Takeover vulnerability and the credibility of signaling: The case of open-market share repurchases

There is debate in the literature focuses on whether open market repurchases can be taken as a signal of stock undervaluation. This research argues that takeover pressures before a repurchase announcement can be a credible signal of undervaluation. The empirical results indicate that repurchasing firms with a higher probability of takeover experience greater announcement effects, improvements in operating performance and long-run abnormal return, positive forecast revisions by financial analysts, and enhanced agreement between management and shareholders. These findings suggest that takeover probability and open-market share repurchases appear to constitute a double-signal for conveying stock undervaluation to the market.     

The Information Content of Share Repurchase Programs

Contrary to the implications of many payout theories, we find that announcements of open‐market share repurchase programs are not followed by an increase in operating performance. However, we find that repurchasing firms experience a significant reduction in systematic risk and cost of capital relative to non‐repurchasing firms. Further, consistent with the free cash‐flow hypothesis, we find that the market reaction to share repurchase announcements is more positive among those firms that are more likely to overinvest. Finally, we find evidence to indicate that investors underreact to repurchase announcements because they initially underestimate the decline in cost of capital.     

The Impact of the Corporate Control Market on IPO Decisions

Entrepreneurs who take their firm public during an active corporate control market face an increased risk of losing control through a takeover. I examine the extent to which the threat of takeover impacts IPO firms’ decisions and find that an active takeover market in an IPO firm's industry increases the probability that the firm incorporates in a state with state‐level antitakeover provisions. IPO firms backed by venture capital investors and reputable underwriters are less likely to incorporate in a state offering antitakeover provisions. A closer examination of equity carve‐outs suggests that control is not a first‐order consideration for some IPO firms.     

Mimicking repurchases

We study the tendency of firms to mimic the repurchase announcements of their industry counterparts. We argue that a firm, by repurchasing its shares, sends a positive signal about itself and a negative one about its competitors. This induces the competing firms to mimic the behavior of the repurchasing firm by repurchasing themselves. Using a broad sample of US firms from the period 1984–2002, we show that, in concentrated industries, a repurchase announcement lowers the stock price of the other firms in the same industry. The other firms react by repurchasing themselves to undo these negative effects. Repurchases are chosen as a strategic reaction to other firms’ repurchase decisions and are not motivated by the desire to time the market, i.e., to take advantage of a significantly undervalued stock price. Therefore, repurchasing firms in more concentrated industries experience a lower increase in value in comparison with their counterparts in less concentrated industries in the post-announcement era. Alternative methodologies used to estimate long-term performance confirm that it is only the repurchasing firms in low concentration industries that outperform the market, their non-repurchasing peers, and their counterparts in more concentrated industries by amounts that are economically and statistically significant.     

Flexibility in share repurchases: Evidence from UK

Although firms cite flexibility as important when repurchasing shares, we know little about how or why firms vary repurchases. We use an extensive sample of daily repurchase transactions from the United Kingdom to investigate how the number of repurchase days and volumes of shares repurchased change based on several known motivations. We find that stock price changes, liquidity, leverage, takeover activity and earnings per share targets impact share repurchasing patterns. Further, we compare actual repurchases to alternative share accumulation strategies and find that firms utilize flexibility without paying higher costs.     

A century of corporate takeovers: What have we learned and where do we stand?

This paper reviews the vast academic literature on the market for corporate control. Our main focus is the cyclical wave pattern that this market exhibits. We address the following questions: Why do we observe recurring surges and downfalls in M&A activity? Why do managers herd in their takeover decisions? Is takeover activity fuelled by capital market developments? Does a transfer of control generate shareholder gains and do such gains differ across takeover waves? What caused the formation of conglomerate firms in the wave of the 1960s and their de-conglomeration in the 1980s and 1990s? And, why do we observe time- and country-clustering of hostile takeover activity? We find that the patterns of takeover activity and their profitability vary significantly across takeover waves. Despite such diversity, all waves still have some common factors: they are preceded by technological or industrial shocks, and occur in a positive economic and political environment, amidst rapid credit expansion and stock market booms. Takeovers towards the end of each wave are usually driven by non-rational, frequently self-interested managerial decision-making.     

Value impact of debt issuances by targets of withdrawn takeovers

An existing finance theory predicts that managers of takeover targets will increase leverage to enhance managerial control which can, in turn, allow target managers to thwart a takeover attempt altogether. We find that targets significantly increase leverage, not only by issuing more debt, but also by repurchasing more equity. We also find that debt issuances by poorly performing target managers made between takeover announcement and withdrawal result in significantly negative abnormal returns at the time of the issuance, consistent with the entrenchment role of debt. On the other hand, debt issued by high-performing target managers is not found to result in these same negative returns. Additionally, we document that debt-increasing, poorly performing targets experience significantly more negative returns at withdrawal announcement, also followed by significantly negative post-withdrawal stock performance, while these negative effects are offset for high-performing targets. Overall, our findings suggest that managerial motivations to block takeover attempts with increased debt issuance differ and that these differences in motivation are recognized by the market.     

