Filter Tests of U.K. Share Prices

The purpose of this paper is to develop and test a model of the promotional expenditure decision for a firm operating under conditions of combined uncertainty and oligopoly. The uncertainty is assumed to exist in respect of the impact of any particular level of promotional expenditure upon the demand conditions facing the firm.

The analysis forms part of a wider study of advertising by confectionery manufacturers and arose largely as a result of conversations with advertising executives in the confectionery market. In the course of these discussions it became clear that the existing body of theory concerning the promotional expenditure decision is almost completely incapable of accommodating the extensive uncertainty which is an integral part of the promotional decision in a market such as that under consideration. It also became clear (at least in the case of the confectionery market) (a) that decision makers regard the pricing and promotional expenditure decisions as being largely independent and (b) that in a large number of cases decision makers think in terms of a minimum or ‘threshold’ level of promotional expenditure. While these factors are predominantly in the nature of impressionistic informal observations and therefore of doubtful validity as bases for a scientific enquiry, it was nonetheless felt worthwhile to attempt to develop a theoretical framework capable of accommodating them.

While exhibiting considerable indeterminacy, the model developed below at least takes explicit cognisance of risk and uncertainty. It is also formulated in such a way that the promotional and pricing decisions are independent. It is rather remarkable and most encouraging that the analysis appears to predict something closely akin to minimum ‘threshold’ levels of advertising expenditure. Our theoretical exercise might therefore be afforded the minimal justification of providing a framework capable of accommodating the various results of introspection and conversational empiricism.     

Optimal pricing when rational consumers anticipate monitoring cost

This article considers a monopolistic firm’s optimal pricing decision over two periods among dynamic pricing, preannounced pricing and single pricing. In the models, consumers rationally determine whether to exhibit strategic waiting by weighing their costs against prospectively lower price. Our analysis yields three main results. First, single pricing that completely eliminates strategic waiting surely would be dominated by intertemporal pricing when facing rational consumers. Second, preannounced pricing may actually yield lower revenue than dynamic pricing when considering its effect on the reduction of consumer monitoring cost. Only when monitoring costs under dynamic pricing and under preannounced pricing are equal, is firm revenue weakly greater under preannounced pricing than under dynamic pricing. Third, in dynamic pricing equilibrium, increasing monitoring cost may increase firm revenue, consumer surplus and social welfare simultaneously.     

Consumption Externalities,Coordination, and Advertising*

The aim of this article is to demonstrate that advertising can have an important function in markets with consumption externalities apart from its persuasive and informative roles. We show that advertising may function as a device to coordinate consumer expectations of the purchasing decisions of other consumers in markets with consumption externalities. The implications of advertising as a coordinating device are examined in the pricing and advertising decisions of firms interacting strategically. Although, at times, the one‐period advertising expense can exceed the one‐period monopoly profit, in equilibrium, consumers will pay a premium for the more heavily advertised brand.     

A laboratory study of advertising and price competition

We use a laboratory experiment to study advertising and pricing behavior in a market where consumers differ in price sensitivity. Equilibrium in this market entails variation in the number of firms advertising and price dispersion in advertised prices. We vary the cost to advertise as well as varying the number of competing firms. Theory predicts that advertising costs act as a facilitating device: higher costs increase firm profits at the expense of consumers. We find that higher advertising costs decrease demand for advertising and raise advertised prices, as predicted. Further, this comes at the expense of consumers. However, advertising strategies are more aggressive than theory predicts with the result that firm profits do not increase.     

Manufacturer's pricing strategy in a two-level supply chain with competing retailers and advertising cost dependent demand

The paper studies a two-echelon supply chain comprising one manufacturer and two competing retailers with advertising cost dependent demand. The manufacturer acts as the Stackelberg leader who specifies wholesale price for each retailer. The two retailers compete with each other in advertising and they have different sales costs. The manufacturer uses one of the following two pricing strategies: (i) setting the same wholesale price for both the retailers irrespective of the difference in their sales costs; (ii) setting different wholesale prices for the retailers depending on their sales costs. Two models are developed. In the first model, the manufacturer shares a fraction of each retailer's advertising cost while in the second model, the manufacturer does not share any retailer's advertising expenses. In both the models, we derive the retailers' and manufacturer's optimal strategies. A numerical example is given to illustrate the theoretical results developed in each model. Computational results show that it is always beneficial for the manufacturer to adopt different wholesale pricing strategy for the retailers.     

