支付系统发展与超额准备金需求变动

本文介绍了我国支付系统的主要发展阶段、超额准备金需求变动的理论基础及支付系统发展对超额准备金需求的影响.研究发现,支付系统的发展降低了商业银行对超额准备金的需求,降低了商业银行超额准备金率的方差,提高了商业银行对超额准备金机会成本的敏感程度,更重要的是它可能影响央行法定存款准备金制度的效果.     

What is in it for us? Network effects and bank payment innovation

The developed world exhibits substantial but poorly understood differences in the efficiency and quality of low value payment services. This paper compares payment arrangements in the UK, Norway, Sweden, and Finland, and discusses the impact of network effects on incentives to adopt new payments technology. A model is presented, in which private benefits for investment in shared inter-bank payments infrastructure are weak. In contrast, due to ‘account externalities’, there are strong incentives for investment in intra-bank payment systems. These two features, distinguishing bank payments from other network industries, can help explain some of the observed cross-country differences in payment arrangements.     

Bankruptcy priority for bank deposits: a contract theoretic explanation

Over the past decade several countries, including the US, haveintroduced or redesigned legislation that confers priority inbankruptcy upon all or some bank deposits. We argue that inthe presence of contracting costs such rules can increase efficiency.We first show in a private information model that a borrowercan reduce overall costs of finance by letting informationallyheterogeneous lenders choose between junior and senior debt.In particular, we find that debt priorities reduce sociallywasteful information gathering by investors. We then argue why,particularly in banking, legal standardization of debt prioritiesmay be superior to bilateral private arrangements.     

Sequential payments and optimal pricing in payment systems

This paper studies the intraday payment behaviour between heterogeneous banks as well as optimal intraday pricing schemes. The paper shows the social optimality of payment sequencing, which allows a bank to delay payments until the bank receives payments from the counterparty. The payment sequencing allows a bank with high liquidity cost to ‘recycle’ payment inflow from another bank with lower liqudity cost, reducing the aggregate cost of funding of banks to settle all payments. But we also see that the banks have an incentive to delay payments more than the payment sequencing requires. This underscores the importance of social planner’s role reducing settlement delay, while leaving socially efficient payment sequencing. In this context, we compare two different pricing schemes, a standard throughput guideline and a time-varying intraday tariff, to discuss the optimal incentive mechanisms in payment systems for the ‘socially efficient sequential settlement’.     

Auctions with heterogeneous entry costs

If bidders have independent private values and homogeneous entry costs, a first‐ or second‐price auction with a reserve price equal to the seller’s value maximizes social surplus and seller revenue. We show that if entry costs are heterogeneous and private information, then the revenue‐maximizing reserve price is above the seller’s value, a positive admission fee (and a reserve price equal to the seller’s value) generates more revenue, and an entry cap combined with an admission fee generates even more revenue. Social surplus and seller revenue may either increase or decrease in the number of bidders, but they coincide asymptotically.     

Payments Settlement: Tiering in Private and Public Systems

What are the benefits provided by a payment system? What are the trade‐offs in public versus private payment systems and in restricted versus open payments arrangements? Modern payment systems encompass a variety of institutional designs with varying degrees of counterparty protection. We develop a framework that allows for an examination and comparison of payment systems, and specification of conditions leading to their adoption. We relate these conditions to the design of present large‐value payment systems (Fedwire, CHIPS, TARGET, etc.).     

Bank regulation,property prices and early warning systems for banking crises in OECD countries

Early warning systems (EWS) for banking crises generally omit bank capital, bank liquidity and property prices. Most work on EWS has been for global samples dominated by emerging market crises where time series data on bank capital adequacy and property prices are typically absent. We estimate logit crisis models for OECD countries, finding strong effects from capital adequacy and liquidity ratios as well as property prices, and can exclude traditional variables. Higher capital adequacy and liquidity ratios have a marked effect on the crisis probabilities, implying long-run benefits to offset some of the costs that such regulations may impose.     

