Do fixed income mutual fund managers have managerial skills?

Motivated by Berk and Green [Berk, J., & Green, R. (2004). Mutual fund flows and performance in rational markets. Journal of Political Economy, 112, 1269–1295] and Chevalier and Ellison [Chevalier, J., & Ellison, G. (1999). Career concerns of mutual fund managers. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 389–432] who show theoretically that performance persistence may be short-lived, we complement Bollen and Busse [Bollen, N., & Busse, J. A. (2004). Short-term persistence in mutual fund performance. Review of Financial Studies, 18, 569–597] and examine performance persistence in high-quality corporate-bond mutual funds over short horizons. Empirically, we find supporting evidence of performance persistence over shorter horizons. Our empirical tests also suggest that the performance persistence we document may be at least partly due to managerial skills.     

Do tournaments solve the adverse selection problem?

This paper provides a solution to a puzzle in the analysis of tournaments, that of why there is no agent discrimination or differential contracting in certain business practice settings. The paper examines the problem of a principal contracting with multiple agents whose activities are subject to common shocks. The presence of common shocks invites the use of relative performance evaluation to minimize the costs of moral hazard. But, in the additional presence of adverse selection, the analysis shows that there may be no need for ex ante screening through menus of offers. This is so because the principal becomes better informed ex post about agent types, via the realization of common uncertainty, and can effectively penalize or reward the agents ex post. Thus, unlike the standard adverse selection problem without common uncertainty where the principal always benefits from ex ante screening, it is shown that ex post sorting through relative performance evaluation reduces the scope for ex ante screening through menus, and can eliminate it completely if agents are known to not be very heterogeneous. This is consistent with observed practice in industries where the primary compensation mechanism is a cardinal tournament which is uniform among employees. The analysis connotes that by using relative instead of absolute performance measures, firms with employees who are not substantially heterogeneous not only can alleviate the agency problem, but there is also no need to extract the agents' ex ante private information about their innate abilities via a screening menu.     

Growth,speculation and sprawl in a monocentric city

An economic theory of sprawl in a growing, monocentric city is presented. Where decision-makers have perfect foresight, leapfrog development and discontinuous land-rent functions may occur and be efficient in both an ex post and ex ante sense. Where the extent of future growth is uncertain, decision-makers become speculators and the spatial pattern of development is more complicated. Ex post inefficiency generally occurs.     

Model occurrence and model selection in panel data sets

In this study we focus attention on model selection in the presence of panel data. Our approach is eclectic in that it combines both classical and Bayesian techniques. It is also novel in that we address not only model selection, but also model occurrence, i.e., the process by which ‘nature’ chooses a statistical framework in which to generate the data of interest. For a given data subset, there exist competing models each of which have an ex ante positive probability of being the correct model, but for any one generated sample, ex post exactly one such model is the basis for the observed data set. Attention focuses on how the underlying model occurrence probabilities of the competing models depend on characteristics of the environments in which the data subsets are generated. Classical, Bayesian, and mixed estimation approaches are developed. Bayesian approaches are shown to be especially attractive whenever the models are nested.     

Predicting the failures of prediction markets: A procedure of decision making using classification models

Prediction markets have been an important source of information for decision makers due to their high ex post accuracies. Nevertheless, recent failures of prediction markets remind us of the importance of ex ante assessments of their prediction accuracy. This paper proposes a systematic procedure for decision makers to acquire prediction models which may be used to predict the correctness of winner-take-all markets. We commence with a set of classification models and generate combined models following various rules. We also create artificial records in the training datasets to overcome the imbalanced data issue in classification problems. These models are then empirically trained and tested with a large dataset to see which may best be used to predict the failures of prediction markets. We find that no model can universally outperform others in terms of different performance measures. Despite this, we clearly demonstrate a result of capable models for decision makers based on different decision goals.     

Seniority bias in a tournament

The paper presents a model where the probability of promotion tends to increase with seniority (overall labor market experience) without relying on the accumulation of general human capital. To this end, we consider the optimal design of a tournament (a relative compensation scheme) between two agents with different time horizon, the young and the old, in an overlapping generations framework. When the principal can only imperfectly monitor each agent’s effort level, the difference in time horizon leads to the ex post difference in the marginal value of effort between the two agents. In this case, the optimal tournament necessarily involves a bias towards the old agent. Within this framework, we also examine the relationship between: (1) the monitoring accuracy and the optimal bias; and (2) the value of outside options and the optimal bias.     