Endogenous direct advertising and price competition

This paper analyzes how the use of endogenous direct advertising affects the functioning of a horizontally-differentiated market. We formulate a two-stage game of pricing and informative advertising in which two firms, first, compete with mass advertising and, later, build a database using their historical sales records and compete by directly targeting the ads on their potential customers. We show that, compared to the case where firms only use mass advertising, direct advertising yields higher advertising efforts and an intertemporal reallocation of both market power and profits from the first to the second period. We also find that targeting increases the overall firms’ profit and the level of social welfare, but the impact on the average intertemporal price and consumer surplus is ambiguous. Finally, when reaching the potential market with mass advertising is sufficiently expensive, the use of direct advertising leads firms to provide the socially optimal level of advertising whereas, if mass advertising is cheap, firms tend to launch too little advertising in the first period and too much in the second.     

Foreign direct investment,input prices,and host country welfare

This paper analyzes a multinational firm’s foreign direct investment decision, through either greenfield investment or cross‐border merger and acquisition, into a host country with an input monopoly that adopts either uniform pricing or discriminatory pricing. The optimal foreign entry mode could differ under each pricing policy. Under Cournot competition, firms’ technological gap and the initial local market structure are critical to the choice of foreign entry mode, whereas product substitutability is important under Bertrand competition. In the presence of foreign entry, this paper also examines the welfare effects of input price discrimination for the host country.     

How do advertised brands benefit from private labels? An application of rational expectations models

Private labels have traditionally been viewed as a threat to advertised brands. Contrary to traditional wisdom, this study uses a two-asset rational expectations model to show that advertised brands could benefit from private labels. While the manufacturer’s advertising creates product differentiation, the retailer’s synchronous pricing strategy further enhances the product differentiation and raises profits as well as the efficiency of price discounts for the advertised brand. In addition, the existence of private labels improves the advertising efficiency, especially for newly introduced brands. The economic role of private labels is not limited to taking a free ride on the manufacturer’s advertising efforts, and this role cannot be replaced by another advertised brand.     

Robust monopoly pricing

We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information. In the robust version, the seller faces model uncertainty and only knows that the true demand distribution is in the neighborhood of a given model distribution. We characterize the pricing policies under two distinct decision criteria with multiple priors: (i) maximin utility and (ii) minimax regret. The equilibrium price under either criterion is lower then in the absence of uncertainty. The concern for robustness leads the seller to concede a larger information rent to all buyers with values below the optimal price without uncertainty.     

Informative advertising by an environmental group

Consuming a product does not (necessarily) reveal the environmental damage it may cause. In terms of environmental damage, most goods are credence goods. Therefore, advertising and pricing rarely can transmit such information effectively to consumers. This article considers the scope with which an environmental group (EG) can signal this information to consumers via advertising and campaigning. Although an EG can inform the public, the welfare effects are ambiguous. Therefore, the EG may not have an incentive to acquire information about the firm’s production practices. However, when the firm chooses the level of environmental damage and the EG chooses whether to acquire information, there exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium for some parameter values, such that the EG acquires information, and the threat of advertising causes the firm to produce an environmentally friendly good.     

Strategic Trade Policy and Vertical Structure

We introduce intermediaries into the Brander-Spencer model of strategic trade policy. A key finding is that in regimes involving independent retailers, output competition and linear pricing (and two-part tariffs under certain restrictions), the optimal policy involves an export tax instead of a subsidy. If firms commit to vertical structure before governments commit to policy then under output competition firms choose integration, whereas if policy precedes structure then at least one firm chooses separation. Under price competition separation is a dominant strategy regardless of whether the structure decision is made before or after the policy decision.     

Transition probabilities in a problem of stochastic process switching

Extant solutions for state-contingent process switching use first-passage time densities or differential equations. We alternatively employ transition probabilities. These conditional likelihood functions also have obvious appeal for econometric analyses as well as derivative pricing and decision making under absorption and extinction.     

TV advertising spillovers and demand for private labels: the case of carbonated soft drinks

The expansion of private labels, or store brands, has transformed consumer choice sets and competition in retail markets, prompting manufacturers to fight back with renewed pricing and product and promotion strategies to forestall further private label expansion. This article examines the spillover effects of television advertising on brand-level consumer demand for carbonated soft drinks (CSDs), including private labels, using a random coefficients logit model with household purchasing and advertising viewing Nielsen data. As in previous work, we find that although brand spillover effects significantly increase demand for CSD brands in the same company and undermine demand facing other manufacturers’ CSD brands, surprisingly, there are positive spillover effects on the demand for private label brands. This indicates that brand advertising is persuasive with respect to manufacturers’ brands but complementary with respect to private labels. Further results show that eliminating television advertising for CSDs would lower aggregate CSD sales as consumers migrate to other beverages, although private labels stand to gain, particularly Wal-Mart brands.     

