Firm performance,corporate governance and executive compensation in Pakistan

This study examines the effects of firm performance and corporate governance on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in an emerging market, Pakistan. Using a more robust Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation approach for a sample of non-financial firms listed at Karachi Stock Exchange over the period 2005–2012, we find that both current- and previous-year accounting performances has positive influence on CEO compensation. However, stock market performance does not appear to have a positive impact on executive compensation. We further find that ownership concentration is positively related with CEO compensation, indicating some kind of collusion between management and largest shareholder to get personal benefits. Inconsistent with agency theory, CEO duality appears to have a negative influence, while board size and board independence have no convincing relationship with CEO compensation, indicating board ineffectiveness in reducing CEO entrenchment. The results of dynamic GMM model suggest that CEO pay is highly persistent and takes time to adjust to long-run equilibrium.     

Compliance and multidimensional firm performance: Evaluating the efficacy of rule-based code of corporate governance

This study seeks to evaluate the efficacy of the Pakistani Code of Corporate Governance by finding out its impact on firm's performance and efficiency. This exploration is done in the context that Securities & Exchange Commission of Pakistan's choice of corporate governance regulations is heavily influenced by Anglo-Saxon approach, whereas de-facto realities of Pakistani corporate environment are quite in contrast.Using a panel data of 119 firms for the period of 8 years i.e. 2003 to 2010, and using a multidimensional performance framework i.e. financial performance and technical efficiency, we find that the extent of compliance has increased since the issuance of code in 2002. After controlling for firm size, growth, dividend payout, age and leverage, we find significant positive impact of compliance on firm's performance (ROA, ROE and ROCE). We also find a weak positive relationship between compliance and technical efficiency. We suggest that compliance is not linearly related with financial performance and we find that high compliant firms are less profitable than average or low compliant firms. This implies that one-size-fit all approach along with mandatory compliance is a questionable approach for Pakistani firms.This study is first in Pakistan in providing empirical evidence on efficacy of the rule-based Code of Corporate Governance and also adds to growing but underdeveloped literature on compliance and firm performance in emerging/developing economies. Further, this study offers insight to policy makers on the efficacy of current corporate governance regulations and offers a research framework for assessing the extent of compliance, effectiveness and economic impact of code of corporate governance.     

Competition and ownership structure: Substitutes or complements? Evidence from the Warsaw Stock Exchange

In this paper we analyse the impact of product market competition and ownership structure on firm performance. Our results show that product market competition has a positive and significant impact on performance. Concerning the effect of ownership concentration, we find a U–shaped relationship with performance. Firms with relatively dispersed and relatively concentrated ownership have higher productivity growth than firms with an intermediate level of ownership concentration. This correlation between concentration of ownership and productivity growth is not explained by the type of the controlling shareholder. Finally, product market competition and good governance tend to reinforce each other rather than to be substitutes. Competition has no significant effect on performance for the firms with ‘poor’ governance; on the contrary, it has a significant positive effect in the case of firms with ‘good’ corporate governance. JEL classification: D24, G32, L1, P2.     

The role of corporate governance strength in crisis and non-crisis times

This study evaluates corporate governance practices of listed firms in the United Arab Emirates and investigates whether corporate governance mitigates/exacerbates the impact of leverage and risk on firm performance during crisis and non-crisis times. The study constructs a corporate governance index not only to examine the dispute of the role of corporate governance during the crisis but also its influence on other factors that fuelled the crisis. A firm-level panel data is used that spans the period 2008–2012 of all listed firms on Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX) and Dubai Financial Market (DFM). The study finds a positive influence of corporate governance strength on the accounting performance, but a negative influence on the firms’ economic performance. In normal times, corporate governance mitigates the negative influence of leverage and risk on the accounting and economic firm performance. However, this synergy effect varies across performance indicators during crisis.     

Does corporate governance influence firm performance? Quantile regression evidence from a transactional economy

This study examines the impact of corporate governance structures on firm performance using a unique sample of 478 non-financial companies listed on the two main Vietnamese stock exchanges. Given the contrasting existing empirical results, we adopt the method of quantile regression (QR) and report some robust and significant negative relationship between board independence/Chief Executive Officer duality and firm performance. These findings seem rather corroborate the agency theory. Furthermore, the use of QR may be more insightful than estimating the mean effect of the response variable.     

INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS,CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN JAPAN

Since the beginning of the 2000s, institutional investors in Japan have become active in strengthening corporate governance, with the aim of achieving long‐term corporate value. The present paper examines the relationship between institutional investors and corporate governance, and also the relationship between institutional investors' shareholdings and firm performance. The results suggest that corporate governance has been enhanced by institutional investors. However, it is found that there is not a statistically significant difference between institutional investors' shareholdings and firm performance.     