Reputation as a governance mechanism? Evidence from payout policy of insider‐controlled firms in Taiwan

This paper examines the effect of entrenched insiders’ reputational concerns on corporate payout policy in Taiwan, a market in which typical public firms are controlled by a single dominant shareholder who is subject to weak takeover threats and has incentives and abilities to extract private benefits by oppressing minority equity holders. The reputation‐building hypothesis predicts that firms with higher expropriation risk by a controlling shareholder make more payouts to credibly commit not to expropriate minority shareholders, thereby establishing reputation in the capital market for risk diversification and low‐cost external financing. I show that corporate payout intensity is significantly and positively correlated with measures related to the moral hazard of dominant owners. The reputation effect manifests in firms that most value it; the interaction analyses indicate that younger, smaller, or growth firms with higher controlling shareholder expropriation risk pay more cash dividends. Moreover, firms are less likely to omit dividends and more likely to resume dividends when their controlling shareholders are more entrenched. Finally, I show that the value of cash dividends is higher for firms with higher controlling shareholder expropriation risk and that expected dividend increases in these firms are value enhancing.     

Why are firms unlevered?

In this paper, we examine why firms have no debt in their capital structure. We reject the hypothesis that zero-leverage policies are driven by entrenched managers attempting to avoid the disciplinary pressures of debt. These firms do not have weaker internal or external governance mechanisms. The debt initiation decisions of these firms are not preceded by shocks to their entrenchment, such as takeover threats or the emergence of activist blockholders. Our evidence supports the hypothesis that these firms are financially constrained. Zero-debt firms are small, young, conserve cash from cash-flow, and are more likely to lease their assets. When they have access to a line of credit, they face stricter covenants and higher all-in costs than comparable control firms. They lose market share in economic downturns, consistent with the financial constraints explanation, but inconsistent with theories of predation which suggest that they may be voluntarily stockpiling debt capacity.     

Insider trading and share repurchases: Do insiders and firms trade in the same direction?

Signaling undervaluation is often considered a primary motive for repurchasing stock, but insider trading activity by repurchasing firms is not always consistent with undervaluation. Net insider buying and selling are both more frequent in quarters when firms are repurchasing non-trivial amounts of stock, with the odds of observing a repurchase the highest in quarters with net insider selling. In multinomial logit models, share repurchases associated with net insider selling are positively related to illiquidity, option exercises by insiders, and pre-repurchase returns and negatively correlated with industry-adjusted book to market ratios when compared to other repurchases. Hence, repurchases when insiders are selling stock are more likely done to support share prices or avoid dilution and are less likely undervaluation signals. We find that insider trades either validate or mitigate the undervaluation signal of the repurchase. Abnormal returns of repurchasing firms with net insider buying versus net insider selling in a given quarter are significantly higher for the quarter immediately after the repurchase and the three subsequent years. For repurchases accompanied by net insider selling, abnormal returns are negligible after only one year.     

The Effects of Cash,Debt, and Insiders on Open Market Share Repurchases

The findings of the authors' recent study suggest, on balance, that stock repurchases function much like tax‐efficient special dividends, increasing when free cash flow is large and when debt levels are low, but not replacing regularly scheduled dividends. Repurchasing companies experience median event returns of about 2% around the repurchase announcements, with a related mean effect of roughly 3%. Companies with greater free cash flow and less debt are more likely than otherwise comparable companies to repurchase their shares. Furthermore, repurchasing companies that exhibit substandard preannouncement stock price returns and seek to buy back higher percentages of shares tend to elicit more positive stock price reactions. At the same time, the study provides some evidence that corporate managers attempt to use their inside information to profit from buybacks. For example, managing insiders in repurchasing firms decrease their selling activity and increase their buying activity two weeks before repurchase announcements to a greater extent than non‐managing insiders. But perhaps the most remarkable finding from this part of the study is how little insiders as a group seem to profit from their short‐term trading behavior—a finding that suggests that the market appears to anticipate much of this behavior.     

