Monetary policy,bank lending and corporate investment

The purpose of this study is to shed light on the chain of causality from macroeconomic financial policy to the microeconomic investment function. Concretely, we aim to provide an in-depth analysis of the relationships between the monetary policy of central banks, the loan policy of commercial banks, and the investment behavior of firms. We focus on countries that conduct their monetary policy under the inflation-targeting framework. Our empirical analysis with data from Germany, Switzerland and Thailand provides several new insights. First, after controlling for the US monetary policy, the monetary policy in Germany and Thailand appears to influence the banks' lending rate in the short run (i.e. within two months), whereas the monetary policy in Switzerland seems to be ineffective at influencing the banks' lending rate in the short run. Second, our results show that the banks' lending rate has a negative effect on their loans and that this negative effect is weakened by their growth opportunities. Third, we find that the supply of bank loans plays a more pivotal role in determining firms' investment than the lending rate. Last but not least, we document that neither the lending rate nor the loan-to-assets ratio moderates the sensitivity of the firms' investment to growth opportunities.     

Corporate Debt Structure and the Financial Crisis

We present a DSGE model where firms optimally choose among alternative instruments of external finance. The model is used to explain the evolving composition of corporate debt during the financial crisis of 2008–09, namely, the observed shift from bank finance to bond finance, at a time when the cost of market debt rose above the cost of bank loans. We show that the flexibility offered by banks on the terms of their loans and firms' ability to substitute among alternative instruments of debt finance are important to shield the economy from adverse real effects of a financial crisis.     

The impact of monetary policy on the financing behaviour of firms in the Euro area and the UK

Abstract

According to the ‘broad credit view’ bank-dependent firms are more strongly affected by monetary contractions than firms with access to non-bank forms of external finance. Within the credit view the bank lending channel focuses on the special role of bank loans, and predicts that monetary contractions reduce loan supply to firms facing information problems. However, the ‘relationship lending channel’ argues that, especially in bank-based economies, bank-dependent firms have close ties with banks, which may reduce the sensitivity of their use of bank debt to monetary shocks. The sensitivity of corporate debt structures to changes in the monetary policy stance is analysed using a sample of 22,000 firms in the Euro area and the UK. Evidence is found for the credit view, the relationship lending channel, but not for the bank lending channel.     

The cost of private debt over the credit cycle

We identify global and regional fluctuations in international private debt flows to emerging and developing countries using data on cross-border loans and international bond issuance over 1993–2009. We use micro-level data on syndicated cross-border loans and international bond placements to estimate the effects of individual borrower characteristics as well as macroeconomic conditions on the cost of foreign borrowing and test whether these effects differ across phases of the lending cycle. First, we find that borrower characteristics associated with lower loan spreads are not necessarily associated with lower bond spreads. Second, we find differential effects of borrower characteristics between cycle phases for loans and bonds separately. Third, we find strong reductions in the cost of debt finance during periods when international debt flows are more than one standard deviation above their mean, but not for expansionary periods, when the growth rate of debt flows is increasing. We also find that higher trade ratios in the borrower's home country raise loan spreads more in periods of high credit flows but have no effect on bond spreads. At the same time, borrowers residing in countries with high investment ratios pay lower spreads on bond issuance particularly during periods of high credit flows, but we find no similar effect for loan spreads. Inflation rates, real exchange rates and previous banking crises have small impacts on loan and bond spreads.     

Procyclical Capital Regulation and Lending

We use a quasi‐experimental research design to examine the effect of model‐based capital regulation on the procyclicality of bank lending and firms' access to funds. In response to an exogenous shock to credit risk in the German economy, capital charges for loans under model‐based regulation increased by 0.5 percentage points. As a consequence, banks reduced the amount of these loans by 2.1 to 3.9 percentage points more than for loans under the traditional approach with fixed capital charges. We find an even stronger effect when we examine aggregate firm borrowing, suggesting that microprudential capital regulation can have sizeable real effects.     

Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008

This paper shows that new loans to large borrowers fell by 47% during the peak period of the financial crisis (fourth quarter of 2008) relative to the prior quarter and by 79% relative to the peak of the credit boom (second quarter of 2007). New lending for real investment (such as working capital and capital expenditures) fell by only 14% in the last quarter of 2008, but contracted nearly as much as new lending for restructuring (LBOs, M&As, share repurchases) relative to the peak of the credit boom. After the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, there was a run by short-term bank creditors, making it difficult for banks to roll over their short term debt. We find that there was a simultaneous run by borrowers who drew down their credit lines, leading to a spike in commercial and industrial loans reported on bank balance sheets. We examine whether these two stresses on bank liquidity led them to cut lending. In particular, we show that banks cut their lending less if they had better access to deposit financing and thus, they were not as reliant on short-term debt. We also show that banks that were more vulnerable to credit-line drawdowns because they co-syndicated more of their credit lines with Lehman Brothers reduced their lending to a greater extent.     