《反垄断法》的施行能否改善公司治理*——来自中国A股上市公司的证据

《反垄断法》能够有效改善中国上市企业的公司治理，提升市场效率。本文以中国2005—2010年A股上市公司的总经理离职事件为研究对象，构建双重差分模型实证检验中国《反垄断法》的施行是否提升了公司治理水平。本文研究发现，《反垄断法》的实施显著提高了我国上市公司经理人离职与企业业绩的敏感程度，促进了市场公平，缓解了公司治理的委托代理问题，强化了股东对CEO的有效监督。此外，本文通过将样本按照行政垄断程度、行业垄断程度及企业垄断程度进行分组并对比分析后发现，该效应在行政垄断程度较高、行业垄断程度较高的地区更加明显，在地方国有企业中尤其显著。以上结果均表明《反垄断法》的实施有助于改善公司治理，切实保护投资者利益，维护市场公平。     

Hybrid Corporate Governance and its Effects on Innovation: A Case Study of AstraZeneca

This case study looks at the relationship between the UK/Swedish pharmaceutical firm, AstraZeneca, and its shareholders from the point of view of its effects on innovation. It uses a theoretical framework on corporate governance and innovation that differentiates sectors according to the novelty, visibility and appropriability of technological change. High novelty requires a corporate governance system with strong industry-specific expertise; low visibility requires good firm-specific perceptiveness. High appropriability favours shareholder supremacy as against stakeholder inclusion. The pharmaceutical industry appears to be high in all three, and this (according to accepted stereotypes) should favour the outsider-dominated corporate governance system of the UK as against the insider-dominated Swedish system. It is found that the corporate governance that resulted from the merger could indeed be described as hybrid, but that (following the building up of one major US shareholding) it was a UK/Swedish/US hybrid. In spite of the apparent similarity of the UK and US 'outsider-dominated' systems, the US element made a crucial difference, in giving engagement by a strong and well-informed shareholder who had some influence on other shareholders. This in turn helped to protect the firm to a significant extent from short-term pressures within the UK stock market, and thus to allow it to maintain its emphasis on long-term innovation.     

Hybrid Corporate Governance and its Effects on Innovation: A Case Study of AstraZeneca

This case study looks at the relationship between the UK/Swedish pharmaceutical firm, AstraZeneca, and its shareholders from the point of view of its effects on innovation. It uses a theoretical framework on corporate governance and innovation that differentiates sectors according to the novelty, visibility and appropriability of technological change. High novelty requires a corporate governance system with strong industry-specific expertise; low visibility requires good firm-specific perceptiveness. High appropriability favours shareholder supremacy as against stakeholder inclusion. The pharmaceutical industry appears to be high in all three, and this (according to accepted stereotypes) should favour the outsider-dominated corporate governance system of the UK as against the insider-dominated Swedish system. It is found that the corporate governance that resulted from the merger could indeed be described as hybrid, but that (following the building up of one major US shareholding) it was a UK/Swedish/US hybrid. In spite of the apparent similarity of the UK and US ‘outsider-dominated’ systems, the US element made a crucial difference, in giving engagement by a strong and well-informed shareholder who had some influence on other shareholders. This in turn helped to protect the firm to a significant extent from short-term pressures within the UK stock market, and thus to allow it to maintain its emphasis on long-term innovation.     

Is there a ‘business case’ for board gender diversity within French listed SMEs

Many studies have investigated the relationship between women on corporate boards (WOCB) and firm performance in accordance with the ‘business case’ for board gender diversity. However, these have been conducted on large firms. This study re-examines this relationship for a sample of French listed SMEs over the period 2010–2014 using a dynamic panel GMM estimator to mitigate endogeneity issues. We find that the percentage of WOCB is positively and significantly related to firm performance. However, the other proxies for board gender diversity are not statistically different from zero. We argue that the relationship is not straightforward. This finding is interesting as it sheds light on the ‘business case’.     

Corporate governance structure and product market competition

This article assesses the effects of the competitive structure of a product market on a firm’s corporate governance structure. Our model demonstrates that shareholders strategically determine the corporate governance structure, including the manager’s stock ownership and his controlling power over the firm, in order to maximize their utility in the product market competition. We find that the manager’s stock ownership is lower and his controlling power over the firm is higher when the firm’s product is more profitable or when competition within the product market is more severe. The inefficiency of the wealth transfer from shareholders to the manager also affects the corporate governance structure.     

The innovation effect of dual-class shares: New evidence from US firms

The proliferation of dual-class structures in the US stock market presents a controversial trend since such shares are traditionally deemed to damage governance quality. We study the relationship between 362 firms with dual-class shares and their innovativeness using patent citations from Google Patents over the 1976 through 2006 period. We find dual-class shares have significant innovation effect in high-tech sectors, hard-to-innovate industries, firms with higher external takeover threat and firms heavily dependent on external equity financing. We also document a positive causality relationship between dual-class structures and the quality of innovation. The channel for this causal relationship is the protection mechanism by which managers can take a long-term view. From a policy perspective, regulators should promote a corporate governance system that protects corporate long-term interest for shareholders.     

