having 20–40 % female management being the most successful.     

Do analysts’' forecast properties deter suboptimal labor investment decisions? Evidence from Regulation Fair Disclosure

We examine whether analysts' forecast properties deter inefficient labor investment decisions. Using accuracy and dispersion as analysts' forecast properties, we find that more accurate and less dispersed forecasts are associated with less inefficient corporate labor investments. Utilizing Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) as an exogenous variation to analysts' forecast activities, we find a causal relationship between analysts' forecast properties and labor investment inefficiency. We also find that more accurate and less dispersed forecasts decrease labor cost stickiness. Our results are consistent with the view that analysts' forecast properties enhance the information environment, which, in turn, improves corporate labor investment decisions.     

Do banks overstate their Value-at-Risk?

This paper is the first empirical study of banks’ risk management systems based on non-anonymous daily Value-at-Risk (VaR) and profit-and-loss data. Using actual data from the six largest Canadian commercial banks, we uncover evidence that banks exhibit a systematic excess of conservatism in their VaR estimates. The data used in this paper have been extracted from the banks’ annual reports using an innovative Matlab-based data extraction method. Out of the 7354 trading days analyzed in this study, there are only two exceptions, i.e. days when the actual loss exceeds the disclosed VaR, whereas the expected number of exceptions with a 99% VaR is 74. For each sample bank, we extract from historical VaRs a risk-overstatement coefficient, ranging between 19 and 79%. We attribute VaR overstatement to several factors, including extreme cautiousness and underestimation of diversification effects when aggregating VaRs across business lines and/or risk categories. We also discuss the economic and social cost of reporting inflated VaRs.