Benefits from a changing payment technology in European banking

An “output characteristics” cost function is used to identify payment sources of technical change in European banking and estimate associated benefits. As the share of electronic payments in 12 European countries rose from 0.43 in 1987 to 0.79 in 1999 and ATMs expanded while the number of branch offices was constant, bank operating costs are $32 billion lower than they otherwise might have been, saving 0.38% of the 12 nations’ GDP. Policies facilitating these changes (antitrust exemptions to weakly coordinate implementation of payment service pricing) would permit benefits to be more fully realized.     

Foreign reserve and money dynamics with asset portfolio adjustment: international evidence

In this paper we argue that more complete modeling of foreign exchange intervention and sterilization dynamics is necessary when there are adjustment costs to changing private portfolios and/or the central bank attempts to balance longer-run monetary control against short-term exchange rate objectives. We show that measured correlations between domestic credit and foreign asset changes, often interpreted as ‘sterilization coefficients’, may be misleading because they vary with the pattern of disturbances as well as private agent and central bank behavior. We assess the empirical significance of this issue by estimating vector error correction models of the domestic and foreign asset components of the monetary base for Japan and Germany. In both countries, we find that that the impact of foreign exchange intervention on domestic credit falls markedly after several months, implying that the degree of sterilization decreases over time. However, the monetary base remained largely insulated as foreign asset positions were subsequently ‘unwound.’     

Private sector share of external debt and financial stability: Evidence from bank loans

In the last two decades, the private sector has contracted a substantially larger share in the total amount of foreign-currency international debt (private sector share of external debt), especially in developing countries. In this paper, I empirically examine the effect of this phenomenon on bank loan prices. I find that the private sector share of external debt negatively and significantly impacts the price of bank loans. This result supports the hypothesis that private sector debt contributes to international financial stability to a greater degree than sovereign debt. Nevertheless, this impact is canceled out in the presence of fixed exchange regimes that are unsuitable with respect to fundamentals. In such circumstances, the private sector may take advantage of capital market distortions that are maintained by official authorities and thus exposes the country to further financial instability. Additional results corroborate the observation that the gain in financial stability stems from more efficient use of funds and reduced monitoring costs.     

中国银行资本监管模式选择研究

有效银行资本监管涉及降低银行倒闭风险所得到的社会收益与抑制金融业发展所产生的社会成本之间的平衡问题,理想的银行资本监管应随着这些成本和收益的变化而调整,设计一种激励相容的银行资本监管制度成为对银行资本监管的现实需要,无论是标准化模式还是内部模型法都是对银行具体风险评价和风险管理方法的约束,整体监管模式建立在预先承诺制的基础之上,注重激励相容、发挥市场约束和银行自身管理的作用,在适用性、稳定性、可操作性等方面都比内部模型法具有优势.     

The Sarbanes–Oxley act and cross-listed foreign private issuers

I examine the short- and long-term impact of the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) on cross-listed foreign private issuers. Both short- and long-term test results suggest that the costs of SOX compliance significantly exceed its benefits and reduce the net benefits of cross-listings.     

Investor protection and the value effects of bank merger announcements in Europe and the US

Investor protection regimes have been shown to partly explain why the same type of corporate event may attract different investor reactions across countries. We compare the value effects of large bank merger announcements in Europe and the US and find an inverse relationship between the level of investor protection prevalent in the target country and abnormal returns that bidders realize during the announcement period. Accordingly, bidding banks realize higher returns when targeting low protection economies (most European economies) than bidders targeting institutions which operate under a high investor protection regime (the US). We argue that bidding bank shareholders need to be compensated for an increased risk of expropriation by insiders which they face in a low protection environment where takeover markets are illiquid and there are high private benefits of control.     

A model of unconventional monetary policy

We develop a quantitative monetary DSGE model with financial intermediaries that face endogenously determined balance sheet constraints. We then use the model to evaluate the effects of the central bank using unconventional monetary policy to combat a simulated financial crisis. We interpret unconventional monetary policy as expanding central bank credit intermediation to offset a disruption of private financial intermediation. Within our framework the central bank is less efficient than private intermediaries at making loans but it has the advantage of being able to elastically obtain funds by issuing riskless government debt. Unlike private intermediaries, it is not balance sheet constrained. During a crisis, the balance sheet constraints on private intermediaries tighten, raising the net benefits from central bank intermediation. These benefits may be substantial even if the zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate is not binding. In the event this constraint is binding, though, these net benefits may be significantly enhanced.     