上市公司债务融资、公司治理与市场价值

本文就上市公司的债务融资与公司治理、公司市场价值的关系进行了理论分析和实证检验 ,发现我国上市公司债务融资占总资产的比重不大 ;总体上债务融资具有加强公司治理、增加公司市场价值的作用 ,但是对于少数资产负债率非常高的公司 ,这种作用并不显著 ;市场对公司发行债券有积极的反应 ;同时债务融资起到了传递公司业绩的信号作用。     

An Applied Econometricians' View of Empirical Corporate Governance Studies

The economic analysis of corporate governance is in vogue. In addition to a host of theoretical papers, an increasing number of empirical studies analyze how ownership structure, capital structure, board structure, and the market for corporate control influence firm performance. This is not an easy task, and indeed, for reasons explained in this survey, empirical studies on corporate governance have more than the usual share of econometric problems. This paper is a critical survey of the recent empirical literature on corporate governance – to show which methodological lessons can be learned for future empirical research in the field of corporate governance, paying particular attention to German institutions and data availability.     

Pyramidal structure,risk‐taking and firm value

This article investigates the relationship among pyramidal layers, risk‐taking and firm value using a sample of local state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) in China. We find that state‐pyramidal layers have a positive and significant impact on firm risk‐taking and firm value, suggesting that the pyramidal structure formed by the state protects SOEs from political intervention. Risk‐taking is conducive to enhancing firm value and is one of the important channels through which state‐pyramidal layers increase firm value. By exploring the role of state‐pyramidal organizational structures in improving SOEs' risk‐taking, our results contribute to both corporate governance and corporate finance literature.     

上市公司因素与股票市场风险关系实证研究

文章应用横截面数据,定量分析了我国上市公司业绩、治理结构、股权分置和信息披露等公司因素对股票市场风险的影响,以及总体公司因素对我国股票市场风险的影响程度,并得出了相应的结论。     

高管团队内薪酬差距、公司绩效和治理结构

公司高管团队内薪酬差距主要指CEO薪酬水平同其他高层管理人员之间的薪酬数额的差别。本文对我国上市公司内高层管理人员薪酬差距和公司未来绩效之间关系进行了检验 ,发现二者之间具有显著的正向关系 ,大薪酬差距可以提升公司绩效。该结果支持薪酬激励的锦标赛理论而不是行为理论。本文还发现 ,影响我国公司薪酬差距的主要因素不是公司外部市场环境因素和企业自身经营运作上的特点 ,而是公司治理结构。本文认为 ,我国上市公司应适当提高薪酬差距以维持足够的锦标赛激励能量 ,而提高薪酬差距的主要出路在于进行治理结构改革。     

NEGOTIATED BLOCK TRADE AND REBUILDING OF TRUST

We investigate the impact of corporate governance on customers' trust using a dynamic model of experience-goods firm. In the optimal equilibrium, customers' trust in the firm is linked to its behavior in the market for corporate control, so that the controlling shareholder has incentives to ensure high product quality while noncontrolling shareholders' interests are protected. Following a trust-damaging event, turnover of the controlling share block restores customers' trust and enhances total shareholder value. Our analysis identifies an endogenous cost of corporate control, offers implications for the control premium, and provides a novel rationale for the separation of ownership and control.     

中国上市公司的治理改进:2002-2006

文章以2002年和2007年我国上市公司的自查报告为基础,选择了18个指标构建了公司治理指数,并以此对我国上市公司的治理状况及其5年间的改进程度进行了综合评价。结果显示,治理指数与公司价值显著正相关,治理指数每上升1点,公司价值约增加0.3个百分点;5年间上市公司的治理水平有明显改进,这种改善总体上会带来公司价值的提升,但这一结论存在一定的内生性。进一步研究表明,上述治理改进的效果是股东权利、董事会与监事会、公司独立性和内控与激励机制等治理机制共同作用的结果。文章还发现,公司风险程度、融资需求、外部市场化水平、兼并或借壳上市等公司特征在一定程度上驱动了上市公司的治理改进。     

股权结构、企业绩效与投资者利益保护

公司治理的核心是对投资者利益的保护 ,公司治理、股权结构与企业绩效之间存在非常密切的内在联系。本文对深交所 1 996— 1 999年除金融性行业以外的上市公司股权结构与企业绩效之间的关系所进行的经验研究表明 ,在公司治理对外部投资人利益缺乏保护的情况下 ,流通股比例与企业业绩之间负相关 ;在非保护性行业第一大股东持股比例与企业业绩正相关 ;国有股比例、① 法人股比例与企业业绩之间的相关关系不显著。本文的研究结果表明 ,国有股减持和民营化必须建立在保护投资者利益的基础上 ,否则将不利于公司治理的优化和企业绩效的提高。