专利提前公开的资本市场动因——基于企业被并购压力视角的研究

随着我国资本市场建设的日益完善,上市公司控制权市场活跃度得到显著提升,企业如何应对被并购压力成为值得关注的议题。本文研究企业是否会选择发明专利公开时点来应对被并购压力。研究发现,当被并购压力增大时,上市公司会越早公开专利。这是因为专利提前公开能够提升公司股票的异常回报,从而降低企业成为被并购目标的可能性或提高企业可获得的并购溢价。异质性分析发现:(1)被并购压力增大时,既有分析师关注度和风险投资者持股比例越高的企业越可能提前公开专利;(2)企业更可能选择技术成熟、质量较高的专利进行公开;(3)其他替代策略的存在会削弱被并购压力对专利提前公开的影响。在使用工具变量、行业并购政策变化和举牌事件作为外生冲击对内生性问题进行处理后,结果仍然稳健。     

Corporate Performance,Corporate Takeovers,and Management Turnover

This paper examines the hypothesis that an important role of corporate takeovers is to discipline the top managers of poorly performing target firms. We document that the turnover rate for the top manager of target firms in tender offer-takeovers significantly increases following completion of the takeover and that prior to the takeover these firms were significantly under-performing other firms in their industry as well as other target firms which had no post-takeover change in the top executive. We interpret the results to indicate that the takeover market plays an important role in controlling the nonvalue maximizing behavior of top corporate managers.     

On the heterogeneity of leveraged going private transactions

In contrast to previous literature, we argue that are two typesof poorly performing firms going private through a leveragedbuyout (LBO). One group consists of firms in which managersown an insignificant fraction of their firm's stock and arevulnerable to a hostile takeover. The other group consists offirms in which managers own a significant fraction of theirfirm's stock and so face little risk of hostile takeover. Ourevidence indicates that there are two such groups of LBOs andthat their motivations and posttransaction actions are different.     

The effect of securities class action lawsuits on mergers and acquisitions

This paper investigates whether shareholder class action litigation affects the takeover candidacy, premium, and completion rate of mergers and acquisitions involving defendant target firms. We use a comprehensive dataset of publicly traded U.S. firms that became the targets of takeover bids between 1998 and 2016 and find that firms subject to shareholder class action lawsuits within the previous two years are more likely to be targeted for acquisition while commanding a significantly higher premium. Firms that face such litigation after a takeover announcement experience a significant decrease in takeover completion.     

Dividends, Share Repurchases, and the Substitution Hypothesis

We show that repurchases have not only became an important form of payout for U.S. corporations, but also that firms finance their share repurchases with funds that otherwise would have been used to increase dividends. We find that young firms have a higher propensity to pay cash through repurchases than they did in the past and that repurchases have become the preferred form of initiating a cash payout. Although large, established firms have generally not cut their dividends, they also show a higher propensity to pay out cash through repurchases. These findings indicate that firms have gradually substituted repurchases for dividends. Our results also suggest that before 1983, regulatory constraints inhibited firms from aggressively repurchasing shares.     

THE INTRA-INDUSTRY EFFECTS OF OPEN MARKET SHARE REPURCHASES: CONTAGION OR COMPETITIVE?

We examine the extent to which announcements of open market share repurchase programs affect the valuation of competing firms in the same industry. On average, although firms announcing open market share repurchase programs experience a significantly positive stock price reaction at announcement, portfolios of rival firms in the same industry experience a significant and contemporaneous negative stock price reaction. This suggests that perceived changes in the competitive positions of the repurchasing firms occur at the expense of rival firms and dominate any signals of favorable industry conditions. Thus, the competitive intra-industry effects of open market repurchases outweigh any contagion effects. In addition, cross-sectional tests indicate that these competitive effects are more pronounced in industries characterized by a lower degree of competition and less correlation between the stock returns of the repurchasing firm and its rivals.     

Financial constraints and share repurchases

We examine how the financial constraints of repurchasing firms affect their post-buyback performance. By every constraint measure we use, a set of constrained firms repurchase. They display significantly poorer post-buyback abnormal return and operating performance than unconstrained firms. Financial constraints are more important in explaining the performance of share buybacks for firms with high actual repurchase ratios. Constrained firms, especially those with high actual repurchase ratios, experience a significantly greater increase in post-buyback distress risk than unconstrained firms. Managerial hubris could explain why constrained firms buy back shares even if the buybacks do not improve shareholder wealth.     

Does cross-listing in the US foster mergers and acquisitions and increase target shareholder wealth?

We examine the role of cross-listing in alleviating domestic market constraints and facilitating mergers and acquisitions. Our results show that cross-listing allows shareholders of target firms to extract higher takeover premiums relative to their non-cross-listed peers. Moreover, shareholders of Sarbanes–Oxley-compliant targets seem to benefit from a higher premium. We also find that cross-listed firms are more likely to be acquisition targets, consistent with the belief that cross-listing increases firms’ attractiveness and visibility on the market for corporate control. Our results are robust to various specifications and to the self-selection bias arising from the decision to cross-list.     

If It's Good for the Firm,It's Good for Me: Insider Trading and Repurchases Motivated by Undervaluation

My findings suggest that information inherent in insider trading can be used to identify undervalued repurchasing firms. I examine the relation between insider trading and the performance of open market repurchase (OMR) firms. I show that firms with high net insider buying prior to OMR announcements not only earn abnormal stock returns in both the short‐ and long‐run, but also exhibit better operating performance. Overall, the evidence is consistent with insiders timing their trades prior to OMR announcements.