A note on simultaneous equation estimation techniques applications with a regional econometric model

A large-scale regional econometric model is estimated using six estimation techniques, including Iterated Instrumental Variables and Iterated Two-Stage Least-Squares. Following estimation the model is simulated and a seventh technique called PANGLOSS is derived. The seven techniques are then compared in ex post and ex ante tests.     

ALICE: Composite leading indicators for euro area inflation cycles

This paper develops Area-wide Leading Inflation CyclE (ALICE) indicators with the aim to provide early signals for turning points in the euro area headline and core inflation cycles. The headline (core) ALICE leads the reference cycle by three (four) months and the lead times extend to five (nine) months based on longer-leading series. Both ALICE indicators signalled turning points in the inflation cycles ex post and also performed well in a simulated real-time exercise. Moreover, in particular the headline ALICE also appeared to be useful for quantitative forecasting of the direction and level of inflation.     

Are professional forecasters overconfident?

Do professional forecasters have an accurate sense of the uncertainties surrounding their own forecasts? This paper examines forecaster overconfidence by comparing ex ante, surveyed forecaster uncertainty with ex post, realised uncertainty based on the dispersion of an individual’s forecast errors. Unlike the literature that focuses on consensus forecasts, our focus is at the level of the individual forecaster. Using microdata from the three major surveys of professional forecasters (Euro Area, US and UK), we examine real GDP growth forecasts over the period 1999–2015. Our findings show that overconfidence dominates among individual forecasters, particularly for longer forecast horizons, and that individual forecasters appear to have little understanding of their own uncertainty.     

Human Capital and CEO Compensation during Institutional Transitions

Firms appoint CEOs with different types of human capital in order to manage resource dependencies. How CEOs are compensated thus can be conceptualized as a valuation process of how boards view the value of CEOs' human capital. Two types of human capital – international experience and political ties – have emerged as potential drivers of CEO compensation during institutional transitions. But how they impact CEO compensation has remained unclear. We develop a resource dependence‐based, contingency framework to focus on the external and internal factors that enable or constrain human capital to impact CEO compensation. Because of the tremendous regional diversity within China, externally, we focus on the level of marketization of the region in which firms are headquartered. Internally, we pay attention to two corporate governance mechanisms: politically connected outside directors and compensation committee. Data from 10,329 firm‐year observations at 94 per cent of listed firms in China largely support our framework. Overall, our study contributes to resource dependence research by extending this research to the context of institutional transitions with a focus on how human capital impacts CEO compensation.     

Coordination in the El Farol Bar problem: The role of social preferences and social networks

In this paper, we continue the pursuit of the self-coordination mechanism as studied in the El Farol Bar problem. However, in addition to efficiency (the optimal use of the public facility), we are also interested in the distribution of the public resources among all agents. Hence, we consider variants of the El Farol Bar problem, to be distinguished from many early studies in which efficiency is the only concern. We ask whether self-coordinating solutions can exist in some variants of the El Farol Bar problem so that public resources can be optimally used with neither idle capacity nor congestion being incurred and, in the meantime, the resources can be well distributed among all agents. We consider this ideal situation an El Farol version of a “good society”. This paper shows the existence of a positive answer to this inquiry, but the variants involve two elements, which were largely left out in the conventional literature on the El Farol Bar problem. They are social networks and social preferences. We first show, through cellular automata, that social networks can contribute to the emergence of a “good society”. We then show that the addition of some inequity-averse agents can even guarantee the emergence of the “good society”.     