Ownership discrimination and private firms financing in China

This study examines the financing/funding of private firms in China. Our results show that private firms are significantly less funded through formal financing channels such as bank loans than state-owned firms, and hence have to resort to alternative financing such as trade credit. Consistent with the theoretical expectation and literature, there is a substitution effect between trade credit and bank loans for private firms, but this effect is much weaker compared to that of state-owned firms. Moreover, while the univariate comparisons indicate that private firms obtain more notes payable than state-owned firms, the multivariate regression analyses show that the relation between bank loan and notes payable is positive and indifferent between private and state-owned firms.     

金融危机对拉美国家私营养老金的影响及经验启示

2008年爆发的金融危机对全球经济产生了重要影响,也对拉美国家私营养老金制度的发展产生了巨大冲击。文章介绍了拉美国家私营养老金制度的改革路径和养老基金概况,从养老金资产价值、投资收益率、投资组合、雇员、制度覆盖面和缴费密度方面切入,分析了金融危机对拉美私营养老金制度的影响。在现状分析的基础上,得出了要保障私营养老金制度可持续运行的一些经验启示:构建多元化的混合型养老金体系,增强退休和养老金支付的灵活性,积极运用生命周期投资策略,实施多元化和分散化投资,以养老金长期收益作为投资目标,建立社会风险应急储备基金和政府担保机制,以及加强员工退休教育。     

Rapid housing privatization in reforming economies: Pay the special dividend now

State ownership and operation of the housing stock in the previously centrally planned economies severely distorts housing markets, stifles labor mobility, and produces operating losses that exacerbate fiscal deficits. The conventional wisdom regarding structural reform is to gradually increase administered rents, thereby reducing deficits. Housing sales, where they occur, are primarily motivated to generate revenue to cover deficits in current operating budgets. We argue that the perceived benefits to a prolonged transition are illusory and the social costs are high.Housing will be affordable only if the population's current ownership of the existing housing stock is recognized and dividends on it are paid out. The payment can be a regular dividend (e.g., housing allowances) or a one-time special dividend (e.g., ownership vouchers). The latter is preferable.     

Cost reductions in electronic payments: The roles of consolidation,economies of scale,and technical change

Unfettered nationwide bank branching raises the issue of whether consolidation of banks’ “back-office” operations, such as their payment processing, reduces operating costs. Whether centralized processing of payments reduces costs depends on the size and range of scale economies, the relative prices of data processing and telecommunication inputs, and changes in technology in addition to the number of sites operated. While consolidating payment operations into fewer sites may reduce average data processing costs, those cost savings may be more than offset by associated increases in telecommunications expenses. To investigate the potential effects of consolidation on future banking operations, we look at the experience of the Federal Reserve in consolidating its Fedwire electronic funds transfer operation over 1979 to 1996. Previous research suggested that scale economies in Fedwire payment processing were minimal and that the observed declines in average Fedwire production costs were largely attributable to technical advance. Our estimates suggest more nearly the opposite. We find that the Fedwire funds transfer operation exhibited large scale economies but little technical advance beyond that already embodied in the technology-adjusted input prices of data processing and telecommunication inputs. We also find that the consolidation of Fedwire into fewer offices contributed around one-fourth of the overall reduction in Fedwire average cost.     

Optimal Disclosure Policy in Oligopoly Markets

This paper examines the private and social optimality of full disclosure of private information in a two-period oligopoly model. An incumbent firm is privately informed about the market demand and its production cost after operating as a monopolist in the first period, and then competes against an entrant in the second period. Two main results are derived. First, it is shown that the incumbent is best off by pre-committing to disclose both the demand and cost information. By disclosing full information, the incumbent nullifies its self-defeating intertemporal incentives, which arise whenever it has private information about the market demand, its cost efficiency, or both. In addition, the equilibrium output variance is the largest under full disclosure, which benefits the incumbent ex ante. Second, the paper shows that the incumbent's full disclosure of the demand and cost information may or may not be desirable from a social efficiency standpoint. In particular, the correlation between the firms' production costs is crucial to the rank of disclosure policies in terms of their impact on social efficiency.