Program Quality Competition in Broadcasting Markets

This paper develops a duopoly model where broadcasters first choose their program quality and then their pricing strategy. Two alternative financing schemes are considered: pay‐TV and free‐to‐air. We find that, from a welfare perspective, a pay‐TV regime always generates inadequate quality and advertising, whereas free‐to‐air might produce excessive quality and advertising. In the case of asymmetric competition, a pay‐TV broadcaster always has a stronger incentive to conduct research and development than a free‐to‐air broadcaster does. Both platforms could either over‐ or underinvest. The pay‐TV broadcaster always shows too few advertisements, but the free‐to‐air media might act in the opposite manner.     

职位定价中的决策困境与策略选择

职位定价的两种方法——职位评估与市场定价之间经常地存在不一致和冲突,因而企业薪酬决策中面临着两难选择的决策困境和潜在风险。分析了市场定价与职位评估这两种方法的理论基础和冲突的根源,比较了两种方法对不同职位定价所产生的薪酬效应,在此基础上提出了解决职位定价决策困境的基本思路,认为应该在薪酬决策之前进行战略分析和价值链分析,并针对不同的职位采取不同的策略。     

供货频次和需求配比视角下的供应链最优价格决策

以供货频次和需求配比为视角,构建了一个供应链动态博弈模型,研究了在需求方为先决策者和供应方为先决策者两种情形下供应链系统的最优价格决策机制,分别给出了两种情形下的最优价格决策方案,指出产品是最优价格决策中的根本性影响因素。     

品牌效应与债务融资双重影响下的广告竞争行为

本文以广告投入较多的制造业与房地产业为研究对象,选取该行业上市公司2004—2007年的数据,实证分析品牌效应、债务融资双重影响下的企业广告竞争行为。研究结果表明:就强品牌企业而言,债务融资对产品市场具有软承诺作用;而在弱品牌企业中,债务融资表现为对产品市场的硬承诺作用。此外,不论强品牌企业的广告竞争策略存在与否,弱品牌企业的广告投资策略均不受影响。     

Maximizing votes under imperfect information

This paper presents an alternative, sympathy voting, to the usual public choice approaches. It deals with voters whose decision depends both on an economic component and a sympathy component. The politician is perfectly informed of the economic component, but not of the sympathy component. The paper compares vote maximization under sympathy voting to the maximization of votes which come from pure homines oeconomici. Sympathy voting is defined in such a way that pure economic voting is its limiting case. The latter property can be used to apply the classical Lagrangean technique to maximizing votes under economic voting. The approach is applied to two typical examples of political choice: the property tax/local public expenditure decision, and public pricing of local public utilities.     

双边市场、不完全信息与二级价格歧视

本文研究了双边市场二级价格歧视问题。本文构建了包括广告商、消费者、垄断平台在内的两阶段博弈模型，研究了在最优与次优情况下平台的定价机制，分析了二级价格歧视对平台利润、社会福利等的影响。研究表明：（1）“顶部无扭曲”或“底部无扭曲”并不严格成立；（2）平台对观众提供的节目质量、广告插播量均可能出现类型逆转的情况；（3）二级价格歧视会增加社会总福利；（4）“会员制”是平台可能的占优定价机制之一。     

Bundling, product choice, and efficiency: Should cable television networks be offered à la carte?

We conduct a numerical analysis of bundling’s impact on a monopolist’s pricing and product choices and assess the implications for consumer welfare in cable television markets. Existing theory is ambiguous: for a given set of products, bundling likely transfers surplus from consumers to firms but also encourages products to be offered that might not be under à la carte pricing. Simulation of “Full À La Carte” for an economic environment calibrated to an average cable television system suggests that consumers would likely benefit from à la carte sales. If all networks continued to be offered, the average household’s surplus is predicted to increase by $6.80 (65.6%) under à la carte sales (despite a total bundle price that almost doubles) and reduced network profits would have to be such that 41 of 50 offered cable networks have to exit the market to make her indifferent. Simulation of a “Theme Tier” scenario provides intermediate benefits. The incremental marginal costs to cable systems of à la carte sales and its impact in the advertising market and on competition are important factors in determining consumer benefits.