Testing the Efficacy of Replacing the Incurred Credit Loss Model with the Expected Credit Loss Model

Abstract

We use a controlled laboratory environment to provide evidence on the potential efficacy of the replacement of the Incurred Credit Loss (ICL) Model of International Accounting Standard (IAS 39) by the Expected Credit Loss (ECL) model of IFRS 9 to account for credit impairment losses. We focus on the simplified version of the ECL model using an uncertain production environment as the context. We induce incentives consistent with the existing rigid rule-based ICL model and the proposed forward-looking principle-based ECL model. Our primary finding is that the combined effects of eliminating the minimum ‘probable’ threshold condition together with allowing managers to incorporate forward-looking information increase both the amount and adequacy of periodic reserve decisions. In addition, we analyze the effects of increased flexibility under the new credit-loss model on earnings management using three different compensation schemes. We find that while the replacement of the ICL model with the ECL model facilitates higher reserves, the resulting increased earnings management varies across compensation schemes, is less than predicted, and does not offset the potential of the ECL model’s positive effects. The results provide ex ante evidence on the likely intended and unintended consequences of implementing the ECL model.     

Optimal information exchange in contests

We study optimal exchange of private information in a two-player all-pay auction contest with independent private binary values. A benevolent information center who is informed about the players’ values facilitates the exchange of information by disclosing a signal publicly. The informativeness of the signal determines the monotonicity of the unique symmetric equilibrium and the players’ expected payoff. We characterize the upper bound of players’ expected payoff and the corresponding optimal signals utilizing such a relation between the informativeness and the payoff. When the players are ex ante sufficiently heterogeneous, the optimal signals work through an information-rent channel by inducing allocative efficient contests. When the players are ex ante sufficiently homogeneous, the optimal signals work through an unlevel-playing-field channel by inducing asymmetric contests. In order to guarantee efficient allocation, a regulator can punish any exchange of information when the players are sufficiently homogeneous and impose no restrictions when they are sufficiently heterogeneous.     

Takings of development rights with asymmetric information and an endogenous probability of an externality

A game-theoretic model is used to analyze the interaction between the landowner and the government. In the benchmark model, efficiency can be reached when compensation is tied to the private value of developed land, which is contrary to much of the takings literature. Further, the level of compensation needed to create an efficient outcome with no over-development is derived. Next, two cases are considered: asymmetric information and an endogenous probability of an externality. First, the presence of the positive externality is revealed only to the landowner before the decision to develop early. In this case, if the landowner does not receive the full market compensation, then he or she has an incentive to eliminate the externality. In the second case, the model includes an endogenous probability of a positive externality occurring that depends on investment in conservation. For an efficient outcome to occur, the landowner should be compensated by the full amount of the positive externality. This compensation scheme aligns the incentives of the owner with society.     

Inference on an extended Roy model,with an application to schooling decisions in France

This paper considers the identification and estimation of an extension of Roy’s model (1951) of sectoral choice, which includes a non-pecuniary component in the selection equation and allows for uncertainty on potential earnings. We focus on the identification of the non-pecuniary component, which is key to disentangling the relative importance of monetary incentives versus preferences in the context of sorting across sectors. By making the most of the structure of the selection equation, we show that this component is point identified from the knowledge of the covariate effects on earnings, as soon as one covariate is continuous. Notably, and in contrast to most results on the identification of Roy models, this implies that identification can be achieved without any exclusion restriction nor large support condition on the covariates. As a by-product, bounds are obtained on the distribution of the ex ante   monetary returns. We propose a three-stage semiparametric estimation procedure for this model, which yields root-n$n$ consistent and asymptotically normal estimators. Finally, we apply our results to the educational context, by providing new evidence from French data that non-pecuniary factors are a key determinant of higher education attendance decisions.     

Potential efficiency effects of merging the Swedish district courts

The Swedish district courts have undergone a substantial restructuring process in which the main reform has been to merge. As a result, the number of district courts has declined from 95 in 2000 to only 48 in 2009. All main arguments that support merging concern enhancements of efficiency. However, it has not yet been explicitly examined whether the mergers have the potential to increase efficiency ex ante. Thus, the expectation concerning higher efficiency was built on a subjective view. This paper investigates whether the mergers can be rationalized from a production economic point of view. Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is used to compute a production frontier where the conducted mergers are incorporated to identify the potential ex ante gains. Furthermore, the overall potential is decomposed into learning, scale, and harmony to investigate the source of the potential gain, e.g., an effect of adjusting to best practice or a pure merging effect such as scale. The results show diverse potentials, i.e., a number of mergers did not have the potential to gain in efficiency while others could gain substantially. A conclusion based on the analysis is that the potential production economic effects should be investigated before merger decisions are made in the future. This is also likely to be true beyond the Swedish district courts.