Does the source of debt financing affect default risk?

We examine whether the source of debt financing is important for assessments of firms’ default risk. This study reveals that during the 2007–2010 financial crisis, firms that depend mainly on financing from banks suffer higher increases in default risk than do firms with no such dependence. Conversely, firms that rely solely on financing from public debt markets do not experience significant increases in default risk. These findings suggest that the bank supply shock theory explains the transmission of financial shocks to the real economy. Finally, firms that depend on bank financing cannot offset the adverse impacts of bank lending shocks by substituting bank loans with publicly traded debt.     

Who Borrows from the Lender of Last Resort?

We analyze lender of last resort (LOLR) lending during the European sovereign debt crisis. Using a novel data set on all central bank lending and collateral, we show that weakly capitalized banks took out more LOLR loans and used riskier collateral than strongly capitalized banks. We also find that weakly capitalized banks used LOLR loans to buy risky assets such as distressed sovereign debt. This resulted in a reallocation of risky assets from strongly to weakly capitalized banks. Our findings cannot be explained by classical LOLR theory. Rather, they point to risk taking by banks, both independently and with the encouragement of governments, and highlight the benefit of unifying LOLR lending and bank supervision.     

Identification of a loan supply function: A cross-country test for the existence of a bank lending channel

Using the theoretical predictions of the Bernanke–Blinder [Bernanke, B.S., Blinder, A.S., 1988. Is it money or credit or both or neither? Credit, money, and aggregate demand. American Economic Review 78, 435–459] model, we seek to examine the existence of a bank lending channel through the empirical identification of a loan supply function and to assess the impact of differential bank characteristics on banks’ ability to supply loans. To this end, we estimate a loan supply model and test for the restrictions implied by perfect substitutability between loans and bonds in bank portfolios. Estimations are carried out on bank panel data for six OECD countries, the results showing that a bank lending channel is at work in only two of them. Moreover, we find that the relevance of bank characteristics is hardly a decisive factor in the identification of a loan supply function.     

Formal finance and trade credit during China's transition

Using a large panel dataset of Chinese industrial firms, we find that poorly performing SOEs were more likely to redistribute credit to firms with less privileged access to loans via trade credit. While that could be consistent with the efficient redistribution of credit, it is more likely that these SOEs extended trade credit to prop up faltering customers that were in arrears. By contrast, profitable private domestic firms were more likely to extend trade credit than unprofitable ones. Trade credit likely provided a substitute for loans for these firms' customers that were shut out of formal credit markets. As biases in lending become less severe, the allocation of lending became more efficient, and the amount of trade credit extended by private firms declined. Our evidence implies that redistribution of bank loans via trade was not a major contributor to China's explosive growth.     

Is small beautiful? The resilience of small banks during the European debt crisis

We examine the lending behaviour of small and large banks in the Eurozone during the sovereign debt crisis. Relative to large banks, small banks are less pro-cyclical in that they exhibit more stable lending growth across credit expansion and contraction periods. In peripheral countries, the portfolio rebalancing of small banks towards higher public debt (substitution effect) does not appear to cause a reduction of their lending to the private sector. Instead, the level of public debt seems to provide a liquidity buffer that influences bank-specific loan growth positively (complementarity effect), particularly during market-wide lending contractions. Our findings show that for small peripheral banks the substitution effect found in the literature can coexist with a complementarity effect when public debt grows faster than private loans. Our analysis contributes to the ongoing debate on the regulatory treatment of public debt in banks and supports incentives embedded in new banking regulation that penalise bank size.     

Does Borrowing from Banks Cost More than Borrowing from the Market?

This paper investigates the pricing of bank loans relative to capital market debt. The analysis uses a novel sample of loans matched with bond spreads from the same firm on the same date. After accounting for seniority, lenders earn a large premium relative to the bond-implied credit spread. In a sample of secured term loans to noninvestment-grade firms, the average premium is 140 to 170 bps or about half of the all-in-drawn spread. This is the first direct evidence of firms' willingness to pay for bank credit and raises questions about the nature of competition in the loan market.     

Bank loans during the 2008 quantitative easing

We examine the effect of quantitative easing on the supply of bank loans. During the Fed’s quantitative easing programs, lending banks reduced relatively more loan spreads, offered longer loan maturities, provided larger loans, and loosened more covenants for firms whose long-term bond ratings were below BBB and were lower than those with investment-grade bond ratings. Furthermore, we find that new bank loans in this period were associated with a reduction in a firm’s value and an increase in default risk. These results indicate that banks took greater risk during the 2008 quantitative easing by relaxing lending standards to relatively riskier borrowers.     

Did Structured Credit Fuel the LBO Boom?

The leveraged buyout (LBO) boom of 2004 to 2007 was fueled by growth in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and other forms of securitization. Banks active in structured credit underwriting lent more for LBOs, indicating that bank lending policies linked LBO and CDO markets. LBO loans originated by large CDO underwriters were associated with lower spreads, weaker covenants, and greater use of bank debt in deal financing. Loans financed through structured credit markets did not lead to worse LBOs, overpayment, or riskier deal structures. Securitization markets altered banks' access to capital, affected their lending policies, and fueled the recent LBO boom.     

Does bank loan supply affect the supply of equity capital? Evidence from new share issuance and withdrawal

We examine the hypothesis that fluctuations in the aggregate supply of bank loans influence the supply of new equity capital. Using residual lending standards as a clean measure of aggregate loan supply and a VAR framework to aid identification, we find that a one-standard-deviation shock to lending standards results in 15% fewer IPOs. Shocks elicit strong responses from IPO-firms that are highly dependent on external capital and increase the number of withdrawals, strengthening the interpretation that the above is driven by changes in the supply of equity. Our results suggest that credit conditions are important to a well-functioning IPO market.     

Supply of bank loans and business debts: A view from historical bankruptcy cases

As bank loans fell in the 2008 crisis, business bankruptcy increased. To study how bank loans affect business balance sheets and bankruptcy, we use new data on bankrupt businesses in Missouri between 1898 and 1942. We confirm that when banks curtail loans, courts see more bankruptcies among businesses with high exposure to bank debt. To reduce real volatility, policy‐makers can set tough bank liquidity requirements in the upswing of business cycle but allow weaker requirements in the downswing. We also find that between 1914 and 1933, businesses in St. Louis were more sensitive to changes in bank loans than businesses in Kansas City, probably due to the tight monetary policy conducted by the conservative St. Louis Fed. The Glass‐Steagall Act weakened the relationship between bank loans and business debt structure. The takeaway is that lender‐of‐last‐resort practices stabilize both the financial sector and the real economy.     

Global equity offerings and access to domestic loan market: U.S. evidence

This study examines whether and to what extend global equity offerings at the IPO stage may affect issuing firms' ability to borrow in the domestic debt market. Tracking bank loans taken by U.S. IPO firms in the domestic syndicated loan market, we observe that global equity offering firms experience more favorable loan price than that offered to their domestic counterparts. This finding holds for a set of robustness tests of endogeneity issues. We also find that, compared with their domestic counterparts, global equity offering firms are less likely to have financial distress, engage more in international diversification, and are more likely to wait a longer time to apply for syndicated loans.     

Determinants of short-term debt: a note

Although various measures to lengthen the maturity of foreign debt are being discussed, there is relatively little evidence on the determinants of short-term debt. This paper briefly reviews the theoretical literature and discusses a stylized model which stresses the role of short-term debt under conditions of uncertainty. We then complement earlier empirical work by Rodrik and Velasco. Using a new dataset, we find that the determinants of short-term bank lending do not differ significantly between developed and developing countries. The level of economic development and the share of loans to banks are found to have a positive, OECD membership to have a negative impact on the share of short-term loans.     

The role of securitization in bank liquidity and funding management

This paper studies the role of securitization in bank management. I propose a new index of “bank loan portfolio liquidity” which can be thought of as a weighted average of the potential to securitize loans of a given type, where the weights reflect the composition of a bank loan portfolio. I use this new index to show that by allowing banks to convert illiquid loans into liquid funds, securitization reduces banks' holdings of liquid securities and increases their lending ability. Furthermore, securitization provides banks with an additional source of funding and makes bank lending less sensitive to cost of funds shocks. By extension, the securitization weakens the ability of the monetary authority to affect banks' lending activity but makes banks more susceptible to liquidity and funding crisis when the securitization market is shut down.     

Reputation, renegotiation, and the choice between bank loans and publicly traded debt

We model firms' choice between bank loans and publicly tradeddebt, allowing for debt renegotiation in the event of financialdistress. Entrepreneurs, with private information about theirprobability of financial distress, borrow from banks (multiperiodplayers) or issue bonds to implement projects. If a firm isin financial distress, lenders devote a certain amount of resources(unobservable to entrepreneurs) to evaluate whether to liquidatethe firm or to renegotiate its debt. We demonstrate that banks'desire to acquire a reputation for making the 'right' renegotiationversus liquidation decision provides them an endogenous incentiveto devote a larger amount of resources than bondholders towardsuch evaluations. In equilibrium, bank loans dominate bondsfrom the point of view of minimizing inefficient liquidation,.however, firms with a lower probability of financial distresschoose bonds over bank loans.